Translated from the German. See Secretary’s Notes, Page 1029.
THE AMERICAN 1st Division had taken up its position in a relatively quiet sector. The 3rd Division had not yet been tested as a whole, although one of its units, the 7th Motorized Machine Gun Battalion, had taken a successful part in the Battle of Château-Thierry during the night of May 31/June 1. It was reserved for the 2nd Division, therefore, to give the answer to the then all-important question: How will the American troops behave in a pitched battle? Therein lay the significance of the battles for the possession of Belleau Woods.*
The stirring impression produced on the hard-pressed Frenchmen by the appearance of the Americans on the Western Front is pictured in vivid language by Pierrefeu in his book, General Headquarters, Sector I:
Striking was the contrast in appearance between the Americans and the French regiments, whose men, in torn uniforms, hungry and hollow- eyed, were scarcely able to hold themselves erect. New life had come to bring a fresh, surging vigor to the body of France, bled almost to death. Thus it came to pass that in those crucial days when the enemy stood for a second time on the Marne, thinking us disheartened, then, contrary to all expectation, an ineffable confidence filled the hearts of all Frenchmen. . . . . General Pétain, who clearly discerned what a vital force they were radiating, thereafter repeatedly pronounced the word “Americans” with the satisfaction of the builder of imperishable monuments who perceives an inexhaustible source of labor in the midst of the threat of a general strike. . . . . General Foch, too, included the Americans as an essential factor in all his plans for the coming offensive.
The drama of the situation is enhanced when one remembers that this intervention came at a time when, at a meeting of the Supreme War Council at Versailles, the premiers of France, England, and Italy issued the following desperate appeal for help to President Wilson:
There is danger that the war will be lost, unless the speedy arrival of additional American troops serves to restore the weakened Allied reserves. Thus only can defeat be averted, because of the exhausting of the Allied reserves long before those of the Germans.
*Die 1 amerikanische Division war zunächst an einer ruhigen Front eingesetzt worden, die 3 Division hatte zwar schon in der Nacht vom 31 Mai/1 Juni mit ihren Kraftwagen-Maschinenge- wehr-Bataillon 7 bei Château-Thierry erfolgreich in den Kampf eingegriffen, wurde dann aber nicht einheitlich verwendet. So war es der 2 Division vorbehalten, eine Antwort zu geben auf die damals noch offene Frage: “Wie werden sich die amerikanischen Truppen im Grosskampf bewahren?” Darin liegt die Bedeutung der Kampfe um den Wald von Belleau.
How did the Allies come to be in such a desperate situation?
The German attack between Soissons and Reims had begun on May 27, with the storming of the supposedly impregnable Chemin des Dames Hill Range, and the French and English positions nearby. By May 30 they had reached the Marne. The French divisions thrown into this battle had been completely crushed; they evaporated, as a French officer aptly expressed it, like rain drops on white-hot iron. Not until June 1 could the French High Command interpose an organized resistance. The German High Command now added to the 7th Army, led by Colonel General von Boehn, four divisions which had been in the second line, namely, the 197th, 237th, 10th, and 231st Infantry Divisions. These troops were now grouped on the right wing of the 4th Reserve Corps, commanded by General of Infantry von Conta, who had then reached the Marne. The mission of this corps was a fan-shaped advance to the southwest, while the advancing corps under Winckler, Wichura, Larisch, and François, took up their positions to the right, facing west. In advancing toward the west, the German High Command hoped to reach Compiegne, and then, by an attack at Noyon, to close the pocket that had been formed there.
There was no intention, however, that the four divisions pushing southwest should make a thrust for Paris. Even if successful this would have created a front in the shape of a spearhead, unfavorable both strategically and tactically. Their mission was therefore limited to protecting the flanks of the corps advancing to the west. The four divisions were followed by two more, the 5th Guard Infantry and the 28th Infantry Divisions, detached from the forces which had reached the Marne. Château- Thierry was taken on June 1, after intense house-to-house fighting, by the 231st Infantry Division, advancing on the left wing. Owing to the timely arrival of American troops, however, they did not succeed in establishing a bridgehead to the railroad on the southern bank of the Marne, as they had been ordered to do. The other three divisions kept up a powerful advance to the southwest, and during the night, June 1/2, pushed back the opposing troops everywhere, breaking the French line sharply in the neighborhood of Gandelu, over a front of four kilometers. Again American troops had to be moved to the front to cover this break.
[Image: The German Offensive, May 27 to June 13, 1918 The heavy line through Montdidier and Reims shows the German lines on May 27.]
The German divisions were still attacking on June 3. The 197th Infantry, which had advanced farthest on the right flank, succeeded that day in occupying Veuilly, Eloup, Bussiares, and Hill 164, close to Les Mares Farm. On the other hand every effort made by the 28th Reserve Regiment to penetrate Veuilly Forest failed; intense machine-gun fire stopped the German troops at the edge of the woods. Under cover of approaching darkness, the 2nd and 4th Companies, supported by a mine thrower, again attempted to penetrate the woods, but were once more repulsed by the fierce enemy fire. This extraordinarily strong resistance was entirely unexpected by the Germans, who thought that they were pursuing a beaten foe. They had no means of knowing that on June 2, the American 23rd Infantry Regiment, the 1st Battalion of the 5th Marines, the 5th Machine Gun Battalion, and the 2nd Engineer Company, had established strong defenses here, with the 2nd Battalion of the 5th Marines adjoining them on the right.
The 237th Infantry Division, with the 462nd Infantry Regiment, was to occupy Hill 142 and Champillon that day, and then proceed to Marigny, while the 461st Infantry Regiment was to attempt the capture of Lucy-le Bocage. As the artillery was not ready to open fire until 12:15 P.M. the attack could not be launched until 12130 p.m. The 462nd Regiment then found such formidable resistance in the strongly defended woods on its front that it could advance only as far as one kilometer south of Torcy, north of the woods. During the night the 462nd Infantry was relieved by the 460th. The 461st Regiment now completed the occupation of Belleau Woods, pressing forward as far as the western edge. After repulsing an enemy counterattack at 3:00 p.m., they cleared the southwest corner of the woods of enemy machine-gun nests, and pushed their advance posts far to the southwest and to the southern edge of the woods. The whole woods now came under severe artillery fire of every caliber, which continued throughout the day and the following night. The attack on Lucy- le Bocage was abandoned, because this place was under enfilading fire from the heights near Triangle.
The 10th Infantry Division, which had taken Bouresches on June 2, was now working up its defenses, as ordered.
At midnight, June 3, General von Conta issued the following order to his corps:
- The right wing of the 7th Army will continue the attack, the Conta Group assuming the protection of the flanks during the attack. The group will fight for a suitable defensive position. This position is located in the following line: Veuilly—Marigny—La Voie du Chatel—Hill 201 about one kilometer southeast of Montgivrault— Le Thiolet—Hill 204 west of Château-Thierry.*
- The exact hour of the attack will be ordered later. The attack will not take place prior to June 7. Get necessary information and prepare at once.
* See map page 960.
In this attack the 5th Guard Infantry Division was to be placed on the right, next to the 197th Infantry Division.
