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THE ORIGINS OF THE WORLD WAR. By Sidney B. Fay, Professor of Modern European History in Smith College. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928, 2 vols., $9.00.
Reviewed by Captain J. K. Taussig, U. S. Navy
Every naval officer should read the two volumes of this remarkable work. Whether or not one agrees entirely with the author’s conclusions or believes that all the available factors and events that may have had a direct or indirect bearing on the causes of the Great War have been considered, I believe that every fair-minded reader will agree that these volumes represent an amount of meticulous research, unbiased consideration, and careful compilation that mark the volumes as a monumental work of the greatest historical importance.
Not only does one find a great store of diplomatic history, but also, and to a degree that aids much in the pleasurable reading, a keen insight into the character and characteristics of the rulers, statesmen, diplomats, and military authorities whose words and actions had at least some bearing on the trend of events that led finally to the conflict.
It is possible that, in view of the fact that Professor Fay does not find Germany solely responsible for bringing on the war, many may think him pro-German in his views. But as we read on through the book, we find ample testimony to show that the intricate combination of circumstances finally leading up to war was not brought about by any one nation but by a maze of combinations that required intensive research and study to reveal and elucidate.
In the first chapter, which the author terms “An Introduction,” we find a complete analysis, in a very general form, of the immediate and underlying causes of the Great War.
The author shows that all the early state publications issued by the various powers, known as the Red, Blue, Yellow Books, etc., were framed as propaganda; that many of these books, while giving partial correspondence, did not give the whole of it; that very few of them told the whole truth and nothing but the truth; and some of them even made changes in original documents to suit their efforts in attempting to place the blame for starting the war on another country.
It is pointed out that for this reason it was impracticable to judge the direct causes of the war from these documents. Particularly is attention called to the fact that in framing the peace treaty the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War, presided over by Mr. Lansing, had no German representative present, and that the German White Book, which had been issued, did not receive the attention which it warranted. This was later admitted by one of the members of the commission.
The author then proceeds to discuss later information which has been issued by the various nations concerned and which, being much more complete than the early books, places a somewhat different aspect on the whole matter. He also discusses the large number of reviews, memoirs, and recollections of various high personalities, and gives an excellent, brief review of these books, stating wherein they are prejudiced or contain errors.
Since the book is an analysis of the origins of the World War, it is quite natural that the author should acquire very definite ideas as to wherein the responsibilities lie. For example, he states: “Count Berehtold, who more than anyone else was responsible for the World War, has long kept silent except for a few short and tardy exculpatory articles, but his memoirs are now announced for early publication.” Of M. Poincare’s part, the author states: “He (Poincare) believed a European War inevitable; in tightening the Entente and in making promises to Russia he did, in fact, tend to make it inevitable. Herein lies his responsibility.”
In writing of the responsibility of the Servian government in the assassination of the Austrian archduke, he points out that Ljuba Jovanovitch, who was minister of education in 1914, in his book titled The Blood of Slavdom, describes how some of the cabinet were aware of the Sarajevo plot for nearly a month, and yet, in spite of this guilty knowledge, took no effective steps to arrest the conspirators or to warn the Austrian authorities of the impending danger. Other revelations which followed placed the Austro-Servian conflict in a new light, which, if true, greatly increased the burden of Servia’s share of responsibility. Of the British part in starting the war, we find a number of interesting statements of particular significance to naval officers, in that he touches on the questions of sea power and limitation of naval armaments. The author quotes Sir Edward Grey’s statement made behind closed doors to the Dominion premiers in May, 1911: “What really determines the foreign policy of this country is the question of sea power.”
It is evident that the author considers the German refusal to limit naval armaments when proposed to be one of the underlying causes of the war, as he calls it “Germany’s folly” not to have accepted the British proposal.
Much stress is laid on Viscount Grey’s book Twenty-five Years, 1892-1916, which the author considers the best of the memoirs that have been written. However, he points out that Sir Edward, like practically all the statesmen on both sides, was suspicious of other countries, and that this suspicion was one of the causes that finally brought about the war. He says:
Though Germany’s actions gave much ground for suspicion, as we shall see, this particular suspicion of Sir Edward Grey’s was wholly incorrect. But the fact that he harbored it must be accounted one of the immediate causes of the War, because it contributed to the failure of Germany’s eleventh hour effort to prevent a general European conflagration.
