It appears to me that the problem of personnel has been somewhat underestimated, and therefore slighted, by the powers-that-be in the Navy. Officers from each Naval Academy class are sent to take postgraduate courses in technical subjects like ordnance and engineering, but I have yet to hear of any of them being sent to take postgraduate courses in advertising and psychology. The engineers select the very best of metals for the purposes to which they are to be put, but the recruiting agencies are less particular. I do not think that the Navy is getting all that it can out of the men that it has. And on the other hand, I do not think the men are getting everything that the Navy holds out to them. I studied the situation as an enlisted man and I have since tried to get at it from the officer’s point of view. The result, I hope, is the mean of the two—the safe course in the middle of the channel.
The solution of the personnel problem, as I see it, bears on the solution of two other problems. The first is the creation from a small peace-time nucleus, of a war-strength Navy which will be worthy of the responsibilities placed upon it in time of war. The Naval Reserve and R.O.T.C., similar to the C.M.T.C. and the R.O.T.C. of the Army, are being tried as possible solutions. But the systems face difficulties in the Navy that are not to be found in the Army. There is less work which requires technical training in the Army than in the Navy.
The second problem is the defense of the Navy against certain destructive outside influences. The motives of the proponents of smaller-navy movements may be the best in the world, but in general, it appears that their ideas are too often blindly idealistic, or impractical. Historical precedents show that it does not pay to be so blinded by enthusiasm for a world-saving idea as to throw discretion to the four winds. A man who has some influence may become so imbued with visions of world peace and universal harmony, that he sets out to establish them at one stroke. To convince the world of his sincerity, he exerts his influence in such a way as to end by cutting an arm or several legs off our Army or Navy. That may be a very effective argument in favor of world peace, but such an argument never won a battle.
Until those countries of the East, where the greater part of the world’s undeveloped population and resources are concentrated, have passed through the stages in their development that we are now in, our nation will need its Navy. And, conversely, as long as that is so, our Navy will need the support of the nation. The Navy is more or less helpless in the hands of these outside influences. There is little that can be done directly to combat them. Our voices are drowned in a flood of propaganda and exhortation. But actions are more impressive than words and there is more than one way of accomplishing the desired result. I believe that the Navy can do a great deal towards protecting itself through a solution of its personnel problem.
In years gone by developments in the Navy have been chiefly in material, with just as much technical development in personnel as was deemed necessary to insure a well-trained crew, capable of operating and caring for the highly perfected machines of war. That the present-day sailorman is almost beyond comparison with the old sailing-vessel man-o’-war’s man, is undisputed. But that he is any shining example of perfection can be disputed. One has but to live in close contact with him for a short time to see vast room for improvement.
Naval wars of the future, like wars of the past, will be fought out with the elementary things of war, i.e., strategy and tactics, new and old machines, and officers and men. Problems of strategy and tactics and problems in the development of old and newly invented machines are being worked °n continually, and with high intelligence. The system of officer selection and development is being improved constantly, and has already reached a high standard. It seems that in the eager research one phase of the big problem is being overlooked.
How about the enlisted man? Is it not as essential to mold a ship’s crew out of a high type of recruits as it is to make guns of the best grade of steel? After all, the machine can be no more efficient than the man who operates it. If the Navy’s personnel is as highly developed as it can be, then we need a higher type to start on. The technical personnel turned out from the radio schools, machinist’s-mates’ schools, etc., is highly efficient, considering the type of material with which the officers have to work. The average Navy man is a fairly good machine, he is above average physically, but there is still something lacking. Otherwise, he would be a well-rounded, fully developed, and more valuable man. Take your own idea of the word man; put the average member of your crew up in contrast, and see wherein he is lacking. Education, moral code, and, ambition will be among the principal defects.
However, the general scale of morals in the enlisted personnel is not low enough to justify the social position assigned to the bluejacket. That the scale is low, is true— from all external appearances. The external appearance is what assigns the position and that social status is having a very definite effect. As I see it, that constitutes a large thorn in the side of the naval service.
