On the next page is shown a reproduction of a sheet of foolscap which had a most interesting and important part to play in the birth of our Navy. The endorsement on the reverse side of the sheet reads:
ORIGIN OF THE NAVY
At a caucus in 1794 consisting of Izard, Morris, and Ellsworth, of the Senate, of Ames, Sedgwick, Smith, Dayton, etc. of the Repres. and of Secrets. Hamilton and Knox to form a plan for a national Navy, Smith began the within figuring as Secret’y of the meeting. Hamilton then took the pen, and instead of minuting the proceed’gs, he made all the flourishes here described, during the discussion. In conseq. of the plan adopd at this meetg, a Bill was reported for building 6 frigates, which formed the foundatn or origin of the American Navy.
The “figuring” on the top of the page reads:
First cost of a frigate 44 guns of 1,300 tons and provisions for six months, 150,000
350 men, 50,000
Provisions for six months, 11,000
Total, 211,000
Annual cost of such vessel, 60,000 Drs.
The rest of the page seems to have been the aimless marking of a man preoccupied with important matters. Similar scratches were made on the reverse side of the sheet but to a less extent.
The original of this document is preserved by the Charleston Library Society, but no one seems to know who presented it to the institution or how long it has been there. The writer of the above indorsement is unknown, but he must have been one of the men present at the caucus, as he writes as though he were an eyewitness of its proceedings. It is possible that the writer was Ralph Izard, a senator from South Carolina, and a member of the caucus. He may well have preserved the document, and later in his life have presented it to the Charleston Library Society. The sheet bears no date except 1794, but its approximate date may easily be determined by a brief study of its historic setting.
In the years prior to 1794 Algiers and Portugal had been at war and though Portugal had never taken very active measures against the Algerian coast, she had kept a strong naval force at Gibraltar, and prevented quite effectually any corsair of this state from venturing out in the Atlantic. This state of affairs had proved very useful to the rest of Christendom for it left Atlantic commerce free from their molestation. Quite unexpectedly this war had been brought to a close in 1793, and it was broadly hinted on the floor of the House that Britain played a vital part in bringing about the truce. This peace or truce allowed the rovers to come into the Atlantic, and the consequences to American commerce were soon evident. A squadron consisting of four ships, three xebecs, and a brig immediately passed Gibraltar, and by October 9, 1793, four American vessels with their crews had fallen into their hands.
President Washington on December 16, 1793, laid before the House and Senate jointly a report from the Secretary of State concerning measures that had been pursued for obtaining a recognition of the treaty with Morocco, for the ransom of American prisoners and for the establishment of peace with Algiers. At the same time he sent certain confidential communications on the subject of ransoms and tributes to be paid to the Barbary States.
On December 17, 18, and 19, these communications were read and discussed by the House. On December 24 a second message was received jointly by the House and Senate:
Gentlemen of the Senate and the House of Representatives:
Since the communications which were made you on the affairs of the United States and Spain, and on the truce between Portugal and Algiers, some other papers have been received, which, making a part of the same subjects, are now communicated for your information.
December 23, 1793.
George Washington
These communications were read and discussed at length in the House sitting in Committee of the Whole on the twenty- fourth, and again on the twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh, the thirtieth, and thirty-first, and on January 1, 1794. (Congress was not in session on December 28, 29.) The question as to what action should be taken against Algiers was of vital moment, and occupied nearly the entire time of the House.
Three resolutions were reported on the first which were read before the House the following day. (January 2, 1794.)
The first resolution read:
Resolved, That a sum not exceeding— dollars be appropriated, in addition to the provision heretofore made, to defray any expense which may be incurred in relation to the intercourse between the United States and foreign nations.
The second resolution read:
Resolved, That a naval force, adequate to the protection of the commerce of the United States against the Algerian corsairs, ought to be provided.
Both these resolutions were agreed to by the House.
The third resolution was far more definite in tone:
Resolved, That a committee be appointed to report to the House the naval force necessary for the purposes aforesaid together with an estimate of the expense.
A motion was made and seconded to amend this resolution by adding the words “and the ways and means of defraying the same.”
On the vote the resolution as amended passed by a majority of two, 46 in favor and 44 opposed to the resolution.
The nine men who were appointed to serve on this committee brought in a report on the twentieth. This report stated that the naval force necessary for the protection of the trade of the United States should consist of four ships of forty-four guns each, 18- and 9-pounders, and two ships of twenty guns each. The aggregate sum needed for these vessels was estimated in round numbers at $600,000. The report then went into details as to how this sum was to be raised.
This report was brought up for discussion on February 6, and continued on the seventh, and again on the tenth. James Madison was most active in opposition to any proposal for naval armament. He maintained that before the American squadron could be equipped, the truce between Portugal and Algiers might expire. He would save the money intended for the fleet and hire the Portuguese ships of war with these same funds as soon as their truce ended. He wished that the House sitting in Committee of the Whole would reject this report and when they did so, he would move a resolution “that the sum of— dollars be provided to be employed in such a manner as should be found most effectual for obtaining a peace with the Regency of Algiers, and failing in this, that the sum should be applied for obtaining protection from some of the European Powers.” Thomas Fitzsimmons, of Pennsylvania, opined that two American frigates with the Portuguese vessels should be sufficient. John Smilie, another congressman from Pennsylvania, thought that Britain would assist Algiers underhandedly against any fleet we might equip. Other members spoke in a similar vein.
