When the Armistice was signed, Admiral Beatty remarked that the fighting had finished and that the talking was about to begin. In no theater did this prophecy prove more true than in the Adriatic. The talking went on for two years and there were times when it looked as if the talking would finish and the fighting would begin again.
It came as a surprise to the American people to find their Navy taking part during those two years in the settling of that much debated Adriatic question. Why should we be there ? Was there any place in the world where we apparently had less reason to be mixed up in other people’s quarrels? And yet there we were from the end of the war until the spring of 1921, accepting the burden of a thankless duty thrust upon us, using our good offices to smooth over other nations’ difficulties and in one case at least actually avoiding bloodshed and probable war: the Navy of the youthful transatlantic power taking a unique part in keeping the peace of the world; demonstrating back there in the cradle of civilization and the birthplace of sea power an ability to make peace just as thoroughly as on its proper occasions it has made war.
The Austro-Hungarian Empire before its downfall included the eastern littoral and islands of the Adriatic from Trieste to Montenegro. Contrasted with the scanty port facilities of Italy’s sandy shore as offered by Venice, Ancona, and Brindisi, the ex-Austrian coast and islands constituted a mariner’s paradise. Trieste, Pola, Fiume, Zara, Sebenico, Spalato, and Cattaro were all first-class natural ports, while the very indented coast line and scores of islands offered dozens of other harbors better than any on the Italian coast. More, the physical layout of the islands and harbors on the rock-bound coast constituted an impregnable maritime fortress, priceless in one’s possession, menacing in another’s.
The people of the southern provinces of Austria-Hungary were mostly Slavic: Croatians, Slovenians, Dalmatians, etc. These southern or jugo Slavs were held in oppression by Austria-Hungary and while furnishing a large part of the army and the greater part of the navy personnel of the monarchy, were nevertheless ambitious to have independence and in the last days of the war just before and during the last great Italian drive on the Piave many Jugoslav regiments deflected, withdrew, and precipitated the Austrian collapse which ended the war for Italy and brought about the armistice on that front. At the same time the Austrian Navy, largely in the hands of the Jugoslavs, declared itself to be out of the war and although attempting to make certain stipulations toward the recognition of a Jugoslavia and the establishment of a Jugoslav Navy, did nevertheless communicate to the Allies its desire to surrender.
The naval and military terms of the Austrian armistice were drawn up by the su
preme war council at Versailles on October 31, 1918, and were signed on November 3, 1918. By these terms all vessels of the Austro-Hungarian Navy were to be paid off, completely disarmed, and placed under the supervision of the Allies and the United States of America. Article five was:
The blockade by the allied and associated powers shall be continued under present conditions; Austro-Hungarian vessels found at sea remain liable to capture, with exceptions which must be approved by a commission to be appointed by the Allies and the United States of America.
All naval aircraft had to be surrendered at a place to be named. All floating craft, naval material, etc. were to be surrendered, and all sea fortifications and islands forming the defense of Pola were to be occupied by the Allies. By the terms of the military armistice all the territory which was not occupied by the Italian troops was to be occupied by the troops of the Allies and of the United States and “— the administration of evacuated territories of Austria- Hungary will be entrusted to the local
authorities under the control of the allied and associated armies of occupation.”
The allied naval council met in Paris and decided that the commission referred to in article five to carry out the naval terms of the armistice should consist of representatives of the British, French, Italian, and American navies to meet in Venice.
Rear Admiral W. H. G. Bullard, then in command of the United States Naval Base at Corfu, was on November 7, 1918, appointed American member of this commission. Each of the nations appointed a flag officer. Throughout the life of the commission the Italians made a point of seeing that their member was the senior and hence the president of the body. At the first meeting it was decided that in the execution of the terms of the armistice the enemy coast should be divided into four sectors and that one of the nations represented on the committee should supervise each sector. The Italians were to have the zone they were occupying under the terms of the Pact of London. The British were to have Fiume, the Americans from Cape Planka to Giupana Island, and the French from Giupana to the Montenegrin border. It was further decided that the enemy naval ships were to be gathered at Pola, Spalato, and Cattaro. The duties of the Allies were to take charge of all enemy floating material, preserve order, preserve the blockade, and see that the terms of the armistice were properly executed. It was understood that in the evacuated (as distinguished from the Italian Pact of London zone) territories the local authorities should carry on their government under the supervision of the naval officers of the powers supervising the respective sectors.
When Italy entered the war she had stipulated in the Pact of London the cession to her, if victorious, of that territory from her border south to Cape Planka, inland to the Dinaric Alps and including a large share of the Adriatic islands. As soon as the resistance of the enemy ceased the Italians began energetically to occupy this territory and within a few days from the signing of the armistice they were strongly established in the Pact of London zone. And then from Trieste to Montenegro and far back into the hinterland one heard nothing of Austrians. They were all Italians or Jugoslavs, each side claiming the majority of the population and each clamoring according to his sentiment for annexation to Italy or for union with the new kingdom of Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia which was beginning to be heard from as the ultimate Jugoslav nation, with Serbia, a victorious ally, as a nucleus.