The Navy draws its recruits from two sources—the city and the country. By far the larger number come from the country. From these sources there are three general types of men—good, bad, and indifferent. Roughly there are about 10 per cent good, 15 per cent bad, and 75 per cent indifferent.
The good men come from good families, have high-school and sometimes college educations, and join the Navy for some definite purpose. In general, they are quiet, clean, efficient, diligent, intelligent, and conscientious. They are to be seen quite often at divine services and are, if I may say it, the backbone of the ship’s organization. Their ratings go through fast; they make good petty officers; they put something into the Navy and get more out of it than the law of compensation commonly provides for. Most of them are to be found in the electrical, radio, or machine divisions, or among the yeomen, storekeepers, quartermasters, and signalmen. Few find their way to the deck divisions. As I said, they come to the Navy for a purpose, and as a result, fill the vocational schools.
The class that I have called indifferent comes largely from the farms; from good, honest, plain, God-fearing, hard-working, inland families. Some one refers to the class as the “backbone of America.’’ It is above the laboring class of the city; it is the least favored group of that great middle class from which the majority of officers come. The average man of this group has finished grammar school and many have had a year or two of high school. The youngsters’ (for few of them are more than that) motives for entering the service are: a desire to see the world; distaste for the hard work and close confines of the farm-; or a strong indisposition for the educational atmosphere to be found about a school. These men fill the deck divisions, and the firemen’s billets in the boiler division or engine-room force. They have no particular ambition save to do as little work as possible, and take ratings as they are offered. They are not over-responsible, have no great strength of character, are easily led and influenced, and, in general, are rather simple. They do hold one deeply rooted idea, and that is that the primary requisite for a sailorman is that he be “hard-boiled”—that is, while they are still young.
To come now to the third class, our recruiting service frequently picks up almost anything that can pass the physical examination and clear the recruiting-office door a sufficient number of jumps ahead of the sheriff. The majority are not of this caliber, but enough are to insure a steady low level in the enlisted personnel’s mass character. It is what Admiral Wilson dubbed “the vicious 40 per cent,” though the percentage is not that high.
This third type of recruit comes, to a large extent, from the cities; from districts in the cities where the lowest levels of American society are collected. In the service they constitute an influence which is directly responsible for the existing public opinion of the enlisted man. They lead their less calloused brothers of the second class and develop the idea in their minds that to be a sailor one must be a “tough guy.” The unhappy incidents, disorders, and disturbances which have given the bluejacket’s uniform a “negative drag” with the public can usually be traced to this group, or to their disciples. The fact that the uniform stands out in a crowd serves to stress such occurrences and stamps them upon the public mind, with the result that the whole service suffers from the actions of a minority. It is this group that introduces, revives, and keeps alive those old service traditions that a recruit on his first liberty must get drunk, tattooed, etc. They keep a detention camp filled with the vilest profanity, the crudest stories, and a most evil atmosphere. The effect is reflected throughout the service and is felt, either directly or indirectly, in the life of every enlisted man. In a majority of cases the men of the second group are led on a downward path by the influence of the third group, the age of the second class rendering them susceptible. There is an attraction for the young in the paths of least resistance; and spare time and money are tools in the hands of the powers of evil.
Officers who come into contact with the second group find them not half so “hard- boiled” and tough as they seem, or would lead one to believe. They are fine fellows at heart, and are really good men through previous home influences. They make good, contented sailormen; the type that stays in the Navy rather than go back to the farm. The Navy caters to them; it encourages reenlistments; there will never be a lack of them, I believe.
What would be the effect of eliminating the third group from the Navy? By all rights they belong to the sheriff; he should have them. With the right influences at the training stations, with a little effort in directing them, the second group could be trained along a course that would lead them up instead of down, and a larger percentage of the high fliers would land in the first group. Personal ambition can take a much better hold in a clean, healthy, vigorous mind than in one clouded with low, immoral thoughts. There comes a time in the life of every first-cruise man when he realizes his own mental and moral deficiencies, and their effect upon him. It acts as a spur to his ambition, providing that has not been stifled by a low plane of thought. If, at this time, he is encouraged and helped in overcoming the inertia piled up in the year or two of drifting, if the momentum he has acquired on the down-grade run is not too great, he can pull out of the slump and the final product is a sailorman of which the Navy might well be proud.
