The College, the Technical School, and the Naval Academy
(See page 123, February, 1930, Proceedings)
Commander H. H. Frost, U. S. Navy.— Commander Rossell’s article is timely. He brings before the service a subject of primary importance. Two main points are made: methods of instruction and changes in the Naval Academy course.
As regards methods of instruction a choice apparently lies between fundamental principles and their practical application. Military writers frequently employ a combination of these methods in the endeavor to tie together the principles and their applications. Their works follow two general lines.
First, we find an enumeration of the principles, which are illustrated by typical concrete examples. This serves a double purpose: it gives the reader a much clearer idea of the principles and adds much to the interest of the subject. An abstract principle is often rather difficult to grasp unless it is reënforced by concrete examples which are readily understood. Also, it is necessary to retain the interest of the student. A mere enumeration of principles is about the dryest reading imaginable. It must be given in small doses. The introduction of concrete illustrations revives the interest of the reader and rests his mind for more heavy work to follow.
Second, we find a group of writers who describe a naval or military campaign in a most interesting manner, using its events to illustrate the principles of warfare. This is a highly effective method—first used, so far as I know, by Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe- Ingelfingen. It is intensely interesting for the student. He absorbs the principles almost without knowing it-—like castor oil in a glass of soda water. It itself is a practical illustration of the present-day principle that you cannot get anyone to read or study anything unless you make it interesting to him. A student can accomplish as much in one hour’s work that he enjoys as in five hours of drudgery.
It occurs to me that possibly either or both of these methods may find some application at the Naval Academy.
Coming now to the question of the Naval Academy course we find that an increased study of cultural subjects is again advocated. The introduction of the machine—typified in the Navy by the change from sail to steam —for many years focused attention on technical subjects. This was reflected in the Naval Academy when Rossell and I endeavored to memorize whole fables of data, pages of facts, and numerous complicated drawings which we feared we might have to reproduce upon the blackboard the next morning. The time for such overemphasis on technical studies seems now to have passed—and we see from the article under discussion that the Naval Academy has followed this general trend of educational thought.
Executive ability is the primary measure of success in both civil and naval life. If you can get the technical knowledge also, by all means do so. It will help you along the first rungs of the ladder. But as you approach the top its influence wanes—and executive ability becomes almost the only measure of your value to the service. This executive ability is obtained—so far as such a quality can be—from broad studies of a so-called cultural nature. History, biography, government, economics, management, leadership, psychology, literature, ability to write and talk, are studies which will give a foundation for the practical experience through which this elusive quality must be obtained.
The Navy is today in closer contact with our people than ever before. We depend vitally upon that contact. We must know our own people: how they think and what they are interested in. We must be able to explain the Navy to them in their own language. We must fit it into their scheme of things. We must be able to show them how it is vital to their safety and prosperity. How can we do this without a knowledge of history, economics, finance, and politics?
Political questions throughout the world are taking on new forms. Mere territorial boundaries are becoming of minor importance. In reality the political and economic boundries of a great nation include portions of almost every country in the world. We have our spheres of economic influence in every corner of the globe. The more subtle methods of economic and political penetration have long ago superseded the clumsy ones of military occupation and annexation. Business rules the world today. The prosperity of a nation depends more and more upon its foreign trade. Those amusing lines of Kipling are a true allegory:
If Schmitt haf collared der dollars, he collars der girl deremit;
But if Schmitt bust in der pizness, we collars der girl from Schmitt.
Our diplomacy supports our trade—and our Navy supports both. That is how our Navy serves as a first line of defense—and not in protecting our boundaries or even outlying possessions. This is the true significance of the London Conference—though as yet no one had been blunt enough to say it.
The Navy goes everywhere. Its flag is seen in every part of the world. It comes into contact with the peoples of every nation. Its influence is immense. It is taking on more and more a political and economic aspect. We can only perform this mission of growing importance, this vital duty for our country, if we know the peoples of the world, their language, their history, their aspirations for the future, their forms of government, their economic methods, and the condition of their finances. Incidentally, even in war the political and economic factors are gaining great importance and fleets must be used against the economic and political structure of the enemy countries as well as against their fleets. All these facts argue for and support Commander Rossell’s plea for more cultural studies in the Naval Academy course.
