The Cause of Battery Explosions
(Sec page 629, July, 1930, Proceedings)
Lieutenant W. J. Holmes, U. S. Navy. —It is believed that the researches of Lieutenant Guthrie and the Naval Research Laboratory have made a valuable contribution to the knowledge of the cause of battery explosions. All submarine battery ventilation systems are designed to keep the hydrogen concentration well below the explosive mixture, even in the event that all the energy input to the battery, at the finishing rate of charge, is being consumed in disassociation of water. However; ventilation systems sometimes fail to operate and in such cases, at critical moments, the hydrogen percentage in the ventilation system may build up to the danger limit in an extremely short period of time. Any success in removing the second element necessary for an explosion, that is, the presence of a spark, will therefore materially reduce the hazard of battery explosions.
With the facts established under “summary” we are fully in accord and the method of investigation at Bellevue is undoubtedly free from errors. With the discussion of ground recording instruments on submarines, however, we do not agree. Also Lieutenant Guthrie’s discussion of ventilation systems does not include the newer “V” type submarine systems. On some of these vessels the installation presents an entirely different problem in the measurement of grounds. To keep to the limits of the original article these vessels must be excluded from the present discussion.
It may seem beside the point to confine a discussion to a difference of opinion in method when we entirely agree as to conclusions. It is felt, however, that these researches will soon lead to new and more stringent regulations as to grounds on submarines, and in such an event we should examine closely everything that has to do with grounds and their measurements.
The peculiar construction and employment of a submarine presents the usual problem of grounds in an acute form. The majority of these occur on the lighting and power circuits due to sweating, oil, dirt, and moisture; and except for furnishing a return path, may be excluded from a discussion of battery grounds. They may not, however, be disregarded in measuring battery grounds unless special care is taken to prevent them from intruding.
The usual ground detector consists of a voltmeter, one side of which is grounded and the other side of which is connected through a selective switch to one leg of the circuit to be tested. The voltmeter usually has an internal resistance of about one hundred ohms per volt. Used in this manner the voltmeter becomes an instrument for measuring the resistance of a path to the ground and the reading of such a voltmeter is a function of the resistance of the voltmeter, the resistance of the path to the ground, and the voltage impressed. A full discussion of such a ground detector will be found in Bullard, Vol. I, page 503. It is evident that if one is fully acquainted with the voltmeter in use and the impressed voltage remains reasonably constant, we may speak of grounds in terms of volts. On a submarine and especially in battery work the voltage impressed cannot be regarded as a constant.
The first disturbing factor is the double voltage system, that is, the batteries may be either in series or in parallel. To illustrate my point: ground the forward battery positive, and observe the readings obtained with the circuit breakers in various positions.
The readings will vary in accordance with the condition of the battery as to charge or discharge but, assuming the battery to be idle, something like the following readings will be obtained:
Dead ground | on forward battery positive | |||
| F.B. | F.B. | A.B. A.B. |
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Breakers out | Pos. | Neg. | Pos. Neg. |
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Battery idle | 120 | 0 | 0 0 |
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Breakers in |
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parallel Battery idle | 120 | 0 | 120 0 |
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Breakers in |
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series |
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Battery idle | 120 | 0 | 240 —120 |
|
If the ground is on some intermediate cell of the battery, say on cell #30 entirely different readings will be obtained.
Dead ground | on cell #30 |
| ||
| F.B. | F.B. | A.B. | A.B. |
Breakers out | Pos. | Neg. | Pos. | Neg. |
Battery idle | 60 | 60 | 0 | 0 |
Breakers in |
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|
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parallel Battery idle | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 |
Breakers in |
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series |
|
|
|
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Battery idle | 60 | 60 | 180 | —60 |
To see why the ground detector behaves in this way it is only necessary to draw a sketch of the ground detector system and trace the circuits for each breaker position.
It is very evident that when we speak of grounds on a submarine in terms of volts we must agree as to the position of the circuit breakers. If we are dealing with battery grounds we are faced with another problem, for, of course, the source of E.M.F. is not concentrated and the ground may exist on any cell. Thus a ground of 10,000 ohms resistance on cell #60 (the end cell) will give a reading on the ground detector of sixty volts and zero volts on the forward battery positive and negative respectively, whereas the same ground on cell #30 (mid-cell) will give readings of thirty volts on both the positive and negative.