In discussing the underlying causes of the war in a general way the author states that they can be conveniently grouped under five heads: (a) the system of secret alliances; (b) militarism; (c) nationalism; (d) economic imperialism; (e) the newspaper press.
Of particular interest to us is the discussion under militarism, in which the author, while not giving a definition of the term, which he states is often used vaguely, considers it to include,
at least two definite conceptions. First, the dangerous and burdensome mechanism of great standing armies and large navies, with the attendant evils of espionage, suspicion, fear, and hatred. Second, the existence of a powerful class of military and naval officers, headed by the General Staff, who tend to dominate, especially at a time of political crisis, over the civilian authorities.
In discussing the effect of army and navy officers, he states that: “Quite aside from any personal motives, the military officers in all countries had a high sense of national honor and patriotic duty. It was their supreme duty to be ready at any moment to protect the state by force of arms.” Yet at the same time he states the fallacious argument which is usually given by pacifists: “To these professional fighters war held out the prospect of quick promotion and great distinction.” I think that he ignores the fact that the professional fighters who carry enough weight with the civilian authorities in regard to the matter of whether or not there shall be war have already reached the pinnacle of promotion and are usually officers of distinction. This statement of the author is one of the few that he makes for which I believe there is no foundation in fact in respect to military officers in general.
The author makes the statement:
But a general mobilization according to prevailing military opinion actually did make war inevitable. It was a process virtually impossible to hold when once begun. This was one of the greatest evils of militarism. It is always at a crisis, precisely when it is most difficult for diplomats to keep their heads clear and their hands free, that militarist leaders exert their influence to hasten decisions for war or get the upper hand altogether.
In summing up the influence of militarism upon the civilian authorities, he holds that it was “a serious matter in the three eastern monarchies of Germany, Austria, and Russia. It was much less in France and virtually non-existent in England, where civilian ministers were ordinarily in charge of the army and navy.”
In some of the examples cited to show the influence of militarism in causing the war, it would seem that the actions of the military and naval leaders with respect to preparations were not in themselves causes, but were in reality effects due to the actions of the statesmen and diplomats. The military and naval officers prepared for eventualities which were being forced by their governments and which, if not foreseen by them, would have placed them in the role of incompetents and made them the recipients of unjust censure, when the war eventually arrived.
The discussion under the effect of the newspaper press is most interesting, as the author states “Another underlying cause of the war was the poisoning of public opinion by the newspaper press in all of the great countries.” He gives a specific example of this in the press feud carried on between Austria and Servia in the weeks following the' murder of the Archduke Ferdinand. He states:
Here was a case in which the governments of both countries, instead of apologizing for their press or trying to restrain it, deliberately allowed the newspapers to incite public opinion and fire it to an indignation and enthusiasm for war. It would perhaps be too much to say that had it not been for this Austria-Servian newspaper feud the war might have been averted, but it is true that the violence of the Servian press was one of the determining factors which led Count Tisza to change his opinion and to accept war with Servia, whereas at first he had been stubbornly opposed to it; and without his consent Count Berchtold and the militarists could not have made war on Servia.
The author takes up the detailed history of the subject with a discussion of the secret alliances beginning in 1871, which was the date of the end of the Franco-Prussian War. By this war Germany was transformed into a strong, unified empire and became one of the predominating nations of Europe.
One may doubt as to whether the underlying causes of the Great War really began in 1871 with the signing of the treaty that ended the Franco-Prussian War. Were not some of the results of the Napoleonic wars still felt throughout Europe, causing race and national hatreds and jealousies of which the French-German situation was only one? The balance of power so necessary to stability, and the settlement of which was so essential for peace, was lacking throughout Europe prior to the Franco-Prussian War, which seemed only to add to the previous disquietude.
However, it is interesting to note that the author apparently considers that clause of the treaty ending the Franco-Prussian War, which gave to Germany Alsace and Lorraine, as the main reason for the disturbed conditions in Europe which followed up to the beginning of the Great War. He states, in referring to the annexation of Alsace- Lorraine by Germany: “History shows that it was worse than a crime. It was a blunder.”
In regard to Bismarck and this Alsace- Lorraine matter, the author states: “Bismarck had mutilated a living body and the wound would not heal; it was to remain an awful, open sore, threatening the peace of Europe for forty years.”