This, then, was the situation on the night of June 3. The American troops, fresh and in full strength, had absorbed the remnants of the crushed French troops. Facing them were the Germans, with morale heightened by the habit of victory, but with ranks considerably worn and thinned by the campaign. The Americans formed such a formidable wall that the commanding general, von Conta, found it necessary to spend several days in preparation, and to add another division preliminary to an attack which had for its objective merely the capture of a defensive position.
On June 4, at 9:00 a.m.,1 the exhausted French 45th Infantry Division was relieved by the American 2nd Division on the Champillon-Monneaux front, where the Americans had actually established themselves on June 3. On their left was the newly arrived French 167th Infantry Division, which had relieved the shattered 43rd; parts of the American 2nd Division stationed here had to be withdrawn from the remnants of the French 43rd Division. On their right was the French 10th Colonial Division, among whom were isolated units of the American 3rd Division. This led the Germans to believe that they were facing the American 3rd Division. It was by design that the French, who had no confidence yet in the American leadership, thus avoided having here the American 2nd and 3rd Divisions united under their own commanding general, as would have been natural. It was not until September 2 that the Americans were allowed an independent sector of their own.
1In this account, Central European time is used. It differs by one hour from Western European time. As daylight-saving time was used on both sides, this difference continued throughout June. Accordingly, 9:00 a.m. in the German account corresponds to 8:00 a.m. in the American account
In general, the positions were as follows:
Facing the American 5th Marines was the German 460th Infantry Regiment of the 237th Division.
Facing the 6th Marines was the 461st Infantry Regiment of the same division.
Facing the 9th Infantry Regiment was the 398th Infantry Regiment of the 10th Division; and facing the 23rd Infantry was the 47th Infantry Regiment of the 10th Division.
This alignment is only approximate. The front of the American units of the 4th Brigade extended farther east than the German regiments opposite them, so that the right wing of the 5th Marines was opposite the right wing of the 461st Regiment, and, similarly, the right wing of the 6th Marines overlapped the right of the 398th Regiment at Bouresches.
The German divisions spent that day, June 4, solely in strengthening the positions they had reached, with the 10th Infantry Division established on the hills north and east of Bouresches. This place had originally been occupied by the 3rd Battalion of the 398th Regiment, but, owing to the lowness of the ground, it did not appear advisable to leave a whole battalion here, and to persist in holding it at any cost. Accordingly, the commander of the 398th Infantry ordered two companies withdrawn on the night of June 3/4, and ordered further that the railway be made part of the main defense line. Bouresches was to serve only as an outpost. On the main front, the battalions intrenched themselves by companies, with machine gun companies distributed in separate nests to the rear. Small outposts were extended as far as the heights of Triangle and the Bouresches-La Roche- Vaux road.
In the morning, the 461st Infantry Regiment ascertained through prisoners and dead that they were facing the American 5th and 6th Marines. Major Bischoff, the commander, reported in the afternoon that an American attack was being made in the direction of Belleau and the northwestern corner of Belleau Woods. It was natural that a unit attacking for the first time would not have the skill of seasoned troops, and it was equally natural that the Germans should count on that lack of experience. The Americans were caught front and flank by the machine-gun fire of the 1st Battalion, 461st Regiment, and, after heavy losses, retired to Hill 169. However, the defenders of the woods suffered greatly from the effects of the continuous heavy artillery fire, in which the American 2nd Field Artillery Brigade, posted along La Voie du Chatel-Coupru, took a very prominent part.
[Image: SITUATION ON JUNE 5, 1918]
June 5 was rather quiet, except for a French attack in the direction of Gandelu and Veuilly, which pushed back the German outposts to the edge of the village, the village itself being retained. There were also sporadic attacks by the Americans along the front of the 461st Infantry, which were repulsed, with many dead in front of the German positions; prisoners confirmed that the American losses were heavy. These daringly conducted raids served to convince General von Conta that he had before hima strong and enterprising foe. Accordingly, on June 5 he issued the following order:
The attack ordered on June 3 is for the present deferred. However, the attack is to be so thoroughly prepared that it could be made within forty-eight hours after receipt of the order.
With the German battalions thus standing on the defensive, on June 6 the French 167th Division and the American 2nd Division launched a combined attack. The French succeeded in entering Veuilly, but were ejected in a vigorous counterattack made by two companies of the 28th Replacement Infantry Regiment. The left wing of the 197th Division was pushed back to a line including the cross-roads one kilometer west of Torcy, the road leading south of Bussiares, and the northern end of the square patch of woods west of Bussiares. Owing to the fact that a new attack was expected early the next morning, and that his position projected too far from the line, the division commander, Lieutenant General Wilhelmi, voluntarily evacuted Veuilly during the night.
[Image: SITUATION ON JUNE 6, 1918. During the Forenoon.]
[Image: MAP OF JUNE 7. An Attack by the 2nd American Division, as indicated, was expected.]
According to the German conception of the conduct of battle on June 6, the two fresh divisions in full force, after a brief artillery preparation and gassing of the enemy artillery, should have rushed simultaneously in thin lines of skirmishers along the entire front. However, General Degoutte, commander of the French 21st Army Corps, to which the American 2nd Division was attached, had a different idea. He had the attack made in echelon, developing gradually from the left to the right in assigned periods of time, so that the different regiments followed one another into battle like the ribs of an opening fan. The right wing of the 4th Infantry Brigade did not advance until evening. This ingenious method of attack, well suited in view of possible flanking movements, had the great disadvantage of enabling the Germans to concentrate their artillery fire every time exactly on the attacking troops. If the Americans, notwithstanding their extraordinary bravery, did not meet with greater material success on June 6, the fault lies mainly in this arrangement of the French corps commander.*
* Note by Major General J. G. Harbord, U. S. Army (Retired), division commander of the American 2nd Division: “I am obliged to acquit General Degoutte of any responsibility as to the tactical methods employed on that date, nor was there any concerted action, of which I am aware, between the American 2nd Division and the 167th French. With the information we had had that the woods were unoccupied by the Germans, we gave it no artillery preparation, thinking thereby to take it by surprise or to find it unoccupied. Occupied as it was by machine gun nests well placed, the tactical formation of the time, which was the advance in successive waves as we were then being taught, did entail considerable losses. My recollection is that the attack took place late in the afternoon. Colonel Otto starts it at 4:4s a.m. He is probably confusing our attack on the woods with the French attack on Bussiares.”
Precious American blood, and much of it, was shed, without any necessity. The difference between the German and the French methods is very clearly shown in the map of June 7, page 946. This map also shows in what manner the Germans expected the attack of the American 2nd Division to be carried out.
