Editor’s Note: This article was adjudged the winner for 1928 of the gold watch presented by Dr. Henry van Dyke to the member of the graduating class who submits the best original article or theme on any naval or equally patriotic subject.
Shall we destroy while we build? Shall we extend our Navy in one direction, only to curtail it in another? These questions, as a result of the proposal to abolish the submarine, now confront those who determine the policy of our Navy both today and tomorrow. There are those who would appropriate for and build cruisers, destroyers, dirigibles, and other component parts of the fleet while at the same time depriving it of a most vital unit—the submarine. Why?
The beginning was a public hysteria, born of four years of flaming headlines, “Torpedoed Without Warning”; a hysteria which brought many to look upon the submarine as a man-made shark and its crew as embodying all that is cowardly, cruel, and treacherous. Revived and augmented by recent disasters to underwater craft, this hysteria has blinded people to the innumerable merits of the submarine and has brought them to look upon it as a work of Frankenstein—to be destroyed without delay.
A moment’s reflection will serve to show the fallacy of such a position. Granted that submersibles were employed illegitimately in the past conflict, when they were directed against non-combatants, who is there to say that it was the fault of the submarine? A vessel is no better than the crew which mans her. Imagine the stately Constitution planned by Blackbeard and four hundred of his cutthroat cohorts—truly we would have a sea scourge! It is generally contended that War is the servant, Policy the mistress. If the policy be one of fiendish disregard for the rights of neutrals, women, and children, then war will be waged to that end—weapons being but the tools of war. Almost daily we are told of the havoc which might be wrought by a fleet of hostile airplanes attacking our defenseless homes; how war would be brought to each and every one of us—soldier and infant alike. The employment of submarines against harmless non-combatants was, it is true, one of the reasons which caused our entry into the war, but now this identical employment is foretold for aircraft! Yet, there are none who would tell us to abolish the airplane.
The mission of the Navy, in war, is the destruction of the enemy’s fleet. Each type of ship is so designed and constructed that she may be enabled to destroy while she herself remains unharmed—or at the most suffers a minimum from hostilities. The dreadnought is heavily armed and armored; the cruiser possesses great speed; while the submarine seeks protection by submerging. It is merely a substitution of a few fathoms of water for a few inches of armor plate, or high speed. She is the logical result of a process in naval development—that of embodying the tactical principle of surprise in a war vessel. True, she makes use of this inherent feature in ambuscade—but in war ambuscade is always legal!
Let us consider the merits and uses of the submarine. The modern underwater craft, while far from perfect, compares most favorably with the surface vessel in the combined qualities of speed, cruising radius, and armament. Marley F. Hay, noted submarine designer and authority, stated recently:
It may be surprising to learn that in point of armament, radius of action, and seaworthiness, a modern submarine already considerably surpasses any destroyer of equal size.
The submarine is far superior to any single type as regards versatility in operation. What other type of vessel can be so advantageously employed in the myriad duties of scouts and advance guards; for protection of trade routes and naval bases; for attacks unsupported by surface ships on moving fleets and convoys; for forcing the passage of straits and channels; for carrying information and dispatches; and guarding lines of communication? All of these have been accomplished by the submarine —a type relatively in its infancy!
For proof of the efficacy of the submarine, one need only recall that nearly fifteen hundred armed vessels were required to patrol the largest mine field ever laid down in naval warfare to limit the activities of 100 to 150 “U-boats,” issuing from their only bases on the German and Flanders coasts. And again, within three hours after the declaration of war between England and Germany, the submarines of the former were reconnoitering in Heligoland Bight. Underwater craft of the British penetrated the defenses of the Dardanelles—defenses which were almost impregnable to surface craft—and operated in the Sea of Marmara. It is interesting to note, at this point, the role played by the submarines of both sides in the action off Heligoland Bight, August 28, 1914. Winston Churchill, then first lord of the Admiralty, made the following statement:
The successful cruiser operations were clue to the information brought to the Admiralty by scouting submarines.
Domville-Fife, in his Submarines and Sea Power, says of the same action:
In the cruiser action off Heligoland, the inferior German squadron was covered by a flotilla of submarines, and, at the moment when the powerful British battle and light cruisers had triumphed over the enemy and were attempting pursuit to complete their victory, the German submarines, by a vigorous offensive, and aided greatly by the presence of mine fields, caused Admiral Beatty to order the discontinuance of the action owing to the great risk to which he would have exposed his big ships had the attack been pressed to what otherwise would have been an annihilating conclusion.
Not only in this instance, but at Dogger Bank and elsewhere was it the submarine that saved surface craft from complete destruction. Even at Jutland, Jellicoe and Beatty always bore clearly in mind the risks from submarines. As to its scouting value, successful and unopposed raids made by German cruisers on Scarborough and Hartlepool were largely the result of information furnished by submarines. The necessary information as to the movement of the British Grand Fleet was made known to the German authorities solely through the activities of their submarines.