It seems that Bismarck did not appreciate that the affront to France would be remembered for so long, it always being his opinion that the bitterness caused by this separation of Alsace and Lorraine would soon be forgotten. As the author states:
Could Bismarck have peered into the future and seen how French pride and French bitterness over the loss of Alsace-Lorraine was to vitiate every effort at permanently satisfactory relations between Germany and France—could he have foreseen how by its direct and still more its indirect consequence it was to be one of the main underlying causes of the World War—perhaps then he would have acted otherwise in 1871.
In fact, it is apparent that the author considers the continued threat of France for revenge for the loss of these provinces as the inspiration which caused Bismarck to make the secret alliances with other nations. He shows that while all of these secret alliances were known, their contents were not known, and it was for this reason that suspicion was always evident on the part of those nations which were not parties to the alliances. However, it seems evident that in all these alliances Bismarck’s idea was defensive rather than offensive. Indeed, the author concedes that. He says:
Bismarck’s policy of a demarkation of interests between Austria and Russia and the pressure he put upon each helped to preserve the peace of Europe, even during the violent Balkan crisis that arose through the union of the two Bulgarias in September, 1885.
And again:
Such was the success of one set of alliances establishing the domination of the Eastern Empires by which Bismarck for nearly a score of years conjured away an open clash between Austria and Russia in the Balkans, preserved almost unbroken the good relations of Germany with her powerful neighbors to the south and cast, and thereby lessened the danger from the west.
And again:
Thus in the period 1871 to 1890 the peace of Europe was secured by the domination of the Eastern Empires and by the system of genuinely defensive alliances which Bismarck had built up, though during the last three years the system was somewhat less secure. No power cared to risk a war against Germany’s overwhelming military force, supported and insured as it was by the secret alliances which had brought Austria, Russia, Italy, Roumania, and even England more or less into cooperation with Germany.
We see here a case where military power evidently prevented war, as France in her isolation could not dare to undertake a war of revenge under these conditions.
Professor Fay then points out how, with the dismissal of Bismarck, things began to take a different turn and the peace of Europe was not so firmly established.
The limits of this review will not permit of further details of discussion. The author, in a fascinating style that forces conviction and interest, carries the reader on and on through the system of secret alliances that resulted in the formation of the Triple Alliance, and then the Triple Entente which was organized in opposition; through the maze of Balkan problems that seemed not to have a solution other than by a resort to arms. Passed before us in accurate detail are accounts of Italy’s dubious loyalty to her allies, the Morocco crisis of 1905, the German fear of encirclement, the Anglo-German naval rivalry, the Agadir crisis, and many other important incidents and events. There is a lengthy discussion of the Liman von Sanders affair, which it seemed at one time would be the spark to set off the fuel which had been accumulating for so many years, but which was settled diplomatically by both sides making concessions.
Professor Fay cites the settlement of the Liman von Sanders affair without recourse to arms as an evidence that war was not inevitable. It is doubtful if all readers will agree with this conclusion. Relations between the nations concerned were gradually becoming more and more intricate, complex, and tense; and differences of ideas and viewpoints were becoming more and more manifest. The Liman von Sanders affair was so simple in comparison with some of the other problems it cannot be concluded that its settlement by diplomacy made it possible for the other differences to be likewise settled. In fact, as one reads through the book, he finds creeping on him a growing conviction that war had to come sooner or later, and the only requirement for lighting the conflagration was some such spark as eventually occurred at Sarajevo.
Among the best features of Professor Fay’s book is the insight given to the characters and characteristics of the chief actors, and the great influence of personalities in the conduct of world affairs. We also see how much more effective, as a rule, were personal contacts in settling differences and in making agreements, than were written instruments. There pass before the reader at various times such world figures as the German Emperor and Russian Czar, Bismarck, Bulow, Tirpitz, Bethmann-Hollweg, Poincare, Delcasse, Cambon, Hotzendorf, Berchtold, the Archduke Ferdinand, Metternich, Sazonov and many another.
Throughout the reading, one is impressed with the wide geographical distribution of the countries, lands, and seas, over which differences occur—practically all over the world excepting in our own Western Hemisphere. In reflection one cannot help but feel how fortunate has been the United States in having a Monroe Doctrine and in having a policy of “No entangling alliances,” which together have kept this country free of the intrigues, ambitions, and conflicts which have habitually confronted the European nations. And another thought that perhaps has a lesson for us with respect to Europe’s and our own present-day problems of reparations, debt settlements, and boundary establishments, is the necessity for immediate adjustments that will not permit rancor and the desire for revenge to continue through the years.