So the Italians at the moment of victory met with a great disappointment. Whether or not they had foreseen this turn of events we are not able to say. At any rate their surface attitude was one of unspeakable chagrin that any one should question their absolute right to the territory promised them by the Pact of London. They had an open quarrel with Serbia as the direct issue. They were suspicious of the French because, the two countries being potential if not actual rivals, it seemed logical that France might encourage the building up of a new nation which would be basicly opposed to Italy. They were resentful towards America because President Wilson’s “self-determination” doctrine had fanned the spark of Jugoslav national aspiration. At any rate there was always in the minds of the Italians that at the hour of victory they were betrayed by their allies and by them blocked from a deserved enjoyment of the fruits of victory.
Vice Admiral Enrico Millo was installed as governor of Dalmatia and the Curzolan Islands. This title clashed with a similar one held by Dr. Ivo Krstel who, in that zone to the southward, unoccupied by Italy, was known as the president of the Provincial Government of Dalmatia. This latter zone included the American sector with Spalato as headquarters, and the French sector within which lay Ragusa and Cattaro. Due to the fact that Spalato, the American headquarters, was also the capital of the provincial government, practically all liaison with that government was through the Americans. This unoccupied Dalmatia was supposed to be purely enemy territory awaiting the disposition of the peace conference. .The majority in favor of ultimate union with Jugoslavia was so overwhelming, however, that it was necessary to remind the people frequently that whatever might be their final fortune they were for the present merely part of a conquered nation and that they should conduct themselves accordingly. They were inclined to take such admonition lightly and in such an attitude they were
given moral support by the presence of an occupying force of the Army of Serbia, destined to be the central unit of the union to which they aspired.
When the Italians first occupied their zone of Dalmatia they met with sporadic incidents of opposition on the part of the Jugoslav element but the majority of these opponents settled down to make the best of it under Italian authority, while the irreconcilable minority took themselves away to other parts of Dalmatia, notably to Spalato where, unhindered by Italian power and associated with a Jugoslav majority, they joined from time to time in reprisals against the Italian minority. And so there would be minor persecutions on one side of the line followed by an opposite and vengeful action against the minority on the other side. These incidents were magnified in the reporting and resentment waxed. Governor Millo soon brought affairs in his zone to his liking but there remained one great fly in the ointment, one thorn in the heart— Spalato. From there came stories of atrocious persecution of his people and furthermore the Italians reported that these things were going on under the encouraging or indifferent eyes of the Allies. Admiral Millo accordingly decided to send a ship to Spalato to protect his co-nationals and quite frankly to make propaganda.
In December, 1918, the committee of admirals was directed to, “hold inquiry and make a report to the allied governments showing clearly what is the existing situation and what measures it is necessary to take to safeguard against any disagreement or trouble in any territory occupied or to be occupied by the allied forces outside of those which the Italian troops are at the time occupying.”
In response to his request Admiral Bullard was informed by the Chief of Naval Operations in December:
With reference to your several inquiries regarding the status of Jugoslavs the following is stated: Serbia is considered by the United States as one of the associated governments. The status of the Jugoslavs is unsettled. They have not been recognized by the United States as an independent national organization. However, in dealing with questions which arise as result of their efforts be guided by the general principles laid down by the President. It is desired that your good offices be used to maintain order and assist local governments as necessary in adjusting matters local and international as they arise.
The committee met again at Fiume in December. They drew up a report adverse to the Italian point of view, taking exception as they did to the continued Italian domination of Fiume while the city was under interallied control. It recommended that Fiume be restored to the condition of a city awaiting the decision of the peace conference by reduction of the Italian representation to two battalions and by maintaining one battalion each from France, America, Great Britain, and Serbia. The Italian admiral refused to sign this report and subsequently resigned from the commission. The Allies were never able to carry out the recommendation in regard to Fiume. The Italians increased the number of their troops there and first the American and later the British troops were withdrawn.
When Admiral Bullard broke up his base at Corfu he used the subchasers for various work in connection with his new duties. He sent an officer to Cattaro to represent the United States in receiving the surrender of the Austrian ships. Some officers and men went to Spalato to take charge of the Zrinyi and Radctzky and two little torpedo boats. The Birmingham and some destroyers were sent on to Admiral Bullard soon after he had assumed his new duties. The Israel went to Spalato as station ship in the latter part of 1918 and from that time until the spring of 1921 we always had at least one ship there.
