FROM APRIL 4 TO MAY 3
ARMS LIMITATION CONFERENCE
American Naval Proposals.—The meeting of the Preparatory Committee for a Disarmament Conference, which from its opening on April 15 at Geneva had been doing little but mark time, was reanimated on April 22 by the very definite proposals made by the chief American delegate, Ambassador Hugh Gibson, regarding methods of naval limitation. Insisting on practical methods that would give some promise of tangible results, Mr. Gibson in the course of his speech made two offers or suggestions: (1) that a way toward naval limitation agreement might be found by working out a common formula for estimating naval values, which would take into account not only tonnage but other important factors such as speed, armament, age, cruising radius, etc.; (2) that the United States was willing to accept as a basis for discussion the French compromise proposal by which nations, after being allowed a fixed total tonnage, should be allowed a degree of freedom in allocating this among various types or categories of ships. Mr. Gibson, stipulated, however, that this method would be acceptable only on condition that no type remained wholly unrestricted.
The American proposals were warmly received, and were very promptly given general approval by Premier Baldwin and the British cabinet, who saw in the reopening of naval discussions a welcome aid to the Conservative government in the approaching Parliamentary elections. It appeared certain, however, that the naval question would not be actually tackled in the April conference, but would be left for a subsequent meeting next autumn, which would give opportunity in the meantime for conferences among the five chief naval powers.
Mr. Gibson’s Speech.—Mr. Gibson’s address began with an appeal for concessions on the part of each nation as the only means of progress. In line with this he said that while the United States had previously insisted on limitation by tonnage and by types, the American delegates were willing to consider the French compromise proposal allowing some freedom in transferring tonnage from one category to another. Then followed his proposal of a “method of measuring naval values:”
My government is disposed to give full and friendly consideration to any supplementary methods of limitation which may be calculated to make our proposals, the French thesis or any other acceptable to other powers, and, if such a course appears desirable, my government will be prepared to give consideration to a method of estimating equivalent naval values which takes account of other factors than displacement tonnage alone. In order to arrive at a basis of comparison in the case of categories in which there are marked variations as to unit characteristics, it might be desirable in arriving at a formula for estimating equivalent tonnage to consider certain factors which produce these variations, such as age of unit, displacement, and caliber of guns. My government has given careful consideration to various methods of comparison and the American delegation will be in a position to discuss the subject whenever it comes before the commission.
In alluding briefly to these possible methods I desire to lay special emphasis on the fact that for us the essential thing is the achievement of substantial results. Methods are of secondary importance.
Following this, Mr. Gibson declared that the United States was ready to agree to a plan for limitation at even lower levels which would still maintain the relative status of the chief naval powers as established in existing treaties. He suggested scrapping the term limitation in favor of reduction, as a more positive word. (This change was later avoided when it was brought up in connection with land armaments by the Soviet delegate.) Mr. Gibson insisted further that limitation or reduction must include all types:
My government believes that there can be no complete and effective limitation of armament unless all classes of war vessels, including cruisers, destroyers and submarines, are limited. It could not agree to any method which would result in leaving any class of combatant vessels unrestricted. In its reply, under date of September 28, 1928, to communications from the British and French Governments concerning an understanding reached between them as a basis of naval limitation, my government pointed out that this understanding applied to only one type of cruiser and one type of submarine, and would leave totally unlimited a large class of effective fighting units. This note also called attention to the American position at the Geneva naval conference and the fact that a proposal for general reduction was urged by the American delegation.
The willingness of my government, I may even say its eagerness, to go to low levels is based upon the fundamental belief that naval needs are relative, namely, that what we may require for our defense depends chiefly upon the size of the navies maintained by others. Aside from the signatories of the Washington Treaty there is no conceivable combination of naval powers which could threaten the safety of any of the principal naval powers. What justification can there be for the powers which lead in the respective classes of naval vessels to sanction further building programs in those classes? In the case of the United States we have already expressed our willingness to agree on a basis that would mean a substantial reduction of our present destroyer and submarine types. In the case of cruisers, it is only possession by others of greatly superior strength in this class which has led to the adoption of the present building program.
The Measurement Formula.—As reported in the New York Times of April 23, Admiral Hilary P. Jones explained the naval formula referred to by Mr. Gibson as follows:
The method or formula which the American naval staff has worked out, is explained by Admiral Jones as follows: A new 10,000-ton cruiser armed with 8-inch guns would be taken as the standard and receive a rating of, say, 10,000 tons “equivalent tonnage.” In other words, it is an arbitrary index number with “value of weights” expressed in equivalent and not displacement tonnage.