Nelson and the Court-Martial Tradition
(See page 943, November, 1929, Proceedings.)
Lieutenant J. B. Wellman, U. S. Coast Guard.—This is an exceptionally well-written article on a subject unusual and worthy of study; however, before attributing the breaking of “The Court-Martial Tradition” to Nelson alone, a calm examination of the facts, and of the life and example of John Jervis, Earl St. Vincent, Nelson’s patron, friend, mentor, and superior, shows that to him should go the major portion of the credit here bestowed only upon Nelson, Jervis’ worthy subordinate and successor.
Jervis was one of the most dominating naval characters that ever existed. Enterprising and fearless, “his iron hands stamped his own image on the British Navy and fashioned it into the splendid instrument with which the triumphs of Nelson were won.” Scion of a long line of landed heraldic gentry whose name-ancestor 650 years before had moved to England from France, where the family, Gervaise, also bore an honored name, Jervis, the “mustang,” was peculiarly fitted by birth and early training to discard nonessentials and judge a man by his true worth instead of by birth, rank, or social position, fictitious values which dominated the selection of the officer personnel and official of his day. Seaman, lord, or admiral received the same courtesy in contacts with him, the same quick commendation for a task well done, and the same energetic and forceful criticism for one carelessly executed.
Entering the Royal Navy as an able seaman, Jervis rose to the rank of admiral of the blue through his own sheer merit and ability. He received honors, viscountcy, and earldom as the reward of his untiring energy and resolute determination to accomplish the task of the moment and provide for the trend of the future, finally receiving the highest naval rank, coupled with royal honors, which could be bestowed upon him by King and Parliament.
Napoleon, the major military opponent of Jervis, and Nelson, his own subordinate, were both brilliant geniuses in their own spheres. Jervis, in comparison, was without inspiration. He was the worker, the reasoning thinker who based his decisions on dispassionate thought, the study and lessons of history, and his estimate of the character and mental processes of his opponents.
He was also a most exceptional seaman. As a young officer his masterly handling of whatever vessel he commanded, his quick estimates of the requirements of existing emergencies, his self-discipline and purposefulness, and the study he made of his profession, made him a marked character among his brother officers in the service as well as among those Army officers of discernment who came in contact with him. While in command of the Porcupine and of the advanced squadron which he led past Quebec, General Wolff, who was his passenger, became one of his most enthusiastic friends and admirers. Superiors of ability, whether ashore or afloat, vied with each other to have Jervis assigned to their command, well appreciating the reliability of his character and the thoroughness with which he completed any undertaking. The motto of his family escutcheon, Adversis major, par secundis, “In good fortune great, in adversity greater,” fairly reflects his character.
America has an interest in the life of this great admiral, particularly in the Navy. John Wesley Jarvis, the artist, copies of whose paintings have appeared from time to time in the Proceedings, was a cousin of his, as was also Midshipman Jarvis who was killed in the battle between the Constellation and Vengeance, and for whom one of our early destroyers was named. It is quite a coincidence that both the British and American Navies possess vessels named after cousins: U.S.S. Jarvis, and H.M.S. St. Vincent.
The record of his life is one succession of engagements and distinguished accomplishments, among which might be mentioned his indecisive but severe engagement with a large French privateer in 1759 in his twenty-fifth year, while in command of the Experiment; the naval participation in the capture of Quebec; repelling on the Scorpion, in company with the Superb, a large French squadron en route to capture Newfoundland in 1762; Ushant, in the Foudroyant in 1778; the reliefs of Gibraltar in the Foudroyant in both 1780 and 1781; the capture of the Pegasus with the Foudroyant in 1782, in which battle he was wounded and for which capture he was made a K.B.; the third relief of Gibraltar, and the skirmish off Cape Spartel in the Foudroyant in 1782; the capture of Guadaloupe, Martinique, and Santa Lucia in 1794 while in command of a small squadron; then his assignment to the command of the Mediterranean Fleet in 1795, on which he faced crises of major magnitude, trained that fleet for fourteen months in the manner for which he was famed, and threw it, fifteen strong, against an enemy almost twice his size at Cape St. Vincent in 1797, utterly defeating it, thus beginning what Mahan calls the splendid series of victories that secured for Britain the command of the seas, blocked every maritime ambition of Napoleon for European dominion, and harassed him to defeat.