In accordance with orders from General Degoutte, at 4:45 a.m. the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 5th Marines joined the French 167th Division in the attack, the 1st Battalion on the left, the 2nd on the right. This attack struck the 1st Battalion of the 460th Regiment, and the 9th Company of the 462nd Regiment, echeloned to the right. As the French had succeeded in making a temporary entry into Bussiares (they were ejected at 9:45 a.m. by a Saxon Jager battalion), the 9th Company of the 462nd Regiment, and the 9th Company of the 460th Regiment, were surrounded by superior forces and cut off in the early morning hours, and, after a particularly brave defense, were practically annihilated. Only a small number of the 9th Company, 460th Regiment, succeeded in fighting their way back to their battalion with their bayonets. The xoth and nth Companies, 460th, dug themselves in, in their patch of woods southwest of Torcy, in the face of the enemy attacking on all sides. They repulsed the attack with severe losses, but were continually harassed by low fliers who almost touched the tree tops. The few available reserves were rushed in turn to the places where the enemy was approaching the closest, sometimes within a few paces. A vigorous counterattack by the 12th Company, 460th, whose company commander fell in this comradely endeavor, cleared the way to the north. The enemy now covered the woods with heavy artillery fire, including gas shells. To have sent further support would have entailed severe losses; the regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel Tismer, therefore decided to withdraw both companies. Of course, this could only be done after dark. Accordingly, these two hard-pressed companies withstood the enemy attacks most creditably during the whole day. In order to support the front of the 460th Regiment, the 2nd Battalion, 462nd, was now wedged in between the 3rd Battalion, 460th, on the right, and the 1st Battalion, 460th, on the left; the right flank of the 3rd Battalion, 460th, was secured by the 10th Company, 462nd, and by establishing flanking machine-gun nests.
Following the orders of the Conta Group, the 237th Division was now required to take over a strip heretofore covered by the 197th Division. The 2nd Battalion, 460th, therefore took position to the right, next to the 3rd Battalion, 460th. At nightfall the regimental alignment was to be reestablished as follows: the 2nd Battalion, 460th, to the right; the 1st Battalion, 460th, to the left; the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 462nd, and the 10th and nth Companies, 460th Regiment, to be established to the rear. To facilitate this, at 7:30 p.m. a heavy artillery barrage was directed along the front of the entire position. In the meantime, a raid by the enemy at 6:00 p.m. was easily repulsed. Despite the heavy artillery fire, enemy raids were made at 8:00 p.m. at different points as far as the line of the 1st Battalion, 460th. They were beaten off by a powerful counterattack of the 1st Company, 460th, and the flanking machine-gun fire of the 461st Regiment. Three Americans were taken prisoners.
By 11:00 p.m. the 460th Regiment had completed the change of position. The two companies surrounded in the grove slipped away from the enemy in good order, without the loss of a single machine gun.
The 461st Regiment, holding Belleau Woods, reported that at 6:30 a.m. the Americans had made a surprise attack on the 2nd Battalion, holding the eastern half of the woods, but that the attack broke down on the front line. The southeastern tip of the woods had been left out of the defensive line on June 5, presumably because of the danger of a surrounding movement.
The enemy’s intentions were obvious, as his artillery fire became more intense, particularly in the region east and north of Bouresches, while the activities of his flyers became more pronounced. The division commander, Major General von Diepenbroick-Griiter, at 6:50 p.m., issued the following order: “We must expect continuous attacks on the front of the 10th Division.” The attack of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, and the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 6th Marines, late that evening, was therefore not at all unexpected by the Germans. It was directed chiefly against the left wing of the 398th Regiment, particularly the 1st Battalion, and the right wing of the 47th Regiment, the 1st Battalion. The Americans were obliged to come down from the heights they were occupying before the eyes of the Germans. They did this in thick lines of skirmishers, supported by columns following immediately behind. The Germans could not have desired better targets; such a spectacle was entirely unfamiliar to them. Under similar conditions, German troops would have advanced in thin lines of skirmishers following one another like waves, or in small, separate units of shock troops, moving forward in rows with their light machine guns, utilizing whatever shelter was offered by the terrain until they were in a position to open fire. It was thus that the French had advanced the same day, through the grain fields, until they had crept close to the German defenders. However, when one considers that this was their first real fight this procedure of the Americans is by no means suprising. Troops coming under fire for the first time often proceed in just that way. The German soldiers of 1914, generally conceded to have constituted the best army ever known, often advanced in almost the same way as the Americans did on this occasion, despite orders to the contrary. This is evident from the French and English descriptions of the early battles. And yet in those days they defeated all the French and English armies, driving them back of the Marne, although they suffered great losses, particularly in officers. It is, therefore, perfectly clear why the vigorous American battalions adopted that method of advancing to the attack. And it was only natural that the entire artillery, machine-gun, and infantry fire of the defenders should have been concentrated on these advancing masses. It was thus that the first attack broke down with severe losses.
This failure by no means disheartened the Americans. They kept on attacking with tenacity. Gradually the German artillery fire to the westward became weaker, as they themselves were under heavy fire from the enemy, and suffered great losses. The artillery battery of the 21st Infantry, for example, had three men left at the guns at 8:55 p.m., and it was, of course, impossible to keep up an effective barrage. All officers, non-commissioned officers, and other personnel were either dead or wounded. It thus became easier to run the barrage. Making good use of the bed of a brook, the 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines, at 8:30 p.m. succeeded in entering Bouresches. As has been seen, there was here only an outpost consisting of the 7th and 8th Companies of the 398th Regiment. After a furious house- to-house battle, they were ordered to withdraw to the main defense line, to avoid being cut off.
Now began a struggle of unexampled obstinacy. The Amercan battalions set about their mission of capturing Belleau Woods, the Bouresches railway station, and Hills 126 and 133, unconditionally resolved to the last man to do so, cost what it might. But the German battalions defended this, their main defense line, with equal determination. After bitter fighting the Americans finally had to give up the struggle, but with the village of Bouresches in their possession. The heroic spirit with which these brave troops attacked will be realized from the fact that, in front of the 4th Company, 398th Regiment, alone, 100 American dead were counted the following morning. On the German side, too, occurred something generally considered very rare in the war; the infantry, particularly the 1st Battalion, 398th, had almost completely exhausted their ammunition. An emergency supply had to be brought up during the night by the 3rd Battalion, 6th Grenadier Regiment, which had been stationed to the rear. The division commander now sent the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 6th Grenadiers, to support the 398th Regiment. The rifle strength of each of the battalions, however, did not exceed 200. The 3rd Battalion, 6th Grenadiers, was posted in the northwestern comer of the woods, near Rochette Farm; the 2nd Battalion was echeloned behind the right wing of the 398th Regiment.
After the 398th Regiment was thus protected against a further expected attack from Bouresches, Lieutenant Colonel Rotenbiicher, commander of the 47th Infantry Regiment, ordered the 1st Battalion, on whose right wing the 4th Company had given way before the American attack at 7130 p.m., to eject the enemy that had penetrated the wood patch east of Hill 192. Captain Rickert, the battalion commander, conducted this counterattack with unusual skill. He waited until dusk, and until after the enemy captive balloon had been hauled down. From 9:10 to 9:14 p.m., the enemy were showered with machine-gun fire from a northerly direction. Here, too, he left the 2nd and 3rd Companies. In the meantime, the 1st and 4th Companies advanced, unobserved, through a ravine southeast of the wood patch, in the vicinity of Point 175. At 9:14 p.m. the two companies threw themselves on the enemy, whose whole attention had been turned to the north. In the ensuing fight in the woods. Lieutenant Gliickert fell, wounded, into the hands of the enemy, but the surprise attack was a complete success. The enemy sought to save themselves by a hasty retreat in a northerly direction, but thus came under the hot fire of the 398th Infantry. Here too, numerous dead and wounded Americans covered the field, some of the wounded begging for water in German.
