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FATEFUL YEARS, 1909-1919. The reminiscences of Serge Sazonov, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1914. New York: F. A. Stokes Company. 1928. $4.00.
The outbreak of the World War in 1914 took the people of the United States, including most naval officers, by surprise. Scarcely had they recovered before the majority of Americans fixed the blame for the war on Germany and Austria. From the time of our entry into the struggle until very recently this opinion was hardly challenged in this country. In the past few years, however, some writers have endeavored to defend the actions of Germany and Austria by asserting that France and Russia conspired to bring on the war in order to recover Alsace-Lorraine for France and to extend Russian influence in the Balkans with the view to eventually controlling Constantinople and the Dardanelles. These defenders of the Central Powers specifically charge that Poincare, an Alsatian, yearning to restore his native province to France, and Isvolsky, Russian foreign minister in 1908, burning to revenge Russia’s humiliation by Austria when she seized Bosnia and Herzegovina, plotted to bring on the European War.
Sazonov, who wrote these memoirs, was selected by Isvolsky to succeed him as Russian foreign minister when he went to Paris as ambassador in 1909, and Sazonov carried out, with little change, the policy of his predecessor, though he apparently gave a stability to the Foreign Office that was sometimes lacking in Isvolsky’s regime.
These reminiscences were written while in self-imposed exile at Prague after the triumph of the Bolsheviks, and were completed just prior to Sazonov’s death in 1927. Although prepared without the aid of his notebook or the Russian official records, they give a very reasonable explanation of the actions of Russia in the years preceding the war. In fact, this book may be considered an authoritative answer to critics of Russia’s pre-war policies. Sazonov repeatedly proclaims Russia’s desire for Constantinople and an outlet to the Mediterranean; and he told the German chancellor in 1913 that Russia’s ally, France, was still unreconciled to the loss of Alsace-Lorraine. But he as frankly states that neither Russia, still weakened by the Russo-Japanese War and the subsequent revolution, nor France, acutely conscious of Germany’s strength, could visualize a successful conclusion to a struggle with Germany and Austria. His plain inference was that therefore France and Russia would be forced to avoid war.
These memoirs give the essential facts of the long diplomatic struggle between Russia and Austria for control of the Balkans. This information will be unusually useful to American readers, as few books on the war current in the United States have given the rivalry in the Balkans between Russia and Austria the space its importance deserves. The descriptions of the complexities caused by the two Balkan wars in 1913 and the successful efforts made by the great powers to localize those conflicts is illuminating; the causes of the World War can scarcely be appraised correctly without a thorough knowledge of the methods employed by the great powers in 1913 to prevent the European conflagration. Russia sympathized entirely with Serbia’s effort to obtain a port on the Adriatic, but Austria and Italy, divided on almost every other question, were united in preventing another power from obtaining a foothold on that sea. Public opinion in Russia, particularly in court circles and among the Pan-Slavic societies, would have favored armed intervention, but neither France nor England would have supported Russia while Germany stood solidly back of her allies, Austria and Italy. Sazonov informed some of the leading members of the Duma of the risks involved in supporting Serbia. Thereupon they ceased their agitation, gradually the excitement in Russia subsided, and Serbia was denied access to the Adriatic. This incident illustrates once more that responsible statesmen are often required to restrain public opinion from rushing into war. This is as true in our country as in Russia, for both McKinley and Wilson were pushed into war by public opinion.
Sazonov had the habit of visiting the various European capitals in the years preceding the war. The descriptions he gives of the political situations in the different states will enlighten American readers. Some quotations from remarks made to him by people in responsible places will surprise those brought up to believe that trained European rulers and statesmen were at least discreet. For example, on a visit to Berlin, William II entertained Sazonov with a vivid exposition of the yellow peril, which Sazonov promptly repeated to Baron Motono, Japanese ambassador to St. Petersburg, and which Sazonov credits with influencing Japan’s decision to declare war against Germany. Japan had more cogent reasons for entering the World War than the gossip of diplomats, but certainly the former Kaiser’s remarks were well adapted to offend the high-spirited Japanese. A little reflection by the Kaiser would have suggested to him that his remarks would not long remain locked in Sazonov’s bosom.
