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The Naval Blockade. By Lieutenant Louis Guichard, French Navy (attached to the Historical Section of the French Ministry of Marine). Translated by Christopher R. Turner. New York: D. Appleton and Company. 1930. $3.50.
Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander J. M. Creighton, U. S. Navy
This book, of extreme interest to every naval officer, is an authoritative account of the efforts made by the Allies to prevent their enemies from receiving supplies. Any idea that their advantages enabled them quickly to shut off German supplies is soon dissipated.
The desperate effort of the Allies to prevent supplies reaching Germany by way of innocent-looking shipments through neutral countries drove them to the formation of a whole service of trade spies and informers stretching around the world. Merchants suspected or proved to be trading with the enemy were blacklisted by the Allies, and all shipments to them were stopped.
The author speaks at once of the difficulty of putting pressure on the neutrals as long as the United States was one of them. The neutrals were too powerful, and their profits were too available and enormous. Besides, they were entitled by What was generally accepted as international law to trade equally with the belligerents in articles not contraband.
The origin and development of the most essential rules of “International Law” which we study from midshipman days onward are excellently described.
Lieutenant Guichard observes at the beginning of this subject that a neutral vessel may trade freely with a belligerent unless:
- She resists visit and search.
- She renders aid to the enemy.
- She attempts or succeeds in breaking a blockade.
- She carries contraband.
Dismissing the first two, it is pointed out that no “blockade” of Germany, per se, was ever declared.
The program of “Economic Encirclement of the Central Empires” was therefore formed on that fine word “contraband.”
By the Declaration of Paris (1856), “a neutral flag covers enemy goods, except contraband of war”; i.e., a Dutch ship loaded with German non-contraband articles, en route to or from Germany, was perfectly safe. The second principal ruling was that an enemy flag does not make neutral goods liable to confiscation just because they are aboard—unless they are contraband.
By the Declaration of Paris, Great Britain gave up her traditional right to confiscate enemy goods of any character found on a neutral vessel. In exchange, the treaty did away definitely with “privateering.” “Contraband” was not defined in the treaty.
The Russo-Japanese War of 1904 inflicted injuries upon British trade in the Orient, particularly as a result of the Russian extension of what the word contraband was supposed to include. Responding to British complaints, the Czar, in 1907, called an international convention at The Hague. Here the British delegates, still under the influence of the memory of their strictures and pains as a neutral in the last war, suggested that the term and idea of “contraband” be suppressed; that nothing be contraband, and that the matter be disposed of decisively, and once for all! (You will see how the British opinion upon this subject underwent an alteration as their picture of themselves as a possible belligerent became more distinct.) Their motion was voted down by the delegates from Russia, Germany, the United States, and France; those of the latter observing that as neutral ships could carry on contraband trade in arms without hindrance from their own governments, they believed some one else to possess means of stopping such things, and preferred to retain them themselves. The principal result of the labors of this conference was the British proposal to establish an “International Prize Court,” whose main duty was to look out for the interest of the neutrals in future wars.
The British knew that the public at home would have to have the powers of this court less vaguely defined before they would accept it, and after a year or more of cogitation, called another conference which led to the Declaration of London, 1909.
Here “contraband” became something more tangible and definite in expression. The definitions were given as follows:
“Absolute contraband”*—eleven articles, including arms, ammunition, horses, shells, etc.; directly and specifically useful at once in war. It was specified that a belligerent could add articles to this list during a war, if the articles were “susceptible exclusively of military use,” and neutrals were notified thereof.
“Conditional contraband”—fourteen articles, including food, fodder, military clothing, fuel and lubricants. This list, also, could be added to. But in order to guard neutrals against too arbitrary and severe additions to items (1) and (2), a list of:
“Free articles” was composed. This contained seventeen objects, which could never be declared contraband of war, absolute or conditional. You will be interested to observe that among these articles were cotton, rubber, fertilizers and ore!