The total losses of the 10th Infantry Division on June 6, were as follows: killed, 24; wounded, 101; missing, 2 officers and 24 men. The losses of the 237th Division were considerably greater: killed, 6 officers and 72 men; wounded 10 officers and 218 men; missing, 5 officers and 90 men. The 237th Division took 40 American prisoners; the 10th, 7 Americans.
Thus ended the battles of June 6. Both sides have reason to be proud of the deeds of their young men there.
June 7 was comparatively quiet. The right wing of the 197th Division withstood an attack by the French from the direction of Gandelu, losing a little ground. During the night this division was relieved by the 5th Guard Division.
At noon the 237th Division received reports of a concentration of enemy infantry in the woods between Torcy and Lucy-le Bocage. This pointed to an attack on the 461st Regiment. Accordingly the 1st Battalion, 462nd Regiment, was assigned to the 461st as a reserve. In the afternoon, after a strong artillery preparation, the Americans actually did try an attack along the entire front of the regiment. On the right wing the attack broke down in the German advanced positions owing to a hot machine-gun fire; on the left wing, the Americans advanced on the line from Hill 181 to the left, but they were finally driven off. Whether a major attack had been planned or whether it was simply a local demonstration, has not been determined.
The losses of the 237th Division on that day were: killed, 9 men; wounded, 68; missing, 8.
The 10th Division also believed that it nipped in the bud an enemy attack in the early morning hours of June 7, by a combined artillery, machine-gun, and infantry fire. A patrol from the 10th Company, 398th, found Bouresches strongly occupied by American forces. Some of their trucks on the way to the rear came under a vigorous German machine-gun fire. During the night of June 7/8, the 47th Regiment was relieved by the 444th Regiment of the 231st Division. The division now extended its quiet front to the west by the width of a regiment.
The losses of the 10th Division amounted to 2 officers and 8 men killed, 1 officer and 50 men wounded, and 13 men missing; there were also 3 officers and 20 men gassed, having inhaled German gas.
An incident very characteristic of the bold behavior of the Americans took place that day near the 231st Division. During the relief of the 1st Battalion, 442nd Regiment, by the 2nd Battalion, on Hill 204, some men of the 8th Company suddenly came upon Americans and Frenchmen on top of the hill in a clearing which divides the southern part of the woods. Two startled Americans were captured, and were led behind the lines by some food carriers of a machine gun company. But despite all their efforts, the Germans could not get a clear statement from them. However, it was believed that a strong enemy patrol had pushed in between the 6th and 8th Companies during the relief operations. Due to the impenetrable underbrush and the heavy machine- gun fire, the 8th Company failed to dislodge them, as did a counterattack by the 3rd and 4th Companies along the edge of the woods, ordered by Major von Gome, the regimental commander. Another attack made by the 3rd Battalion, 442nd Regiment, also ended in failure.
The division commander, Major General von Hiilsen, then issued an energetic order to clean out that “American nest.” The efforts were repeated on June 8, and again on June 10, but the intruders, no doubt considerably reenforced by the French, held their own, notwithstanding the fact that they were hemmed in by a semicircle of the 442nd Regiment. Their tenacity was so great that, finally, all efforts to dislodge them were given up. The German position on Hill 204 was strongly fortified to form a ring around the “American nest.”
On June 8, at one o’clock at night, the 460th Division asked the 237th Division for a barrage, but the threatened enemy attack did not materialize. At 1130 a.m., however, the 461st Regiment, stationed on their immediate left, repulsed an attack made in strong force after a drum fire of fifteen minutes.
At 5:00 a.m. came an attack against Belleau Woods by the 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines, reenforced by one company of the 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines, and two companies of the 2nd Engineers. The 461st Regiment made the following report concerning this attack:
At 5:00 A.M. the enemy renewed his attack along the entire front of this regiment. Beaten back everywhere else, he succeeded in penetrating on the left wing, favored as he was by the possession of Bouresches. A counterattack by the 6th and 8th Companies, 461st, and the 365th Engineer Company, threw the Americans back to their original position in the woods. The mass of dead lying in front of the point where they temporarily broke our line indicates that the enemy suffered great losses. Forty prisoners were taken by the 461st Regiment.
The losses of the 237th Division were: 2 officers and 49 men killed, 8 officers and 128 men wounded, and 2 men missing.
At 2:00 A.M. an attack was made against the 398th Regiment, 10th Division, by the American 34th Infantry Regiment, but was beaten back with great losses. Attempts by our own men during the early morning hours to bring in the American wounded lying along the front failed because the enemy evidently misunderstood the attempt, and fired on the hospital unit. During the night of June 9, the 398th Regiment was relieved by the 109th Grenadier Regiment of the 28th Division.
The losses of the 10th Division on June 8, 9, and 10 were 5 men killed, 1 officer and 29 men wounded, and 18 men sick.
With the relief of the 197th Division by the 5th Guard Infantry Division, and of the 10th Division by the 28th, the division fronts were shifted to the right by the width of one battalion. The front of the 5th Guard Division was narrowed; the 197th Infantry Division was required to take over Bussiares during the night of June 8/9; and the 40th Regiment of the 28th Infantry Division was shifted to take over the eastern half of Belleau Woods. This last, as we will see later, proved fateful.
Lieutenant General von Jacobi, commander of the 237th Division, which has held our interest so much, had among his officers some outstanding regimental commanders. Lieutenant Colonel Tismer, commander of the 460th Regiment, to which had been assigned the 3rd Battalion, 462nd, and a company of shock troops, to take over Bussiares, anticipated the events of the coming day in the following order, issued at 11:25 p.m.:
If the enemy attacks tonight at Bussiares or Torcy and breaks through anywhere, a counterattack should be made immediately, if possible, in order to gain ground that can be used later as an advanced position if it offers favorable facilities for defense.
The 3rd Battalion, 462nd Regiment, and the company of shock troops were to enter Bussiares; the 3rd Battalion, 460th, and the 1st Battalion, 462nd, were to hold themselves in readiness in the hollow near Licy-Clignon.
Such was the situation when the enemy, at 4:40 a.m. on June 9, after a vigorous artillery preparation, attacked the front of the 5th Guard Infantry Division and Bussiares. They succeeded in pushing back the 20th Regiment of the 5th Guards, which was unacquainted with the ground, and in surrounding several of its companies in the triangular wood patch southwest of Bussiares, but they were unable to force their way into the village. At 8:00 a.m. they increased their artillery fire, with considerable use of gas shells. At 9:30 a.m. they made a furious attack, and, after a violent house- to-house fight, penetrated into Bussiares. Thereupon followed a terrific counterattack of the 2nd and 3rd Companies of the 460th Regiment. In full force, they threw the enemy out of the village and followed him to the heights southeast of Bussiares. They established positions here, but were compelled to return to the southern edge of Bussiares, because they were suffering from the short-range fire of their own artillery. The enemy held out in some of the houses on the western edge until 4:30 P.M., when they were ejected. During the night, the 3rd Battalion, 460th Regiment, occupied Bussiares, relieving the 3rd, 462nd.
