INSCRIBED on the heart of the Navy are the words: “Loyalty, Devotion, Service to National Ideals.” Judge the Navy in its every act by this inscription.
Every naval officer who enters the service takes an oath in these terms:
I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same, that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will willingly and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am to enter. So help me God.
This oath becomes the guiding principle of all his subsequent efforts. Its intelligent execution requires of each officer an understanding of his duties under the Constitution. In the preamble of the Constitution we find that the objects of the formation of the government of the United States were “to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common Defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to Ourselves and our Posterity. . . . .”
The oath of office and the duties it entails under the Constitution are not idle words in the mind of the naval officer, but rather his life mission. He must devote his entire time to living up to the requirements of that oath and those duties. “To provide for the common defense, to promote the general welfare,” are active every-day requirements of his profession. Of course these are very general requirements constituting a general mission. There must be more specific direction of effort if effective results are to be achieved. So the Navy formulates a policy which is published, setting forth in detail the ends to be attained in the furthering of its general mission.
The average naval officer enters the service as a boy and grows up with the service, so it is important in our scheme of organization to provide for his education along the lines which will make him most efficient in the execution of his mission. We emphasize the importance of educating the heart as well as the mind of the officer and man. This particular aim finds expression in our Articles for the Government of the Navy which say, among other things, that “the commanders of all fleets, squadrons, naval stations, and vessels belonging to the Navy are required to show in themselves a good example of virtue, honor, patriotism and subordination.” This is a high mission. The service is reminded of it once each month by the public reading of this article to all officers and men. Its monthly repetition results in its becoming engrained in the consciousness of every officer and man of long service in the Navy.
A further stimulus to high conduct and to the realization of the ideals of perfect service is found in our custom, which has now spread from the military service to the public, of rendering formal tribute to the flag whenever it is hoisted on board ship, whenever it is lowered at sunset, or when the flag passes on the street. Each officer and man stands at attention and salutes the emblem of the country to which lie owes allegiance. The repetition of this formula of allegiance through the long years of the career of the naval man cannot help but have its influence upon his devotion to the service which claims all the best years of his life.
These appear to be generalities, but their influence on the conduct, zeal, and devotion of the individual is marked.
The naval officers and the enlisted men who make the Navy their life career do so at great personal sacrifices, but they have always as a reward the consciousness of service to the country, which claims and is entitled to their devotion.
The government has seen to it that officers and men are divorced from the necessity of considering self-interest, through an adequate provision of pay, and through retirement arrangements at the end of the individual’s career such that he and his family will be provided for during his lifetime. This fact enables each officer and man to determine his conduct by an answer to the question, “Where does duty lie?” and not by an answer to the question, “Where does self-interest lie?”
The naval officer not only believes in his profession but believes that the country by its organization of the military services has bestowed upon itself a great spiritual asset— a group of highly representative Americans divorced from the necessity of considering self-interest and encouraged to devote themselves exclusively to national welfare.
Like every loyal public servant the naval officer and enlisted man desire most of all a secure place in the heart of the public, based upon an appreciation by the public of the Navy’s effort to do right and to do well all the time. They feel that the moral support of the public is an essential to complete success in their efforts. They hope for the commendation of the public in what they do and find that commendation chiefly in the attitude of the press of the country, and in the attitude of Congress toward the naval needs of the country. Whether that commendation comes or not they carry on with all the vigor they have in a sustained effort to serve.
The Navy to be successful must cultivate in its personnel, elements of character calculated to produce unity and strength. Chief among all of these characteristics is loyalty —the active service of an understood cause. Loyalty for the Navy is not mere devotion, but intelligent activity in the sustained service of an understood cause. Whatever breaks down organization or tends to a scattering of effort is disloyal in its effects. It is for this reason that the Navy is impatient of any individual who fails in his loyalty to the ideals of the service, ideals that have been developed out of its long experience. No team work, so essential in military operations, can be fully effective unless the individuals of the team are actuated by a devotion that will subordinate personal opinion to the plan and orders of authority. Decision of character, sound initiative, a clear and constant perception of the goal of effort, the will always to strive toward it, are necessary to the naval officer or man who would serve his country well in accomplishing the mission given him in his oath of office and in the laws and regulations governing the service.