Any story of the activities of the American Navy in the Adriatic will necessarily be interwoven with the affairs of the Italian ship Puglia. In keeping with Admiral Millo’s decision to maintain a station ship at Spalato, Commander Giulio Menini went there with that ship in January, 1919. Menini was a large, kindly man, middle aged, fatherly, and inspiring of confidence. If in his zeal to serve the interests of his country he appeared at times to demand too much of his American colleagues, he nevertheless maintained the most cordial relations and every American who dealt with him will remember him with affection. Every one of the thousands of American officers and men who were over there in those years will remember the old Puglia, “aground on her beef bones” just inside the Spalato breakwater. She had the next berth to our Olympia and they were somewhat alike in appearance. Captain Menini has published
a book, Passione Adriatica, an eloquent description from his point of view of those disturbing days. It is interesting to quote certain of his passages which bear directly upon the personality or the actions of American officers.
Because of the excited mental state of the local people, due to their fear of Italian occupation or aggression, the Allies had frequently expressed the opinion that it would be better for peace and tranquillity if there were no Italian ship at Spalato. This idea was not supported by the Italians. To abstain from keeping a ship there was from their point of view to cede their equal rights, to abandon their Spalatino co-nationals and to forfeit an opportunity to make propaganda and gain a foothold. By all means they must have a ship at Spalato and Menini was instructed at all costs to moor his ship in some way to one of the piers. Thus when the Puglia arrived and approached a mooring at the breakwater an American officer went aboard and asked the captain not to moor there or at least to wait until the American captain could see him. Captain Menini however feigned not to understand him and completed his mooring.
In order to gain favor the Puglia soon began a systematic distribution of free food which Menini had brought with him for that purpose. This was a great bone of contention from the start. The Italians were quite frankly making propaganda and the Jugoslavs had no way of counteracting it except to try to stop the people from taking the food and to protest vigorously to the Allies that this was not an ethical way to approach a plebiscite. The chief of police told the admirals that before Menini began serving out free food the Societa Operaio (Italian labor society) had forty members and that the system of having the hungry peasants enroll at the society prior to drawing food from the Puglia soon ran the membership to over a thousand. Menini, seeing a thousand Italians where but forty had been before, might well pat himself on the back. One ventures, however, an assertion that by the same methods a corresponding number of British or American or Portuguese conationals could have been uncovered.
The Olympia went to the Adriatic in January, 1919. The old veteran of Manila Bay had returned late in 1918 from extraordinary service on the Murman coast and after lying for a month or two at a British dockyard was sent on to Venice, stopping at Gibraltar en route to pick up Admiral Niblack and his staff. Admiral Niblack relieved Admiral Bullard and the flagship remained at Venice for about a month. In the meantime Spalato was getting hotter. The presence of the Puglia enraged the unstable element of the Dalmatian population and the American destroyer captain had his hands full of petty incidents, accusations, and countercharges. Captain Menini insisted on free circulation in the town for his officers and men. They were jeered at by Jugoslav ruffians and timidly applauded by the Italian minority. At night the officers would go to the little Italian club, Gabinetto di Lettura, and there under the portrait of their king would enjoy a “bath of Italianity.”
Towards the end of February the committee of admirals was to meet at Spalato. Grand excitement in the town. An American holiday and an American admiral! Notices were posted telling the people of George Washington, Woodrow Wilson, and Admiral Niblack. A great welcome was prepared but they reckoned without their guest. The American admiral very wisely vetoed all demonstration and declined to be the object of any special welcome.
The four admirals arrived, each in his flagship.
Our admiral was admirably fitted for that duty by his heartiness of spirit, his long and varied experience in dealing with foreigners, his ability as a linguist, his firm Americanism, and by his extraordinary patience.
Rear Admiral Ratye was a delightful French diplomat. He had many occasions to stand very firmly for the interests of his country but his most usual role in the committee was to smooth over the taut situations which developed between the other members.
Rear Admiral Kiddle of the British Navy was quiet but effective. His observations were brief, to the point, and showed a complete knowledge of the situation.
The committee was under the presidency of Rear Admiral Ugo Rombo. He was a small, dapper man with a brilliant eye and a square, grey beard, every hair of which was capable on occasion of bristling with furious indignation. Of an ancient and noble family, his every motion bespoke a fierce pride in himself, his profession, and his country. Socially he was charming. His English and his French were excellent. But as president of the committee he was most difficult, at times offensive. He was an eloquent advocate, too eloquent as a rule, and it is certain that another admiral more diplomatic and conciliatory might better have served his country under those trying conditions.
Menini says:
The evening of February 23 a ship arrived with the American admiral of the committee, a sympathetic and characteristic figure, very good natured, who laughed at every occasion. He was said to be of the Republican party and not Wilsonian but in any case he showed himself to be well disciplined and obedient to the orders emanating from Wilson. I remember that he had on his staff an American-Florentine lieutenant whose name I have not remembered but who spoke Italian beautifully. I never knew whether he sympathized with us or with the Slavs but in every way he was very correct. (Note: Lieutenant Commander, now Commander, Rufus King.)