The 461st Regiment repulsed an attack during the night, and again at 5:00 a.m., another American attack directed along the entire front of the regiment. It was learned from statements of prisoners that the attack had been made by the 5th and 6th Marines and the 23rd Infantry, but that it had been repulsed with heavy losses.
The losses sustained during these daily battles had reduced the companies of the 461st Regiment to such an extent that it became necessary to put almost the entire regiment on the front line, in order to attain the required strength in our main defensive line. There remained in reserve only the 3rd Company, directly behind the 1st Battalion; the 9th Company, behind the 2nd Battalion; the 365th Engineer Company, directly behind the left wing; and the 366th Engineer Company, near the center. Major Bishchoff, the regimental commander, a veteran in African bush and forest fighting, had thus far been able to repel all American attacks by those methods. During the night of June 10, he was to turn over the left half of his regiment’s front in Belleau Woods to a battalion of the 4th Regiment, 28th Infantry Division. From the officer sent in advance he learned that this battalion was to relieve six weakened companies of his regiment by stationing only two companies on the main defense line, while the other two companies were to be echeloned east of the woods. Major Bischoff protested at once. He insisted that the customary procedure must be avoided; that the woods were so thick that a counterattack coming from a deep position would be ineffective.
His arguments did not prevail, however, as the plans of the 28th Division had already been approved. Major Bischoff had a presentiment of what was to be enacted on that scene in the next few days. To provide against the worst, he left six heavy machine guns in the relinquished position, but unfortunately only for twenty-four hours.
The losses of the 237th Division on June 9 amounted to 40 men killed, 6 officers and 163 men wounded, and 3 officers and 57 men missing. Those of the 28th Division, which had taken over the new front at 10 :oo a.m., were 9 men killed, 1 officer and 44 men wounded.
The commander of the 28th Division, in his order of the day, dated June 8, addressed his tired troops as follows:
An American success along our front, even if only temporary, may have the most unfavorable influence on the attitude of the Entente and the duration of the war. In the coming battles, therefore, it is not a question of the possession or non-possession of this or that village or woods, insignificant in itself; it is a question whether the Anglo-American claim that the American Army is the equal or even the superior of the German Army is to be made good.*
* Der Div. Kdr. der 28 Jnf. Div. hatte im Tagesbefehl vom 8 Juni seinen müden Truppen zugerufen: “Gewinnen die Amerikaner vor unserer Front auch nur vorübergehend die oberhand, so kann dies auf die Stimmung der Entente und auf die Dauer des Krieges den ungünstigsten Einfluss ausüben. Bei der uns bevorstehenden Gefechstätigkeit handelt es sich also nicht um Besitz oder Nichtbesitz eines an und für sich gleichgültigen Waldes oder Dorfes, sondern um die Frage, ob es der englisch-amerikanischen Reklame gelingen wird, das amerikanische Heer als eine dem deutschen Heere ebenwiirtige oder gar überlegene Truppe hinzustellen." Nirgends ist dieser Gedanke so klar zum Apsdruck gebracht, wie in diesem Befehle des Generalmajor Böhm.
Nowhere is the thought more clearly expressed than in this order of Major General Bohm.
On June 10, the main defense line along the front of the 5th Guard Division was shifted back to the north of Clignon Brook. The main defense line of the 460th Regiment was also drawn back. The village of Bussiares, now but an outpost, was occupied only by the 3rd and 4th Companies of the 460th. This shift was accomplished without interference by the enemy.
The 461st Regiment had now taken over a battalion front from the line of the 460th. Only the 1st Battalion of the 461st was now left in Belleau Woods. An attack on this battalion at 5:00 a.m., preceded by the heaviest artillery preparations, was repulsed by machine-gun and artillery fire. At the same time the Americans made an attack against the 2nd Battalion of the 40th Regiment, in the eastern half of the woods. This attack and a further one from the direction of Bouresches were both repulsed.
The losses of that day amounted to 1 officer and 36 men killed, 5 officers and 132 men wounded, and 4 men missing, in the 237th Division; 137 men killed, 247 wounded, and 50 missing, in the 28th Division.
We now come to the decisive American attack of June 11, executed mainly by the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, and the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines.
At 3:30 a.m. the enemy artillery fire had reached its maximum effectiveness. At 5:30 a.m. the 1st Battalion, 461st, was attacked in the western half of the woods. Our demand for an artillery barrage received no answer, as our signal lights could not be seen through the heavy fog. Nevertheless, this attack was beaten off. Fifty American dead lay along the front of the battalion.
[Image: SITUATION ON JUNE 10, 1918.]
Immediately after, however, the enemy broke through the right wing of the 2nd Battalion, 40th Regiment, and appeared on the flank and rear of the 1st and 4th Companies of the 461st Regiment. Favored by the fog, he immediately renewed his attack on the front of the two companies. After a bitter night battle, the German companies lost three officers and eighty men as prisoners; the rest fought their way through by bayonet to the north, where they were incorporated into the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, and 7th Companies of the 461st Regiment, under Major Hartlich, the battalion commander. Major Hartlich, after building a strong barricade in the woods, marched at the head of his companies to the counterattack, sweeping along, by his own example, those units exhausted by the struggles of the day. This spirited procedure had its effect; by noon the 1st Battalion, 461st, had regained its position.
Upon being informed of the enemy incursion, the commander of the 237th Division advanced the 1st Battalion, 462nd Regiment, into the wood patch near Les Brusses Farm, and the 2nd Battalion, 462nd, to point 182. The hard-pressed 1st Battalion, 461st, was reenforced by the 1st and 3rd Companies of the 462nd, and two machine gun platoons. It should be noted here that in the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 460th Regiment the number of influenza cases began to increase about this time to an alarming degree.
On the front of the 2nd Battalion, 40th, in the eastern part of the woods, the first American attack had been repulsed by the 7th and 8th Companies. However, owing to the thinness of the lines—against which Major Bischoff had protested in vain—the Americans succeeded, in a second attack, in breaking through the right wing of the 2nd Battalion, 40th Regiment. In this operation the Americans made good use of the bed of a brook which ran through the middle of the woods in a northeasterly direction. The captain of the 5th Company, 40th, standing here in reserve, immediately threw himself upon them. But his company was soon scattered in the thick forest. There remained under his control but few of his men, or of the mine throwing company stationed in the woods, and he was overwhelmed by numbers. His company, thrown into confusion, together with the 7th and 8th Companies of the 40th Regiment, was attacked flank and rear. In the ensuing bayonet battle, fought on both sides with the utmost bravery, both sides suffered great losses. The general confusion among the defenders was increased by German-speaking Americans who, in the thick woods, called out, “Wo ist das Regiment 40?” and the like, apparently for assistance. This confusion resulted in the loss of practically the entire personnel of the three companies; but few succeeded in fighting their way through. Those who did not fall in battle were taken prisoners.
