NO DOUBT the morning Egyptian papyri were once full of the doings of the young Croesus and Pharaoh, King Tut, who—like the Prince of Wales now—was the best headliner of the day. But one day the boy, of whom so much was expected, died, was given a most lavish interment, other Pharaohs succeeded and were succeeded; the young man was forgotten, except by a few musty old Egyptologists. But a few years ago, after a fearful lapse of time, he was rediscovered. More work for the linotypers then ensued than was ever known to the scribes skilled in the ancient hieroglyphics.
With a very considerable foreshortening of the time element there arc points of similarity in the story above and the history of the Nicaraguan canal project. For some time before and certainly very much during the life of its principal champion, the venerable Senator Morgan, the Nicaraguan Canal had much front page space—only to go into oblivion through the fickleness of chance, politics and diplomacy. Then came the Treaty of 1912-13, ratified between Nicaragua and the United States a few years afterward, giving the United States the sole right to build a Nicaragua canal, for which right $3,000,000 was paid. Directly, and every few months since, the old controversy, the Nicaraguan vs. the Panama route came to the fore with all the old misconceptions and often several new ones.
Some strange assertions pass as true statements of fact. A while ago in Managua, the capital city of Nicaragua, the author was confidentially told by a resident American business man that “The United States is already taking up its option, they have three dredges from the Panama canal now working at our Atlantic entrance.” One sees learned articles in both American and foreign magazines occasionally in which it appears that the author is under the impression that the more northerly canal is to be a sea level proposition. Long periods of reasoning and argument as to the military advantages of a duplicate canal in war time get space in the popular press, mostly postulated on the idea that the new canal is to be an open strait from ocean to ocean. The following description, largely compiled from the reports of various early investigations made in Nicaragua may aid in clearing up some of these misunderstandings.
Brief history of the early investigations. —A sea-level canal, based on an investigation in the field, has never been seriously proposed. The first serious reconnaissance for a canal route in Nicaragua was made by an American, John Baily, in 1826. His report, reviewed by both American and English commissions, covered very nearly the same territory afterward retraced by many others. Colonel Childs in 1852, working for Commodore Vanderbilt of New York Central Railroad fame, made the first real engineering investigation. Vanderbilt already had much information on Nicaragua, having had for some time a line of steamers running up and down the San Juan River and across Lake Nicaragua. He had a stage route from there to the Pacific Ocean; this combination trans-Nicaraguan route was connected with ocean steamers from New York to San Juan del Norte (then called Greytown) on the Atlantic, and San Juan del Stir to San Francisco on the Pacific. He did a good business just then in the "On to California movement” of the early ’50’s.
The construction of the Panama railroad and the activities of the American filibuster, Walker, in Nicaragua, put Vanderbilt out of business, and Colonel Child’s estimate was for more money than could be raised. The Lull-Menocal studies of 1872, which substantially checked Colonel Childs, planned for several locks on each side of the big lake. It was the same Menocal that in 1887, at the head of the Maritime Canal Company, spent several millions of dollars, actually working on a canal. They made unloading wharves, a 950-foot jetty, cleared forty-five miles of right-of-way, built fifteen miles of railroad, constructed shops, storehouses, a hospital, and had two dredges digging on the sea-level portion of the proposed canal. Most of that material is rusting or rotting in the dank jungle now. One of Menocal’s earliest assistants was Lieutenant Peary, U.S.N., afterwards the discoverer of the North Pole. From the time of Childs all these engineers were figuring on a lock level canal.
The Nicaraguan Commission, later called the Isthmian Canal Commission, made two reports which were very complete studies. These reports were published in 1899 and 1901; the second report included the Panama route and made a comparison of the two routes.
To date no further studies have been made but the work has been so well covered that, if some day a canal be built there, it is likely that there will be only a few changes such as slight shifting of alignment, wider channels and deeper cuts, in amounts sufficient to take care of the longer and wider hulls now current. The Walker Commissions (both the Nicaraguan and the first Isthmian Canal Commission headed by Admiral Walker) recommended a canal 183 miles long (it would have taken from eighteen to thirty-six hours for a complete transit).
The canal alignment as recommended.— Beginning on the Atlantic side, several miles north of one of the mouths of the San Juan River, San Juan del Norte is the eastern terminus. Proceeding westerly the line crosses several ridges of hills, each at a higher elevation. In each one of four of these ridges is a lock, the canal level becoming elevation 115. A short distance west of the junction of the San Carlos River (a large river flowing northward in Costa Rica) with the San Juan, the canal coincides (with the exception of some cutoffs at riverbends) with a canalized San Juan River. The lower river is completely divorced from the upper river and the canal by the building of the “Gatun dam of the Nicaraguan project,” known as the Conchuda concrete dam. That
is, the lower San Juan is only the drainage outlet for the Costa Rican streams from the south. Proceeding westerly the canalized San Juan is fifty-five miles long to Fort San Carlos, the entrance of the canal channel to Lake Nicaragua; and, as the lake is relatively a shallow body of water (although it is at an elevation of 115 feet above the sea), a very considerable quantity of dredging is necessary in the seventy-one miles of lake channel to the west side of the lake. Then come nine miles more of cut to reach the site of lock No. 5; the succeeding eight miles are largely in the river valleys of the Lajas and Grande Rivers (the latter on the Pacific slope) and they contain three more locks, giving a descent to sea level and the Pacific port of Brito.