The ideal of the Navy is service, but that service to be efficient must find expression in specific accomplishment, in things that must be done in peace as well as in war, in order that the mission for which the Navy is created and maintained shall be surely accomplished. The necessity of preparing in times of peace for efficient service in a time of national emergency brings most of the criticism of the pacifist and similar organizations upon the Navy. The Navy even amidst the most profound peace must give its principal attention to the conditions that it desires most of all to avoid—attention to the requirements of war. A Navy that functions only in time of war and subordinates all activities to pacifist ideas in time of peace, will invariably fail of its defense mission, and will be neglectful of the high duty for which it is created. It is this fact that causes the thoughtless to charge it with being militaristic, when in reality it is seeking only to follow the dictates of duty.
It is not enough for the Navy in time of peace to use what it has and to develop efficiency in the use of what it has. We would be seriously neglectful of our duty if we failed constantly and urgently to recommend through legislative channels the requirements of an efficient Navy in ships, in personnel, in training and in operations in time of peace. Those are duties with which the Navy is particularly charged and on which it is especially qualified to advise.
In making his recommendations the naval officer has in mind not naval needs but national needs. This idea found very concrete expression recently in a hearing before a committee of Congress in which the chief of naval operations was asked if the Navy needed certain cruisers. His reply was, “No, the country needs them.” That is the basis of every recommendation made to higher authority, the basis of the country’s needs and not the Navy’s needs. The Navy has no need independent of the country. It is a servant of the country, nothing more and nothing less.
This attitude of having always in mind the country’s needs rather than the specific needs of the Navy governs our relationship with the merchant marine. The merchant marine is closely associated with two of the Navy missions contained in the preamble of the Constitution. It assists in providing for the common defense and assists in promoting the general welfare of the nation. It would be quite natural to suppose that the Navy would direct its influence toward building up a merchant marine especially useful in time of war. This idea has received partial expression in laws now on the statute books, but the Navy in balancing the requirements of general welfare against the requirements of war believes that the merchant marine should be built to meet the peace-time needs of the nation. As to foreign commerce, it is particularly concerned in seeing the flag over merchant ships that make their chief business the carrying of goods to foreign ports and the bringing of goods from those ports to ours. These are generally vessels of moderate speed, ill-adapted to the requirements of war, yet I believe that no naval officer would ever sacrifice the peace time advantages to the country of this class of ships of the merchant marine in order that the faster, more serviceable ships from a war standpoint might be built. We believe that prosperity can be built up best at sea through American transportation facilities for goods of all classes to and from our shores and through the ability effectively to guard these vessels and their cargoes.
There is a popular delusion that naval officers desire war for purposes of personal preferment. Nothing is further from the truth. The naval officer desires above everything that his country remain at peace, and it is only when the country itself expresses its determination for war, through constitutional agencies, that the naval officer enters war with devotion and energy and enthusiasm.
Can anyone believe that the 5,000 marines now operating in the jungles of Nicaragua are there from choice? They are there in obedience to orders—unsolicited, unsought, but received and obeyed with the greatest loyalty. For them there is no promotion incident to the service, no comforts and no emoluments, no reward except the consciousness of duty well performed, duty requiring on their part the highest type of devotion and service to the decisions of their country. They are removed for the most part from the public eye and so do not enjoy the acclaim with which less conspicuous service would be rewarded were their activities nearer home. Not one citizen in a thousand knows the names of the commanding naval officer or the commanding general who are devoting all of their time and effort to the solution of an extremely difficult problem. The subordinate officers and men in positions of great responsibility and danger have even less of public interest to support them in their devotion to service; yet duty, loyalty, the desire to serve, see them through.
