The preliminary disarmament discussions at Geneva in 1926 occasionally produced something extra good. “I see by the papers,” as Mr. Dooley says, that one of the best contributions to those discussions was made by Rear Admiral Hilary Jones, senior representative of the United States Navy.
It will be remembered that considerable of the discussion was along a highly theoretical and abstract line. So much of it was of this nature, promising but small practical results, as unfortunately to seem a poor recommendation for such preliminary discussions. There seemed to be a suggestion of futility of discussion unless backed by authority to take definite action. The American delegation, had, however, offered a definite and practical plan for discussion, which plan was concurred in by the British, Japanese, and some other delegations. The feelings of these delegations may be imagined as the abstruse and unpromising discussions developed.
Finally, one of the distinguished naval officers from a certain continental European country, in offering difficulties to the proposition of limiting tonnage of naval vessels by classes, said it would be difficult to classify vessels. For example, he said, “What would you call a battleship that was armed only with three-inch guns ?”
To this Admiral Jones replied that he would call it a joke.
It would be difficult to sustain the thesis, as a sensible proposition, that the bigger a ship is, the smaller its guns should be, or the fewer its guns should be. If the reader concurs that such a proposition is absurd, it may be interesting to consider in that connection one or two of the articles of the Washington Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament.
A certain clever married woman, in advising a younger married friend, said: “My dear, don’t go poking among your husband’s private letters and papers. It can only bring you sorrow.” Perhaps there is something of futility, and certainly, from the American viewpoint, considerable that is sorrowful, in studying closely the Washington Treaty.
That the end sought by many who contributed to that treaty was wholly desirable is not denied. Certainly the voices of American naval officers have not been raised against the application of the principle of voluntary limitation of naval armament by the various powers, provided that limitation were upon an equitable basis. The treaty as completed contained certain ratios of warship tonnage of certain kinds allowed the respective signatory powers. Not only was comparison implied, but it was necessarily written into the treaty in the most specific terms. Yet there are those who maintain that too close discursive comparisons should not now be made, as they might compromise friendly international feelings.
The fact that the ratios have been largely vitiated in the Pacific in a manner principally adverse to the United States by Article XIX is a considerable story by itself. It is one that will not be retold here, but one worthy of American consideration.
No criticism of any country or any person is intended by these remarks, except as the facts themselves constitute an indictment. The facts seem to indicate that the United States did not come out of the Washington Conference in as good a position as other countries as respects limitation of naval armament. But this constitutes no criticism, direct or implied, of any other country or its representatives. If the United States lost at the Washington Conference table Americans need not look abroad for those to blame.
Therefore these observations are not directed at our friends across the sea. We respect their diplomacy. These words are written in the hope of contributing a mite toward the avoidance in the future of mistakes similar to those in the Washington Treaty. Another disarmament conference impends. Inequities in the Washington Treaty should be recognized for what they are. Unfair provisions in such a treaty lead neither to security nor peace, which are the objects sought by such treaties.
A good many of the inequities of the Washington Treaty, including Article XIX, have received considerable belated publicity. There seems to have been comparatively little even belated comment about certain features of Articles IX and X. They merit examination.
Articles IX and X of the Washington Treaty Limiting Naval Armament are here quoted:
ARTICLE IX No aircraft carrier exceeding 27,000 tons (27,432 metric tons) standard displacement shall be acquired by, or constructed by, for or within the jurisdiction of any of the Contracting Powers.
However, any of the Contracting Powers may, provided that its total tonnage allowance of aircraft carriers is not thereby exceeded, build not more than two aircraft carriers, each of a tonnage of not more than 33,000 tons (33,528 metric tons) standard displacement, and in order to effect economy any of the Contracting Powers may use for this purpose any two of their ships, whether constructed or in course of construction, which would otherwise be scrapped under the provisions of Article II. The armament of any aircraft carriers exceeding 27,000 tons (27,432 metric tons) standard displacement shall be in accordance with the requirements of Article X, except that the total number of guns to be carried in case any of such guns be of a calibre exceeding six inches (152 millimetres), except anti-aircraft guns and guns not exceeding five inches (127 millimetres), shall not exceed eight.
ARTICLE X No aircraft carrier of any of the Contracting Powers shall carry a gun with a calibre in excess of eight inches (203 millimetres). Without prejudice to the provisions of Article IX, if the armament carried includes guns exceeding six inches (152 millimetres) in calibre the total number of guns carried, except anti-aircraft guns and guns not exceeding five inches (127 millimetres), shall not exceed ten. If alternatively the armament contains no guns exceeding six inches (152 millimetres) in calibre, the number of guns is not limited. In either case the number of anti-aircraft guns and of guns not exceeding five inches (127 millimetres) is not limited.
From reading those two articles some things are plain, and some things are not so plain to the casual reader. Briefly, the following is provided:
- The tonnage limit of an aircraft carrier is 27,000.