Sazonov describes the ways and means employed to reconcile the interests of Great Britain and Russia. Persian Lamb skillfully partitioned between the Lion and the Bear brought temporary friendship between these ancient rivals. Sazonov’s account agrees substantially with the account given by Grey in his Twenty-five Years. The success of the method suggests that if enough territory belonging to the small powers had been available to divide among the great powers the war might have been indefinitely postponed.
An instructive side light on the way Great Britain attempts to secure continuity in her foreign policy is revealed by the conference held at Balmoral by Sazonov on one day with Grey and on the following with Bonar Law, leader of the opposition in the House of Commons. There was a guarantee to Russia that both major parties in Great Britain would support the entente with Russia. To obtain an American parallel let the reader imagine Lodge guaranteeing the policies of Woodrow Wilson to a foreign ambassador.
Even this guarantee was not sufficient, for in the fateful days immediately preceding the British declaration of war, Sazonov implored Grey to make some statement to indicate that England would support Russia and France. This Grey was unable to do, for British public opinion was not formed, the Cabinet itself was divided on the question of intervention, and the invasion of Belgium was necessary to crystallize British opinion and enable the British leaders to go to war with Germany.
This incident raised one of the most interesting questions of the war, for Sazonov asserted in August, 1914, and maintained until his death, that if the British government had stated in the last days of July, 1914, that Great Britain would range herself on the side of Russia and France in the event of a European war, Germany would not have permitted Austria to attack Serbia. Many students of the events preceding the war agree with Sazonov. Lloyd George in his famous Guildhall speech in 1911 made it evident that Great Britain would support the Entente if war arose over Morocco, and Germany compromised the question with France. But as Buchanan, British ambassador to St. Petersburg, told Sazonov in July, 1914, British interests in Serbia were nil and British public opinion would not favor a war over a Serbian question. Most British leaders informed on the European situation realized that Great Britain would eventually he drawn into any general European war but because the immediate cause of the war did not sufficiently concern the interests of Britain to arouse British public opinion, the British government could not make the statement of its intentions which might have averted war. The indecision on the part of the British government caused her Allies painful anxiety and may have misled the German leaders concerning the British intentions. This much-argued point indicates that a representative form of government did not under the existing circumstances tend to preserve the peace.
The chaotic conditions prevailing in Russia during the war are discussed by the author, who reluctantly confirms the reports previously published of the influence the infamous Rasputin exercised over the Czarina, who in turn dominated her well-intentioned but weak-willed husband. Surely if a dynasty ever dug its own grave it was the Romanoffs in 1916-1917, and its overthrow precipitated all Russia into a blood bath.
A critical study of this book, which avowedly gives the Russian side of the story, will not completely exonerate Russia from all responsibility for the World War, but it will refute the assertion made by Teutonic advocates that Russia and France plotted to bring about the World War. Unbiased American readers considering these memoirs with those issued by statesmen of other countries, will probably conclude that the causes tending to produce the European war in 1914 were stronger than all the restraints that the wisdom of European statesmen were able to devise, and while remaining convinced that the authorities of the Central Powers unquestionably were immediately responsible for the decisions that precipitated the conflict, will further conclude that the Teutonic leaders probably were driven along the path that led to this struggle by forces that were to all practical purposes beyond their control.
W. D. P.
STAR ALTITUDE CURVES. By Lieutenant Commander P. V. H. Weems, U. S. Navy. San Diego: Rodney Stokes Company. 1928.
Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander G. R. Fairlamb, U. S. Navy
Star altitude curves were developed by Lieutenant Commander Weems for use by navigators of aircraft. The curves are circles of equal altitudes of Polaris and various “companion” stars. They are computed for one-minute intervals of local sideral time and are plotted on the mercator projection. Longitude lines of the mercator projection are, however, eliminated, and in lieu thereof longitude is scaled in one-minute intervals of sideral time. The curves can therefore be used to determine a fix without reference to the dead-reckoning position, the declination, right ascension, hour angle, or azimuth, by merely using the arguments of altitude and Greenzuich sideral time. The fix is determined by the point of intersection of Polaris’ altitude curve with that of the selected companion star. The Polaris curves give, of course, the latitude. The intersections of these curves with the companion star’s altitude curves determine instants of local sideral time, which, of course, when referred to Greenwich sideral time, give longitude. In other words, to quote from the introductory discussion, “the simultaneous altitudes of two stars together with the Greenwich sideral time of observation definitely determine a point on the earth’s surface.” It is marvelously simple both in theory and practice.
A sight is taken of Polaris, whose altitude changes very slowly, followed immediately by a sight of one of the companion stars and the time of this sight noted; for aircraft the second sight should be taken within a minute of the Polaris sight, and for surface ships within about five minutes—unless, of course, run between sights be allowed for; the observed altitudes are referred to the curves, and the latitude is picked off on the side margin directly opposite the point of intersection, while the local sidereal time of sight is picked off vertically from the top or bottom margin. The L.S.T. is then applied to the G.S.T. of the last sight to obtain the longitude. Unless a sidereal watch is carried, the G.S.T. of sight must be computed, and hence the air navigator should be provided with a watch carrying G.S.T. The whole operation of solution and plotting the fix may be done in about one minute.
The present curves are, of course, applicable only to the northern hemisphere, but there is no reason why a system of star curves might not be computed for the southern hemisphere. Another objection might be made to the method in that Polaris is the key star throughout, and it might be obscured by clouds or mist. For aircraft this objection is not significant since it should be an easy matter to climb above the mist. Surface vessels would be unable to use the method in this case, but it was not primarily designed for their use. The curves are corrected for parallax and refraction, so that no corrections to altitudes are necessary with the bubble sextant, but for the convenience of those using horizon sextants, a dip-correction table is given on the front page. Also, a time-arc conversion table is included.
The present curves have been computed for mean positions of the selected stars as of January, 1931. The author points out that, due to procession of the equinoxes, and other causes, the stars slowly change position, and he estimates that to reduce the maximum possible error from this cause, the curves should be reconstructed every six years. The maximum error from this cause he computes to be 2.5 miles in 1928 and 1934, and it reduces to zero in January, 1931. The companion stars have been selected with care in order that two or more should be visible at any time or place throughout the northern hemisphere. For example, in the volume covering latitude 30?-41? N., Vega is given under two conditions of setting and one of rising; Arcturus is given under nearly its whole range of rising and setting; Capella under one condition each of rising and setting; and Alpheratz under a range of 18? altitude setting.
The curves are published in convenient volumes, size 8 ¾ by 10 ¼ by 3/8 inches, weighing ten ounces, and containing about forty to fifty pages of curves, which look very much like ordinary cross-section paper. There are eight blank pages of fine cross- section paper in the back for the convenience of the air navigator in making his computations. The lettering and numbering of the curves are clear and easily read.
If anyone could be so gratuitous as to criticize Lieutenant Commander Weem’s great contribution to the science of celo-navigation in general and aerial navigation in particular, it would be on the score of the general arrangement of his curves. For example, they are published in bands of 10?of latitude. Thus, for craft making great changes of latitude, it will be necessary to equip with one book for every six hundred- mile change of latitude. The latitude scale of the curves being therefore fairly small, it will scarcely be feasible to determine the actual point of intersection closer than two minutes of latitude. The reviewer, however, considers that the general arrangement and scale selected can hardly be improved upon from the standpoint of the air navigator. The author, though not a pilot, has had practical navigating experience in the air and is therefore better qualified to know the needs of air navigators than hosts of our naval aviators, who, sad to relate, have probably never held a bubble sextant in their hands. The reviewer is convinced that one of the big problems of naval aviation is satisfactory navigation of planes at sea. Star Altitude Curves completes another link in the Weems system of aerial navigation and it behooves all squadron commanders to have their pilots become acquainted with it, and to exercise and become proficient in it.