As soon as the ship was anchored I went to call on the admiral who requested me as soon as the Italian flagship should be sighted to send to the admiral and beg him to anchor outside for the present, because, he said, “These gentlemen of the local government have made a mistake that I must first straighten out.” ....
I remember as if it were now the arrival of our admiral with the beautiful Bixio, the finest looking and most powerful ship present. .... The conversation between him and the American was really tragic. He wanted at any cost to go into the port and to telegraph Millo to prepare troops in case of offense, but the ally who wished to avert any possible occupation by us, plainly threatened a diplomatic incident with the United States if he was not given time to arrange things in the city and our chief had to agree. It was arranged however that he should be the first to enter port the following morning and that the Bixio would moor to the San Pietro pier which was right in the city.
The next day just as all the admirals were arriving the populace behaved very badly. Two Italian senior officers were walking in the town and they were surrounded by an ugly mob which insulted and threatened them. One old woman bolder than the rest struck one of the officers with an umbrella. Several American bluejackets arrived on the scene and succeeded in escorting the Italian officers away from the disgusting scene.
That same night about dark, a mob formed and went about the town crying “Down with Italy,” tearing down Italian signs and throwing stones in the windows of the Gabinetto. We got word on the Olympia of what was going on and the captain took me ashore with him to see whether we should have to land a patrol. You may be sure that Admiral Rombo was loudly demanding intervention and the punishment of all and sundry. Captain Boyd found the police coping fairly well with the situation. President Krstel himself was all about urging the excited ones to restrain themselves. We found a menacing crowd around the Gabinetto held back by gendarmes or soldiers. Inside there were several hundred Italians or Italian sympathizers afraid to face the mob and go home. They were willing to go out under our convoy, however, and by the time the captain and I had each made two or three trips we found that the remainder had gotten up their nerve and gone home alone.
The next day, soon after the Olympia was moored inside the harbor, the admiral gave his flag captain the job of organizing an international patrol. I have described this patrol in a previous article; it will suffice to say here that for two months we had a patrol of American, British, French, and Italian bluejackets in the town. Thus began my intimate association with the life of Spalato which kept me ashore there practically all the time for the next nine months. As Captain Menini says in his book, “who did a little of everything. Supervisor of the police, organizer of parties, ambassador to the local government. I have sent to call him day or night, etc…”
As a result of the disorders and the mistreatment of the Italian officers, it was arranged that the president of the local government and the mayor should go aboard the Italian flagship and make an apology. Captain Menini’s description of this ceremony sheds considerable light on the character of Admiral Rombo.
There advanced then in solemn manner the president of the Slav government, Dr. Krstel, in high hat .... flanked by the interpreter, Professor Misetic Krstel had prepared a long dis
course but scarcely had he begun to speak when our chief shut him off, crying vehemently, “Who are you, tell me who are you?”
"I am the president of the Jugoslav government of Spalato,” disconcertedly responded Krstel.
“It does not exist!” exclaimed the admiral, furious, “It does not exist, do you understand?”
"It will exist,” responded the president.
“Get back!” ordered the admiral. “I want the mayor, I want the apology of the mayor of the city. Come forward the mayor!” Krstel stepped back and there was pushed forward Tartaglia, white faced, not knowing what to do or say.
“Take off your hat and apologize,” said our admiral in a loud voice. “If I were in your position I would be ashamed and would put my hat on the ground.” And the more the admiral talked the lower went the mayor’s hat.
“I beg pardon,” said Tartaglia in a weak voice. “I apologize to the offended officers in the name of the city,” and he remained uncovered.
“Very well, I accept the apologies,” said the admiral. “Go away and come back an hour later and make your duty call.”
The mixed patrol kept things fairly quiet. With the eyes of four nations always on them the disturbing element was not so free to break out. One night, however, I was sharply accosted by a drunk who assumed a threatening attitude until his companion restrained him by telling him that I was American. He was all apology in an instant. He had mistaken the device on my uniform for the five-pointed star of Italy. The local authorities were frequently reminded that American or Italian, we were all there in the same status and must all be treated alike with courtesy. One realized, however, that it took more than the authority or the good offices of the American admiral to force these Jugoslavs to like the Italians.
The Italian senior naval officer was very much incensed by the publication at a nearby village of a notice to the effect that the populace had been assured by the American admiral that there would be no Italian occupation of that place. Captain Menini, “full of surprise and indignation,” addressed a letter to Admiral Niblack, asking if it were true that he had given such assurance. I quote from the American’s reply.
My answer is, “yes.” I did not, however, give any directions to the local government as to how to use this information, and if they sent this information to Trau to be posted I am very glad of it because it served the purpose for which I intended the information to be used, namely to allay the fear, excitement, and dread which exist in this community that any change will be made in the present arrangement for holding in trust for the allied governments this territory in question until such time as the peace conference shall make its decision.