On February 21 the House acted on the resolution, “That a naval force, to consist of four ships of forty-four, and two ships of twenty guns each, be provided for the protection of the commerce of the United States.” This was resolved in the affirmative by a vote of 43 to 41.
On March 5 a bill for providing naval armament was formally presented. On the same day the President sent a message to both the House and Senate, dated March 3:
I transmit to you an extract of a letter from Mr. Short relative to our affairs with Spain, and copies of two letters from our Minister in Lisbon, with their enclosures containing intelligence from Algiers; the whole of their communications are made in confidence…
G. Washington
The enclosures mentioned included a letter from Colonel David Humphreys, our commissioner to Algiers, to the Secretary of State, dated from Madrid, December 25, 1793. M which he said:
It appears absurd to trust to the fleets of Portugal, or any other nation, to protect and convoy our trade. If we mean to have a commerce, we must have a naval force to defend it.
A second enclosure was from one Captain Richard O’Brien, then a captive in Algerian hands. This letter was addressed to Colonel Humphreys under date of December 6, 1793- He wrote in part:
I see no alternative, but for the United States with all possible speed, to fit out ten sail of forty-gun frigates, six brigs of war of eighteen guns each, and four schooners of sixteen guns each. These to be the fastest sailing vessels ever built in America.
There was also enclosed a petition signed by thirteen American captives in Algerian hands, all masters of American merchant vessels. In the petition they described the hardships and privations that they endured and begged for deliverance by their government. And finally there was enclosed a list of American vessels captured by the corsairs of Algiers. This list showed that there were 13 American ships and 119 American seamen in Algerian hands on December 29, 1793-.
This message of the President’s with the documents accompanying it stimulated Congress to action, for on March 7 the House went into Committee of the Whole to consider this bill to provide naval armament. It was moved to strike out the clause to provide two ships of twenty guns, and to substitute two ships of thirty-six guns. A long and somewhat acrimonious debate followed on the bill on March 10, but it finally passed the House by a majority of eleven, 50 in favor of, and 39 opposed to it.
On the same day the bill went to the Senate where it was read the first time. On the thirteenth it was read a second time, and on the seventeenth it was read again and referred to a committee consisting of Senators Langdon, Morris, Butler, Taylor, and Cabot. This committee reported amendments on the eighteenth which were adopted in part. The next day the bill was read before the Senate again and passed. The House agreed to the amendments the same day. The bill finally became a law by the approval of the President, March 27, 1794.
This bill, of so much consequence to the future history of the nation, was not passed without strong, determined opposition, as the close margin of votes readily shows, and won a majority in its favor only by the insertion of a clause that should peace be established with Algiers, all further proceedings under the act should cease.
Senator Maclay, commenting on an earlier attempt to provide naval armament for the nation, said:
It is the design of the Court party to have a fleet and an army. This is but the entering wedge of a new monarchy in America, after all the bloodshed and suffering of a seven years’ war to establish a republic. The Indian War is forced forward to justify our having a standing army, and eleven unfortunate men now in slavery in Algiers is the pretext for fitting out a fleet. [And again he wrote:] This thing of a fleet has been working among our members all the session. I have heard it break out often. It is another menace to our republican institutions.
When the three resolutions were passed on January 2, 1794, no definite plans for naval armament seem to have crystallized, but in the eighteen days succeeding the committee of nine formulated very definite plans for the building of a navy, which they embodied in their report of January 20. The caucus referred to in the document shown here would hardly have met after the committee of nine had made such a definite report, so it would seem that the caucus of which we have this record must have met at some time between the second and the twentieth of January, 1794.
It is interesting to note that Ames and Dayton, both present at the caucus, each voted against the third resolution of January 2, but in favor of the resolution of February 21, and in favor of the bill presented on March 10. With only a majority of two in support of each resolution, the bill needed every supporter to be obtained, and it is possible that the astute Hamilton invited these two men to the caucus in an endeavor to win them over in support of the bill.
This interesting sheet of foolscap helps to clear up a debated point in our early history. The biographer of Henry Knox, Secretary of War under Washington, states that Jefferson and Knox were the only supporters in the Cabinet of this bill for the establishment of a navy, and that Hamilton was opposed to it; that the bill was only passed by the sanguine confidence of Knox in its success, and by his strenuous efforts for its accomplishment. Many years afterward John Adams wrote to Jefferson (October 15, 1822) that as he remembered, Washington and Hamilton were both averse to the measure. Jefferson answered him soon after (November 1, 1822) stating that as he remembered, the President approved of the measure, but that he did not precisely remember Hamilton’s views on the subject. But if Hamilton attended a caucus with Knox, its strong supporter and advocate, for the purpose of furthering the interests of the measure—-for such must have been the aim of this meeting—then Hamilton must have been at least mildly in favor of it: though he well may have had misgivings as to how he, as Secretary of the Treasury, would raise funds to pay the expense of building and maintaining a fleet.
Knox must have been sanguine of the success of the measure for on February 3, 1794, he invited Joshua Humphreys, the marine architect, to come to the War Office to consult with him.
Mr. Humphreys accepted the invitation and related the subjects that were discussed by the War Secretary and himself at this meeting:
I attended; the subject under consideration was the construction of a navy, whereat I set forth the principles on which I recommended frigates should be built, as expressed in a letter which I had addressed to Hon. Robert Morris.
Mr. Humphreys refers here to a letter which he had written to Morris on January 6, 1793, stating the principles which should govern the construction of a class of vessels not hitherto in existence.