If more than one ground exists on the battery in question the prediction of the ground detector readings is not so simple. Without going into the details of the solution of this problem, although it presents a very nice exercise for one interested in the setting up and solution of simultaneous equations arising from the application of Kirchhoff’s laws, it may be proved that for any number of parallel battery grounds:
when
Rg = total resistance of path to the ground.
Rv — Resistance of the voltmeter in use.
dp = Voltmeter deflection when measuring the ground to positive.
dn = Voltmeter deflection when measuring the ground to negative.
With these preliminary considerations we may proceed to examine in detail Lieutenant Guthrie’s arrangement for measuring the ventilation system ground. The first point to be brought out is that an electrical path must exist from the plates or bus bars of the adjacent cell to the voltmeter terminal in the rubber nipple in order for the voltmeter to register. In attempting to complete the other side of the circuit, however, we are immediately struck by the fact that the grounded side of the voltmeter is, electrically speaking, dangling in mid-air. To complete the circuit another ground must exist, either on another cell in the battery or on one of the circuits connected thereto, and the voltmeter deflection is as much a function of the resistance and position of this ground as it is of the resistance of the moisture path from the cell to the rubber nipple.
If the ungrounded lead is moved from one cell to another we will find the voltmeter deflection increasing or decreasing by increments of about two volts depending upon whether we are approaching or receding from the second ground. Finally if the connection is made to the grounded cell, or the cell to which the grounded circuit is connected, the reading will be zero. Indeed a grounded portable voltmeter is sometimes used at the individual cell switchboard to locate a grounded cell. If one side of a voltmeter is grounded and a lead taken from the other side to the various points on the cell switchboard the cell at which the voltmeter deflection is zero may be taken as the grounded cell, provided that only one ground exists. From this cell the voltmeter will give positive deflections if the lead is moved in one direction and negative if moved in the other direction from the cell. It must be pointed out that with more than one ground the reversal and zero reading will take place at the electrical mean of the grounds and therefore more than one ground cannot be definitely located by this means.
Thus the voltmeter readings found by Lieutenant Guthrie’s method may be almost without meaning. In attempting to eliminate the effect of grounds along the cell tops we have only emphasized these grounds or some other grounds on connected circuits.
The regular ship’s ground detector is by far a better instrument for measuring the resistance of the acid film ground. Care must be taken, however, that any external circuits connected to the battery are free from grounds and the best plan is to have the battery under consideration entirely on open circuit while measuring the grounds. This will not eliminate the grounds over the tops and along the sides of the cells but with a reasonably clean battery, and no cracked jars, these grounds should be negligible, usually in the neighborhood of 200,000 to 400,000 ohms. In any event no method of measuring the grounds can eliminate from consideration any ground on the battery or the circuits connected thereto. They can only be eliminated by mathematical computation of the individual resistance or by their mechanical removal.
The choice of the term “ground” and the decision to use a grounded voltmeter for measurement is unfortunate. It immediately leads to conjecture that if we can keep the battery free from grounds we are out of danger. This is not the case. Consider the fact that cells #1 and #30 are immediately adjacent, with their ventilation leads coming into the same duct a short distance apart. A very short acid film therefore will form a short circuit between these cells and such a short circuit will have a voltage of from sixty to seventy-five volts impressed. There is no ground here and no deflection will be shown by any grounded voltmeter. It is admitted, however, that only a short film path is necessary to ground any of the end cells and that the full battery voltage/may be impressed across this short path.
In “Experiment Five” it was stated that the voltmeter deflection could be used as an index of the current flowing in the acid film. This may be accepted for the experiments as conducted but it cannot be accepted when we move the problem aboard a submarine. If we have a ground of 10,000 ohms resistance on the end cell of a battery, the ground detector will show approximately sixty volts and if necessary return ground is on the other side of the line, the maximum current flowing will be 0.012 amperes. With the same voltmeter deflection of sixty volts, if the ground is on the mid-cell of the battery the resistance would be zero and any other ground would cause a theoretically infinite current to flow.