The French delegate has received from his government a declaration of Premier Orlando that Italy has no intention of sending troops into this zone. The Italian delegate to the naval committee for the Adriatic also gave me his assurances to this effect. While the movement of troops in the Italian zone concerns only the Italian authorities, I regard it as only natural that the inhabitants of Spalato and Trau should have been greatly alarmed at a critical time by reports, more or less inaccurate and possibly untrue, that during the night of February 25-26, 6,000 Italian troops arrived in the neighborhood of Muc, within easy reach of Spalato and Trau, and that 6,000 additional troops arrived there the night of February 26-27. There were also rumors of a definite nature that Italian forces had embarked at Sebenico on board the SS. Cortellazzo in the afternoon of February 24, with artillery and equipment, ready for service. It is not necessary that this information should have been exact for the effect is the same whether it was true or not. In giving out the definite information that there would be no Italian occupation of the American zone, I am quite sure you will join me in agreeing that I rendered a distinct service to the allied cause by removing from the minds of an excited population the idea that one of the Allies was about to act contrary to the allied spirit and interest.
A. P. Niblack.
During these days the committee of admirals was meeting daily. They discussed and acted upon some routine questions such as the regulation of the requisition of merchant shipping, but most of their time was taken up with an inquiry into the political situation at Spalato, the claims and counterclaims pertaining thereto.
Because of the fact that he represented the nation most interested in the affairs under discussion and because the ambitious policy of this nation was not altogether supported by the policies of the other nations represented on the committee, it was natural that the Italian delegate was frequently voted down in his efforts to influence the committee to agree with him.
Menini:
In any case the method of procedure was always the same. They gathered on the Bixio at the time which our admiral indicated and I, who understood perfectly their methods, observed invariably for an hour beforehand the passage of barges and motor boats with their chiefs who would meet on one of their ships, where they put themselves in accord and assigned to one another the parts which shortly afterward they must recite and then, one by one, they would go aboard the Bixio where their president would open the meeting with the result that, concerning our affairs, one single favorable vote would be found in the urn, that of the Italian; the others voted with touching unanimity always together and against us.
On March 5 a typical incident took place at Trau. The Italian motor schooner Costante was alongside the sea wall when a mob of the usual “smart alecs” came along and forced the captain to haul down the Italian flag. The Italian authorities were naturally incensed. Admiral Niblack had notices in several languages posted in the town in which he chastised severely the local
authorities. Having arranged for the presence of one warship from each of the four nations, a ceremony was organized at which the mayor and chief of police came aboard the Italian destroyer and apologized for the outrage.
Menini’s book is full of such incidents and he generally reports having referred the matter to the Americans. Sometimes he is satisfied with what they did for him; generally not. In the case of the Morpurgo bookshop, from which the Jugoslavs proposed to condemn certain books because of their anti-Slav tendencies, the Italians made their usual appeal to the Americans and Captain Menini amusingly states that the Americans while not understanding what the row was about, in order not to appear ridiculous, prevented the sequestration. There is something in what he says. I handled that matter for the admiral and we understood that it was a question of forcing the book-dealer to vacate his place of business. The essence of the dispute really mattered little since a word from our admiral one way or the other was sufficient to settle these petty affairs.
It is interesting to observe the different types of diplomacy unconsciously adopted by officers according to their individual natures and the various impressions created by their methods in the minds of the parties between whom their good offices are being employed. The demanding type will lead each party to believe that he is partial to the other. The conciliatory go-between will create such an atmosphere of friendliness in each camp that he will be regarded by both sides as a partisan. The take-it-or- leave-it type will state the plain facts and ask for an answer in the same spirit.
I can conscientiously say that throughout the time they were at Spalato the American officers were entirely neutral and that officially and socially they showed no favoritism. We gave a party once early in our stay before we realized that the Montagues and the Capulets could not be entertained under the same roof. We saw our guests glare at each other and depart in haste. They wrote long letters very courteously explaining their actions. After that we had a dance each Wednesday night but we never again made the mistake of mixing the antagonistic elements. One week we would have the Italians as our guests, the next week the Jugoslavs, and so on. But the point I wish to make is that the same American officers took part in all these occasions and opinion was about evenly divided as to which of the alternate Wednesdays brought the most pleasure. It is true, however, that the average American officer in his associations ashore gravitated towards those people or that person with whom he found easiest communication. One could speak English with Professor Misetic, who was an ardent Jugoslav and a rather clever propagandist. Count Pavlovic and his daughters spoke English and Americans saw a lot of them but nothing to the damage of Italy ever came of that association. Dr. and Mrs. Karamen, leaders in the Italian set, were frequently in evidence and we saw a lot of them and got very friendly. I had a casual acquaintance with almost everybody in town and after learning how to pass a few trivialities in both Italian and Croatian I got along nicely with both parties.