Every modern power of today calls upon her naval officers for reports on foreign ports, defenses, vessels, and officers, especially estimates of the character and abilities of the latter. This system was originated in modern times by Jervis, who in 1772 obtained leave of absence to tour France, learning the language, meeting her civil, naval, and military authorities, and forming his own estimates of their character as possible future opponents. He also inspected the harbors, defenses, and roadsteads of Brest, Lorient, Quiberon, Rochefort, and Bordeaux. Any student of the later Napoleonic campaigns and the political chaos which led up to the battle of Copenhagen, and Nelson’s plan to operate in the Baltic and destroy the Russian fleet, can appreciate how correctly Jervis estimated the possible trend of events when he finds that the next step of Jervis was the investigation of the harbors, roadsteads, and defenses of Cronstadt, St. Petersburg, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Carlscrans, Lubeck, Hamburg, and the ports of Holland.
All these things merely demonstrate the thoroughness with which Jervis applied himself to details of his profession. All the ships he ever commanded were noted for the perfection of their order and training as well as the general good health of their personnel. When he became admiral he demanded the same application from the officers commanding the different vessels of his fleet, and also that they themselves study and inculcate that habit among the officers under their command. By some of the easygoing, blustering, or negligent officers of the time these demands were considered tyrannically personal and were resisted almost to the point of insubordination. Jervis, never the man to “pass the buck” or permit another to do so, rose to the principle of his motto, “stronger in adversity,” and vigorously crushed the opposition of these officers, who either delivered the desired results or were sent home relieved of their command. The results he obtained and the consequent increase in the efficiency of the fleet under his command prompted Nelson’s admiring and enthusiastic comment that the fleet was composed of “such ships as England hardly ever produced, and commanded by an admiral who will not fail to look the enemy in the face, be their force what it may. Of all the fleets I ever saw, I never beheld one in point of officers and men equal to Sir John Jervis’, who is a commander in chief able to lead them to glory.”
One famous incident illustrates the way he met mutiny. During the insubordination following the mutinies of Nore and Spithead, which in turn affected Jervis’ ships blockading Cadiz, two mutineers were tried on a Saturday, found guilty, and sentenced to be hung. Jervis, persuant to the sentence of the court, ordered the execution to be carried out on the morning of the following day in order to furnish a deterring example to others mutinously inclined which would immediately check further progress of the insubordination. The sentence was carried out. Vice Admiral Thompson censured the execution in a public letter as a profanation of the Sabbath. Jervis immediately relieved Thompson from duty and ordered him home —and did nothing more about it. Another example of the same type occurred in the insubordination of Sir John Orde, whom he also relieved of his duties and ordered home. In both cases the Admiralty looked expectantly for charges on which to base a court-martial of the offenders. Orde on his arrival home preferred charges against Jervis and demanded a court-martial on him, which demands the Admiralty ignored. Jervis, however, preferred no charges even when Orde challenged him to a duel, merely declining the duel on the ground that he “was not personally responsible for public measures taken officially in the interests of the public safety,” a caustic comment which should have checked Orde. The matter becoming public, the King and Admiralty took action which would have resulted in Orde receiving a court-martial had he not receded from his position.
Jervis had his experiences with courts-martial and it is very probable that he himself ordered some on subordinate officers, but the incidents are so rare that the ordinary histories of the times make no mention of them. Had he done so the offenses which required the court must have been of an extremely aggravating nature. Both of the cases cited called for court action yet Jervis merely got rid of the officers concerned, seemingly taking the attitude that a court would be a waste of time and effort when the offenders were so easily got rid of. He educated those whom it was possible to teach, the others he discarded.