- There is one exception, as follows: Any power may make over into carriers not exceeding 33,000 tons each, two ships that otherwise would have had to be scrapped.
- No carrier may carry a gun greater than eight inches in caliber.
- The main armament of a carrier is unlimited as to number of guns if none of them exceed six inches in caliber.
- A carrier is unlimited in the number of its anti-aircraft guns and guns not exceeding five inches in caliber.
- The main armament of a carrier not over 27,000 tons may not exceed ten guns if any of them exceed six inches in caliber.
- The main armament of a carrier over 27,000 tons may not exceed eight guns if any of them exceed six inches in caliber.
These points may be summed up as follows :
- An aircraft carrier may carry an unlimited number of anti-aircraft guns, or guns not exceeding five inches in caliber.
- An aircraft carrier may carry an unlimited number of guns if none of them exceed six inches in caliber.
- As many as ten guns larger than six inches but not exceeding eight inches in caliber may be carried by an aircraft carrier not over 27,000 tons, but not more than eight such guns may be carried by an aircraft carrier of greater tonnage. That is, one aircraft carrier may carry ten eight-inch guns, but a larger carrier by the limitation of these articles may carry but eight eight- inch guns.
The limit, arbitrarily fixed by Article IX, is 27,000 tons. It will be interesting to see just where this limit strikes the aircraft carriers of the nations signatory to the Washington Treaty. But four of these nations have aircraft carriers, built and building. For convenience, the significant data are shown in the accompanying table.
AIRCRAFT CARRIER DATA
Name | Date | Displacement in Tons (Normal) | Guns | Speed in Knots | Remarks |
Hermes | Sept. 11, 1919 | British (b) 10,950 |
3 pdr. A. A. | 25 |
|
Eagle | June 8, 1918 | 22,790 (Deep load 26,200) | 9-6 inch (50 cal.) 5-4 inch A. A. 4-3 pdr. A. A. | 24 | Late battleship |
Argus | Dec. 2, 1917 | 14,450 | 2-4 inch (50 cal.) 4-4 inch A. A. 4-3 pdr. | 20.75 | Late liner |
Furious | Aug. 15, 1916 | About 19,100 (Full load about 22,900) | 10-5.5 in.(50 cal.) 6-4 inch A. A. 4-3 pdr. | 31 Good for 32-33 | Late cruiser |
Courageous (Building) | Feb. 5, 1916 | About 18,600 (Full load about 22,700) | Probably same as Furious | 31 | Late cruiser |
Glorious (Building) | April 20, 1916 | Same as Courageous | Same as Courageous | 31 | Late cruiser |
Akagi (Building) | April 22, 1925 | Japanese 26,900 | 10-8 inch 4-4.7 12-4.7 inch A. A. | 28.5 | Originally laid down as battle cruiser of 42,000 tons |
Kaga (Building) | Nov. 17, 1921 | About 27,000 |
| 23 ? (original design) | Originally laid down as battleship of 39,900 tons |
Hosho | Nov. 14,1921 | 9,458 | 4-4.7 inch 2-3 inch A. A. | 25 |
|
Lexington (Building) | Oct. 5, 1925 | United States 33,000 | 8-8 inch (55 cal.) 12-5 inch A. A. (25 cal.) 4-6 pdr. (4-21 inch torpedo tubes) | 34.5 | Originally authorized as battle cruiser |
Saratoga (Building) | April 6, 1925 | 33,000 | Same as Lexington | 34.5 * | Same as Lexington |
Langley | Launched Aug. 24, 1912 converted 1920-21 | 12,700 | 4-5 inch (51 cal.) | 14.99 | Ex-collier Jupiter |
Bearn (Building) | Launched 1920 | French 21,450 | 8-6.1 inch 6-14 pdr. A. A. 8-3 pdr. A. A. (4-21.7 inch torpe tubes) | 21.5 do | Laid down 1914 as battleship |
Notes to Table of Aircraft Carrier Data
(a) Data from Jane’s Fighting Ships, 1926, and from U. S. Office of Naval Intelligence as of October 1, 1926.
(b) There is also one seaplane carrier building in Australia.
(c) By Article VIII of the Washington Treaty “all aircraft carrier tonnage in existence or building on November 12, 1921, shall be considered experimental, ana may be replaced, within the total tonnage limit prescribed in Article VII without regard to age.” Of all the carriers now built, only the Furious is not “experimental.” That ship underwent refit and complete alteration of appearance in 1921-25.
Of the six carriers of Great Britain, built and building (or being converted to use as a carrier), not one exceeds 27,000 tons. The Eagle, at deep load, displaces 26,200 tons, which is sufficiently near the limit to suggest that it may have inspired the limit.