From the above considerations we conclude that no system of ground detector can give us a certain indication of the possible danger from sparking due to a current- carrying acid film in ventilation ducts. In view of this, the existing regulations in the Bureau of Engineering Manual concerning grounds are sufficient and adequate.
The article does not state what steps are under consideration for the elimination of the conditions described. Considerable experimenting has been done, however, as to the effect of increasing the number of baffles in the exhaust from the cells, with a view to preventing the carrying over of particles of electrolyte into the ventilation duct. These experiments give promise of some relief. If the moisture in the vent duct arrived there only by carrying over particles of electrolyte it would be possible to almost completely prevent the formation of the film by an efficient baffling system. It is very doubtful, however, that such is the case. During a charge the battery is almost always hotter than the compartment in which it is situated. Also during gassing the space over the electrolyte becomes a very efficient spray chamber. In passing through this space, therefore, the temperature of the air is raised and it becomes saturated with water vapor. Subsequently in passing through the ventilation system the temperature of the air drops below the dew point with consequent deposition of the moisture. Water may frequently be found dropping from the ventilating ducts and such water is usually found to be very low in acid content, showing that it has been deposited there by the processes of evaporation and condensation.
Now the problem of reducing the evaporation is bound up with the question of battery temperatures. Each pound of water so evaporated removes about 960 B.T.U.’s from the cell and reduction of evaporation means increase of temperature. In many installations temperature is already too high for battery longevity. It would seem therefore that the most promising line of attack might be in the refrigeration of battery ventilation or the artificial cooling of the battery. Such systems are now found on some foreign submarines.
Naval Policy at the Crossroads
(See page 269, April, 1930, Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander L. Doughty, Jr., U. S. Navy.—It is surprising to find in the Naval Institute, and in the Prize Essay at that, a passage as follows:
When the United States has been at war she has never stood for the complete freedom of the seas as defined by her at times when she was neutral. We recognized the effectiveness of sea power in the last war, after we entered it, by assisting in as strict a blockade as it was possible to enforce. Observe the Civil War and the curtailment of provisions and supplies that finally bore fruit in bringing Lee’s half-starved army to terms. The blockade of Cuba was one of the first operations of the Spanish-American War. We remember the most drastic, effective blockade ever maintained with a great fleet, that of the British Navy in the World War. This blockade was later augmented by a squadron of American battleships.
This embarrassing fiction was first given to the world in 1923 in Hendrick’s Life and Letters of Walter H. Page, Vol. II, page 266. It was at once seized upon by British apologists, both in England and America, and has been repeated so often, and with such apparent authority, that it has gained general credence, even among naval officers. It is, however, categorically untrue, and it seems pertinent to examine the basis of this charge. For a clear understanding of the matter it is necessary to go into some detail as to the nature of the blockade of Germany during the World War.
No blockade, in the commonly accepted sense of the word in international law, was ever established. Prior to the entrance of America into the war, the commercial isolation of Germany was achieved by England by two means:
By conferring some of the legal rights of a blockading squadron to a squadron which was not blockading the enemy’s coast and harbors.
By a vast system of economic measures to prevent the entry of supplies into Germany, including restriction on exports, trade agreements, rationing of border neutrals, purchase of their surplus products, bunker control, black lists, angary, and requisition.
It was the economic pressure which effectively throttled Germany, but it must be borne in mind that these measures were only put into effect by the threat of naval pressure. The actual seizures made by the Tenth Cruiser Squadron were comparatively few, but the fact that Britain had the power to put the Orders in Council into effect, and would rigorously enforce them if necessary, induced the neutrals to accept the restrictions.
Now the significant point is that when we entered the war we cooperated with Britain in the economic measures, but not in the naval features of the blockade. There is not a single instance of any neutral cargo being seized at sea by the U. S. Navy during the war. The right of visit and search was exercised freely by us, in accordance with international law, but this activity was directed entirely at suspected enemy raiders. The only merchant vessel captured by the U. S. Navy was the gas schooner Alexander Agassis, American owned, suspected of being outfitted as a German raider, which was captured by the U.S.S. Vicksburg off Mazatlan, Mexico, on March 17, 1918, and was later released by the U. S. Prize Court.
