IN ORDER successfully to fulfill its mission in time of war, the Navy must thoroughly organize and prepare itself in time of peace. Preparedness is the keynote of its success and no part of the complicated naval structure can be neglected without detrimental effect upon the whole. In line with this preparation great sums of money have been expended in building, equipping and operating navy yards, fueling stations, radio stations, etc. This vast expenditure has been made primarily for the purpose of affording every facility for maintaining the efficiency of the fighting fleet in time of war. War preparedness is the only possible justification for these large expenditures. In peace times the functions of these establishments could be as economically performed through the ordinary commercial agencies, but in order to insure that the Navy will have available and under its control the facilities necessary for its operation when the emergency arises, these expenditures are authorized from year to year and there can be no question as to the wisdom of such a course.
History has shown that in all wars the nation which commands the sea is successful. The last two wars in which the United States has been engaged have not been exceptions to this rule.
Fortunately, in the last war, the combatant fleet of the enemy was so confined to its home bases by superior forces that the merchant vessels of all neutral wartime nations were available for use as transports and supply ships. It cannot be expected that this fortunate condition will always exist. In future wars the United States may be wholly dependent on merchant ships under its own flag for the necessary transportation and supply service until such time as mastery of the seas will permit the employment of vessels of neutral countries.
In these days of economy, it is neither practical nor necessary to maintain all combatant vessels on a full commission basis nor would it be practical or desirable to maintain the necessary auxiliaries as a part of the peace-time fleet. Provision must be made for the necessary auxiliaries in a national emergency by drawing upon the merchant marine of the country as the only source able to supply the necessary vessels and personnel.
All nations which support navies in times of peace have made provision for expanding these navies in national emergencies. Their combatant forces will include vessels which are, in peace times, held in reserve but will in national emergencies be manned by crews which have been trained in peace times for duty on these vessels. These crews are usually composed of men who have resigned from the regular service to engage in civil pursuits and of men who, with some training, have become qualified naval reservists. It is customary to maintain the efficiency of these men by means of practice cruises on regular naval vessels and they are therefore available in a national emergency for service on such vessels.
The practice of the various maritime nations in providing for the auxiliary ships and personnel so necessary in times of emergency will be found to be very dissimilar both in policy and scope. Some nations have by subsidy or by direct payment to the merchant ship personnel induced and encouraged the shipping interests to have their vessels and crews enrolled in the Naval Reserve. Other nations require a term of compulsory military and naval training from the men of suitable age and physique. In the United States the same necessity for preparation exists, but our experience has shown us that neither a subsidy nor compulsory training are acceptable. Due to the extreme degree of economy which is practiced in the peace time operation of the Navy, a very complete and exacting plan of expanding both the combatant forces and the auxiliary ships and personnel is necessary.
The United States has followed the general practice in regard to the training of reservists for combatant vessels and has in training a comparatively small Naval Reserve which provides for the manning of additional naval vessels to be placed in full commission in an emergency. Congress has recognized the need of additional auxiliary vessels and personnel to be drawn from the merchant marine in time of emergency by passing a law creating the Merchant Marine Naval Reserve and providing a plan for the training of the personnel. This branch of the Naval Reserve has received but little recognition, and it is the purpose of this article to draw attention to this condition and to urge that prompt action be taken to remedy the defect. Congress has authorized compensation for the training of the Merchant Marine Naval Reserve by providing that when Congress has made available, in time of peace, the necessary funds for this specific purpose, officers of the Merchant Marine Naval Reserve may be paid in each year a sum not to exceed one month’s base pay of their grade or rating in the regular Navy.
Unfortunately, Congress has as yet been unable to provide the funds so necessary for the operation of the excellent plan established by this law. Even though the estimates submitted by the Navy Department since the passage of this law in order to merely make a start in the development of this branch of the Naval Reserve, have been nominal (less than $50,000) the continued forced reductions in the estimates for the Navy as a whole have made it impossible up to the present time to secure any appropriation for this purpose. The last Naval Appropriation Bill carried the total of $319,650,075. When the fact is noted that in time of war the value of the merchant service used as auxiliaries to the regular Navy is generally conceded to be thirty per cent of the value of the regular Navy, it is to be regretted that the merchant marine branch has, so far, been entirely unprovided for. Of the above sum, $3,890,500 was allotted to the other two branches of the Naval Reserve (The Fleet Reserve and the Volunteer Reserve)—branches which have made good progress in their development while the Merchant Marine Reserve has modestly awaited its turn.
When Congress passed the law providing for this reserve, it very wisely stipulated that no man could enroll who did not follow the sea as a profession and a three-year absence from the sea terminated his eligibility.
No such rigid eligibility rules exist in any other branch of the naval service and these rules are ample insurance that the enrolled personnel will consist of practical seagoing men well versed in the requirements of their profession.
The deck officers are skilled in the handling of their vessels and arc superior navigators and competent seamen. The engineer officers are practical seagoing engineers, skilled in their profession and able to operate and maintain their vessels under all conditions. They have no superiors.
Can anyone question the desirability of enrolling these men and giving them such naval training as will fit them for the part they must play as an integral part of the naval forces ? It is obvious that best results will be secured with men acquainted with their ship and trained together. The Navy Department, therefore, plans the training on a ‘‘ship unit basis.” Certain vessels have been selected as desirable for service as naval auxiliaries. These vessels have been chosen for different purposes; such as tankers, supply ships, transports, etc., and it is proposed to offer to the officers of these selected vessels a course of training which will fit them for the duties to be performed as officers of naval auxiliaries.