If it be correct that the British carriers Courageous and Glorious will have the same heavy battery as the Furious, then no British carrier will have guns exceeding six inches in caliber. In other words, their number of guns will be unlimited, and future increases in number may be made at will, subject only to structural limitations. However, if the British so elect, the Courageous and Glorious, both considerably smaller than the Saratoga type of the United States, may each carry two more eight-inch guns than the largest American carrier.
Japan, in converting to carriers her two partly built heavy ships, is faced with the proposition of having radically to cut down the displacement they were designed for, or of having carriers above the limit. Japan has elected the former alternative. The Akagi, originally expected as a battle cruiser to displace '42,000 tons, converted to an aircraft carrier will displace 26,900 tons. Similarly, the Kaga, intended as a battleship to displace 39,900 tons, as a carrier will displace 27,000 tons. And the Akagi will carry ten eight-inch guns. Presumably the Kaga will carry the same.
The two big carriers of the United States, the Lexington and the Saratoga, now being converted from the partly built battle cruisers of the same name, will displace 33,000 tons. By Article IX they are limited to eight eight-inch guns, and that will be their main battery.
The smaller Japanese aircraft carriers will out gun the larger American carriers.
It may be contended that on the smaller displacement there cannot be carried the engineering plant required to equal the speed that a larger carrier could make, and that therefore, to give equality, the smaller carrier should be permitted to have the greater battery. However, speed is in any ship a vulnerable possession, easily lost. Carriers cannot be so heavily armored as battleships, and still have greater speed, which they must have, as they are more lightly armed. And even battleships are liable to considerable diminution in speed under comparatively light punishment.
The new American carriers are immense ships. Big ships afford big targets for guns, torpedoes, mines and bombs. Why should they not be allowed commensurate batteries ?
Article IX puts a big premium upon keeping the displacement of an aircraft carrier within the 27,000 ton limit. And there are other considerations in favor of the smaller aircraft carriers, as stated by The Engineer of August 6, 1926, after giving some characteristics of the American and Japanese carriers:
In British naval circles, however, the utility of such monster ships is questioned. Logically considered, the carrier is not a fighting ship, but an auxiliary; her prime function is to furnish a floating base for aircraft working with the fleet. Being peculiarly vulnerable to gun fire and other methods of attack, she should keep as far away from the enemy as is consistent with the performance of her special duties. Otherwise the necessity of affording her protection will impose a serious burden on the fighting ships proper. Moreover the sinking or disablement of a carrier such as the Lexington or Akagi would be a disaster of the first magnitude, since it would deprive the fleet to which she belonged of half its air force at a single blow. Hence the preference in this country for carriers of such moderate dimensions as the Hermes. The reconstruction of such comparatively large vessels as the Glorious and Courageous is probably dictated by motives of economy. Had funds been available, new ships of smaller tonnage would doubtless have been laid dowa ....
The foregoing quotation, from a highly respected British source, sets forth arguments against very large aircraft carriers. A good many may concur with these arguments. They certainly have some weight. But insofar as they have value, in setting forth the vulnerability of the large carriers, and their need for protection, these are arguments for a battery commensurate with the size of the carrier.
The Chief of the American Navy Bureau of Construction and Repair, before the subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, stated (December 19, 1925) that the revised limit of cost for each of the carriers Lexington and Saratoga, including planes, was more than forty-four million dollars. This cost also included armor and armament, and ammunition. A further increase of this limiting cost is to be requested by the U. S. Navy Department. In 1925 the “General Board of the United States Navy recommended .... the immediate construction of one 23,000 ton carrier.” Perhaps this recommendation was significant. It would hardly be unnatural if misgivings had sometimes assailed the minds of the, responsible officials with regard to the large carriers.
Tremendously big and tremendously costly, their security in belligerent service, and even peacetime service, will constitute a big problem for their captains and admirals. The loss of one would be a major fleet calamity. Without armament limitation discriminating adversely against large carriers, the security of those carriers is a serious responsibility. The naval personnel charged with that responsibility did not receive much help from their diplomatic colleagues at the Washington Conference table. .Whether any more very large carriers will ever be laid down, at least during the life of Article IX, is a question each can answer as suits himself.
Suppose that a Lexington of 33,000 tons and only eight eight-inch guns should lose but seven knots from its maximum speed of 34.5 knots. Speed is a ship’s most ephemeral possession, and probably in battle is its most vulnerable characteristic. Such a loss is by no means a far fetched assumption. Then the Lexington could be overhauled by an Akagi of 26,900 tons, bringing into action ten eight-inch guns against eight eight-inch guns of the Lexington.
The Lexington could then be sunk by the smaller but better armed Akagi. The Akagi’s best ally would prove to be Article IX of the Washington Treaty. By that article the smaller ship was allowed more of the larger guns.
What then is the verdict? Is Article IX absurd? Is it dangerous to the United States?