This exercise of economic pressure can in no way be confused with the question of the freedom of the seas. The legality of these measures was exhaustively debated and affirmed by the House of Representatives. The conclusion reached was that in war any government has the right to prevent the national resources from directly or indirectly assisting the enemy, which means in plain language that they can use their economic strength for driving special bargains.
What the United States had objected to prior to our entrance into the war, was not the exercise of these purely domestic rights by England but to the use of naval power to put them into effect. Since the U. S. Navy was not used for this purpose after we entered the war it is difficult to see how any accusation of inconsistency can be made. The mention of the American battleships which joined the Grand Fleet is simply meaningless. These ships had no possible connection with restrictions on neutral shipping.
It is true that we protested against the British Black Lists, which we later adopted when a belligerent, but the protest was based on comity rather than right, and the legality of the measure was not questioned. In any case this was a purely domestic matter and not related to the freedom of the seas.
Going back further into this question we come to the Spanish-American War. The United States exercised the usual belligerent rights of blockade, visit and search, etc., with scrupulous regard for international law, and I know of no altercations with neutrals over the exercise of these rights.
Coming to the Civil War, the United States established an effective blockade of the Confederate ports, in accordance with international law. The doctrine of continuous voyage was extended somewhat to prevent blockade running, but the legality of these measures was not questioned by the neutral governments.
The United States has been the traditional upholder of the rights of neutrals at sea in time of war, and on occasion it has gone to war for this principle. In all its wars this government has freely exercised the recognized rights of a belligerent in restricting neutral commerce, and when a neutral has not questioned the right of belligerents to do the same. On no occasion has this government violated, when a belligerent, the rules which it sought to impose upon others when itself a neutral.
Are We Raising a Frankenstein?
(See page 598, July, 1930, Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander E. Topp, U. S. Navy (Retired).—Italicized sentences such as “Millions for ships but not one cent to train officers’’ and “The government of the richest country in the world, having the second largest merchant marine, does not spend one single cent for the education of the men who will be put in charge of its merchant ships,” should not be allowed to go unchallenged. Neither can we let pass the author’s statement “. . . . that at the present day there does not exist any school run under Federal or State supervision where the future licensed marine officer, who is to be put in charge of the ships of our merchant marine, can obtain the proper scientific education to enable him to navigate these ships efficiently.” Inconsistent with these alleged deplorabilities, Captain Jansen later admits of the existence and of the efficacy of two institutions in his statement, “The man trained in the New York or Pennsylvania state training ships is one of the best trained men we have in this country.”
On June 20, 1874, Congress authorized the Secretary of the Navy to furnish upon application by the governor of a state, a suitable vessel with all of her equipment, charts, books, and instruments of navigation, for the use of state conducted nautical schools. A similar act was passed on March 4, 1911, designating the ports of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Seattle, San Francisco, Baltimore, Detroit, Saginaw, Norfolk, and Corpus Christi, for sites for state controlled training schools. This act also authorized the detail of naval officers to act as instructors in the schools, and provided that a sum equal to that expended by the state but not to exceed $25,000 in any year be given to the states involved to assist in maintaining the schools.
Under the benefits of these acts the state of New York established its school in 1874; the state of Massachusetts in 1892; the state of Pennsylvania reestablished her school in 1919, and the state of California is now engaged in the establishment of a school.
The current naval appropriation bill provides a sum of $100,000 to assist the four states mentioned above in the establishment and operation of their schools. However Navy aid does not end there. In addition to the money grant, the Navy also repairs the vessels loaned to the states at its own expense. A sum exceeding $90,000 is being spent on repairs to the Pennsylvania training ship Annapolis. Smaller, but substantial sums have been expended on the ships of the two other eastern states.
Nor is the Navy the only federal agency making a contribution towards training. The SS. Henry County has recently been transferred from the Shipping Board to the Navy, for further transfer to the state of California as a schoolship. Not satisfied with this generous contribution involving about $40,000, the Shipping Board also turned over much valuable surplus material to be used in outfitting the ship. This donation, plus the money spent, or to be spent by the Navy in the near future, will bring the total cost above $75,000 in addition to the annual federal grant of $25,000.
