INTRODUCTION.
In reading Stanley Baldwin’s address on “Truth and Politics given to the students of the Edinburgh University, one is confronted with the words, “Let us take our stand on public right and a law of nations with Grotius rather than with Machiavelli.” The Premier was speaking of words and their value in international relationships, but this reflection, so dep, so sound, gives cause for thought.
The point of view. It may appear unusual to the lay thinker, that a naval man should choose to approach his subject after this manner, but there are substantial reasons for so doing. There is a school of thought in this country confined to men and women not responsible in their acts to their government, who think it necessary only to wish a thing and enact a law, in order to have it become an established fact. Many ardent lovers of peace believe that to wish peace and world stability will bring it to pass. But the government servant who is held responsible for his acts and his words knows better. No federal officials have a keener realization of the futility of such an attitude of mind than have statesmen and naval officers. This is perhaps not always understood by those who know little of the purpose of the Navy or of how its men are trained; how close students of international affairs its leaders are; how studiously they strive to keep the peace; and how intimately statesmanship and naval power are interwoven. But those who do know the Navy, know also the contribution which the trained mind of the naval officer makes to the solution of the nation’s problems, and particularly in the keeping of peace between nations.
Back of every technical and local situation which confronts us, calling for the determination of a mission and a decision, there lies the fundamental cause. Unless a perception and understanding is had of the deeper and underlying factors affecting the relationship between world states, the government servant views .his own special problems from a limited and imperfect viewpoint. In time of war the keen quick analysis of the immediate problem is the matter of moment. In time of peace, if this method be the only one used, it may be fraught with danger and render the naval officer subject to the charge of militarism, from a somewhat unappreciative public, which in these quiet times gives slight heed to the problems which constantly confront federal servants. During moments of grave state danger bordering on or culminating in war, the naval man must be efficient to the last detail in the art of conducting war; before such an unfortunate crisis is reached, and while matters are still within the political and diplomatic stage, every government official should know the correct method to adopt to avoid such a crisis. This he cannot do unless his knowledge, experience, and particularly his appreciation of fundamental reasons, lead him to choose the best way.
For these reasons, especially as most world states are now endeavoring to adjust their political problems on democratic and constitutional lines long accepted by the Anglo-Saxon peoples as being the correct way of future world progress, it behooves the naval man in time of peace to know how best the peace may be kept, though in time of war he must be the astute technician. The functions of government, in the democratic state, are so nicely balanced, that no one department can work alone; all must cooperate to a greater degree than was deemed necessary under more autocratic forms of administration. Provided we accept this and act towards this end, we possess great strength. Unless we do, our judgments are incomplete and our decisions are the casual opinions of the moment. Our national policies of long standing are not pat expressions, though they are often quoted unthinkingly. They reflect the deep inner voice of the American people. They are our peace-time guides. Even after the crisis has been precipitated, and impulse and emotion prevail, the naval man must furnish always for the stage of his immediate acts, the background of calm, thoughtful analytical decision, arrived at in peace, else he will never be able to help limit war, moderate it or determine the direction which it should take. As the architect, he must build the house wherein his naval problems rest. The foundations should be sound, else the structure with all that it contains must fall into ruin. This is the path of duty. It is also the path of sanity. If we follow this road, not only may we help to iron out our country’s difficulties, but we may be able to contribute our mite towards world progress.
A cursory survey of past influences. In a general review of the Pacific, nothing but a very hasty survey of influences, tendencies, and actions can be made. In brief, it may be stated, that with the exception of a few adventurous spirits, traders and explorers, who early found their way into the Orient, this part of the world remained for centuries a sealed book to our western civilization. It is true certain religious and cultural influences passed from east to west and back, and also some trade, but until nearly the middle of the nineteenth century the Orient remained in a state of practical isolation from the Occidental World. During the centuries gone before, the East as a whole including Siberia remained largely a pastoral and agricultural country with a certain amount of internal local trade. The great dominating factor, however, was not industry. It was the land itself which laid its hold upon the peoples living therein, not the manufactured products which came out of it.
This, of course, affected the civilization which we call oriental. Then, too, the prevailing religions were those which we speak of as being based upon law rather than upon personality. This, too, affected the character of the oriental civilization. So it was that when we approached these somewhat isolated peoples about the middle of the nineteenth century we came stamped with the imprints of a civilization quite different from theirs. Perhaps it was no better; probably it was no worse; certainly it was different.
In dealing with the Orient, stress has been laid often upon racial differences. One may not be too sure that the dissimilarity which we note between our two forms of civilization is due entirely to race, although undoubtedly this is a strong influence. Geography, environment, religion, form of government, attitude toward life, the character of the land lived in,—all are potent factors. When America and Europe approached the East it was first with the idea of trade. Subtly and probably unconsciously the attitude of America in this advance was different from that of any other western world state. Added to the desire to trade and to enter into friendly relationships with the Orient, America unconsciously desired to convert it. This unconscious attitude is traceable to the influence which our form of government has imprinted indelibly upon the pol life of every American citizen. We are a nation of missionaries, whether we think so or not. This is not said in disparagement, nor is it said in praise. The average American acts in this matter unconsciously.
Howbeit, while we went there to trade, there is no evidence that we went there to acquire colonies. The acquisition of the Philippines, which after the Spanish War made us a world power, was due to none of the reasons which first brought us to the East. Our acquisition of the Philippines was in reality a matter of fate rather than a matter of desire on our part. The same tendencies which actuated us in the approach to the East could scarcely have been those of the European states. Europe had been an armed camp for many centuries. Let us say it was no one's fault, but that the evolution of our western civilization made it so. The facts, however, speak for themselves. Though in the make-up of our great federal state, tariff boundaries had disappeared, in Europe it was not so. While much of the land we acquired was bought or had fallen to us as lucky children of the earth, the nations of Europe had fought for what they held. For many generations the continental powers had pushed out into the world seeking new avenues of trade, seeking new colonies which might enrich the Old World. We were developing our own land then.