In short, the second group, when once rid of the influence of the third, would start on an upward trend, instead of the present downward one. Then the lowest elements of the second set would show up favorably with the present highest elements.
Of course, those men in the service at present would have an influence over the newcomers, but it could be counteracted. Older men of the second class soon realize the error of their ways. If it were put up to them properly, I believe they would cooperate in such a move for the good of the service. The influence of those left over from the third group would become less marked because they become less of leaders with age. They form a minority and with the odds against them, this Devil’s brood wouldn’t have a chance.
Furthermore, with this source of bad reputation rooted out, the public’s opinion of the uniform would gradually rise. Then, perhaps, the self-respecting enlisted man would not be a social outcast—a man looked down upon by the civilians because some of the thoroughbred reprobates in uniform have given him a poor reputation. The men of the first class are of too strong character to seek the sort of company into which their weaker brothers of the second group are led by members of the third group, or are forced to accept though the effects of loneliness. I know of many cases where nice girls would not go with a man in uniform, when they were more than glad to go with the same fellow in civilian clothes. That reflects discredit on the service, and anything bringing the service into disrepute has a reflection upon all those connected with it, either directly in the case of the sailor, or indirectly in the case of the officer. As long as the uniform is held in that light, it falls short of what can and should be made of it.
The future social status of the bluejacket does not concern us so much as the fact that the question of social position does keep out of the Navy a great many youngsters who would gladly come in were it not for the barriers the uniform sets up against them. It is reasonable to believe that the third group would be replaced by this type of men, which would bring the first group UP to 25 per cent of the whole. That is, providing the Navy offered the proper inducements to such a class of men.
By proper inducements I mean an increase in the educational facilities and the erasure of the social barriers now existing. Those two things would provide a strong enough attraction to draw a great many high-school and first- or second-year college men to the Navy who were not financially able to go to, or finish college. A vocational training, supplemented by self-instruction in other subjects, with the aid and supervision of officers and other capable instructors made available aboard each ship, backed by practical experience, travel, and the benefits of many human contacts, if properly advertised, would bring into the Navy thousands of high-class men. I have found out that such is possible through conversations, while on leave as an enlisted man and as a midshipman, with former schoolmates at work, or home from college.
Under the present system, it seems to me that the Navy is passing up good for bad; that the men are not getting out of the Navy all that there is in it in the way of a foundation for a useful life in or out of the Navy; and that the government is supporting a so-called non-productive organization which might be made to serve the dual purpose of protection and education.
It is argued, of course, that such a class of men would not remain in the service and the government would be out the money it took to instruct and develop them, losing their services just at a time when they were becoming of value. It is there that the problem of a war-strength Navy comes in.
What is the mission of the Navy in times of peace? Is it not to prepare for war? What better way is there of obtaining a highly developed, efficient, and effective naval reserve? That we would be out the money of instructing them is true, but at the same time we would be laying the foundations for a war-strength Navy that would do away with the “thirty-day wonders” of the last war.
The question of protection against the political powers enters here. With such a system in force, there would be a steady flow of trained men and good, capable, patriotic citizens turned out of the Navy during peace times, to form an enthusiastic citizenry in favor of a large, live Navy. Four years in the Navy would mean an opportunity for the sons of the middle class of America to acquire an education and fit themselves for a useful life at government expense. Battleships would become floating colleges and any attempt to cut an arm off the Navy would meet with a howl such as would be set up if the doors of all the state colleges and state universities were closed. The Navy’s only means of self-protection is to sell itself to, and plant itself in the life of, the American people.