Following the abortive battle of Ushant, Keppel, the commander in chief of the British Fleet, received the usual court-martial. Jervis, whose excellent handling of the Foudroyant during that battle had excited the admiration of Keppel and the more discerning officers of the fleet, served notice on all concerned that dissentions and lack of zeal were responsible for the result of the battle, and that had Keppel received the support he should have, and that had all the captains engaged and fought their ships as they ought to, the battle would have ended differently. His testimony, supported by that of the few other captains of like principle largely contributed to Keppel’s acquittal. Previous courts-martial like this had generally resulted in a verdict based on the testimony of captains allied together in cliques for each other’s defense. Anyone was liable to be the scapegoat. Jervis’ testimony, with its cold, succinct exposition of facts and principles, cut the Gordian knot of this practice, and this court-martial marked the beginning of the turning point in the breaking of the “court-martial tradition” under discussion.
As commander in chief, Jervis ever impressed upon his captains the one idea that they were personally responsible for the efficiency of their vessels and the education and training of their officers and crews. “Responsibility” was his watchword, and his phrase, “The true test of a man’s courage is his power to bear responsibility,” has become an axiom. Holding himself within stern limits, he demanded similar self-discipline in his officers. The most disciplined man in the fleet was Jervis himself. He insisted that a captain must be a disciplined and trained man himself if he was to be considered competent to command a ship and set an example to his subordinates; further, that while he was in command he would hold him responsible for the order on that ship. This is exemplified in the case of the Marlborough mutiny as quoted by Mahan in The Influence of Sea Power on the French Revolution and Empire. As for the mutineers among the crews of the vessels, Jervis, faced with desperate conditions, had to adopt desperate measures to preserve his country. Faced with a combination of wily allies headed by Napoleon, one of the greatest military geniuses the world has known; the Mediterranean abandoned by the British fleet; Mann disobedient and fleeing to England with his squadron; the knowledge that the ships at home were demoralized and mutinous with whole ships’ companies seizing and fleeing with their vessels; and that each new draft or accession to his own fleet meant new problems of the suppression of mutiny and the proper discipline and training of the new personnel; with the knowledge that the naval forces of his opponents were numerically several times superior to his own; with England in a panic of apprehension and daily expecting to receive the news of the formation of a new armada of invasion which it could not oppose; with the knowledge that he and his fleet represented the first, and possibly the last line of defense of his country; with all of these conditions facing him he realized that rashness would be ruinous but that the enemy must be defeated wherever met and in whatever combinations, yet with a minimum loss to his own command, for, in spite of the results to him of any battle, his fleet must remain a fleet in being ready to threaten or engage successfully other combinations of the enemy. This could only be accomplished by bringing his own fleet to a state of incomparable efficiency so that ship for ship they were infinitely superior to that of the enemy. He accomplished this, and St. Vincent was the result. With that fleet thus trained Nelson carried on the work.
Jervis knew that the mutineers were in a sense justified. With some immoderate and arbitrary captains who were comparatively unjust in their treatment of their crews, and with venial supply officers and other ships’ officers afloat who stole from the allotments for the crews’ subsistence and fed the crews on little else than filth, he could and did battle, but when it came to the shore establishments and the venial members of the Admiralty who stocked the ships, he was powerless to act. He bided his time, however, until in later years when in Parliament, and also when First Lord of the Admiralty, he forced investigations, prosecutions, and sweeping reforms which shook Britain almost to the throne. The entrenched criminals fought him in politics, anonymously and openly, finally apparently defeating him. Investigations proved that “the depredations on the King’s naval stores amounted to 500,000 pounds per annum!” Jervis censured the Naval Board for conniving at these “irregularities” and insisted on the appointment of a Royal Commission of Inquiry, which uncovered further frauds and criminal corruption. He censured and reprimanded those, often in high position, who had permitted or “winked” at these “irregularities.” Even as the training and discipline he forced on the fleet, which later brought its rewards in the victories of St. Vincent, Aboukir, Trafalgar, and Copenhagen, were resisted most vigorously by those who should have cooperated, so were his blows at the root of the mutinies and corruption in the service. His enemies forced his retirement, thinking that by depriving him of authority they could render him harmless, but he still fought on until the further uncovering of frauds and the defeat of the lobbyists converted Parliament, which finally affirmed “that the conduct of St. Vincent in his late naval administration has added an additional luster to his exalted character, and that he is entitled to the approbation of the House.” The crimes which had provoked the mutinies of Spithead and the Nore were exposed, and in a sense avenged. His exposure of the treasonable criminals who composed the venial and corrupt element among the officials of “the arm-chair navy” and the purveyors to the Admiralty, combined with his demands for better training and efficiency in the fleets and in the dockyards, resulted in drastic re
forms which removed forever from the British Navy any cause for mutiny or disaffection. Had he never done anything else, his fame would rest secure on the results which he here obtained.