The 1st Battalion of the 40th was now thrown into the counterattack. They were received by the Americans, however, with a heavy machine-gun fire, and advanced only 200 meters. Their losses were so heavy and their ranks so thinned that any further effort at counterattack seemed hopeless. The commander of the 28th Division now ordered the 2nd Battalion of the 110th Regiment, which had advanced to the region southwest of Etrepilly, to the support of the 40th Regiment. The new troops were stationed to the right of the 1st Battalion, 40th, and Captain Mencke was given command of the two battalions in the attack. He pushed forward another 200 meters, and then came to a standstill; his machine guns and mine throwers were powerless in the thick forest. His men were so exhausted by about eight o’clock in the evening that all attempts to advance were stopped. The front line was even moved back a little to get a better situation.
The brigade commander issued orders to retake the old line the next day at any cost.
The losses of the 237th Division on this day amounted to 2 officers and 28 men killed, 2 officers and 114 men wounded, and 3 officers and 82 men missing. Those of the 28th Division have not been fully established, but they amounted to about 3 officers and 151 men killed, 6 officers and 355 men wounded, and 1 officer and 53 men missing. The number of prisoners was probably somewhat greater than this.
Quiet reigned along the front of the 460th and the 461st Regiments during the forenoon of June 12. The Americans contented themselves with feeling out the positions with strong patrols.
At 5:01 p.m., however, a surprise attack was made on Belleau Woods, without artillery preparations, executed mainly by the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines. The 1st Battalion, 461st, repulsed the enemy in the advanced positions. The 8th Company, 461st, which formed the connection between the 40th Regiment and the 1st Battalion, 461st, also met with success. Some fifty dead lay along the front. But the neighbor on the left was not so fortunate. Soon afterward the 8th Company was completely surrounded from the left and cut off, while the 7th Company, 461st, was attacked from the rear. On the northeastern corner, also, the enemy was advancing clear through the woods.
Accordingly, Major Bischoff ordered the 2nd Battalion, 461st, to withdraw as far as Pavilion Hill, but not to give up that position under any circumstances, because it dominated the ground as far as Hill 190-Belleau-Torcy, and its loss would have necessitated the withdrawal of the entire line back of Clignon Brook.
In accordance with these orders, the left wing of the 2nd Battalion, 461st, fell back and proceeded to a counterattack toward the northeastern part of the woods, with the 5th and 7th Companies of the 461st, and the 1st and 3rd Companies of the 462nd. This attack succeeded, and the troops established themselves in the woods south of Pavilion Hill, beating off all further attacks. There was now a gap between the 461st and the 40th Regiments, which was filled by the 2nd and 4th and Machine Gun Companies of the 1st Battalion, 462nd. These units now formed the left wing of the 461st Regiment.
As there was very little firing coming from the woods at 8:00 p.m., a skirmish line reconnoitered through the forest to the northern edge of the large clearings, where they dug themselves in.
Lieutenant General von Jacobi now concentrated the entire fire of his artillery on the southern part of the woods. He also requested the commander of the 5th Guard Division, Major General von Haxthausen, to join in the fire, and detailed the 2nd Battalion, 462nd Regiment, stationed at Les Brusses Farm, to the support of the 461st Regiment.
On the front of the 28th Division, the 2nd Battalion, 110th Regiment, and parts of the 1st Battalion, 40th, had renewed the attack at 4:15 a.m. The American resistance here proved exceptionally vigorous. However, the German right wing succeeded in reaching the old line at 6:01 a.m.
A strong artillery fire began at 5:30 p.m., soon followed by attacks en masse. The American masses, advancing in part in columns, were subjected to a murderous fire; nevertheless they continued to throw in new forces. They succeeded in breaking through at various points. Now they appeared in the rear of the 2nd Battalion, 110th Regiment, and the 1st Battalion of the 40th. After an obstinate resistance, both battalions were forced back. Those remaining behind fought their way to the eastern edge of the woods, and then returned to the Bouresches-Belleau road, where they were incorporated into the 1st Battalion of the 100th.
Thus the bold 2nd Regiment, 5th Marines, succeeded in driving completely out of the woods the forces of the 28th Division that had established themselves there.
The losses of the 237th Division amounted to 8 men killed, 5 officers and 48 men wounded, and 1 officer and 63 men missing. Those of the 28th Division were 2 officers and 43 men killed, 1 officer and 274 men wounded, and 1 officer and 35 men missing.
The question might here suggest itself: How can it be explained that the Germans, after fighting off with unheard-of bravery continuous American attacks for seven days, should have been overwhelmed in hand-to- hand fighting in the comparatively short time of two days, as soon as the Americans had forced their way into the forest? The question is the more pertinent and the success of the Americans the more creditable because it had been common knowledge that it was precisely in hand-to-hand fighting that the German was an exceptionally redoubtable foe. It had been repeatedly demonstrated during the long course of the World War that, due to the Furor Teutonicus once dreaded by the Roman, the Germans were so superior to the French and the Russians in this form of combat—and what is more important, felt themselves so superior—that it was only when the French and Russians outnumbered them that they dared meet the Germans at close quarters. The marked superiority of the German race over the Roman and Slavic races in hand-to-hand fighting impressed itself throughout the hardest battles of the World War. If the sport-loving English, and the powerful Canadians and Australians, proved to be the equals of the Germans in hand-to-hand combat, it must be remembered that like ourselves, they are of Germanic blood.
To give a complete answer to this question, we must also examine the organization and equipment of a German infantry regiment at this time. In each there was a mine thrower company of six light mine throwers; each of the three battalions had one machine gun company with eight heavy machine guns; each of the four companies of a battalion had six light machine guns. With such an organization, which was quite similar to that of the French, the German infantry possessed a great firing force which enabled them to beat off the American attacks. But the small number of men armed with the rifle—men with bayonets—constituted a great disadvantage once the fighting started inside the forest itself. Moreover, their shock troops had been considerably thinned out. It was quite the contrary with the Americans.
Even as it was, the equipment of the attacking divisions had been reduced before beginning the offensive, in order to give them greater shock force. During trench warfare, each infantry regiment had as many as twelve light mine throwers, twenty- four grenade throwers, and thirty-six heavy, and ninety-six light, machine guns.
There is another point. Even before the opening of the Chemin des Dames offensive, a German commanding general had seriously recommended to the High Command that each two divisions be merged into one, because he believed that the fighting strength of our infantry had been too much reduced. In the first place, the infantry regiments were weak in numbers; secondly, the number of specialists not participating in actual combat amounted to 2,000, in each division. As the specialists have smaller losses than
the fighting men, the result was that after the first heavy engagements they were actually numerically greater than the infantry troops.