Now—the question of destination! Briefly, the incriminating circumstance of “continuous voyage” was applied only to articles of “absolute” contraband. Articles 33, 34, and 35 said that “conditional” contraband was liable to seizure only if destined directly to the armed forces or a government department of the enemy or to merchants and contractors in the enemy country who, by common knowledge, supplied such articles to the government. By this ruling the doctrine of "continuous voyage” did not apply to “conditional” contraband, which could be stopped only if going directly to the government agencies or contractors mentioned in Articles 33 and 34, and these shipments were not to be stopped if they were to be transshipped at a neutral port en route.
Thus, by the Declaration of London, wheat (food), en route from neutral America, consigned publicly and openly to the German government and routed so as to be discharged at Rotterdam and conveyed up the Rhine by barge, could not be interfered with by the provisions of this Declaration.
Finally (and very important), Article 65 stated that the Declaration had to be accepted as a whole—that you couldn’t use the part which helped you and not observe the rest of it.
It is well to state here that when the British public found out about the “International Prize Court,” on which they would have but one vote in eight, there was a great disturbance. And when they read that food could be stopped from coming directly to England, even when consigned to merchant contractors who might easily be said to allow some of their supplies to get into the hands of the government, they saw themselves being starved in the next war. The transshipment clause was of no benefit to them, because no other country was contiguous with their islands, while their likely enemies had every available avenue of this kind.
England refused to sign. The Declaration was never ratified, and it was not a legally binding document upon any nation, nor is it yet.
The World War. On August 6,1914, the United States asked the belligerents to state upon what document they were going to base their actions, and suggested the Declaration of London, even if this had never been ratified.
Germany replied happily that she would accept the suggestion of the United States, and abide by this Declaration. It suited her perfectly! (Especially as Article 49 stated that if it endangered a belligerent war vessel to attempt to take a proper prize into port, the prize could be destroyed. This was the legal basis upon which she later excused her submarine operations.)
The Allies were about to answer in a similar vein, when they learned that shiploads of grain from America were unloading in Dutch ports, and the canals were full of barges taking this over to Germany.
The British Order in Council of August 20, 1914, and the French decree of August 25 stated that the Declaration of London would be applied, “but with very serious departures from it as regards conditional contraband,” and the French declared flatly that they would capture conditional contraband even if en route to a neutral port if its final destination were the enemy. In other words, the exemption of conditional contraband from the doctrine of continuous voyage was thrown overboard by the French three weeks after war was declared.
Upon receipt of these replies the United States declared that, owing to important reservations made to the Declaration of London by various belligerents (the Allies) she would take no account of it during the present war, and requested that the “existing rules of international law” be observed. At the same time we protested that it seemed quite inadmissible that the Allies would presume to capture neutral merchandise en route from our neutral ports to neutral Dutch or Scandinavian ports.
Picture yourself as one of the Allies in these days of crashing nations! They “took counsel” again, and, not wishing to offend the United States, and to satisfy us, avoided placing cotton on the contraband list—which the British had studiously placed on the forever-to-be-free list in 1909 because they had to have our cotton in their mills!
In addition to exempting cotton, the British issued a new Order in Council on October 30, which cancelled their former one of August 20, mentioned before.
This new Order in Council again recognized the validity of the Declaration of London, but conditional contraband en route to a neutral port only became liable to capture when it was consigned “to order,” or to an unknown consignee. The order also included new lists of contraband goods, among which appeared certain articles which had been declared to be forever on the free list in 1909.
The American government protested again on December 26, 1914, on the whole subject of contraband and invoices, and ended by drawing attention to the “deplorable condition of American trade which was being excluded from the countries adjacent to Germany.”
The British government responded rather ironically on January 7, calling attention to the exports from New York to various European states in November, 1913, and November, 1914. In the case of Holland the figures for the month of 1913 were $558,000. For November, 1914, they were over $7,000,000!
On February 4, 1915, the German government presented a memorandum to all neutral powers on the subject of the action it felt obliged to take owing to the conduct of the Allies in stopping the maritime trade of the neutrals “in defiance of international law.”
The actions objected to were:
- The addition to the contraband lists of articles "which are either not at all, or only very indirectly employed for military purposes.”
- The abolition of the distinctions between absolute and conditional contraband and how they were to be treated.