Then the value of any other cruiser would be estimated on the basis of its relative age, displacement and gun power, allowance being made according to a determined percentage when any one of these three factors differed from the standard. Thus the equivalent tonnage of a new 6,000-ton cruiser with 6-inch guns would benefit by reduction both for displacement and gun power so that its equivalent tonnage would be less than 6,000, and the same vessel, if old or obsolete, would get an even lower equivalent tonnage rating.
By adding the equivalent tonnage for each cruiser and each navy, one would get the total existing equivalent tonnage, which might be lower or higher than the displacement tonnage. Reduction then would be based on the total equivalent tonnage, as representing real value, instead of on displacement tonnage, which represents only one factor in value.
The complicated technical part of the formula consists in determining what factors to include and how much percentage to allow for each. It is stressed in American quarters that though the formula includes only three factors, the Americans are willing to consider adding others, such as speed, cruising radius, number of cannon, etc.
American Concession on Land Forces.—In accordance with a promise made in his speech on naval limitation, Mr. Gibson on April 26 put forth in behalf of his government a definite concession in the matter of army effectives, withdrawing objections to the view, held especially by France, that trained reserves should not be counted as “army effectives” in any scheme of reduction. Thus he went over to the concession made by England in connection with the abortive Anglo-French Naval Agreement of last year. In doing so, Mr. Gibson called on other nations to make similar sacrifices. His concession was hailed by the French delegates, and also by the Japanese, as “a way out of many difficulties;” but as the conference went on little disposition was manifested on the part of the European delegates to offer corresponding concessions for the common cause.
American Suggestions Criticised.—In the general enthusiasm over the American proposals at Geneva, the note of criticism was not conspicuous. However, Baron Sakamoto, naval member of the Japanese House of Peers, “admitted frankly” that Japan would not be willing to extend the 5-5-3 ratio to all classes of naval vessels, and especially to cruisers. In the United States, Chairman Britten of the House Naval Committee expressed a feeling about the activities at Geneva which seemed to be somewhat prevalent in Congress.
Chairman Britten declared that Mr. Gibson’s suggestion that trained army reserves be not included in computing military strength was equivalent to agreeing that ships in reserve, but ready to fight, should not be included in establishing naval strength.
“This is the second time in ten days that Gibson has played directly into the hands of British and French diplomacy,” Mr. Britten said, “the first being his proposal to accept the British category theory for measuring the naval strength of the leading powers, instead of by global tonnage as was the case in the Washington conference.”
“I have been unable to learn,” Mr. Britten continued, “that the complete surrender of American principles of the past now advanced by Ambassador Gibson has been approved by either the Navy General Board or the General Staff of the army. It will be interesting to learn by what authority Gibson is proposing to negotiate European treaties.
“American world position must not be used to deceive the weaker nations into accepting a make-believe disarmament agreement which will never be ratified by the United States. The present meeting in Geneva is the sixth session of the Disarmament Preparatory Commission, extending over a period of years.
“Nothing has come of the past meetings and the present one will end in the usual fiasco. As an exhaust chamber for the smaller nations it has been a great success.
“As a justification for the maintenance by England and France of large military and naval establishments, it is a howling success. It is quite evident that our representative is playing with those in power in Europe, but the less we have to do with diplomatic log-rolling and secret agreements over there, the better. We are too credulous and too young at this game of deception and intrigue.”
International Law Code.—The League of Nations Secretariat on April 11 received from the United States State Department, in answer to a questionnaire sent out on codification of international law, two long memoranda on the topics of nationality and of territorial waters, with promise of a third relating to the responsibility of states for injuries to foreigners in their territory. The contents of these were not made public, but the response made by the United States was taken as giving assurance that it would participate in the conference which the league has called for next year to attempt a codification of international law on the basis of the replies to its questionnaire. A second meeting of the Preparatory Commission for this conference was set to meet in May.
REPARATIONS CONFERENCE
Breakdown Threatened.—The return of the German delegate Dr. Schacht from Berlin on May 2, and news on May 3 that the American chairman, Mr. Owen D. Young, had made a new compromise proposal for annual payments averaging somewhere under $500,000,000, offered apparently the last hope for a successful outcome of the Conference of Experts on the Reparations Question which had been in session at Paris, for the preceding ten weeks.