Now, what was the actual situation with regard to strength? The German battalions stationed opposite the American 2nd Division had suffered heavy losses since May 27. It is difficult to determine the actual losses during and after each of the daily battles. However, a good grasp of the situation may be gained from the report of the 237th Division that, on June 13, its rifle strength, exclusive of machine-gun and mine-thrower troops, was:
460th Regiment—21 officers—575 men
461st Regiment—12 officers—429 men
462nd Regiment—14 officers—478 men
In accordance with a brigade order, all available men from the transport service had been concentrated and brought to the front line. This added on the front of the 462nd Regiment a total of 1 officer, 58 noncommissioned officers, including a sergeant major, and 150 men, all of whom were urgently needed, as the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 460th Regiment had had over 100 new cases of influenza in the last two days.
It may be assumed without doubt that the rifle strength of an American company at this time was about equal to that of a German battalion. When the German companies reported that they were attacked by superior numbers in the woods, that must actually have been the case.
On June 13, a concerted attack was . planned, to be made under the commander of the 28th Division, with the object of regaining the woods and the village of Bouresches. The artillery preparations began at 4:00 a.m., and fifteen minutes later the united battalions of the 109th, 110th, and 128th Regiments began the advance; but they were soon driven back to their positions by heavy machine-gun fire from the woods and from Bouresches. Parts of the 109th Grenadier Regiment did succeed in establishing a foothold in Bouresches, where they left an outpost. As the attack failed to progress, the 461st Regiment did not join in.
Toward five o’clock in the afternoon, the positions still held by the right wing of the 28th Division and the 2nd Battalion of the 461st Regiment were attacked by the Americans, but they did not succeed in forcing the Germans completely out of the woods. The 461st Regiment, reenforced by the 2nd Battalion, 462nd, managed to reestablish its communications and to organize the main defense line for further resistance.
The losses of the 237th Division amounted to 4 officers and 32 men killed, 3 officers and 106 men wounded, and 9 men missing. Those of the 28th Division amounted to 65 men killed, 317 wounded, and 35 missing. The total losses of the 28th Division from May 27 to June 15 amounted to 70 officers and 2,100 men.
[Image: SITUATION JUNE 13, 1918. Early in the Morning.]
The conditions existing in the 40th Regiment on June 13 were described as follows: “Due to exhaustion, malnutrition, and above all to lack of junior officers, the fighting value of these troops is practically nil.”
On June 15, a gathering of American troops in the northwestern part of the woods, in front of the 237th Division, was scattered by a withering fire. The 237th lost 1 officer and 13 men killed, and 1 officer and 60 men wounded. Major Mors, commander of the 462nd Regiment, died as a result of severe wounds received on June 6. On June 16, the gallant 237th Division was relieved by the 87th Division.
The conditions existing in the 237th Division are best described in the following extract from the diary of Lieutenant Breil, commanding the 12th Company, 461st Regiment, and in private life a head school master:
He who escaped being wounded during the days around here may surely boast of exceptionally good fortune. But there was no time to worry about that; we were too exhausted. What our men did here can only be judged by one who was on the scene himself. How feeble and sick we were, with fever (the influenza), and diarrhea, all of us without exception, and yet we held out! Here we had a good example of the influence of a leader. Major Bischoff, the veteran African fighter, said to his men: “I know you are all sick. Any physician would have you put on the sick list. But will you allow the successes won with our blood to be jeopardized or even lost? A man can endure anything so long as he has the will to do so. Clench your teeth, then! Pull yourselves together! When we get out of this place we will have time to recuperate.” Not a man reported himself sick.
The other divisions, the 10th and 28th, were among the finest in the German Army. As the most successful German division, the 28th (Baden) Infantry had led the attack from Chemin des Dames to the Marne, defeating and hurling back all the French who opposed its bold dash. Like the 5th Guard, this division had been relieved on the Marne in order to undertake a new task. The troops of both divisions naturally had been used up by the long-drawn- out fighting, without any intervening periods, and were sorely in need of rest.
The question might therefore be raised: Why did the German Supreme Command place these badly worn troops in the battle line, well knowing that they could not live up to their standards or their reputations? As a matter of fact, General Headquarters still had at its disposal at that time, in the army group of Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, alone, thirty-seven fully manned and fresh divisions. But it desired to use them in a decisive offensive against the English in the region of Ypres, the plan being to push their northern wing back against the sea, and to roll up their southern wing. As stated before, there was no intention of making an attack on Paris. The great offensive launched between Soissons and Reims, as well as the later attack on both sides of Reims, July 15-17, was intended as a diversion to cover this mighty so-called “Hagen” (hedging) operation. It was only as a result of the successful attack of the Allies on July 18 that the German Supreme Command was compelled to abandon that vast plan, and to use the “Hagen Divisions” for defense in other quarters.
On June 14, the Supreme Command issued orders to the army groups of the German Crown Prince to suspend the offensive, and to organize for the defensive. This put an end not only to the battles raging since June 9 on the front of the 18th Army in the region of Noyon, on the Avre and the Matz, and to the great offensive conducted by the right wing of the 7th Army west and southwest of Soissons, but also to the local attacks in the Belleau Woods region. The latter offensive could have been brought to a successful conclusion only by the use of fresh troops. The 28th Division was no longer equal to the occasion.
Thus the possession of the woods was now no longer disputed by the Germans. They became resigned to the loss. The new defensive positions held by the Conta Corps, and the advanced zone, are shown on the map, page 958.
The newly arrived 87th Division now took over the right sector of the front of the 28th Division; the latter in turn, the right sector of the front of the 231st Division. This front, on which there had been so much fighting, now became a so-called “quiet front.” However, as will be seen, there was no lack of fighting here, even if it was a “quiet front.”
The transfer of the positions to the 87th Division gave rise to the suggestion that the northern corner of the woods be evacuated, and that the main defense line be withdrawn to the slopes behind the villages of Belleau and Torcy, to gain a stronger advanced position. In the forest itself, an advanced position could have been created only by clearing the very thick underbrush with mines. However, General von Conta did not approve this plan.
[Image: SITUATION ON JUNE 15, 1918. 8:00 A.M.]
The division commander stationed the 345th Regiment on the right, and the 347th on the left. Within the woods was the 1st Battalion, 347th, less one company, which was withdrawn to Belleau village as a reserve.
We shall now take only a brief further glance at the events concerning Belleau. On the night of June 17/18 our positions in that region were attacked by infantry patrols, which were repulsed by light machine-gun fire and hand grenades. During the night of June 18/19, the enemy made a surprise attack along the entire line of the division with infantry and machine guns. At 4:50 a.m., June 20, without special artillery preparations, they attacked the front of the 347th Infantry in strong lines of skirmishers, but without success. Patrols from the 3rd Battalion, 347th, found between sixty and seventy American dead in one small area. They appeared to belong to the 7th Infantry Regiment.
On June 21, at 6:30 a.m., the enemy attacked the nth Company, 347th Regiment, then stationed in the woods. This attack broke down close to our lines, with heavy losses to the enemy. We captured three wounded Americans of the 7th Regiment.
On June 23, between midnight and 5:00 a.m., four patrol raids in considerable force took place, the last one after artillery preparation. All were beaten off with rifle and machine-gun fire.