Summarizing, there are about 10.5 miles of sea level channel; eight locks, four to each side of the canal; thirty-eight miles of canal at intermediate levels between sea level and lake level, seven of which are on the Pacific side; 125.5 miles of high level at elevation 115, composed of 54.5 miles of canalized San Juan River and 70.5 miles of Lake Nicaragua dredged channel.
Some facts about Nicaragua.—Nicaragua is about the area of Alabama or North Carolina, with the population of San Francisco or Pittsburgh, i.e., 49,200 square miles and 600,000 people. Lake Nicaragua (which is no miles long and thirty-nine to forty miles wide) is the largest lake between Lake Erie and Lake Titicaca in Bolivia; it has but about twenty-five feet lower elevation than the 490-squarc-mile-interconnecting-Lake Managua, the Tipitapa River being the connection. Topographically the western or Pacific slope is but ten to thirty miles wide although it contains about three- fourths of the population. The rainfall on the Atlantic side at Bluefields and San Juan del Norte is nearly continuous in the rainy season, being about 250 inches, nearly twice that of the Atlantic terminus of the Panama Canal.
Ship lanes by the two routes.—The table below indicates some of the comparative distances between ports by the Nicaraguan and Panama routes. The northerly route is the shortest for vessels in American coastwise trade. This advantage is partly discounted, however, by the longer time taken to transit the longer canal, in some cases the savings are more apparent than real.
Panama
Two fair harbors existed in nature.
Panama railroad already built; had to be partly relocated.
Much actual work had been accomplished by the French.
Average rainfall, seventy to 130 inches.
Region wholly in one country with favorable treaty.
Distance lighted and maintained, about forty-seven miles.
No active volcanos within 200 miles; no serious earthquakes on record.
Cost, about $375,000,000; about one-half billion for everything.
Transit time, six to ten hours.
Summit level eighty to eighty-seven feet.
Double locks, six in all, but located in three towns.
Curvature gentle, sharpest at La Pita Bend.
No storms and relatively little river currents.
Twenty-five miles of deep water in Gatun Lake.
Panama now sanitated.
Coast fortifications easily made on outlying points or islands.
U. S. Coastwise traffic is from 300 to 600 miles longer.
Nicaragua
Two harbors must be created; San Juan del Norte presents unusual difficulties. 120 miles of railroad (the whole way less Lake Nicaragua) must be built.
Much actual data lacking; no actual construction work now done. Rainfall varies between sixty and 250 inches.
Part of route along the border of Costa Rica, with possible friction. About 183 miles to be lighted and maintained.
Several active volcanos near route; Ometepe Volcano, near lock site, lately active; buildings show earthquake damages.
Cost, conjectural; originally estimated at about one-third more than Panama.
Transit time, eighteen to thirty-six hours.
Summit level, no to 115 feet.
Double locks, eight in all, located in eight different towns.
Curvature sharp. Canalized San Juan has many bends.
Heavy winds at east entrance and Lake Nicaragua.
Deep water through Lake Nicaragua about forty-five miles.
Practically no sanitation.
Fortification difficult, particularly on eastern coast.
Advantage in distance more or less lost in extra time of transit.
Some comparisons between the Nicaraguan and Panama Routes:
From | To | Via Nicaragua | Via Panama | Savings | |
Via Nicaragua | Via Panama | ||||
San Francisco | New York | 4,920 | 5,260 | 340 |
|
| New Orleans | 4,120 | 4,700 | 580 |
|
| Liverpool | 7.650 | 7,840 | 190 |
|
Iquique | New York | 9,460 | 9,700 | 240 |
|
| New Orleans | 8,650 | 9,120 | 470 |
|
| Liverpool | 12,190 | 12,270 | 80 |
|
Yokohama | New York | 4,390 | 4,000 |
| 390 |
| New Orleans | 3,590 | 3,420 |
| 170 |
| Liverpool | 7,125 | 6,580 |
| 545 |
What of the future?—Will the Nicaraguan canal ever be of more than historic value? Who can say? Surely not the writer. But there is this to be considered. When fully developed to its ultimate capacity for passing ships (by a change in the method of drawing water at Pedro Miguel locks, building another flight of locks at Pedro Miguel, Mirafiorcs and Gatun, and construction of the Alhajuela storage dam on the upper Chagres River), with due consideration to the water necessary for the locks, there can be forty-eight complete transits a day at Panama; this can easily represent sixty ships a day, by occasional tandem lockages; that ago is, by locking up or down two short ships in the same chamber at the same time. At present the Panama Canal is operating at less than fifteen ships a day, or about one- fourth her ultimate capacity.
He who can guess when the other three- fourths of the ships will come should answer the question above. The coastwise trade will not supply them for a long time yet; maybe some of them will come from the development of the western coast of South America. It would appear that most of them must originate from ports in Europe—but there does not appear to be much prospect of its pushing us into the new construction just now;
at least, until the reconstruction from the war reaches a much further advanced stage than at present.
Surely it must be a considerable time before the Panama Canal is to be outgrown. Perhaps it will be military or naval reasons that will bring it all about rather than business ones. But there is an axiom in war about dividing one’s forces in the face of an enemy; there would be two canals to defend. It was Carnegie that advised his partners to "Put your eggs all in one basket, but eternally watch that basket.” And he was a pretty wise Scot; maybe that’s as good tactics for defense as for business.