The line of demarcation between Army and Navy effort in joint coastal operations was definite prior to the advent of aircraft. Functions involving sea operations were inherently naval while those involving land operations were, by the same tokens, inherently army, and the coast was always there as a tangible dividing line. Airplanes, however, are capable to a certain extent of operating over either element and herein lies the possible source of much confusion in joint operations, resulting in the possible creation of a “twilight zone” of divided or overlapping authority and responsibility.
At present the Navy operates patrol and scouting aircraft from shore in connection with the protection of sea lanes. The Army operates aircraft from shore bases for all other purposes. Airships, in the following discussion, will not be considered, for it is now recognized that, so far as operations over the sea are concerned, they are a part of the fleet, although they operate from shore stations in a manner similar to the surface vessel.
It is believed that the only real controversy between the Army and Navy concerning air components is over bombardment and pursuit aircraft to be used in defending this country against an enemy approaching over the sea. The question is: who is to provide and control the bombing and pursuit aircraft that will operate from land bases and fly out over the sea to the limits of their cruising radius? If this point is definitely settled, there will be no further controversy.
The following extract is from the hearings which took place before the Lamport Committee:
Major General Patrick: “Once the decision is made to place upon the air corps the development and utilization of air power as a primary function, there should follow immediately a solution of the vexing problem of air coast defense. The pro and con of propriety of assigning this function to either the army air service or the naval air service has been studied and discussed at length. Without entering into discussion of the ways and means at present provided to solve this problem, the plain fact remains that there is an undeniable duplication of coastal air facilities in the United States and in its possessions. The creation of an air corps primarily as an air-going combat unit should remove this question from a consideration of whether the air service of the Army or the air service of the Navy should be charged with operations in this “twilight zone” which includes the water area within reach of air operations conducted from land bases. I have no hesitation in saying that the assignment to the air corps of all air coast defense functions which can be performed from land bases (the limit to be taken at about 200 miles under the present state of aircraft development) will be one of the most important and immediate economies, and one of the greatest gains to efficient national defense which will result from the formation of the air corps.”
Mr. Faust: “It is your opinion, I gather, that this coastal defense belongs rather to the Army than to the Navy.”
Major General Patrick: “I think beyond question that the Army air components, no matter how it may be constituted, whether as at present a part of the War Department, or whether it be established as an air corps, can and should undertake the air defense of our coasts.”
I have quoted Major General Patrick in order to give the opinion expressed by the Chief of the Air Corps at that time, and which is still the opinion of a great many members of the Air Corps, as well as other air enthusiasts.
The coast defense is now under the control of the Army. Aircraft may be called “bullets with wings.” The Army claim of having control of aircraft operating from shore bases for offshore purposes, other than for the protection of our sea lanes, is based on the fact that they now have charge of the coast defense and, therefore, they should have aircraft which increase the range of their guns from yards to miles. This claim at first may seem to be justified but no conclusion should be drawn until investigation has been made as to the type of planes most suitable to perform this function and the personnel required to operate them. The claim that the Army should be responsible for the area 200 miles or any other number of miles from the coast merely shifts the “twilight zone” so many miles seaward. With increased range of aircraft this zone shifts farther and farther from shore and over the high seas until it reaches the point of absurdity. In an emergency who would be in command and who would be responsible in this zone when this new weapon is to be used? The last war again demonstrated the importance of unity of command, but it took months before it was accomplished. If one organization is responsible the chance of success is increased. If a change in responsibility is necessary, it should be made where it will do the least harm; that is, as far as possible from the first line of defense where it is most essential that command be unified.
The fact that the Navy is permitted to have aircraft operating from shore stations for protection of the sea lanes is not questioned. It is recognized that for the Navy to carry out this important function it must have all the facilities under one command. The responsibility with the necessary authority must be lodged in a single organization.
To obtain a logical solution it seems to be self-evident that an analysis should be made of the types of aircraft that are best suited for operating from shore stations over the water, and the type of personnel required for operating these types. The country demands most efficient material and personnel at least expense. After we have determined the kind of material and its operating personnel, we can then determine the type of organization, bearing in mind that unity of command is of vital importance and that responsibility and authority must go hand in hand. With the proper organization duplication of effort will be minimized with resulting economy.
The following are the general uses of aircraft operating from shore stations: To assist in (1) maintaining sea lanes; and (2) defeating enemy attack from beyond our coast line. The part that aircraft can play in this will, to a great extent, depend upon effective range. The greater the range of our aircraft, the greater is the distance that our offshore offensive can be started, and the greater distance at which our sea lanes can be protected by aircraft. Greater range, therefore, gives greater protection.
The first problem is truly a naval problem and there is no controversy.