- Violations of the Declaration of Paris. (German goods, not of contraband nature, seized on neutral vessels.)
- The proclamation of a war zone of the whole North Sea, which amounts, to a certain extent, to an irregular blockade of neutral coasts, which was specifically forbidden by international law.
There then followed Germany’s first declaration of submarine war. She declared that from February 18 onward, any hostile merchant ship encountered in British or Irish waters, including the channel, would be destroyed without regard for passengers or crew. Neutral ships in these waters might also be endangered, as the ruses of war allowed enemy ships to hoist neutral colors to escape supervision, and mistakes could not always be avoided.
There followed the Order in Council of March 11, 1915. All goods, presumed to be en route to Germany by any means, were to be stopped. The Allies declared a proper observance of the Declaration of Paris of 1856 and said that they would respect non-contraband goods found on neutral ships and not seize them, but would “sequester” them, or return them to their owners.
On May 28, 1916, the Allies sent a joint memorandum to the neutrals to explain that they had started out to try to observe the Declaration of London but that conditions had developed so different from those in any previous war and the Germans had contrived to compromise innocent neutral commerce to such an extent, that the rules laid down in the Declaration could not stand the strain of these changed conditions. This had forced the allied governments to alter or qualify these rules on a number of occasions, and for fear that these modifications had exposed the Allies to misconstruction, they would now declare that they must confine themselves simply to “the historic and admitted rules of the law of nations.”
On July 7, 1916, by a simultaneous proclamation in London and Paris, the Declaration of London was declared to be cancelled.
I shall not take you through the engrossing stories of the internal conflicts in the neutral European countries between neutral rights, neutral duties, sympathies pro and con the Allies, and the lure of profits. Every part of this work is absorbingly interesting —and every sailor should read it!
MATTER AND RADIATION. By John Buckingham, M.A. New York: Oxford University Press. 1930. $3.00. Reviewed by Professor A. F. Wagner, Post-graduate School, U. S. Naval Academy.
The author of this book presents in very concise form those fundamental ideas which are absolutely essential to an intelligent understanding of the principles of modem atomic physics. The style employed is very refreshing to readers of scientific literature! because it is not the cold fact presenting type common to most scientists. A very noticeable human touch without any sacrifice of scientific accuracy or professional dignity is injected by the author with sufficient frequency to make the reading of this book a real pleasure. This book is not only a real contribution to scientific literature but it is also a “scientific work of art.”
The subject matter is divided into five main parts or chapters, namely, Electric Waves, Atoms and Molecules, The Electrical Structure of Atoms and the Production of Radiation, Detection of Infra-red Rays, and Uses of Infra-red Rays.
The chapter on Electric Waves deals with such things as early ideas about light, velocity of light, wave theory of light, acoustic analogies, and Maxwell’s theory.
The more important facts regarding atoms and molecules are presented by discussing such subjects as differences between solids, liquids, and gases, motions of the particles of substances, sizes and velocities of the molecules of a gas, atoms are not simple structures, relations between electricity and matter, the idea of energy and its transformation.
In the chapter on the Electrical Structure of Atoms and the Production of Radiation there is presented an excellent brief treatment of such subjects as the Rutherford model, production of light by hydrogen, quantum principle, disruption of atoms, radioactivity, production of infra-red rays.
The fourth and fifth chapters are devoted to a discussion of the detection and uses of infra-red rays. The methods of detection mentioned are color changes, photography, expansion of metals, thermojunctions, electrical resistance changes, radiomicrometers, radiometers, phosphorescence. The chapter on uses of infra-red rays contains facts and information which may have considerable military value and the possible uses mentioned are very interesting. Some of the more important subjects treated are detection of invisible objects, secret signaling, burglar alarms and warning systems, fog penetration and “seeing through fog,” distant control of torpedoes and aircraft, selfsteering torpedoes, photography of invisible objects through fog, navigation, and infrared rays, radiation and climate, medical uses.
This book can be highly recommended as one from which people who are not professional scientists can obtain a good brief presentation of the modem physicist’s theory of the constitution of matter, and at the same time this book deserves a place in the library of the well-informed physicist.