Let me give several examples based upon the suggestion. First, an example of the opportunity that the Navy offers at present. The officer in charge of a recruiting station goes to a high school and addresses the boys to show them the opportunities offered by the Navy. (There are a great number of opportunities; let us pick one that is possible at the present time, if people only realized it.) There is a youngster in the audience who wishes to become a doctor but since his family is large and of only moderate circumstances, it is impossible for him to receive any financial assistance from his parents. A course in medicine is expensive; it is very hard for one to work one’s way through. The naval officer tells him that he can enlist in the Navy as a hospital apprentice and go to the pharmacist’s-mate’s school. There he will learn one side of his profession at first hand. Once out of the school, he will be stationed at a hospital or on a ship where he can continue his education. For his pre-medical subjects, he may take a correspondence course provided by the Navy Department, and be helped along by some capable person (a medical officer). Part of his spare time he can spend studying. Upon enlisting, he may make an allotment which he can increase as he rises in rate. At the end of four years he could take and pass examinations on his pre-medical subjects, and could have saved enough money to pay his tuition for some time. By working on the side while at school, he could graduate and become a doctor—a self-made one. In the event of war, the Navy would have available a doctor with a first-hand acquaintance with service medical work. That is perfectly possible in the service at the present time—but the men in the service lack the ambition to take advantage of the opportunity, and those on the outside with the necessary ambition know nothing of it, or do not care to enlist because it would mean a drop socially and a number of influences that add nothing to a man’s character.
If such a system were in effect in the Navy, even more might be accomplished. It is all possible at present, but the Navy could make the opportunity much more valuable and enticing by providing better instruction and making provision for self-instruction with less inconvenience to the man. Say a young man enlists in the Navy. He has heard of the opportunities offered by the service. He finds that he likes the sea and wants to follow it all his life. He tries for the Naval Academy and fails in his examinations or is too old to enter. What then? He goes to sea and decides to take up quartermasters’ work. A course is provided in connection with his work that covers mathematics, astronomy, and in general, the subjects necessary to make him a good practical navigator during his four years in the Navy. In the meantime, he takes side courses in practical deck seamanship, cargo stowage, international law, etc. At the end of four years he is prepared to take and pass an examination for third-mate’s papers in the merchant marine. Upon the expiration of his enlistment he enters the merchant service. War comes and the government has available a man capable of running a transport, train ship, or standing watches on the bridge of a man-of-war. The man himself is an advertisement for the Navy when he gets out; he has done well by himself, and is an asset to his country.
The Bureau of Navigation offers the Navy Training Courses, or rating courses which help the enlisted man to prepare himself for a higher rating. These courses are very popular and well-known throughout the service. There are also general academic courses covering subjects such as algebra, physics, English, and chemistry, which are provided to help ambitious individuals in overcoming their educational deficiencies. The existence of these is not so generally known. Then there are more extensive courses covering completely a single technical subject such as piloting, or gas engines. These courses are available to every man in the Navy.
Generally speaking, a thing becomes a necessity and that need will be supplied only when a great enough demand for it has been created. The courses offered by the Bureau of Navigation exceed the requirements of the Navy’s personnel in its present state. These courses will improve, become more extensive in the range of subjects covered, and will go deeper into the different subjects in proportion to the demands placed for, and upon, them. For that reason, those offered at present should be advertised and pushed to the limit by the officers and men aboard every ship. When a large number of men are taking full advantage of the courses available, the system will develop more rapidly and in time will build up into a fine, thorough, elementary and advanced educational system. The opportunities offered by such a system would attract a great deal of attention outside the Navy and bring to us good men, where we get bad.
This article is but a suggestion as to the unlimited and undeveloped possibilities of the Navy. It can be made one of the greatest practical educational institutions of the country. It can be an asset in times of peace as well as in times of war. In it can develop a truly efficient naval reserve. Navy stock can be raised a great many points in the eyes of the American people by the elimination of a certain group of men through more selective recruiting, advertising among a higher group, and making something to advertise about. There is no radical, revolutionary change involved; it is merely a case of developing the opportunities that already exist and making them more available.
Perfection comes not from without, but from within. A man who is a part of an institution, and who does not do his utmost, to make of that institution all that it is capable of being, is failing in his duty. The Navy, in peace and in war, will be just what its officers and men make it. Its possibilities are great, and on the men who develop those possibilities will be reflected greatness. Theirs will be the highest reward for a life spent in a worthy cause—the service of their country.