An account of the events leading up to the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand is followed by discussions as to the responsibility for this crime, the Austrian ultimatum, the Serbian reply, and the several proposals for preserving the peace. All of these events are recounted with a thoroughness of facts and in a convincing and gripping manner which carry the reader through the many interesting pages with a feeling that here he is having set before him, in concise form, the truths which had been difficult, if not impossible, to find in the many books which had previously dealt with these same events.
Final chapters are devoted to the Russian and other mobilizations, which were soon followed by the various declarations of war, and to a statement of the author’s conclusions. Professor Fay finds that none of the nations concerned really wanted a general European war, that all of them were to a greater or lesser degree responsible, but that to Austria, more than to any other country, belongs the greatest blame for bringing on the conflict. He points out that, although the nations did not want the war, it occurred nevertheless because the political and military leaders did certain things which they should not have done, and failed to do other things which they should have done. This shows that in the final analysis the war was brought on by the inherent weaknesses of human nature. These frailities are still with us. Until they are eradicated we must lay our course with respect to preparedness on the assumption that future wars are not only possible, but are probable.
OUR NAVY AND THE WEST INDIAN PIRATES. By Gardner W. Allen. Salem, Mass. Essex Institute. 1929.
Reviewed by Rear Admiral Elliot Snow (CC) U. S. Navy (Retired)
Those readers of the U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings whose attention perchance was caught by a short account of “A Visit to Lafitte,” which appeared as an item of the Secretary’s Notes in the June, 1928, number, and who may now wish to learn more fully of the operations of our Navy in suppressing piracy and promoting safety to ocean-borne traffic in the West Indies, should read a recent excellent compilation by Dr. Gardner W. Allen.
Our Navy and the West Indian Pirates, under which caption Dr. Allen’s latest contribution to United States naval history appears, is one of the publications of the Essex Institute of Salem, Massachusetts. The book is based very largely on material collected by the late Rear Admiral Caspar F. Goodrich, U. S. Navy, to whose memory the record is dedicated.
Those officers of the naval service and the many friends in civil life to whom Admiral Goodrich endeared himself, particularly those he made during his last tour of active duty as liaison officer of the United States Navy at Princeton University, will greatly appreciate the dedication, and will with understanding appraise the correctness, courtesy, and modesty of the closing words of the author’s preface:
After long and distinguished service in the Navy, Admiral Goodrich died December 26, 1925. He was deeply interested in the subject here presented, to which he devoted much time and labor in unearthing the original sources. His earnest wish was almost a command and without it this little book would never have been written.
Dr. Allen has also drawn upon the collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, the Boston Public Library, the Boston Athenaeum, and the Harvard College Library.
Another very rich vein of information to mine, at least for the history of the Baratarian pirates and their leader—“The Napoleon of the Gulf”—Jean Lafitte, is the Louisiana Historical Quarterly. The brief and guarded way in which the author refers to the assistance given by Jean Lafitte and his followers to General Jackson at the Battle of New Orleans, casting a doubt as it does to the value of Lafitte’s performance on that occasion, will doubtless come as a surprise to a part of the readers of Dr. Allen’s account.
A quotation from the introduction, written by Admiral Goodrich, will serve to show the value to the service of the reading of this little book and furnish to naval officers and to our wise legislators, who support the Navy, one more cogent argument to use in combating the pernicious doctrines of “foolish patriots—pacifists.”
It is a patriotic duty which he [Dr. Gardiner W. Allen] has performed in thus making such matters known to our people who, too commonly, regard this first line of the national defense as useful only during hostilities and as an undue burden at other times. It is idle to expect that, until the millennium arrives, it will ever be wholly exempt from calls to aid. Even now, by the way, it has to keep a force on the Yangtze River for the safeguarding of American property and lives. Nor, until that blessed day, will it be wise to allow to fall into disrepair or impotence an arm which cannot be improvised over night.
For what the Navy did to promote peaceful traffic in West Indian waters and the Gulf from 1800 to 1826, as shown by Dr. Allen, though different in kind from its peace activities of today, is still emblematic of the eternal value of the Navy in promoting the peace of the world and the welfare of our compatriots who travel and traffic upon the seven seas.
WE FIGHT FOR OIL. By Ludwell Denny.
New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1928. $3.00.