Peace is what the Navy wants all the time, but the kind of peace that guards the interests of their country. They know that the civil government will be watchful of that, and that their duty is to assist in that high aim.
As specific examples of the Navy’s desire to promote peace, I will cite one or two instances. Some years ago our fleet visited a great foreign city. One of the men in a crowded public square during a band concert, jostled a woman so that she fell and broke her collar bone—a very regrettable incident, and one that might have been magnified into a situation highly injurious to the friendly relations then existing. The problem for the officer in command was how to turn the incident into one that would make the relations still more cordial. As soon as he heard of the incident he loaded a taxicab with flowers and went to the home of the injured woman. Later he sent his aide with another generous contribution of flowers. When the incident became known to the fleet, the officers and men contributed a purse of S3.000 as an expression of their regret and of their friendship. The reaction to the manner in which the incident was handled resulted in an accentuation of the friendship for the officers and men of the fleet and through them for the country which they represented.
On another occasion a cruiser was sent to assist in the solution of a civil war in a small republic. During the four months of its presence in the disturbed area, that cruiser established friendly relations with both contesting parties, and through its efforts was able to restore peace with justice. Its success was chiefly brought about through the sympathetic understanding of the real problem involved and through untiring efforts to adjust the difficulty. The commanding officer had no thought of war as the desirable solution, but rather throughout the negotiations the thought of justice and equity to guide him.
It is an anomaly that in time of peace the visit of vessels of war of one country to another is always a gesture of friendship. These occasions are always made use of by naval officers and by the men of the Navy to strengthen the bonds of international friendship. Sometimes in these visits unexpected and difficult situations arise requiring prompt tact and sound judgment. On a visit of a large detachment of our fleet some years ago to a great foreign city, the mayor, in welcoming the officers and men at a public reception, stated that they were welcome provided there was nothing in the visit of sinister import to any other friendly nation. The American naval officer immediately replied to the effect that the visit was a gesture or friendship, and that it contained no element whatever of hostile import to any other country on the face of the globe; moreover, that it was the hope, the ardent wish not only of the officers and men of that fleet, but of the country which they represented, that if any special waves of friendship were developed by the visit, they would spread from that focus to the farthermost shores of the most distant seas.
Our vessels cruising in distant seas always have in mind the question of how best they can increase the feeling of esteem and friendship between their own and foreign countries.
Two squadrons of destroyers approaching a small village in the South Seas sent a radiogram that they would pass at a certain time. The whole village turned out to see them. When the destroyers arrived near the village they maneuvered close in to shore in order that the villagers might have the rare opportunity of seeing these interesting vessels. These same squadrons were to pass another village about eleven o’clock at night. A message was sent giving the hour of passing and saying that there would be a searchlight display. At the appointed hour over fifty searchlights were turned on the sky and on the shore and kept on for an hour, making a most inspiring exhibit. The reaction of the people and of the press of the island to these attentions was all that could be desired; it was later accentuated by a visit to the principal city of the island. On that visit the officers and men of the squadrons concentrated their attention on the children, the forenoon of each day being set aside for them. Thousands of children visited the ships and were shown everything. These incidents indicate the spirit and the heart of the Navy directed toward the establishment and maintenance of a friendship of the world for America. They are typical, not exceptional.
The more spectacular instances of the devotion of the Navy to humanity are well known and need only to be mentioned here. Burning Smyrna, earthquake-stricken Sicily, Japan, Jamaica, San Francisco, all brought out the highest qualities of the head and heart of the Navy. When assistance was rendered in foreign ports, the Navy made it a point to stay only so long as their services were valuable and not to stay for purposes of observation or of curiosity—to do what they could and then to leave.