The plans and expectations of the conference suffered a complete upset when Dr. Schacht on April 17 at last presented a definite statement of what Germany was willing to pay, but in terms hopelessly below the demands of the debtor powers. His memorandum made two alternative offers: (1) a flat annuity for thirty-seven years of 1,650,000,000 marks ($396,000,000) with an estimated present value of about $6,360,000,000, to be paid “unconditionally” provided Germany was granted among other things “access to overseas raw materials,” preferential tariff treatment, and economic contact with the detached province of East Prussia; (2) payment of the same amount, over the same period, but subject to the protection of the “transfer clause” which would relieve Germany from meeting her annuities in the event of a financial crisis.
This German offer was 200,000,000 marks below the lowest annuity proposed by the creditor states, and about 550,000,000 below their estimate of the average payments Germany should make over fifty-eight years. In other words Germany offered fifteen billion dollars over thirty-seven years, and was asked for twenty-eight billion over fifty-eight years. The German proposal furthermore—at least the second and only practical one—made no provision for the unconditional payments on which was based the whole conference plan for converting a certain part of the debt into negotiable bonds. Up to the close of April, Germany made no offer of better terms, though faced clearly with the alternative of return to the payment of 2,500,000,000 marks under the Dawes Plan, with continued military occupation and political strain.
Drafting of Report.—In spite of the setback resulting from the German attitude, the Conference was expected to continue in session at least until the middle of May, occupying itself with the drafting of a detailed report, which by its evidence of work accomplished would prove the conference not altogether fruitless. It was stated that this report would give the conclusions of the committee regarding Germany’s economic progress, capacity to pay, scope of the proposed international bank, and advantages of the new plan of payments over the Dawes plan. So far as completed, it was said to be an admirable report, acceptable to the German delegates as well as the rest, and lacking only the amount Germany would pay.
UNITED STATES
Arbitration of “I’m Alone” Dispute.— On April 26 the correspondence between the United States and Canada regarding the sinking of the rum-runner I’m Alone was made public, and it was announced that Canada had agreed to the American proposal that the case be submitted to arbitration, as provided for in Art. 4 of the Anglo-American Ship Liquor Treaty. This specifies that claims “shall be referred for the consideration of two persons,” one of whom shall be nominated by each nation. If no agreement is thus reached, it will be referred to a claims commission consisting of an American and a Canadian and an additional neutral member.
The correspondence, while notably cordial in tone, showed wide disagreement both as to the facts of the case and the points of law involved. There was uncertainty as to whether the I’m Alone when first approached was 10.8 miles from shore, as stated by the Coast Guard officers, or from 14.2 to 15 miles, as stated by her captain. Canada argued that the “doctrine of hot pursuit” outside territorial waters was not applicable when the pursuit began outside the old three-mile limit; that in this case the pursuit was not continuous; and that the subsequent firing and sinking were uncalled for. The United States, on the other hand, argued that the legality of pursuit from within one hour’s steaming distance was implied in the Ship Liquor Treaty, that the pursuit was continuous by units under one command, and that force was used only as a last resort.
MEXICO
Revolt Crushed.—The backbone of the revolutionary movement in Mexico, carried on during the past two months primarily by a group of discontented military officers, was broken by the crushing defeat administered to the rebels by the government forces at Jiminez on April 2, and the slaughter at La Reforma on the next day. At the close of April some of the rebel leaders crossed into the United States, and others, as at Nogala on April 30 and Agua Prita on May 1, formally surrendered to the federal authorities. On May 3, Gen. Jose Gonzalo Escobar, the rebel commander-in-chief who was elected provisional president on April 8, was still at large, but was expected to seek refuge outside Mexico. In the two months of operations the federal army remained loyal and was ably led. The government superiority in aircraft especially put the rebellion under a fatal handicap. It appeared clear that air control will play a decisive part in future Latin-American uprisings.
During the Mexican hostilities, an American negro soldier was shot near Naco, Arizona, in a clash with Mexican rebels attempting to smuggle munitions into Mexico. In the same vicinity on April 6, bombs were dropped by Mexican aircraft on the American side of the line, leading to the dispatch of eighteen U. S. Army airplanes for border patrol with orders to fire on any Mexican craft flying over American territory.
GREAT BRITAIN
British Elections.—An interesting development of the hot three-party fight of Conservatives, Liberals, and Labor before the May Parliamentary elections in England was the bitter attack on the Balfour debt settlement principle made in the House of Commons on April 16 by Former Chancellor of the Exchequer Philip Snowden of the Labor party. He criticised the debt settlements made by the Conservative government and declared that if the Labor party went into power it reserved the right to repudiate the “infamous Balfour principle”—that England would demand from the allied debtors only enough to cover her payments to the United States. His speech created a sensation, for it apparently threatened the permanence of previous and pending debt agreements. Subsequently, speaking in Parliament, leader Ramsay Macdonald of the Labor Party declared that his party would hold to all existing agreements, until changed by mutual consent.
