An Account of the Insurmountable Handicaps Imposed Upon a Noble Body of Men
As the thirtieth anniversary of the Battle of Santiago passes by, few will fail to recall the decisive manner in which Admiral Sampson’s ships annihilated the Spanish fleet. How many, though, have ever heard the Spanish side of the events leading up to the battle? Many no doubt remember that their ships were inferior in power and that their crews had not been efficiently trained. That is but a small part of the story, however. If we scan the various statements, articles, and documents from contemporary Spanish sources we find countless interesting points and a few amazing disclosures. These pages, then, will undertake to recount some of the lesser known facts and incidents preceding and bearing upon the battle, rather than to describe or discuss any phases of the battle itself.
Spanish Navy Decadent
Of course the fundamental source of all of Cervera’s troubles was the hopeless and helpless state of the entire Spanish Navy and its organization at that time. The state of decay extended back for decades. In spite of the fact that war had threatened imminently for months, Cervera’s ships were very nearly the only ones capable of even going to sea when the war finally did break. No money was available for urgent repairs to ships; many months’ back pay was due the personnel. Cervera was not even able to obtain charts of Western Atlantic waters nor information as to the defenses of various Spanish harbors in this hemisphere.
Strange to say, in the face of the complete deficiency of the Spanish Navy, it was most grossly overestimated both in Spain and in the United States. Cervera well knew his navy’s many and sad shortcomings. He devoted his best energies to the end that his superiors might also realize the true state of affairs. His was a voice crying in the wilderness, however. The minister of marine at one time even outlined to him a plan whereby the Spanish Navy would destroy Key West and then cut off other Atlantic ports, although in the meanwhile it might be necessary to engage the American fleet in order to maintain control of the sea. At a last banquet to Spanish naval officers, a serious affair where duty was the keynote, the archbishop himself proposed a toast to their assault upon the city of Washington! And who will forget the panic that seized many Americans dwelling in the coast cities after Cervera left the Cape Verdes—the demands upon the government to apportion ships to each city for protection against the terrible enemy fleet. This hysteria was undoubtedly part reason for the theoretically unwise division of the American Atlantic fleet—the formation of the “Flying Squadron.”
Early in April, 1898, events began to move at a more rapid pace. Cervera had been pleading that the plan of campaign for the approaching war be outlined to him. The minister of marine, less than three weeks before the outbreak, replied with this extraordinary despatch
Your cipher telegram received. In these moments of international crisis no definite plans can be formulated.
Possible explanations of such sentiments are that the minister either was unable to conceive a plan or else he had already decided upon the procedure later adopted and did not desire to apprise Cervera thereof any sooner than necessary. This latter view is strengthened by the unique means by which the orders were finally delivered. Cervera left Spain for the Cape Verdes where his squadron was assembling. His orders were dispatched on an eight-knot collier which left Cadiz almost immediately after him and was to stop en route at the Canaries for coal!
The Squadron of Admiral Cervera
As is well known, the fatal orders directed Cervera to sail for the West Indies. At this point it is fitting to describe the units which he was finally able to take with him. The squadron consisted of the four armored cruisers Infanta Maria Teresa (flag), Viscaya, Almirante Oquendo, and Cristobal Colon, and the three torpedo-boat destroyers Pluton, Furor, and Terror. The first three of the cruisers named above were Spanish-built sister ships of 7,000 tons, mounting two 11-inch, ten 5-inch, eight 2.2- inch, eight 1.4-inch, two machine guns and six torpedo tubes. Their armor belts were twelve inches, turrets ten and one-half inches and protective deck three inches in thickness. Each one of them was credited with a trial speed of over twenty knots. The Colon was purchased in Italy at the last minute and was of practically the same size and speed as the other three. Her armament consisted theoretically of two 10-inch, ten 6-inch, six 4.7-inch, ten 2.2-inch, ten 1.4-inch, two machine guns and four torpedo tubes. Almost her whole side as well as her turrets were covered with six-inch armor and the protective deck was one and one-half inches in thickness.
The three destroyers were almost brand new. The Furor and Terror displaced 380 tons and made twenty-eight knots on their trials. The Pluton weighed 420 tons and was once capable of thirty knots. All three were armed with two 12-pounders, two 6-pounders, two 1-pounders and two torpedo tubes. These seven ships were not insignificant on paper but, as will be seen later, their actual strength was but a shadow of their paper strength. In any case they could have competed on even terms with no more than a small fraction of the American Atlantic fleet, not to mention the Oregon.