The principal point of difference between the Navy and its attitude toward peace and the honest pacifist and his attitude toward peace is one of method. The Navy believes that peace with justice can best be attained through trusting in the integrity of intention of our own country. The pacifist desires to see us weak, believing that this weakness will guarantee peace. The naval officer believes in seeing us strong, believing that strength is the best guardian of peace, and that since in international affairs we must trust some one, we can best trust the government of the United States.
The Navy believes that to be strong is not to be warlike, but rather to be effective defenders of righteous peace. It believes, in the words of the President, that “after all, peace is a spiritual attainment. We can set up material safeguards like fortifications and armaments, which will afford us much protection against attack, but unless we cultivate, sentiments of friendship and understanding they are no guarantee of peace.” This idea dominates all the international acts of the Navy during the period of peace.
The foreign propagandist interested in keeping our Navy weak makes use of slogans and epithets which are widely copied in the press. If we want cruisers of a certain type, they say that these cruisers are offensive cruisers; that the cruisers they propose are defensive cruisers. These statements are false, but because of their wide use and because of their reiteration they are accepted by many whose knowledge of the Navy and naval requirements must be incomplete. We are told that our country wants a Navy for prestige; that our need for a Navy is not so great as the need of other powers. The statement that we need a Navy for prestige is also false, and is known to be false, by those who put it forward. They make no attempt to demonstrate even a shadow of truth in the statement, but seek through reiteration and through wide publicity, to establish the false idea in the minds of the American public. The naval officer on the other hand knows that a strong Navy is a stabilizer of world conditions; that the more highly organized the world becomes the more necessary it is that that organization be stabilized by international agreement, and not through the exercise of the superior power of one nation only. The welfare of each individual of our country is intimately associated with and dependent upon the equitable operation of world organization. There can be no guarantee of such a condition that is not based upon the power to enforce a just consideration of our commercial place in the world.
A systematic foreign propaganda has been directed against the soundness of the opinions of American delegates and American naval officers, seeking to discredit those opinions when they ran counter to foreign desires. This propaganda has gone so far as to take the form of an actual public attack by a foreign minister on the capacity and knowledge and fitness for negotiations of our American delegates to the Geneva Conference. This attack was based not really upon the incapacity of those delegates, but on the foreign recognition of the fact that those delegates were competent but were not subservient. It is not to be expected that a great body of public servants such as those constituting the naval profession, can read these statements of foreigners circulating in our press, sometimes with approval, without resenting them and without desiring to find some way of presenting the truth to our compatriots. The gist of foreign naval propaganda may be summed up in the following words: “Disarmament for us, but preparation for them.”
Officers of the Navy are frequently presented with problems in which the honor and dignity of their country are involved. These problems often require prompt decision without reference to higher authority. The naval officer must keep himself constantly in touch with the policies of his government, with international customs and practice, in order that he may bring credit to his country and create no incidents that will produce unfavorable reactions. The following incidents are illustrative of these problems.
In 1915, before the United States entered the World War, an American cruiser on the high seas was approached by a cruiser of one of the powers at war with a signal flying, “Stop instantly.” Should that cruiser have stopped or should it have proceeded on its way?
In the same year a United States cruiser visited a port of one of the powers at war for the purpose of obtaining fuel. Fuel was available in that port. The next nearest port where the cruiser could obtain fuel was 900 miles away. The cruiser was met off the port by a boarding officer who informed the captain that the cruiser could not enter the port unless the local authorities were allowed to seal the radio room of the cruiser. This was a new and unexpected requirement on the part of the belligerent power, one not in accord with international practice. A cruiser, even in a foreign port, is United States territory, upon which the sovereignty of the United States is still operative. Should the captain have permitted the sealing of his radio room or should he have accepted the voyage of 900 miles to the next fueling station?
On March 24, 1927, a group of Americans and Europeans had been driven by marauding and unorganized Chinese troops from their homes and places of business to a house on a hill on the outskirts of Nanking, where they were cut off from aid or from means of escape to ships. The killing of Europeans had begun; every argument, every conciliatory proposal, every possible patience had been exercised by these refugees and by our ships in the harbor in seeking to avoid the necessity for the use of force in defending their lives. What should the American ships present in that harbor have done?