The same officers whom Menini calls Jugoslavofile were regarded by the Slavs as pro-Italian. It is too bad he could not have heard Admiral Andrews or Captain Boyd laying down the law to President Krstel on such subjects as the imposition of Belgrade tariff regulations or the recruiting of local men for the Jugoslav Army when the place was still awaiting the disposition of the peace conference.
This “umpiring” or employing our good offices between the political contenders occupied the greater part of the Navy’s efforts but there were other things to be done.
Central Europe was starving and the United States was sending food ships to the Adriatic. Trieste was the principal port used by our ships. The Adriatic was packed with mines and these would break away and form a wandering menace whenever the wind blew. To route the food ships, bunker them and service them in the ports of call— this all fell to the Navy. One of these ships was costing from $2,000 to $2,500 a day and one day saved in turn-around would pay the annual salary of a lieutenant. We had a main port office at Trieste from which depended others at Venice, Fiume, Spalato, Ragusa, Cattaro, and Gallipoli. At most of these places we generally kept a destroyer for communication facilities and to transport public servants on urgent duty. The port officer at Trieste organized the Navy radio station at Vienna which continued to function for several years as the primary means of communication between our government and its interests in middle and eastern Europe.
On March 31, 1919, Rear Admiral Philip Andrews relieved Rear Admiral Niblack.
Menini:
The new American admiral came from London and Paris. He had commanded a large unit during the war. He spoke only English, was a man of most minute detail, lover of his profession, indefatigable and most authoritative worker, Wilsonian and imbued with the idea that Italy acted in the Adriatic from imperialistic motives . . . . but in any case he remained the rigid executor of the orders of his government, and I must confess that although Italian aspirations had found in him a decided adversary, he had for me a real esteem .... and I wish here to thank him for that, saying however of him and his work all that I think. ....
The admiral’s flag captain was from one of the southern states and spoke French easily, to be precise, the classic French of the time of Louis XV. (Note: Captain David F. Boyd.)
Admiral Andrews’ tour in the Adriatic lasted for two years. During that time he learned a great deal about that part of the world. He visited Belgrade and Rome more than once; he knew the leaders at both capitals and was on frank and easy terms with the leaders “at the front,” so to speak. But even now in a recent letter to the author of this article the admiral warns that politics should be avoided because “neither you nor I really know anything about that side!”
Our admiral had no real authority in the so-called American zone except in a very general way in the execution of the terms of the armistice. Due, however, to the mere fact that he was there he was frequently called upon by both the Italians and Jugoslavs, and especially by the former, and requested to take positive and retributory action towards the correction of alleged or real evils. He was powerless to act in the majority of cases except in the employment of his good offices. There probably has never been an occasion in the history of our Navy when this function of good offices has been so continually in use over so long a period as at Spalato from November, 1918, to the spring of 1921.
No affair was too insignificant and many were the occasions. When the Nino Bixio changed her berth some nit-wit got some red paint and wrote on the vacated pier, "Nino Bixio stinks!” I must go with an Italian officer and the chief of police and see the insult erased. The medical officer of the Puglia goes to Trau in civilian clothes to call on his fiancee. He is arrested at night but released when he identifies himself. Next morning still in town he is arrested again and sent back to Spalato. Apologies; misunderstanding. A Serbian lieutenant is arrested in the Italian zone and sent back to Spalato in a destroyer. We must receive him and turn him over to his own. An Italian sailor is investigated for having allegedly made an obscene remark to a Serbian officer. A Croatian youth is brought in for shouting at the doctor of the Nino Bixio, “The Italians are only capable of running away!”
And then once I sat on a board consisting of one officer from each of four navies to investigate “the report of the Italian artificer Lisciando Vito, member of the interallied patrol, who states that the French members of the patrol bore themselves openly favorable to the Jugoslavs, shouting ‘Bravo’ and throwing kisses to Jugoslav ladies—etc.” One night the admiral sent me to get an Italian soldier out of jail. We searched for him all night after being assured by the military and police that they had no such prisoner. We located him just before daylight in a prison within the very walls of Diocletian’s palace and it gave me great pleasure to invoke the admiral’s authority and make the chief of police get out of bed and go with me to release the soldier.
Some girls leaving the vicinity of the Puglia, where they had been visiting with their friends, were, for very devilment, arrested and accused of being loose characters. Menini notified our admiral immediately and he took the matter up vigorously with the local government. The latter claimed that in spite of their protestations of innocence the girls really were bad and that they would prove it. This was an affair that might lead on and on and its solution seemed hardly a fitting job for us. At any rate some sort of apology was exacted but it was far from satisfactory to any chivalrous person. Two women of opposite politics engaged in a public brawl. “Your king is a so and so,” said the Jugoslav. “Yours is a butcher,” shouted the Italian, and again the good offices of the Americans were brought into play.
