The distinctive feature that marks the battleship is the supposed ability to receive as well as give hard knocks, or in other words, defensive armor of such thickness and so arranged as to keep out the shells of an enemy. The question of whether the battleship is merely the survival of an idea, and is no longer a utility, has been confused by the consideration of new weapons of offense, the torpedo, the mine, the airplane bomb; but we may dismiss these weapons from consideration and consider the gun only.
In the eighties and nineties, the main topic of naval discussion was the struggle between the armor and the gun. We had compound armor, then Harveyized and Krupp armor; the steel shell, then the capped shell. But after the introduction of a new powder that was a chemical compound instead of a mechanical mixture, the armor versus gun discussion faded away, leaving the gun victor. That the victory was complete is shown in the increase of battle ranges from ten to twenty-five thousand yards.
Conservatism is natural in any permanent organization, and is fostered by selection, which discourages methods and thoughts that are alien to the methods and thoughts of the older and hence more conservative officers.
The Navy adopted with resistance the Fiske telescopic sight, the Sims method of target practice, Poundstone’s suggestion of the all-big-gun ship, and it clung until recently to the ram bow.
At the battle of Lissa, the Austrian attack was bold, the Italian gunfire was inefficient, and though several attempts were made, only one Austrian ship successfully rammed an Italian. Yet from that inconclusive data ram bows were installed on cruisers and battleships, and were given up long after the destructive effect of gunfire made it impossible for a ship to ram, as well as inexpedient, for ships could be sunk by gunfire without risk to the hull of your ship by ramming.
For a long period we equipped cruisers and battleships with torpedoes, and only escaped the torpedo-net equipment because we had no battleships at the time that torpedo nets were considered necessary.
Although the increased accuracy and destructive effect of gunfire, and the increased battle ranges, finally led to the abandonment of ram bows and torpedo tubes on battleships, we have never logically considered the effect of these factors on armor. Perhaps it is because of a deeply rooted instinct such as is expressed in the saying that a drowning man will clutch at a straw.
As long as battle ranges were short enough to allow a flat trajectory, a side armor belt nine to fourteen feet wide and turret protection were considered sufficient to keep out direct hits, but with the new battle ranges, flat trajectories are no longer possible, and the angle of descent of the projectile exposes the decks of battleships to a direct hit. But an increase in the thickness of the armored deck involves widths of ninety feet instead of fourteen feet, and we are forced to increase the percentage of displacement weights allotted to armor.
In the assignment of displacement weights, about 50 per cent was allotted to passive defense, and armor protection was the most expensive of construction costs. The outer skin of a vessel is an area of the second degree, whereas the cubical contents are of the third degree, so in order to secure displacement for guns, ammunition, engines, and fuel, the size of battleships was constantly increased, which involved extra costs in harbor depths and dry docks. This simple remedy is no longer available with a limited displacement, and we have come to an impasse.
Increase in battle ranges makes necessary increase in thickness of protective deck, and an increase in the percentage allowed for protection.
If we accept this, and our ships have protection at great ranges, and the enemy has not, we naturally select great ranges in action. But to select our ranges means we must have superior speed, and hence must allow a greater percentage of weight to engines.
To insure destructive effect at great ranges our guns must be of great caliber and weight.
Since accuracy of gunfire decreases with great ranges and a curved trajectory, we must increase the weights allotted to ammunition.
As we lack naval bases, our weights allotted to fuel cannot be decreased.
With a fixed displacement, I defy American ingenuity to solve this problem, unless like Columbus with the egg, we cut off something, and we must free ourselves of this fetish “armor.”
In 1915 I wrote Admiral Plunkett, then inspector of target practice, advocating smaller battleship units, no armor, great maneuvering qualities, and the adoption of “dodging” the enemy shell, but the reply was that changes of course disturbed the aim of our guns, although I understand that the fleet has since adopted this principle.
Removing armor and gun turrets lessens weights in the hull framing, and allows unlimited angles of gun elevation, gyroscopic gun platforms, and increased length of guns.
The battleship is spoken of as the “backbone of the fleet,” but what vertebrate animal uses its backbone for offense or defense?
The simile is apt, however, if we consider the formation of the Grand Fleet with the husky dogs of war in the rear, protected by a screen of scouts, torpedo-boat destroyers, submarines, and airplanes.
And if contact is made with the enemy fleet, the airplanes and submarines remain at the front to win command of the air and underwater, then push through to attack the enemy battleships, before our battleships advance.
What quirk of mind is it that dwells on safety for the personnel of the battleship, but pays no attention to the personnel of the cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and airplanes.
Lieutenant Percival in the August Proceedings emphasizes as important, protecting with armor the crews of rapid-fire guns, because they may be attacked by airplanes, vulnerable to rifle fire.
Battle at sea cannot be made safe, nor is morale improved by seeking shelter. The Great War was at a stalemate because of shelter in trenches, and the war was not won by armored tanks, but by the resumption of open fighting by the infantry after a preliminary barrage of artillery fire.