His failure to court-martial Orde or Thompson, and his vigorous defense of Keppel in the court-martial which followed Ushant, both demonstrate his conviction that the usual court-martial is too often the refuge of the weak and disputatious, and therein harmful to the service. He held before his officers the fact that “No man is fit to be entrusted with responsibility, or the command of a vessel or fleet, who is not himself a disciplined and intelligent character.”
The breaking of “the court-martial tradition” came, but it came with Jervis, not Nelson, and the Battle of St. Vincent was the supreme example. Nelson, in the third ship from the rear, saw that a situation was developing whereby Jervis’ plan to keep the lee and weather divisions of the Spanish fleet separated while he engaged the weather was on the point of failure. He zealously furthered his chief’s intention by crossing over and placing his ship in the breach ahead of the van ship, the Culloden, and with the support of that ship held the breach, thus preventing the juncture of the enemy forces. Jervis, who but a short time before had been cheering Troubridge on the Culloden for his skillful handling of that ship, on being approached by his chief of staff with the suggestion that Troubridge and Nelson were separated from the rest and should be recalled, replied, “I will not have them recalled. I put my faith on those ships; it is a disgrace that they are separated and not supported.” It is plainly seen that the suggestion that Jervis “could not bring” himself to court-martial Nelson for changing from the rear to the van without orders is far from the actual facts, for Nelson received his unstinted praise as did also some others. As for the rest of the captains, what Jervis’ private comments to them were is apparently not known, but Nelson, in his own criticism of the commanders of different vessels of the fleet, added the statement that Jervis “was not quite content, but says nothing publicly.” So perished “the court-martial tradition,” and here was born a new tradition of approval of spirited furtherance of the intentions of the commander in chief.
It is no detraction to Nelson to place the credit for breaking this tradition where it more logically belongs. Jervis was the greatest organizer and trainer the British Navy ever had, and was, next to Nelson, her greatest commander in chief, free however of the examples of poor judgment and temperament Nelson displayed at Naples. Furthermore, but for Jervis and his early appreciation of Nelson’s true worth and genius, the latter probably would have been court-martialed out of the service instead of dying her national hero. Certain it is that he would never have been entrusted with the series of independent duties prior to St. Vincent or with the command of a fleet afterwards but for Jervis, and it is problematical whether he would have dared look for Parker’s signal of recall with his blind eye at Copenhagen except for the trust he had that Jervis would support him in the principles which prompted him to stay and fight it out with the enemy. Had Jervis been First Lord at the time the fleet left on the Copenhagen campaign it is very unlikely that any other than Nelson would have been in command. As soon as Jervis returned to power this error was corrected, and Jervis, supported by Nelson’s recommendation, quashed every demand and plea for an inquiry on that battle; a battle which had more matter for courts-martial in it than possibly any other before or since.
Nelson understood, and had a deep trust and affection for, Jervis. The only criticism he had for him was on the ruthless methods Jervis took to obtain the needed results; “Where Lord St. Vincent takes a hatchet, I would use a penknife!” He enthusiastically approved the results Jervis sought to obtain, whether those results were the suppression of mutiny among the crews, the crushing of insubordination among the officers, the ending of corruption in the service, the transformation of the various vessels of the fleet into a homogeneous and well- trained unit, or his plans for victorious offensives against the enemy.
With John Jervis, Earl St. Vincent, ably seconded by others, perished “the court-martial tradition.”