And then in September, 1919, occurred the so-called Trau affair, which but for the prompt action of the Americans might have brought on an open war between Italy and Serbia.
Trau is a little jewel of a Venetian seaport at the western end of the Canale Castelli. It nestles at the foot of the barren mountains which form the water shed between the valleys of the Kerka and the Cettina rivers. The heart of the little town is surrounded by a fifteenth century wall which is decorated here and there with the conventional lion of St. Marc with his foot resting in the open book of Venetian science. The Jugoslavs have altered one of these marks. They will lead you around behind the church and up an alley and there they will show you the lion of Trau, posed with his foot on a closed book. The book of Venice. Trau is fifteen miles west of Spalato by road, about thirty miles by deep water. The Italian lines were twelve miles to the northwest.
A certain Fanfogna of Trau, dreaming of being a second d’Annunzio, had tantalized some junior officers of the Italian Army of occupation and had persuaded them to join him in a magnificent stroke which would join Trau to Italy and make great men of the bold spirits who accomplished the deed. So early in the morning of September 22 the American senior officer at Spalato received hurried and urgent calls from the Italian captain and the Serbian town major. Two Italian officers and about ninety men in four camions had arrived at Trau before daylight, had surprised and locked up the small Serbian garrison and, placing themselves at the disposition of Fanfogna, had “annexed" Trau to Italy. Governor Millo had promptly disavowed this unauthorized, hot-headed act of the subalterns and had telegraphed Menini to get in touch with the Americans and try to send back the renegades before the Serbians acted in force. Captain Boyd sent the Cowell to Trau and I was to go by motor and take Commander Maroni of the Puglia with me. My job was to intercept the bellicose Colonel Plesnicar of the 13th Serbian Infantry and urge him to wait while Maroni persuaded the misguided Italians to go back where they belonged.
With a large American flag lashed to the bow of the wheezing old Dodge, Maroni and I started out. All along the road warlike steps were in evidence. The Salona bridge was barricaded and machine guns and infantry were disposed for defense of the highway. We found Colonel Plesnicar at Castel Vecchio a few miles from Trau. He grudgingly agreed to the plan and said he would wait for two hours to hear from our efforts before he would advance. Except for the downright urgency and seriousness of the moment and the business in hand one must have laughed at the evident disappointment of this soldier who wanted nothing on earth but a good fight and instead had to wait while tact, diplomacy, and common sense went ahead and deprived him of the best opportunity he had had since the battle of Monastir! Plesnicar insisted that one of his officers should go with us, so Maroni and I were joined by a Serbian lieutenant who spoke French and proved a very level-headed fellow.
On the outskirts of Trau we found two Italian camions and a party of soldiers, most of whom were lying around asleep. Maroni in a few earnest words persuaded their officers to go with us into the town. There we met the other officer and Fanfogna, who tried to take charge of the conversation, but Maroni would not treat with him at all and continued to talk with the army officers. These were not hard to convince and were just about to give orders for their men to assemble for departure when Commander Van Hook of the Cowell arrived. The Italian leader then to save his face told Van Hook that he would go provided the American forces would occupy the town and exclude the Serbs. Van Hook would not hear of such a proposition but he landed a small patrol to cover the disordered period between the departure of the Italians and the reestablishment of the Serbian routine.
One of the camions could not be started and had to be left behind. This caused some disorder, the result of which was that one officer and one man remained behind at Trau. They were placed aboard an Italian motor launch which had followed the Cowell from Spalato. Maroni and I followed the soldiers to the boundary line to make sure they were out of trouble and then I went back to Castel Vecchio and disappointed Colonel Plesnicar by informing him that the Italians were all back in their own zone. Maroni, having done a good day’s work for Italy, returned to Spalato in his motor launch.
This was a close call. These Serbs had no interest in the niceties of diplomacy. Time and again Colonel Plesnicar had bluntly said that he wanted to fight. This day he was suffering from the indignity of having his small garrison surprised and locked up and we knew that when he gave us two hours in which to get that expedition peacefully away from Trau he meant two hours and no more.
Captain Menini reports this affair and adds:
The Serbians took charge of the camion and of several helmets abandoned by our men in their hurried departure; they brought it all to Spalato and carried the booty in triumph through the city as if it was a captured prize of war, singing of the heroic Serb soldiers who as always had been ready to defend the sacred threshold of the country, and one of our helmets was exposed in a shop window with unbecoming humorous inscriptions. . . . . The camion remained in the possession of the Serbian military authority who wished to send it around through the Jugoslav country as a trophy and it took several months of effort of the American admiral to get it back.