THE CABLE AND WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS OF THE WORLD. By F. J. Brown, C.B., C.B.E. New York: Sir Isaac Pitman and Sons. 1927. $2.25.
Reviewed by Lieutenant C. W. Brewington, U. S. Navy
Mr. Brown is director of the International Cable Companies Association and was formerly assistant secretary of the British post office, in charge of cables and wireless. In his preface he states that his primary object is “to give a succinct and—as far as possible—non-technical account of long-distance submarine cable communication as it exists today (1927).’’ This he has succeeded admirably in doing. This little book of only 146 pages contains the sort of information that everyone, and especially naval officers, should know about the world’s system of submarine cables. There are twenty excellent illustrations and a folding frontispiece map showing the main cable routes of the world.
The book opens with a brief historical and geographical resume and covers the disposition of the former German cables by the Treaty of Versailles. Of interest to Americans is the fact that of the long distance cables, about 144,000 miles are British, about 85,000 miles American, 20,000 miles French, and the remainder (about 16,000 miles) are of various nationalities. Part of the mileage credited to the United States consists of leased cables, British owned.
The second chapter deals in greater detail with the principal cables of the world, giving ownership, length, date of laying, etc., partly in tabular form.
The manufacture and laying of cables is next described, followed by the methods of locating, grappling for, cutting, and repairing them. It is surprising to note the small diameter of the cable that is laid in deep water (about the size of a man’s thumb), and the large diameter of the shore ends and shallow-water portions. The description of the methods of grappling for and cutting cables is of interest to the naval officer, and the illustrations show him the various types of grapnels he might use for this purpose.
In his treatment of the technique of cable communication the author is non-technical to a fault. After discussing in detail the differences between ordinary landwire signals and cable signals, and the difficulties to be overcome in cable signaling, he is very meager in his description of the material means for accomplishing this.
One chapter is devoted to cable finance. When the immense first cost and the large maintenance expenses of cables are realized it is easy to see why, with their comparatively short life of forty to fifty years, it is necessary to charge rather high rates to make them pay.
The new type of “loaded” cable is described, the first successful one using the new alloy “permalloy,” produced by an American company. The necessity for loading, how it is done, and the greater signaling speeds made possible by its use, are explained.
The competition between radio and cables, the advantages and disadvantages of each, and their respective fields of usefulness, leads up to a very brief account of the latest developments of wireless.
A further chapter deals with the question of state versus private enterprise in both cable and wireless communication, and the cognate question of national and international control. This is followed by a discussion of the various kinds of rates and services placed at the disposal of ^lie public by the cable and radio companies. The final chapter deals with radio broadcasting, as the author says, “mainly from an international point of view.”
Less than one-sixth of the book deals with wireless. Its interest and value lies in its concise presentation of information on the cables of the world.
OUR RELATIONS TO THE NATIONS OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE. By Charles Evans Hughes. Princeton University Press. 1928. $1.75.
Reviewed by Brockholst Livingston
Consisting of a series of lectures delivered at Princeton University, this little book by Mr. Hughes (who surely needs no introduction) is of vital interest to naval officers because of the frequency with which they are involved in Latin-American problems.
The distinguished author prefaces his discussions with:
Instead of repeating shibboleths or harping on what is called “imperialism”—a phrase which serves as a substitute for thought and suggests the moral indignation which is so often used to cover a multitude of delinquencies in argument— it is necessary to seek a realistic conception of our relations to the American states and our duties and privileges in the New World of the second quarter of the twentieth century.
He further on states: “We shall make progress if we recognize that instead of a Latin-American problem there are a series of distinct problems. . . . .” To enlighten us on the problems he gives us “a realistic conception” of them—perhaps as they appear to him from his close connection with them.