Under the second problem, the controversy still rages. To defeat effectively aircraft attack from the sea you must destroy the enemy bases and, if possible, before the first attack is launched. Such an attack once launched is difficult to find and destroy since aircraft can operate in three dimensions and attack may come from any direction. This is especially so for night attack. Even assuming that an attack is launched, it is almost as essential to destroy the bases. The aircraft attack is then at end except for the first flight.
Therefore, to protect our shore line we should destroy the enemy aircraft floating bases as far as possible from our coast line. If the aircraft operating from shore can destroy the enemy aircraft carriers offshore at a distance greater than the range of the enemy aircraft operating from carrier or floating bases, the conclusion is that no enemy aircraft can attack our coast. Let us consider what type of plane is best qualified for this long-range offense. In this discussion it is, of course, assumed that the fleet and all carriers are otherwise occupied; in other words, that this is purely a coast defense problem.
Contrary to the general opinion which has been expressed in former hearings on this subject, the flying boat is a most efficient load-carrying machine; in fact, it is now generally accepted as more efficient; i.e., it has a greater percentage of useful load than the landplane of the same gross load, and the greater the size of the plane the greater the load-carrying efficiency. The reason for this is that the flying boat has a greater allowable take-off and landing speed, since it operates from and to an unlimited aerodrome, and hence has a greater allowable loading. To be specific, patrol planes now in use by the Navy are capable of carrying two 1,000- pound bombs 1,000 miles and return under service conditions.
Since the flying boat operates over water it is safe in the event of a forced landing, whereas the landplane will sink in a short period of time, if not immediately. Under certain conditions, if repairs can be made, the flying boat can again take off. Such long-range bombing and scouting coast defense problems as described above should be carried out in peace time for practice, and in connection therewith the American people demand that danger to our operating personnel be reduced to a minimum. By the use of the flying boat this object is gained in time of war as well as in time of peace, and with the same type planes. Moreover, the flying boat can be developed into an aircraft carrier capable of carrying a complement of fighting planes, thus increasing by several hundred per cent the effective range of present fighting aircraft for the purpose of gaining control of the air and defense of bombing attack. After launching the fighting aircraft from the flying boat carrier, the latter can perform patrol functions and, if neccessary, can later pick up the pilots from the fighting planes when they have executed their mission. As a possible alternative to the above, large flying boats can be used for the purpose of accompanying and refueling fighting planes taking off from land bases. However, the impression must not be gained that the above operation is confined to aircraft, for the attack will be conducted by aircraft, surface craft, and sub-surface craft simultaneously. As previously mentioned, in order for this attack to be successful it must be coordinated under one command and it should be noted that all the types of vessels and aircraft used are the same as now used or contemplated for regular naval operation.
If enemy aircraft and ships evade, wholly or in part, the first line of defense as described above, and get in closer to the coast, a supplementary line of defense can be established by small, light, fast airplanes of the fighting and light bombing class operated from shore bases. The attack of these aircraft must, of course, be coordinated with the pursuit from that part of the first line of defense which remains and with surface and sub-surface craft against enemy surface craft as well as aircraft. It should be clear that there must be no shift of command or responsibility between these two phases of the defense. The “twilight zone” must be pushed back to the shore line where it will do the least harm.
Since the first and by far the most important action in coast defense is to be over water, and since the attack is principally against surface craft (attacking enemy aircraft being of secondary importance, and not necessary if we destroy the enemy aircraft carriers far out at sea), we require personnel who are also familiar with ships and who are experienced in seamanship, as well as trained aviators. It is evident that the type of personnel required is naval personnel.
Since the Navy must have aircraft for use in connection with the protection of the sea lanes, and since these types of airplanes can, in general, be the same as the types required for fleet work, it seems that, from the standpoints of effective organization, unity of command, and prevention of duplication, there is only one logical solution: to place all aerial coast defense under one control, and that is the Navy.
Therefore, the line of demarcation between the activities of the Army and Navy should not be at sea but at least at the shore line, as it was before the advent of aircraft. If the Navy is given the responsibility and authority necessary to the protection of our coast by the operation of aircraft from shore bases, we will have unity of command and no enemy will gain a foothold on our soil.
Coast Defense
Let us consider this problem in the following manner:
- What is to be done? Protect our coast line from air attack.
- How is this to be done? By destroying the enemy aircraft carriers at sea at a distance greater than the enemy aircraft can launch their attack against our coast.
- Where is the attack to be made? At sea.
- What means are necessary—material and personnel? Since the attack is primarily against aircraft carriers, the most efficient long-range aircraft, and personnel who are familiar with ships and who have a knowledge of seamanship are necessary. The most efficient ship is the flying boat for long range and the most efficient pursuit type of aircraft is that which can drop its landing gear.
- How is it best to accomplish the above? It is self-evident that the Navy can best perform this mission.