The state of Pennsylvania has appropriated $125,000 to run her school for the next two years, and the state of California has appropriated $115,000 for a similar period. In 1928 the state of New York spent more than $104,000 for schoolship purposes.
The author also states, “He” (a prospective merchant marine officer) “will soon realize that there are any number of public schools in the country which will teach him any trade under the sun, free of charge and with very little red tape involved, but not one single public school where he can take a course in navigation, nautical astronomy, or the other subjects which are essential to him in his future profession and a knowledge of which will enable him to pass the federal examination.” Involving the whole country this statement covers too much territory for a complete list of schools giving such instruction. There is, in the author’s own state at least one, the San Francisco Navigation School, operated for years under the expert guidance of Lieutenant Commander John MacMillan, U. S. Naval Reserve, a graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy. Its graduates are to be found in the Army, Navy, Naval Reserve, as well as in governmental and private aviation enterprises.
It seems not unfitting to mention that in June, 1930, a committee of representative shipping interests under the able leadership of U. S. Shipping Board Commissioner H. I. Cone, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy (Retired) met in Washington, and began a thorough investigation and study on the subject of suitable training for future merchant marine officers.
Historic Cavite Navy Yard
(See page 811, September, 1930, Proceedings)
Commander Frank Luckel, U. S. Navy.—Lieutenant Cope’s article upon “Historic Cavite Navy Yard” will undoubtedly be of immense interest to all who have seen service in the Philippine Islands. Inasmuch as the author states that “To get historical information .... one has to rely mostly on hearsay stories,” and, in the hope that I might be able to contribute in some small measure to available information, the following comment is offered.
About two years ago while visiting an old Marine Corps warehouse or boat shed in the municipality of Cavite, I noticed and became interested in the old Santo Domingo church. Inquiring concerning its history, I was informed, in great detail, of a tunnel that ran from the church to the basement of the captain of the yard’s quarters within the Cavite Navy Yard. The legend also referred to a second tunnel from Porta Vaga, which either connected with the first or ran independently, I have forgotten which. According to the story, which was verified in essential details by all the oldest Filipino inhabitants who were interviewed, these two tunnels were of large enough cross section to admit a “calesa” and were further reputed to contain considerable buried treasure. None of those interviewed had any first-hand knowledge or had actually seen any part or evidence of either tunnel.
This unanimous belief in the tunnels’ existence, I found was not shared by several American foremen who had worked in the navy yard since the American occupation. They had all heard the story of the tunnels, but rather scouted their actual existence, and I was further informed that there was no apparent exit in the basement of the captain of the yard’s quarters. I thereupon visited the old Santo Domingo church, the interior and grounds of which were used for the husbandry of pigs and chickens. The family owning the latter lived in a nipa shack in the church enclosure, and spoke fair Spanish and English. They had heard of and believed in the existence of the tunnels but had seen no evidence of any entry leading from the church or its enclosure. Accompanied by them, I searched for some trace of such a subterranean passage but could find none. I then continued these investigations at Porta Vaga and found no sign of any tunnel there either.
The structure of the grounds and floors was such that I believe that, had there been any tunnels, some evidence of the entrances would remain. Furthermore, while the stories usually contain some reference to cavings-in along the tunnel’s route, there were no existing signs of these. Workmen who have made excavations in the vicinity of Cavite informed me that the soil there would make such extensive passageways quite likely to be indicated by subsidence or cave-in somewhere along their course.
According to the legend, these passageways were installed to permit underground communication with Porta Vaga and Santo Domingo, during such times as Fort San Felipe might be under siege. While this sounds reasonable at first glance, nevertheless, the very layout of Fort San Felipe and Porta Vaga would seem to require that the defenders control the intervening territory. While hoping that someone can prove otherwise, all this appears to me to indicate that these old tunnels never existed, however much we might like to believe the old legend.