Reviewed by Captain John K. Christmas, U. S. Army
Mr. Denny quotes on the title page of his excellent work these significant words of President Coolidge in his letter of December 19, 1924, constituting the Conservation Board: “It is even probable that the supremacy of nations may be determined by the possession of available petroleum and its products.” With this as a theme the author interestingly reviews the present status of petroleum oil in modern civilization with particular reference to the influence of oil on the international situation.
Mr. Denny is an American journalist with experience as a foreign correspondent in Europe and the Near East and later as representative of a press bureau in Washington.
Now, when the pacifists and their many- hued adherents are striving to defeat every bill for a modest increase in our Navy, is an excellent time to read this important book. The author quotes chapter and verse to substantiate most of his statements so that the reader realizes, when he has finished, the ramifications, power, and shrewdness of the forces opposing our peaceful development.
Most striking is the fact that we are in a race and struggle with the British Empire for control of the world’s oil resources. While, according to Denny, the principal contestants are Sir Henri Deterding and Mr. John D. Rockefeller, these have ranged behind them most of the other big oil men of their respective countries, not to forget the official and unofficial efforts of the two governments to support and protect their citizens. Denny says the United States was late getting into the international phase of oil, both commercially and politically (Is there much difference?) but has made good progress lately. It is shown that the British government is a partner in one large British oil company.
Having been amazed to find that America and Britain are contending fiercely for control of the international oil situation, the reader is somewhat prepared for a worse shock. As it now stands (1926 figures) the United States produces about 70 per cent of the world’s oil but Great Britain controls about 75 per cent of the known oil reserves of the world. Shell Union Oil (British controlled) and subsidiaries were third in oil production in the United States in 1926 and foreign companies controlled 13 per cent of the reserve oil lands here. In Russia, Persia, South America, and Central America, Great Britain has beaten us to concessions for oil reserves.
In addition to the two major subjects described above, Mr. Denny takes up, among others, the following interesting subjects: the movement towards nationalization of oil lands in South America and the Near East; our troubles with Mexico over oil lands; overproduction of oil in this country; and the possibilities of the German processes of producing petroleum oils synthetically from coal.
This book is particularly interesting from a naval standpoint because oil is vital to our Navy and merchant marine. Lord Fisher’s foresight as to the naval value of oil in 1882 is quoted: “The use of fuel oil adds 50 per cent to the value of any fleet that uses it.”
Clemenceau wrote to Wilson in 1917: "A failure in the supply of petrol would cause the immediate paralysis of our armies, and might compel us to a peace unfavorable to the Allies.” This would apply even more to the American Army in any future war due to the increasing mechanization of the Army.
In the closing chapter Mr. Denny says; “Maybe the United States is ‘too late,’ as the British officials boast. Many neutral observers are of that opinion.” And again: “But if the American government and companies are beaten, they do not know it. The struggle continues, and will continue.” He says in the closing paragraph: “War is possible. War is probable—unless the two empires seek through mutual sacrifice to reconcile their many conflicting interests…If some miracle of diplomacy is achieved, oil may cease to be an international explosive.” This book is heartily recommended to all interested in the future of our country and in international affairs.
LEX TALIONIS. Baltimore: Fleet-McGinley Co. 1922. $1.50.
THE UNLIQUIDATED WAR. 1928. $2.00, and
SIDE-LIGHTS ON REPARATIONS. 1928. $2.00. Washington: Byron S. Adams.
All by Ralph Warren Hillis.
Reviewed by Captain G. J. Meyers, U. S. Navy
In view of recent events which have again centered interest on the World War reparations question, every American should familiarize himself with the points involved. For the past year or so, the press has contained repeated discussions of the plan to sell German reparation bonds in the United States. This is what is meant by commercialization of the bonds. The meeting of the committee of international experts in Paris has brought this matter to a head. What this committee will bring forth as a plan of settlement, of course, no one can tell. But the fact remains that American thought, both official and private, in view of the many plans already presented by European and American bankers, should prepare itself to answer the questions that undoubtedly will have to be met by/America when the committee of experts presents its conclusions and recommendations to the world. American preparation, such as it is, will be called upon to make decisions that best conserve the interests of the United States. The three books here reviewed throw much light on the question covering the period from the first peace proposals to the year 1928. The books should be read in the sequence in which they appear in the heading of this review.