These incidents are only typical of those that arise constantly in the life of the naval officer and demand of his educated heart and head sound solution in consonance with the dignity, the spirit, and the duties of the country which he represents.
While the Navy has always the mission of peace, it has also the mission of readiness for national emergency—war. In our own ports the public comes in contact with the Navy chiefly during its so-called holidays, when ships are thrown open to public inspection and visitors by the hundreds and thousands are received on board. The impression is gained on these occasions that the Navy is not very active, because on the days when the ships may be inspected, the Navy is not actually at work; but I can truthfully say that there is no harder worked governmental organization in our country than the Navy. The schedules of fleet employment provide six months in advance for what each ship of the fleet is to do on every day. The execution of these schedules requires constant cruising, maneuvers and target practice of all kinds, both night and day. Each individual finds his time fully occupied.
Naval training is essentially a training in movement, and movement of large numbers of ships requires the greatest possible cooperation of the team, in order that correct results may be achieved and disaster may be avoided. The tactical exercises of the fleet are always dangerous. One cannot train a navy for war without taking great risks. Night maneuvers are especially dangerous, since during these maneuvers ships must operate without lights. One can imagine the feeling of great responsibility incident to the command of a large group of ships racing through the night to discover the opposing fleet, and having discovered it, to deliver its attack without fail and without accident. I have participated in numerous maneuvers of this character. In subsequent interviews the captains of my command have invariably told me of hairbreadth escapes, of tactical problems presented and successfully solved. It is to the credit of the Navy that no major accident has ever occurred during these maneuvers.
Some idea of the feeling of responsibility that rests upon the shoulders of the senior officers of the fleet during these maneuvers may be gathered from the fact that the normal peace-time maneuver involves the movement of from 50 to 100 ships in a comparatively limited area; that these ships carry upwards of 30,000 officers and men; that their cost to the country runs into the hundreds of millions of dollars, and that inefficiency in their use may cost the country in a single day or a single night many lives and many millions of dollars.
Within each ship the duties of subordinate officers and men are equally dangerous and highly responsible; if any individual fails properly to perform his duties it may mean disaster for the ship in such exercises as target practice, torpedo practice, and mining practice. The public notes with interest that a great battleship may fire three salvos of 16-inch shells from its turrets at a target fifteen miles away in one minute of time and hit that target, but they have very little conception of the weeks and months of training required to produce that efficiency with safety. No man may fail in his job, if such results are to be achieved.
The airplane must be shot from the battleship’s catapult; its pilot and an observer must perform their duties where seconds of time are measures of efficiency. If they are slow or unreliable in their observation and in their radio communication, they fail of their mission, and the ship’s gunfire becomes ineffective. Every officer and man on the ship must perform his duties with clock-like precision or the rate of fire of his ship will become slow and inefficient. The fireman and the engineer must be equally alert if the ship is to succeed.
The Navy measures its tactical and strategic efficiency by the actual results it attains. These are carefully recorded day by day and year by year, so that the whole service knows who is the most efficient and who is not. This stimulus of competition to effort is present in the Navy through each day of the year. It takes the place of the dollar measure of efficiency in civil life, and has always as its underlying motive the spirit of readiness of the Navy for its high mission of preserving through its strength the peace, or if peace be broken, of restoring it with honor to the country.
It seems to me that a more sympathetic public attitude toward our Navy would result if the press and the public could be thoroughly imbued with the idea that the Navy is the country’s Navy, that it is not “The Navy” but “Our Navy.” Ownership stimulates interest. The naval profession never regards our Navy in the light of Navy ownership, but in the light of a service belonging to the public. It regards its whole organization and material as a public institution owned and operated by and for the public. It desires to be known by that public as “Our Navy.” It desires that the public judge our Navy by its motives and by its acts interpreted on the background of those motives.