Instead of dealing with individual cases, he handles the questions from the point of view of subject. The Monroe Doctrine and Canada are separate treatises. Under the general heading of Latin America we find the statement of policy concerning recognition of governments and the special questions relating to the recognition of governments under the Central-American treaties. Furnishing of arms, loans and investments, and financial advisers are all discussed, and, in a brief space, adequate answers supplied.
The hoary matter of intervention comes in for its share of pages, while arbitration is mentioned in even fuller terms. Altogether, the book is complete and well worth reading. We humbly recommend the former Secretary of State.
AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS. By D. M.
Reeves. Ronald Press. New York. $5.00.
The last paragraph of Aerial Photographs strikes the key note of the book’s importance. Pictures taken from the air, no matter of what nature, furnish more information of the characteristics of a given portion of the terrain than can possibly be gained otherwise. The advantages of aerial pictures increase proportionately to the knowledge of their uses. Here is where this book is so valuable. It furnishes in detail a workable knowledge of the various uses of aerial photographs, and the author presents this information in a very lucid manner, free from technical terms unimportant in a work of this nature. It makes an excellent handbook for each member of the military and naval service as it describes and outlines the many uses to which aerial pictures may be put in the different branches of the services. In addition it clearly explains how their use affects an incalculable saving in time while producing the required results—excellent and detailed information of any section of the terrain.
All other forms of portraying parts of the earth’s surface, by means of conventional signs, etc., are merely approximations which never can show the real condition. Photographs taken from the air are the only means we have of showing parts of the earth as they are. We are so used to viewing it through the medium of conventional signs, that when we observe the actual thing in a photograph we hardly recognize it.
For example, as illustrated in the book, in war time, the more detailed information that can be obtained of any active portion of the enemy’s territory, the more efficient can be our dispositions and attacks on that area. Aerial pictures can furnish more and better information than any other means, and with an inestimable saving in time and lives. Personal observation, when boiled down, is what a person thought or remembered he saw. Aerial photographs record exactly what exists, uncolored by a personal point of view, and in most cases with a far more discerning eye than the human observer. Suppose a landing force must go ashore to occupy a section of rough jungle coast that is occupied by the enemy. Positions should be taken by our forces where the least number of men can take and hold the area with the minimum loss of life. Probably very poor maps of any particular section of the country exist. Yet the plan for the disposition of the troops must be made as complete as possible, before landing.
Several strips of film could be taken of the territory as far inland as necessary, and a mosaic map rapidly assembled. Additional prints from the same film could then be viewed under a modern stereoscope. By this means all the characteristics observed on the prints under the stereoscope could be retraced on the like prints in the mosaic. Relative contours, trails, roads, and other features, and a complete knowledge of the positions of the enemy could be obtained. This could be accomplished in a relatively short time. Thus, before the landing force ever set foot ashore, excellent information of the ground they would occupy would be available.
The author touches on an especially interesting field where aerial photography can be of great value, though with certain limiting conditions. That is the securing of data on undersea objects. Many of these uses are mentioned, and I believe that there are many possibilities in this direction that have not been developed. Naturally, work in this field will always be limited by weather and conditions of the water obtaining in the locality concerned.
To emphasize the value and indicate the possibilities of development of aerial photography, a fact relevant to this subject should be mentioned here. With our standard service mapping camera, photographs can be taken from an altitude of ten thousand feet with such clearness that when viewed under a stereoscope, differences of a yard or less in heights of objects can be readily discerned. This camera has a focal length of twelve inches. A camera with a focal length of thirty-six inches, flown at an altitude of 30,000 feet, would give pictures of the same scale and with like clarity and distinctness. The plane would rarely be heard and never seen. These facts obtainable with present day equipment and material only indicate the possibilities of aerial photography in future conflicts, and stress the importance attached to the development of this auxiliary of aviation.
H.D.B.