On June 24, they attacked at 8:00 p.m., and, after being beaten off, again at 10:15 p.m.; once more they were repulsed with heavy losses, after we had resorted to barrage fire. Commencing at about 12:30 a.m., there were sporadic raids by grenade throwers against the 1st Battalion, 347th. Simultaneously, patrols advancing on the right wing of the battalion were driven off. At 3:00 a.m., a rush against the center of the battalion was repulsed. At 4:00 a.m., the enemy again made unsuccessful attacks on the right and left wings of this battalion. In this attack the enemy crept in cautiously, with their helmets covered with green brush. French troops were now found with the Americans. Along the left wing of the battalion, the enemy was only fifty or seventy- five meters from the German lines.
The conclusive American attack took place on June 25. The divisional report was as follows:
At 5:00 p.m., a very heavy artillery fire suddenly began from Belleau and the high ground between the woods and the village. Simultaneously, medium and heavy mine throwers directed a fire on the part of the woods held by us. At 6:00 p.m., the adjoining battalions and the artillery positions also came under fire. The companies on the left, the 3rd and 4th of the 347th Regiment, stationed nearer the edge of the woods, suffered severe losses, since the mines burst for the most part in the trees.
The infantry attack began about 6:30 p.m. The battalion at first evaded the force of the blow. Captain (Cavalry) Kaulbars, commander of the battalion, was informed of the heavy losses suffered by the companies, and, at 7:00 p.m., he sent an emergency call, by radio, for the assistance of the 3rd Battalion, in reserve. He now distributed the 1st Company of shock troops among the 3rd and 4th Companies. At 7:12 p.m., division headquarters was informed by the artillery observers that the battalion was again advancing on the woods. At 7:45 p.m., observers noticed white light signals from the depth of the woods (“Here we are.”) At 8:09 p.m., an artillery observer reported that the northern tip of the woods was again in our possession, and that the enemy fire had quieted down.
An infantry flier sent by the division reported that the infantry had again reached the old line.
After a short pause, a new attack was opened at 8:30 p.m. The enemy broke into our positions between the 3rd Company and what remained of the 4th. Both were rolled up against the 2nd and 5th Companies of the 2nd Battalion, adjoining them on the north. A regrouping of the massed shock troops for defense could not be effected for lack of time, particularly since at the very opening of the attack the captain of the 4th Company had been killed, and the captain of the 3rd Company mortally wounded. Those prisoners captured in our counterattack fell again into the hands of the enemy.
At 10:15 p.m., there were only remnants of the five companies participating in the fighting. They succeeded in establishing themselves anew in positions now held along the Torcy-Belleau road.
The division had dispatched two companies of the reserve battalion of the 3rd Replacement Regiment to Belleau from the region north of Bouresches. These companies were detailed to the 347th Regiment for use on the thinned portion of its front. The 6th Company occupied the southern edge of Belleau as a measure of precaution.
The total losses of the five participating companies of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 347th Regiment, amounted to 7 officers and 433 non-commissioned officers and men. Of these, 2 officers and 64 non-commissioned officers and men returned wounded. Therefore, there remain 5 officers and 369 non-commissioned officers and men to be classed as dead or missing. Assuming that the report from Eiffel Tower of 5 officers and 259 men prisoners is correct, no men must be counted dead. The 66 mentioned above as wounded were light cases, and returned to duty before the second attack. At the ratio of 1 dead to 2}4 wounded, there would be a total of 275 wounded, with 209 of them either seriously wounded or lightly wounded but not recovered. On this basis we should count 264 less 209, or 55 unwounded prisoners, who must belong mainly to the five companies stationed in the western corner of the woods, and attacked in the rear.
[The central line shows the German positions on June 2, 1918. The broken line to the left shows the defensive positions as originally planned, which became the object of the German attack in this area. The heavy line to the right shows the German positions on June 14, after the attack by the American Second Division.]
So much for the report of Major General Feldkeller, commander of the 87th Infantry Division. Reports to the effect that part of the Americans wore German uniforms with insignia of the 109th Grenadier Regiment are no doubt mere stories. On the other hand, it is true that they sought to create confusion amidst their foe by calling out in the German language.
Belleau Woods was now entirely in the hands of the American 2nd Division. The map on page 960 shows clearly the territory gained by this division, and that gained by the French 167th Division.
To get an accurate conception of the effect produced by the first appearance of the young American troops in a pitched battle in the western theater of war, we must keep in mind both the material results attained and the moral impression produced. The two combined will give a correct picture. It is much like the effect of a well-directed artillery fire; every experienced soldier knows that often the moral effect is decidedly greater than the material.
The enormous moral impression created by the appearance of the Americans on the side of the Allied powers was dwelt upon at the beginning. In the course of my narrative, I have pointed out that the death- defying boldness of the Americans, their impetuous onslaughts, and their tenacious endurance, were well recognized by the opposing troops and produced a great impression on them.
The opinion of the commanding general of the 4th Reserve Corps, von Conta, concerning the Americans after these battles is evidenced from the following report, dated August 17, 1918:
Fighting Value: The 2nd American may be described as a very good division, and might even be considered as fit for use as shock troops. The numerous attacks by the two marine regiments in Belleau Woods were executed vigorously and without regard for the consequences. Our fire did not affect their morale sufficiently to interfere appreciably with their advance; their nerves had not yet been used up.
The replacement troops must be pronounced excellent. They are healthy, strong, physically well-developed men from eighteen to twenty-eight years of age, who only need the proper training to be turned into opponents worthy of respect.
In spirit the troops are lively and full of a grim, but good-natured, confidence. Indicative is the expression of a prisoner: “We kill or get killed.”
General Ludendorff had recognized from the first reports how considerable was this new foe and how great the danger when many such fine American divisions appeared on the front. On June 8, he therefore issued the following order to all army groups on the Western Front:
American units appearing on the front should be hit particularly hard in order to render difficult the formation of an American army.
The order is significant in that it shows what a high value even the German Supreme Command set on the aid of American arms.
So it was the 2nd Division that brilliantly and deeply engraved in a glorious chapter of the history of the war the answer to the question as to how the Americans would behave in a pitched battle.*
* So hat die 2 Division eine glänzende, mit ehemem Griffel in die Kriegsgeschichte einge- grabene Antwort gegeben auf die Frage, wie sich die Amerikaner im Grosskampf bewähren würden.
On the edge of the blood-drenched woods, however, we might well erect a monument draped with the French, German, and American colors, and bearing the inscription:
THESE ARE THE WOODS OF BELLEAU; IN JUNE, 1918, WRESTED FROM THE FRENCH, AFTER A BRAVE DEFENSE, BY THE GERMANS, STORMING ON IN A BOLD TWO-DAY OFFENSIVE; HEROICALLY DEFENDED BY THEM FOR NINE DAYS ; THEN TAKEN BY STORM IN TWO DAYS, WITH INCOMPARABLE BRAVERY, BY THE AMERICANS, WHO REMAINED VICTORIOUSLY IN POSSESSION OF THE WOODS. HONOR TO THE UNEXCELLED HEROES OF THE THREE NATIONS WHO, TRUE TO THEIR FATHERLAND, HERE FOUGHT AND DIED.