It might be of interest in connection with Lieutenant Cope’s article to know that the old Spanish mint is reputed to have been located within the walls of San Felipe, which seems to indicate a very high opinion of its security. Relative to the recent building up of Sangley Point by marine action, it is interesting to know that jurisdiction over Sangley Point is not vested in naval authorities to the same extent as exists with regard to the Cavite Navy Yard. In fact, when for any reason it is desired to insure against the arrest by Philippine authorities of any personnel who might be attached to the Naval Hospital at Canacao, it has been deemed prudent to remove them to the limits of the navy yard proper. This appears to be a present day indication that when Fort Felipe was built there was no Sangley Point, and hence the imperfect jurisdiction in the case of the latter.
Admiral Sir Percy Scott and Gunnery of the British Navy
(See page 815, September, 1930, Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, U. S. Navy (Retired).—In June, 1921, on pages 966 and 967 of Professional Notes the Proceedings published the following extract from The Naval and Military Record of March 30, 1921:
Gunnery and Torpedo Planing. Sir: As an American of English descent, a former member of the Naval Consulting Board, and a man interested from boyhood in navies and in everything pertaining to the sea, I have always been an intense admirer of the British Navy. I have been especially an admirer of the work of the late Lord Fisher—whom we regard as one of the great figures of naval history—in mechanizing British sea power, and of the strides made by ihe British Navy, under the leadership of Admiral Sir Percy Scott, R.N., in speed and accuracy of gunfire, since the latter’s first memorable performance in H.M.S. Scylla in 1899, both in using individual naval telescope sights on gun mounts and with the director system.
As one of the pioneers of the aeronautical movement, and a governor of the Aero Club of America for many years, I have been profoundly impressed by the British Navy’s skillful development of the torpedo-plane since 1913; and I believe that great good will result from the controversy now going forward in your country and ours over the effect the torpedo will have on the capital ship.
But, while having the utmost respect for the superb performance of the British Navy, I cannot square with the spirit of fair play, for which the British officer is beloved the world over, the fact that British naval officers, in discussing their achievements in gunnery and torpedo planing have continually refrained from mentioning the truth that they owe the naval telescope sight, the director system, and the torpedo-plane to an American naval officer, the present Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske.
Admiral Fiske—then Lieutenant Fiske—took out the basic patents for the naval telescope sight and the director system in 1890. Both were described on page 506 of London Engineering on April 24, 1891, and in La Revue d’Artillerie on March 12, 1892, as well as in such newspapers as the New York Times, and many naval and scientific periodicals on many occasions. Furthermore, the fact was later published broadcast, that on September 22, 1892, on board the U.S.S. Yorktown, in Bering Sea, Lieutenant Fiske, using his telescope sight, made a record at target practice with a 6-inch gun that was wholly unprecedented. This subject was elucidated at great length by Lieutenant Fiske in an article that was published in the U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings in June, 1896.
Moreover, it was perfectly well known by all the navies that the U. S. Navy adopted the telescope sight shortly after Lieutenant Fiske’s demonstration in 1892, and that it was used in the U.S.S. Olympia at the battle of Manila Bay on May 1, 1898, and in all the American battleships at the battle of Santiago on July 3, 1898. Still, the British Navy date the improvement of modern naval gunnery from the performance of H.M.S. Scylla, in 1899, and attribute the invention of the naval telescope sight and the director system to Sir Pergy Scott.
I cannot but find the British Navy similarly remiss in regard to the torpedo-plane, for the torpedo-plane was patented by Admiral Fiske on July 16, 1912; and the fact was widely published, and with full illustrations and description, during the remaining months of 1912 and the early part of 1913. The British and Italians began experiments with it in 1913. In 1915 certain Turkish craft-—I think four—were sunk by a British torpedo-plane in the Sea of Marmora, and in 1917, I believe, the Germans sank two British steamers in the North Sea. Since then, all the great navies have been at work developing it; but apparently they have not only followed the general plan described in Fiske’s original patent, but have adhered almost exactly to the mechanical apparatus described in his patent, even to its details. Nevertheless, Mr. Bywater, in your issue of February 16, 1921, refers to Fiske merely as the first to advocate air torpedo work in the United States.
All of the facts that I narrate can easily be verified by reference to the United States Patent Office, and to leading newspapers and other periodicals printed in the English, French, German, Spanish, Russian, and Japanese languages, and to Fiske’s autobiography, which has been on sale in England for more than a year.