As regards the efficiency of submarines, operating against blockades, it may be worthy to note that, in addition to furnishing information and undertaking auxiliary operations, German submarines continued to be a menace up to the close of the war— long after the German cruiser raiders had been destroyed and operations by their surface craft were impossible. This in spite of mine and patrol. In fact, the best defense against submarines was found to be submarines. Admiral Sims, in The Victory at Sea, points out that in proportion to the number of antisubmarine craft employed, the Allied submarines destroyed three times as many German subsurface craft as Allied destroyers and twenty times as many as auxiliary patrol craft.
At the present time, it is perhaps inopportune to prophecy, but there can be no doubt that the feat of the cargo carrying Deutschland, which successfully ran the cordon thrown about passages leading to America, marks but the beginning of a new era of war time merchant shipping. The advantages of the submarine as a blockade running merchantman are at once apparent. Thus we can say that the submarine has met successfully every test; that it has proved its worth not only in one but in many phases of naval operations. It is obvious, therefore, that to deprive our Navy of the advantages of such a type of craft would be at least seriously crippling.
Not only would abolition of the submarine impair the fighting efficiency of our Navy— the point in which we are primarily concerned—but it applies none the less pertinently to the navy of the lesser nation. The submarine as the weapon of the smaller nation is a point of real significance to the United States. We have ever championed the cause of the lesser nations in their rights of self-defense. Such nations cannot afford sea protection of the order of the great powers, but protection is, nevertheless, required. Yet there are those who, in the scrapping of the submersible, would deprive them of that most effective and economical means of defense.
That naval authorities are not unmindful of the utility of the submarine is adequately proved by the position taken by Admiral Beatty in his dispatch to the British Admiralty concerning the result of the cruiser action off Dogger Bank, in January, 1915. Naval authorities, from this report, drew these three conclusions: that gun fire was not adequate submarine defense; that safety lay only in utilizing the maneuverability of the surface craft; and, finally, that surface ships should, in the event of attack by underwater craft, turn away at once and steam out of range. Imagine the confusion which would be wrought by a sizable flotilla of submarines in such an attack! Formations broken; communications impaired; cooperation between the various units utterly destroyed—each ship, or at best, each division turning away in order that they might remain intact. The opposing surface fleet need only cover the rout caused by the underwater advance guard and take up an advantageous central position. War remains a “business of positions” today as in the time of Mahan, and there is no more economical medium of exchange than the submarine in the purchasing of the tactically superior position. There is, moreover, need of a new definition of superiority when submarines are employed. A surface fleet, inferior in type and number to an opposing force, but possessing sufficient submarines, well used, may, at the decisive moment, convert its inferiority into superiority.
If a decade ago the submarines could have accomplished and performed so well the tasks assigned them of which a few isolated examples have been set forth, how much more could they do today and what infinitely greater power will they have tomorrow? For we have made but a beginning. Submersibles mounting guns of large caliber have been successfully designed and built. Compare, in this light, the bombardment of Whitehaven by the submarines of the World War, carrying 28-pounders, to the destruction which could be wrought by a shelling from 8- or 12-inch guns. Submarines have been built carrying such weapons; it is true, they were not an unqualified success, but it has been shown that the mounting of such guns on vessels of this type is more than a structural possibility. Submarines are becoming—if not submersible dreadnoughts—at least underwater cruisers. Our own highly successful “V” type is more than a match for a destroyer
even while operating as a surface vessel. It is not beyond the realm of probability, then, that in a short time we shall be building an underwater craft which will be able to stand off as much as a division of destroyers with her guns alone, while conserving her torpedoes for attacks on heavier armed vessels. Such a craft would not have to dive to seek protection from a light cruiser; her gun fire would suffice. Combine, then, her heavy armament with the peculiar advantages of her construction, and we have indeed a worthy weapon. Such types are long past the stage of possibility, or even of anticipation; they are the submarines of a very near tomorrow. Truly, the Nautilus of Jules Verne is becoming an actuality.
We, as a nation, have never attempted to outstrip the world in the building of our Navy. We have not strained our resources in the building and equipping of a vast, all-powerful naval force. We have, on the contrary, been content with a fleet which is barely sufficient for our needs. America has, many times in her history, been represented on the ocean highways by a fleet far below the level of adequacy. That we were not content with such a fleet is most positively shown by the attitude of the American people toward an adequate naval force. Yet, submarines are an indispensable arm of our Navy.
As American citizens we should be proud of our Navy, should support it, and be jealous of its prestige; and we should want it to be the leader in naval progress. We want to feel—and rightly so—that our sailors are as fine, our battleships as powerful, our cruisers as swift, as those of any navy in the world. Among the things that “ought to be,” that we should want to be, is a submarine force second to none. For we shall need submarines to scout where cruisers cannot go, we shall need them to supplement the mine defenses of our harbors, we shall need them to operate against enemy submersibles, and we may need them to carry our cargoes safe from hostile vessels. It behooves us, therefore, to retain what we have and develop it as best we may. The submarine is an American invention. It belongs to America along with the airplane, the steamship, and the telegraph. It is ours to keep, to improve, to perfect and to use—but not to misuse.