Cervera's Strange Orders
Cervera’s orders were, specifically, to steam to Porto Rico and there cooperate in the defense of that island. The orders were later modified to grant greater latitude of movement and choice of destination in the West Indies. Any such plan of course meant absolutely certain and complete destruction or capture. The content of the orders was not a complete surprise. The Admiral had long feared such a fatal decision. Nor had he hesitated to voice his objections, always backed by sound reasons. The Spanish penal code forbade any praise of the enemy but Cervera time and again risked censure and punishment since he clearly saw it to be his patriotic duty to make known to those over him the true situation. The last and strongest protest followed the receipt of the orders. A council of war of the several captains was held aboard the flagship and the proceedings cabled back to the minister of marine. This rather brief dispatch confirmed and emphasized Cervera’s many protests and urged reconsideration of other plans of campaign.
Almost immediately, and long before the full report of the meeting could reach Spain, the minister called a meeting of the eighteen general officers of the navy to act upon the dispatch received. The surprising result was that fourteen voted that the original plan be adhered to. The opinions of the other four differed only in that they were in favor of a delay for reenforcements. In the meanwhile Captain Villaamil, commanding the torpedo flotilla, had addressed a cablegram to the premier giving his unqualified opinion that their utter destruction was assured by the proposed step. He was a deputy and was thus able with safety to make his sentiments known. The minister of colonies replied to his protest with a brief message in English which read simply: “God bless you”! This same unusual individual, on an earlier occasion, had given his opinion that the war “would not be of any importance anyway because as soon as the Americans had sunk three or four Spanish ships peace would be concluded.” Was he far wrong?
The reasons which led to Cervera’s being ordered to the West Indies have always been a puzzle. They will, in all probability, never be known definitely. This paper cannot undertake to analyze all the evidence and discuss the various possibilities. It seems to the writer, however, that those who had the decision to make, felt that it would look better were they to do something, however certain to be fatal, rather than to follow the proper course and appear to do nothing by waging a defensive naval war. And so they sent out Cervera with the only available ships—the one thing they could think of. Admiral Montojo, the gallant Spaniard who at Manila suffered the penalties of his government’s shortcomings, gives perfect expression to the situation:
“Alas for the vanquished!” is an old saying, but we should now add: “Alas for those who are sent out to be vanquished!”
Every Ship Unready
The die had been cast. The ships must go. Scarcely prepared for the 3,000-mile run, let alone all the eventualities of an overseas campaign, they set forth woefully deficient in things large and small. Cervera had been unable to get the simplest navy yard jobs done or to secure in adequate quantity the most necessary supplies of any sort. He graphically described his plight in three short words: “We have nothing.’’ The Terror’s boilers were in wretched shape. The Viscaya’s last docking had been just a year prior to the coming Battle of Santiago. Her bottom was so foul that the Admiral described her as “nothing more than a buoy.” The limit of accomplishment at Cape Verdes of the fleet divers was to clean her propellers and sea cocks. She had just ended a long round trip to the United States, the Oquendo, in addition, coming from Havana at the same time.
Although the vast ordnance deficiencies will be outlined later it will be mentioned at this point that the Colon had never received her two heavy guns. The usual interminable delays had prevented and the government had not seen fit to take Cervera’s advice and accept two inferior guns rather than risk having none at all. Once more Cervera was right. The dispatching of the Colon before receiving her principal offensive weapons never fails to bring to the writer’s mind the tale of the Irishman, the hunter who was observed aiming his gun at a bird. When told that the gun was not loaded and that, therefore, there was little use of pulling the trigger he replied that he could not delay as the bird would fly away before he would have time to load.
After endless delay in coaling, the squadron finally got under way on April 29. The run to the West Indies was marked by little more than the natural difficulties encountered in towing the destroyers which were not fitted with proper bridles for such service. Two days before sighting land the torpedo craft were cast off to steam under their own power. The Furor and Terror were sent ahead to obtain information at Martinique and the Terror immediately broke down. The Furor went on alone and learned of little but the annihilation of the Spanish Asiatic fleet at Manila. After the return of the Furor, Cervera drew near to Martinique in order to leave the Terror to repair her boilers in the neutral harbor of Fort de France. She later escaped from there, avoiding both internment and destruction, and made her way to San Juan, Porto Rico. From this point on, therefore, she was no longer a member of Cervera’s squadron.