I remember going many times to various Serbian military authorities on the subject of this camion. As far as I can remember no one of them ever advanced any good reason why they should keep it but they kept it. And when they did turn it over to us after many weeks it was far from being in the condition in which they had received it. It was one of those trucks with double rear wheels and they had removed one tire from each pair before giving it up.
Menini asked the American captain to publish a manifesto informing the people that the Trau affair had not been an act of the responsible Italian authority, that no such acts were contemplated, and that the people should be calm.
Menini:
Then the American captain, to tell the truth, published a proclamation that was very well done in which after conveying the very conciliatory ideas of Admiral Millo he inserted a fine eulogy of Maroni, saying that everybody should admire the manner in which this Italian officer had executed the instructions of his captain, accomplishing with admirable abnegation a thankless mission against his own compatriots.
The Jugoslav government ruined everything however by adding that the American’s modesty was as great as his love for Jugoslavia and that all the credit for the arrested invasion should go to him. And he, naturally, allowed it to be said.
On July 11, 1920, a real tragedy occurred at Spalato. Captain Menini had some time before been relieved by Commander Tom- maso Gulli, who continued to carry on as before, maintaining the Puglia at Spalato to show the flag and to protect the “conationals.”
On this night, fearing for the safety of some of his officers who were ashore during a disturbance, Captain Gulli sent a small motor boat in to the inner landing with instructions that if further assistance was needed they should fire a Very rocket as a signal. The little boat party found a menacing crowd at the water front and, believing that his brother officers were in trouble, the boat officer fired his Very pistol. Gulli himself took charge of a large motor boat which was armed and ready and rushed to the scene. When he got to the little pier he found a very tense situation but there need not have been even then any serious happening. The chief of police called out to Gulli that his officers were safe at the Italian club and Gulli was probably on the point of ordering his boats back to the ship when the mischief was done. Some one on shore threw a bomb which burst in the crowd. The tense nerves of the people ashore and in the boats were overcome and firing began immediately. Poor Gulli was hit in the stomach and in spite of the efforts of his own people, the Jugoslav doctor, and an American medical officer, he died that night. An Italian enlisted man was also killed.
It was a heart-breaking affair. It served to sober all the people to the realization that such things could not go on. A more tolerant attitude must be assumed by both parties. It was such a cruel lesson!
The American Navy had no repair facilities of its own in that part of the world. Admiral Andrews found the Italian Navy particularly courteous in placing at his disposal its dockyard facilities at very reasonable costs. The dockyard at Venice helped us out in many ways and the old Austro- Hungarian yard at Pola, which was operated by the Italian Navy for a while and then turned over to a commercial company, did a great deal of work for the American Navy.
Having guarded the ex-Austrian battleships Zrinyi and Radetzky for two years, we finally got orders in October, 1920, to turn them over to the Italian Navy. The plan was to tow them out beyond Zirona passage and transfer them to Italian tugs. After waiting for appropriate weather the job was undertaken on November 7. The Olympia put a line to the Radetsky, the Chattanooga to the Zrinyi. Then with a destroyer on each side of each battleship the anchors were weighed and they went ahead. Both the tow lines parted while making the turn to get out of the Canale Castelli but the destroyer captains handled the job skillfully and brought it to a successful conclusion. We had also been custodians of two small torpedo boats, numbers 12 and 52, but these were driven ashore in the fierce bora of October, 1919, and were completely wrecked. As they also were ordered turned over, that transaction was done on paper. The Italians receipted to us and then expended them “where they are as they are,” being careful, however, to get a statement from the Jugoslavs that they would not attempt to use them.
In November, 1920, virtually without warning 7,000 Russian refugees were brought to Cattaro and Ragusa. The Jugoslavs had offered to take care of them and send them to the interior but they had made little or no preparation to receive them. Admiral Andrews got busy and secured the assistance of the American Red Cross in Montenegro which sent doctors, nurses, supplies, and clothing. The American Navy filled the gap until the Red Cross took over. Destroyers were used to transport stores and officials. A Navy doctor was kept available with a destroyer to take him where he was needed. Another destroyer rushed from Venice to Cattaro with serum which averted a typhus epidemic. The refugees were gradually taken inland and the pressure at the coast was reduced.
Little has been heard of this emergency humane service. Hundreds of lives were saved and untold suffering avoided by the prompt action of our forces. Surely in this emergency and in the greater one which occurred in Turkey two years later, the American Navy saved more lives than it would destroy in the course of a great war.
The maps will tell the tale of the allocation of disputed territory. Zara is Italian, the Istrian peninsula, the islands of Cherso, Lussin, Lagosta, and several smaller ones are all part of Italy. Jugoslav names have replaced the Latin names of certain places. Sebenico is now Shibenik, Ragusa is Dubrovnik, Trau is Trogir, Spalato is Split, and the children are grown, those who used to cry, “Long live Wilson because he owns a chocolate factory!”