When money is available it is proposed to compensate these officers for the effort they must make in order to obtain the purely naval knowledge necessary for them as members of the naval service. This includes training in signaling, gunnery, etc., as well as a certain knowledge of cruising in fleet and convoy formation, fleet tactics, as well as a knowledge of administrative procedure, etc., so as to enable them to fit into a naval command in time of war. No instructions in the technique of their seagoing profession is planned for these officers.
It must be borne in mind that these officers must prepare themselves while carrying on their ordinary duties in the merchant service.
This training must not be allowed to interfere with the normal peace time activities of the vessels and no interference with the usual commercial duties of the personnel can be permitted.
The commandant of the naval district in which the vessel makes its home port will supervise the training and administration of the personnel in the Merchant Marine Naval Reserve. The master of the vessel, if qualified and enrolled, is to be the senior member of the unit and through him the training of his officers is to be conducted.
The ship unit plan seems to promise the largest return for the least outlay because in this method of organization and training the ship will be in a position to join the fleet as a complete unit with officers on board familiar with the ship, her equipment, characteristics and machinery.
The building of suitable vessels for the merchant marine is without the province of the Navy Department. While it must view with regret the present relative inferiority in numbers and types of vessels available in the American merchant marine which are suitable for auxiliary purposes, it is powerless to act. It is, however, distinctly the duty of the Department to prepare, insofar as it is able, means for the proper utilization of such vessels as are available.
Those with experience in the late war cannot forget the confusion, waste of time and money incident to the manning of auxiliary and reserve vessels. Prior to the war there were but few vessels in foreign trade under the American flag, consequently few officered by American citizens. Even had there been in existence at that time a Merchant Marine Naval Reserve it would have been so small as to have been almost negligible. While American tonnage was large, it was composed almost entirely of coastwise and inland water vessels. As a result of wartime ship-building, conditions at the present moment are somewhat different. The Shipping Board is operating more than 350 ships in the foreign trade and privately-owned vessels are being operated in larger numbers, but as no provision is being made for the replacement of these vessels, this favorable condition cannot be expected long to continue. The present merchant fleet does not contain many ships which will be absolutely ideal as auxiliaries in an emergency, but this fleet is performing a very important function in developing a larger number of merchant marine officers in the seafaring profession. A typically American method has been devised for giving the officers on board these vessels the training needed to make them a potent factor in the national defense, and it is the duty of Congress and the Navy to develop in every way and without delay this necessary auxiliary force.
About twenty-five years ago, a distinguished foreign naval authority expressed himself on the subject of naval reserves as follows:
Looking at the problem from the standpoint of the statesman, it should he the aim to strengthen our Navy, as far as possible, by means which least tend to stimulate the regrettable rivalry in the maintenance of excessive armaments. Constant and large additions to the permanent force have that effect. A force in reserve does not in the same degree provoke to retaliatory measures.
Other nations have proceeded to act on this theory with apparent success. Great Britain has the splendid reserve force now known to the world as the Royal Naval Reserve (a merchant marine reserve solely) in which all classes of British society are interested. It has varied in size from time to time as exigencies occurred ranging approximately between 10,000 and 35,000 in numbers. At the present time Great Britain is spending about $2,000,000 annually for its support and requiring from the members of this reserve in return, not only an option on their services in time of war, but constant training in peace time, largely on active ships of the Navy in order to maintain efficiency. This training is usually started in early youth, generally in the grade of midshipman and lasting for a period of six months beginning immediately upon completion of their merchant school ship work and followed by additional periods from time to time as they grow in age, and advance in rank. This training includes courses in gunnery, torpedoes, signals, navigation and fleet maneuvers for deck ranks and ratings and highly technical instruction is also given to the engineer branches.
As one instance of and showing the completeness of this reserve organization, it may be stated that at the outbreak of the World War the Cunard Line was employing 163 navigating officers of whom 139, or eighty- five per cent, were officers of the Royal Naval Reserve. The direction of this great organization for the national defense of Great Britain is based on a committee system but is under the command of an admiral with very plenary powers. The striking words of this commanding officer concerning the value to their country of this merchant reserve, during the World War, are significant of its value as a national asset in time of war. He said:
The fact that our mercantile marine, and consequently the Royal Naval Reserve, has always included many of the world’s finest seamen has never been doubted, but to many the wonderful way in which these officers and men adapted themselves to the needs of the Royal Navy in the World War came as more than a surprise.
The limitations and equalization of armaments have placed the balance of power in the merchant vessels of the contending nations. The discussions at Washington and Geneva have brought into prominence this feature of naval power.
Large and swift commercial vessels, properly armed and manned by trained personnel, are superior as war vessels to many cruisers now carried on the navy list. They can be used as commerce raiders to better advantage than can many cruisers and therefore as much care should be used in preparing these vessels for such duty as is expended on the preparation of the cruisers. Under the Merchant Marine Reserve plan this can be done with almost no cost as compared to the cost of maintaining cruisers of equal or less capacity.
The development of a merchant marine naval reserve personnel is one of the biggest and most important things, as an asset to the country, to the national defense and to the Navy that the Navy and the country at large can well advance, and is one that the American people should support.