Cervera’s III Fortune Reaches Its Climax
At this juncture two frightful pieces of bad luck were encountered by Cervera. To begin with, there was to be a vitally needed collier at Curagao for him. When he cabled home his “arrival” at Martinique the minister of marine changed the collier’s destination to Martinique, cabling the change to the Admiral at that station. He never received the message since the Furor and Terror were the only ships of his squadron that had made port there at all. Moreover, by the time the dispatch arrived the squadron was on its way to Curagao.
As if this were not enough, the crowning climax was his failure to receive another cablegram sent to him at Martinique on the same date. It read:
Situation changed since your departure. Your instructions amplified so that if you do not believe that your squadron can operate there successfully, may return to Peninsula, choosing route and destination, preferably Cadiz. Acknowledge receipt and indicate decision.
Here at last was the consummation of Cervera’s efforts extending over many months. Those higher up at last saw the light. With coal from his collier he would soon have been on his way back to Spain instead of being headed for the certain destruction of his ships and the death of hundreds of his men. But, tragedy of tragedies, he missed the dispatch. The viewpoint of the general officers at home had probably been changed, first, by the receipt by mail of the full report of Cervera’s council of war at the Cape Verdes; further, by the Manila disaster, and perhaps also by the naval bombardment of San Juan.
From then on matters went from bad to worse. Upon arrival off Curasao, not only was the collier unaccountably missing, but the Dutch enforced their neutrality laws strictly, allowing only two ships to enter the harbor and allowing these to ship only 400 tons of coal. The collier, next ordered from Martinique to Curasao, arrived too late there also and, after starting on to Santiago, was captured en route. If Santiago had not already been decided upon by Cervera and his officers as the most suitable destination, the pressing shortage of coal would have forced the decision at this time. From Curasao to Santiago the voyage was uneventful. As an example of the complete lack of information which Cervera had to put up with in his operations, it might be of interest to note that for several days the Oregon was in reasonably close proximity although he believed her still to be in the Pacific.
Cuba Already Lost
The reception, or lack of it, which the squadron met with upon reaching Santiago is significant. Few even came down to the water front to witness the arrival of the ships. Except in the hearts of a few Spaniards there was little interest or even curiosity inspired. Cervera had written on February 26:
. . . . To defend an island which was ours, but belongs to us no more, because even if we should not lose it by right in the war we have lost it in fact, and with it all our wealth and an enormous number of young men, victims of the climate and bullets, in defence of what is now no more than a romantic ideal . . . .
His words could scarcely receive more conclusive confirmation than by the sentiments of the Cubans made so evident that day; “we have lost it in fact,” was only too true even before the struggle.
Santiago an Unfortunate Choice
When Santiago was selected as the destination of his squadron Cervera could not well have picked a base more poorly fitted for his purposes. He was not to blame; he had not been furnished with information as to the equipment of any of the West Indian ports. It was fate. By taking all the coal on hand there was nearly enough to fill the bunkers of his ships. Fresh water, however, was most exorbitant in price and almost unobtainable in quantity for his boilers and his reserve feed bottoms; and worst of all, there were absolutely no facilities for taking aboard either coal or water. The lack of tugs, lighters, water boats, handling devices, etc., was almost complete. Only one example will be given: it was not possible to purchase in the entire city anything like enough baskets, even, to use in coaling. When the ships left on their final dash they had not in six weeks succeeded in filling their bunkers! Although they were not blockaded for ten days after their arrival they were unable to leave before then for lack of coal. Of course, it would have been of little avail to have gone elsewhere anyway. In fact the fate of the ships was sealed from the day the Admiral missed the cablegram authorizing his return to Spain. One strange feature of the ten days immediately preceding the establishment of the rigid blockade is that the Spaniards never seemed to realize that, until that time, the Americans had not assured themselves definitely of the presence of the Spanish squadron.
Ordnance Shortcomings Unbelievable
The list of the ordnance faults of the ships sounds like a nightmare, as indeed it had been for Cervera for months. His best efforts had been unsuccessful in correcting any of the troubles. It has already been stated that the Colon was without her big guns. The other three cruisers had fired a total of exactly two rounds per gun in target practice with their heavy guns. This was not enough even to show up defects and when the day of battle arrived, it was found impossible to close the breech of the Teresa’s stern gun after the first shot. Not one single effective torpedo had reached the squadron. The field guns of the Viscaya and Oquendo were unserviceable and the Teresa had none at all—an important item when we consider that two-thirds of the crews of the squadron aided in the defense of the city by land.