British Budget.—Mr. Snowden’s attack on the debt settlement occurred during the discussion in Parliament of Chancellor of the Exchequer Churchill’s budget speech on April 15. The new British budget estimates the revenues at $4,133,000,000 and expenditures at $4,112,000,000, leaving a surplus of $21,000,000. The most significant item, taken as the chief Conservative bid for support in the May elections, was the immediate and empire-wide abolition of the tax on tea. It was figured that this would reduce revenues by $30,000,000, but would effect an immediate reduction of 8 cents a pound to the consumer.
Gen. Dawes Ambassador to England. —On April 10 it was announced that former Vice-President Charles G. Dawes had accepted from President Hoover an appointment as United States Ambassador at the Court of St. James to succeed Mr. Alanson B. Houghton. His appointment was warmly acclaimed in the British press. At the close of April Mr. Dawes had completed his work as chairman of the Dominican Budget Commission and sailed thence to New York.
EUROPEAN POLITICS
Germany Excludes Trotsky.—The German Cabinet in April definitely refused Leon Trotsky’s request for domicile in Germany. The decision was generally approved by the press, with the exception of a few Socialist and liberal papers, and even by the German Communists, who were influenced by the hostility toward Trotsky on the part of the Stahlin regime in Russia.
Polish Cabinet Reorganized.—Dictator Josef Pilsudski of Poland reorganized his cabinet in April on a more distinctly military basis. Major Kasimir Switalski, wartime officer of Pilsudski’s Polish Legion, became prime minister, and three colonels of Pilsudski’s personal following were given prominent cabinet posts.
New Austrian Ministry.—On April 30, twenty-seven days after the resignation of Chancellor Seipel and his cabinet, a new ministry was organized in Austria under Dr. Ernst Streeruwitz of the conservative Christian Socialist party. The new cabinet is viewed with disfavor by the radical Socialists because of Dr. Streeruwitz’s association with the Austrian fascist organization known as the Heimwehr. He is also an ardent advocate of the Anschlusz, or union with Germany.
FAR EAST
Hankow Rebels Defeated.—Early in April the revolt against the Nanking government in China centering in the Hankow region suffered a sudden and almost complete collapse. On April 4 the fortifications around Hankow were abandoned before the advance of President Chiang Kai-shek’s forces, and the rebel leaders either retreated or went over to the government. As in the case of the sudden ending of the revolt at Canton, judicious use of Nationalist funds facilitated the easy victory at Hankow.
Nanking Rule Threatened.—Despite the defeat of the Hankow rebels, President Chiang on April 10 declared his intention to resign upon his return to Nanking, holding himself responsible for not having prevented the uprising. Though Chiang’s threat of resignation was not carried out, events during April revealed the increasing difficulties confronting the Nanking regime through the disaffection of Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang. Feng apparently regarded it as a breach of faith on the part of the Nanking leaders that both the Hankow and Shantung provinces were not put under his control. It was proposed that upon the evacuation of Shantung by the Japanese, Feng’s army of 40,000 in that province should occupy Tsinan-fu and the inland stretch of 125 miles of railway leading to the coast, while President Chiang would send troops to control Tsingtao and the coastal region. This compromise offer was refused by Feng, and the evacuation of Tsinan-fu by the Japanese was consequently postponed at the request of Nanking—a delay which did not serve to raise President Chiang in popular favor. Feng’s policy, it is said, is to avoid open hostilities at least until late summer, when the sentiment against the present authorities will have risen to a point where it may be construed as a mandate for him to take control. Meantime he has received overtures from his former enemy, Dictator Chang Hsueh-liang of Manchuria, who now declares the Nationalist movement betrayed by the leaders at Nanking.
Japanese Evacuation of Shantung.— As stated above, the evacuation of Shantung by the Japanese, scheduled to begin on April 15 and to be completed by May 25, was delayed at the request of Nanking. Most of the Japanese troops and munitions, however, had already been concentrated at Tsing-tau, and the province outside the chief cities was left in a state of anarchy. On May 1, it was stated from Tokio that the Japanese would complete evacuation by May 25 as originally planned, arrangements having been completed for the control of Tsinan-fu by Nanking troops.
In the Chefoo region, Marshal Chang Chung-chang’s forces occupying Chefoo suffered a severe defeat on the night of April 21-22 in their siege of the Nationalists at Ninghaichow. Chang’s forces were driven from Chefoo, and on May 1 it was reported that Chang had attempted to take refuge at Port Arthur, but had been prevented from landing by the Japanese authorities.