Lex Talionis covers the period from the offering of peace to Germany to the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. It collects the series of events relating to the negotiation and formulation of the peace and draws from the facts certain deductions which were later to be proved correct in all their essential details. The first two chapters deal with the peace terms offered to and accepted by Germany. In all reparations discussions, it is necessary to keep one fact in view. The peace terms accepted by Germany included “compensation to civilians injured by aggressions by Germany by sea, land and air; no punitive damages.” This truly meant reparations, not indemnities. The remainder of the books covers the Entente peace and the historical steps taken to circumvent President Wilson’s wishes, the making of the peace treaty, the imposition of the naval blockade against Germany, and the forcing of Germany through starvation into signing the treaty.
The Unliquidated War covers the period from the signing of the Treaty of Versailles to the Dawes Plan. The fact of particular interest to Americans is the creation of the asset called “reparations” and the conspiracy in Europe to convert this asset into gold at the expense of America. The author says, “If the great transference of wealth from America to Europe as contemplated by means of the world economic conference in 1921 had been made, it would have been, in fact, a gigantic swindle upon the American people, for the German bonds would have been as worthless as the paper upon which they were written.” A possibility of the future against which America must be on its guard, in case the German reparation bonds are commercialized, is the repudiation by Germany of the whole obligation. With these bonds in the possession of the American investor, whose bayonets would be used to force collections from Germany? Certainly not those of France. This book gives a picture of a “blue sky” venture without parallel in history.
Side-Lights on Reparations contains a series of commentaries on the reparation question, written between 1922 and 1928. The next to the last chapter deals with “The British Plan,” the forerunner of numerous other plans appearing with increased frequency in the press up to February, 1929, all aimed at the one goal—the separation of America from a huge part of its gold stock for the benefit of Europe. In connection with the chapter preceding the conclusion to this volume, on the subject of “Suppression of Foreign News by the Press,” it might be well to recall to the reader the words of President Coolidge on February 4, 1928: “Whenever any of the press of our country undertake to exert their influence in behalf of foreign interests, the candor of the situation would be greatly increased if their foreign connections were publicly disclosed.”
In conclusion, it must be stated that President Coolidge showed emphatically his disapproval of the attempts to saddle reparations on the American public. Where his successor stands is not a matter of public knowledge. Where he will stand, if there are any doubts in his mind on the subject, depends on the mental preparedness of the people to express themselves intelligently upon the subject when the committee of financial experts presents its report to the American nation. These three books succinctly cover the historical period which forms the background for that report. Every officer of the government should be familiar with this background and every citizen, if he reads these books, will be mentally prepared on an international question vital in its outcome to the welfare of the United States.
LA BATAILLE DES FALKLAND*
By Claude Farrere and Paul Chack, edited with notes and vocabulary by W. G. Hartog, M.A., Litt. D., Oxford University Press, $.50. 1928.
Reviewed by Professor Henry Bluestone
As will be remembered, Admiral von Spee, sailing homeward after the easy victory of Coronel, detailed two cruisers on the morning of December 8, 1914, to destroy the radio station of the Falkland Islands, burn the coal supply and take the governor prisoner. The would-be raiders discovered a formidable British force which had arrived the day before. The flight of the German squadron began first east, then south. In the three separate combats that followed, the Germans, hopelessly outclassed in armor, range, and caliber, stood by their guns to the last shell. Then they opened the sea cocks to hasten the sinking of their disabled craft. Few were taken out alive from the icy waters.
These facts are told most vividly and concisely but with a keen eye for significant points and maneuvers. However, the story of the battle proper covers but twenty of the ninety pages. The rest is devoted to preliminaries and digressions, and it is these digressions, with their sallies of wit and irony, that make the booklet a delightful specimen of French colloquial style.
In the course of the story, we get a close glimpse of Lord Fisher on the job in his office; we attend war councils aboard the German flagship; and round Cape Horn in a raging mountainous sea where the German ships are saved from capsizing only by throwing overboard the coal they had on deck and which made them top-heavy. Among other touches of description is that of the serene, transparent moonlight night, “amidst a calm that pervades things and men…There, two miles ahead, you see the clear-cut profile of the Dresden on the diamond-studded azure of the crystalline sky. Midnight. But two hours ago and it was daylight; two hours more and a new day will dawn—the dawn of December 8.”
* See pp. 1806 et seq., U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings for September, 1925, for a review of “Combats et Batailles sur mer,” five stories (Tahiti, Penang, La Mort de L'Emden, Coronel and Les Falkland) by the above authors.