The situation in connection with the heavy broadside guns was even more appalling. Two of the 5.5-inch guns on the Viscaya were useless, and one on the Oquendo. The condition of the 5.5-inch ammunition was almost unbelievable. About eighty-five per cent of it was known to be defective before the battle—fuses and primers unreliable and cartridge cases of incorrect size. Considering faulty breech design also, it was realized that the expanding gases of the propelling charge would be likely to backfire through the breech—perhaps even blow off the block —endangering the lives of the gun crews. These casualties indeed occurred during the battle. There was therefore the dilemma of foregoing target practice entirely or risking the lives and morale of the crews. The former procedure was adopted with the result that the Spanish fleet went into action without having fired one single practice shot from these guns!
Two years of dickering with the makers had brought just 300 new cartridge cases for all the 5.5-inch guns on the three Spanish-built cruisers. The defective ones had to be used anyway. When the time came it happened more than once that seven or eight of these old cases had to be tried before one could be found which would fit. Other difficulties encountered by the broadside gun crews included the blowing out of firing pins, the impossibility of closing the breech after two or three shots, breakdowns of the ammunition hoists, etc. The decision to omit target practice was undoubtedly wise.
As for the Colon, besides never having gotten her big guns, she had never received her apparatus for reforming and recharging either her 4.7-inch or her 6-inch cartridge cases. Thus the seventy-two extra powder charges per gun which she had aboard were absolutely useless.
Although a description of the harbor defense batteries does not properly belong in this narrative, it will nevertheless be mentioned in passing that there were exactly two modern guns on the heights at the entrance to the channel and there were only 200 rounds of ammunition for both of them. One of the venerable defenders bore the original date of 1668, whereas five, dated 1724, had just been mounted.
The Ultimate in Lack of Perception
Perhaps the most astounding document of the entire war was the message of June 3 from the minister of war to the governor general of Cuba. It should be borne in mind that by that date Cervera had been bottled up tightly by a tremendously superior American fleet. The dispatch is given in full without comment:
Very serious situation in Philippines compels us to send there ships and reenforcements of troops as early as possible. To be able to cope with hostile squadron at Manila it will be indispensable to send an equally strong fleet there. At present only two warships here and one of them I believe cannot pass through canal. The only thing we can do is to send all the ships of Cervera’s squadron that can get out of Santiago. But before deciding, the Government wishes to know your opinion as to effect the withdrawal of Cervera’s fleet might produce in Cuba. This movement would be only temporary, and as soon as object is attained in Philippines the squadron would return to Cuba without loss of time and strongly reenforced.
Forty to One
The fall of Santiago was approaching, the occasion which would force Cervera to make his dash or destroy the ships inside the harbor before they should fall into enemy hands. He was now under the orders of the governor general, a happy circumstance for him, as he was not willing on his own initiative to order hundreds of his officers and men to go out to certain death. A contemporary expert estimated the disparity in fighting strength of the opposing fleets at forty to one. This seems not impossible if we consider the deficiencies under which the Spanish ships labored. One of the Spanish captains estimated that under the protective decks of the American ships “there was no other danger to the life of a man than that of dying of old age.”
On the day of battle the high spirit of every officer and man reached its zenith. From the very beginning of the crisis, months before, the morale of the crews could bring forth nothing but praise—and this despite the fact that they operated continually without proper facilities, supplies, equipment, ammunition—even pay. When the sacrifice was ordered, however, there was still nothing but eagerness for battle. How different from the crews of Scheer, who mutinied rather than offer a final unequal battle even though a victory and the winning of the war were still at least possible. No victory was possible for the Spaniards.
The Galllant Vanquished
History should never fail to record the nobility exhibited by the Spanish ships during their necessarily slow passage through the narrow, tortuous channel out to sea. This was done under the heaviest fire, especially in the case of the later ships to emerge. No reply could be made to the Americans’ fire. Only the bow gun of each ship would bear. And the fire of the bow gun of even the leading vessel had to be withheld in order that the piloting past the dangerous rocks be not interfered with. Every Spanish ship had to undergo this ordeal for many minutes and not one faltered. Finally for each the turn to the west could be made, the pilot was dropped and “commence firing” sounded; speed was increased and the race was on.
We will not deal with the battle here. Suffice it to say that it was waged by the Spaniards with the same gallantry as that by which all their earlier operations were marked. The Vis cay a, with all guns out of action, made a totally infeasible attempt to ram before turning ashore. It may be said of all the ships individually and collectively that they attempted the impossible and failed.
We have heard now of Cervera’s trials and tribulations; we know the workings of uninformed public opinion. Realizing the bitter irony of fate, would it be unreasonable for one to guess that Cervera was held to blame for the destruction of his squadron? This was actually the case! For months he was the scapegoat but was fortunately cleared of all censure at last by the full exposition of the facts.