Surely, it cannot be the intention of the British Navy to claim credit it does not deserve, nor to withhold from a distinguished officer in a sister navy the credit to which he is entitled for useful achievement.
In closing, please permit me to express my appreciation of the fairness and good feeling which you invariably display in treating American subjects. Your attitude has won you the confidence and respect of your American readers. Respectfully, Henry A. Wise Wood.
In the same issue of the Proceedings appeared the following from the Naval and Military Record of April 20, 1921:
Who Invented Torpedo-Planes? We published in our issue of March 30 a letter from Mr. Henry A. Wise Wood, of New York, who entered a courteous protest against the presumption, general on this side, that the naval telescope sight, the director system, and the torpedo-plane were British inventions, when the fact is, he declared, that we owe all these things to an American naval officer, the present Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske. We forwarded Mr. Wood’s letter to Admiral Sir Percy Scott, and invited him to comment upon it, but, being at present away from his books of reference, he has been unable to favor us with a detailed reply. However, he informs us that when he was commander of the Edinburgh in (he thinks) 1897, telescope sights had been in use on turrets for some time, but “possibly Admiral Fiske was the inventor.” We believe that Admiral Fiske was, in fact, first in the field with this device, which made accurate shooting possible at long range and certainly the evidence which Mr. Wood adduces on his head seems overwhelming.
We have also read that Admiral Fiske evolved an effective system of director firing many years ago, but we do not know whether this system was fundamentally the same as that which Sir Percy Scott perfected, or whether its introduction into the United States Navy antedated the adoption of the Scott director by the British Navy. As regards torpedo-planing, we are aware that Admiral Fiske has been for some years a strong advocate of this weapon, and we accept Mr. Wood’s statement that the admiral was the pioneer of air torpedo tactics. So far as we are concerned, the last thing we desire is "to withhold from a distinguished officer in a sister navy the credit to which he is entitled for useful achievement.” Admiral Fiske, we would add, is widely known and esteemed in British naval circles both as a sea officer of the very best type and as a man of brilliant inventive genius. We remember him, also, as having publicly defended the policy of the British Admiralty towards the U-boats menace at a time when that policy was being subjected to criticism by other American officers who were not conversant with -the peculiar conditions of warfare in the North Sea.
I patented what is now called the “Director System” in many countries in 1890. My U. S. patent is dated September 9, 1890, and is called a “Method of Pointing Guns at Sea.” Its solitary claim reads:
The method of pointing a gun located on a rolling, heeling or vibrating platform, which consists in adjusting a telescope, also located on said platform, and movable on a transverse axis, approximately parallel to that of the gun, at an angle to the axis of the bore of said gun equal to a certain predetermined angle of elevation necessary to cause the projectile fired from said gun to travel to a given target, and, second, noting the moment when the line of sight of said adjusted telescope is caused by the movement of said supporting platform to intersect said target.
The drawing of said patent showed the telescope wholly unattached to any gun. Furthermore, one of the sentences in the specification reads “ It places the determination of the instant of firing the gun in the control of a person distant therefrom, and hence in a position away from the excitement and hurry prevailing in the immediate vicinity of the gun.”
Because of the fact that ships were not so constructed then that the guns would traverse in parallel planes, I found it impossible to adapt this method practically to any existing ship; and so I restricted my activities at first to the simplest case, that of one gun with the telescope attached to it; the existing patent covering that use of a telescope also, because the exact position or mounting of the telescope was immaterial, so far as the basic method was concerned. My first patent on a “Telescopic sight for ship’s guns” was applied for on March 9, 1891, and granted on September 5, 1893.
It would be in very bad taste to endeavor to detract, in even the smallest measure, from the honor due to Admiral Sir Percy Scott for his inestimable services to naval gunnery, and therefore to the national defense of every civilized state. And it would be thoroughly discreditable to belittle the magnificent British Navy, on which our own Navy was originally patterned. But nevertheless, in the interests of truthful history, there can be nothing wrongful, in these days “when all things are forgotten” so very quickly, in reminding ourselves that for certain appliances which she regards as of inestimable value, the British Navy is indebted, wholly and incontestably, to the United States Navy.