One of the saddest incidents connected with the engagement was the first report from the commandant-general of the” navy, Santiago, which was repeated to the minister of marine in Madrid. It stated:
Our squadron went out, keeping up galling fire, which could hardly be heard for hostile fire. Has apparently succeeded in running blockade, taking westerly course.
Even two days later it was reported that the Viscaya and Colon had escaped.
One strange feature of the operations was the coincidence that Captain Concas of the Teresa had, a few years previously, on a replica of Columbus’ Santa Maria, taken part in a pageant depicting the beginnings of Spain’s dominion in the Western Hemisphere. Now he was an only too prominent actor in the final passing of her glory from the New World.
An Engineering Hypothesis
It is very dangerous even to hazard a guess as to the possibility of Cervera’s escape under any circumstances. Assumptions must be made which may be entirely false. Therefore any thesis propounded long after a battle is likely to err in some serious respect. Nevertheless the following idea is brought forward if only as an interesting conjecture.
Cervera’s chances lay in the potential speed of his ships. All had exceeded twenty knots on their trials and all had been in commission but a few years. As soon as it was fairly certain that a long stay in Santiago was in order, and that it would be concluded by the final contest, the utmost endeavors should have been made to put the boilers and engines in as close to perfect condition as could possibly be managed. Here enters the dangerous assumption that their condition at that time, the availability of spare parts and shop facilities, as well as the skill of the engineer ratings, would have permitted the work to be consummated. If it was humanly possible, however, every single boiler should have been emptied, cleaned and overhauled and every main engine put in perfect condition.
The hull of every ship should have been scraped by divers even if it were a job of weeks’ duration and performed by inexperienced men. If necessary, elementary diving helmets could have been constructed, so designed as to rest upon the shoulders, and each supplied with air by any simple hand pump and hose. If all the above undertakings were successfully accomplished it might have been possible to get the ships in condition for a run at, say, eighteen knots at least. This is better than anything of which the American battleships were capable, even after working up to full speed. The next requirement was full power immediately after clearing the channel. This means not only all boilers lit off and on the line at full pressure, as was actually the case doubtless, but also all boilers actually delivering full power under forced draft by that time. Since the channel had to be negotiated at low speed this means that a vast quantity of high pressure steam would have to be bled direct to the main condensers. Even if necessary to release it through the safety valves the loss of feed water would be justified. This was the one hour in the lives of the ships that counted and all should have been subordinated to the one end.
If, then, full power were available and a high speed thus attainable almost immediately after the turn to the west, escape would have been pretty nearly assured considering the circumstances under which the American fleet 'was caught. Not only was every American ship equipped with Scotch boilers, but also only two of them even had all their boilers lit off; some of the main boilers were even empty! In fact the Colon, with her Niclausse boilers, was the only quick steamer in the battle. Due to the exigencies of the blockade the American ships were not so clean, either as to hull or boilers, as might otherwise have been the case. On the morning of the dash the Massachusetts was absent and the New York out of reach, at first anyway. And a big gap had been allowed to remain in the western end of the semicircle of American heavy ships.
The destroyers’ chances for safety would lie in the possibility of their gaining the disengaged side of their cruisers before being disabled. As for the cruisers it would seem that the fire hazard was their chief danger, for the American shooting was really quite poor that day. All the wood that could possibly have been dispensed with should have been ruthlessly ripped out before weighing anchor. Fire fighting and the conservation of all steam possible for the
main engines should have been the primary considerations, outweighing any offensive action. When we consider the fact that the Colon actually did outdistance the American ships until her good coal was consumed, it is not unreasonable to assume that all of the cruisers, at least, could have gotten clear away.
There are several assumptions and a great deal of hindsight contained in the above discussion and it is properly contended that foresight is less effective. The arguments, therefore, may not have a great deal of weight. In any case, the escape of Cervera’s squadron, say to Havana at best, would have gained no more than a postponement of the evil hour. The method of escape is an interesting possibility nevertheless, over which to ponder.
The Sailors of Spain
It may safely be said that Cervera did all that one man could possibly do toward the effective advancement of the Spanish cause. That he assumed the gigantic handicaps which were forced upon him and still carried on courageously, accomplishing as much as he did, is all the more to the credit of him and all his subordinates, officers and men. The entire story of those months could hardly be summarized more effectively than by a contemporary statement:
If Spain were as well served by her statesmen and public officials as she is by her sailors she might yet be a-great country.