It is not that we are better, but that civilization had advanced when we became colonizers. Had we extended our borders across water in the earlier times, it is doubtful if we could show a cleaner record behind us than, as a whole, marks the colonizing effort of Great Britain. She was a pioneer and in a sense our leader, and much of the world spread of the so-called western civilization is due to her own efforts, and unaided. Nevertheless, the fact remains that when we approached the East we approached from a country which had not been an armed camp, which had not had conflicting tariff problems, whose internal trade relationships could balance outside competition. We approached from a country which had vast resources within its own geographical limits. Moreover, in time of peace, opportunity had been afforded us to build up and to stabilize our own democratic form of government which had never had to contend with balances of international political power as a part of its daily life. Therefore, our attitude toward the East was bound to be different from that of any other of the western world states.
This difference in the attitude of approach has worked a difference in our relationships with the East in the past, and it is continuing into the future. Our attitude of mind has shown itself on several occasions. For instance, in spite of China's political weakness, America has never advocated the partition of China. It has been ever the policy of our government to oppose this. In the matter of trade, while we have insisted upon equal opportunity, we have been opposed to the policy of special interest. In other words, our attitude toward the East has, in general, been what the spirit of the Declaration of Independence means, namely, equal opportunity for all.
Present tendencies. In order to attempt to discuss present tendencies, it would be necessary to analyze the relations of the great powers vis-a-vis each other and the Orient, and further to consider the relationships existing among the oriental peoples themselves. These matters are so thoroughly discussed in the press and in the current magazines, that it seems unnecessary to repeat the attempt here. The best one may do is to predict, and it is preferable to leave this dubious course to those who are not held responsible for what they say.
The Pacific question is, of course, America’s great future problem. Other nations interested in the matter are Holland, Japan, China, France, Great Britain, Canada, Russia, New Zealand, Australia, some of the Central and South American countries and very likely India and the Straits Settlements. Some are more directly interested than others; some are vitally interested, now and always. Others, at this particular moment, apparently are not interested at all, but all are liable to have at some time or another a concern in matters pertaining to the Pacific. There are nations in or bordering upon the ocean who desire never to see the peace broken. Some have strong nationalistic leanings. Others have not become stabilized or have not yet recovered from the effects of recent revolution. There are nations apparently who believe their destinies require further territorial expansion, or who may feel that they have vested rights due to geographical position. Certain of these nations may view their problem as in part a racial one. Many seek avenues of trade in the opening up of this large section of the world. Probably all believe that we will not get very far in the solution of any problem unless a stable condition exists in the Orient.
The establishment of a stable condition in the Orient was one of the main purposes of the Washington Conference. Without world stability, nations progress but a short distance upward; nor are instability and insecurity conducive to the practical application of the principle of limitation of armaments. Speaking generally, it is fairly safe to say that any particular governmental attitude of mind which has existed in the past will not be subject to immediate radical change unless conditions become so acute as to force it. In the matter of radical changes, conservative governments are loath to take impulsive or impetuous action. In other words, they wish to see where the road leads before they advance far upon it. This is wise. Governments which do not accept this policy are poor leaders. Matters tend to get out of hand and no matter how well meaning the intentions, the result is frequently chaotic. A chaotic condition is deadly to the cause of peace. The first condition then, and one upon which depends the ultimate solution of our Pacific problem, is the establishment of conditions of stability and of national security to the peoples most vitally interested in the solution of the Pacific problem.
Insofar as America is concerned, it must appeal to all thinking people that in broad matters of policy we are following consistently the general line of conduct mapped out for ourselves when first we became vitally interested in the Pacific. You have but to read of the efforts which are being made by our State Department for the solution of some of China’s difficulties, and you must agree that America’s attitude in the matter is as liberal and broad as the situation permits. If you need any further evidence, you have only to read the daily papers to see what America’s attitude has been in the matter of revenues, questions of extra territoriality, et cetera. This indicates a line of conduct entirely consistent with the ideals of the American people, with the character of our government and with the traditionally liberal attitude which we have, for the most part, maintained in the past. With reason it may be said that despite certain inconsistencies, in Far Eastern matters American policy is less in a state of flux than that of any other interested nation. This statement is not to be taken in any sense as a criticism, nor does it lay down a course of conduct for any other nation whose necessities may be different from ours. It does, however, appear that a general survey of the situation would indicate the facts to be as stated. If it be true then that American policy seems even in the present disturbed times to have a certain continuing air of stability about it, this alone is bound to have a determining influence upon Pacific problems.
Some salient factors affecting American policy vis-a-vis the Orient. An attempt will be made to enumerate some of the factors which are thought to have a determining influence upon America’s attitude on Far Eastern questions. These are not all of the factors. Each nation has its own particular interests, and consequently other factors enter into its view of the situation. But as regards this country, the liberty is taken of enumerating, in the order of importance, those factors which it is thought most immediately concern us.
Geography, in its relation to security, comes first. There can be no doubt that the influence of America will always be felt in the settlement of Far Eastern problems. However, to an extent which applies to no other interested country or dominion except Canada, geography, as affecting national security, regulates America’s political attitude toward the Orient. It is axiomatic that no nation is quite free to act in a disinterested manner, if the question of national security may not be dismissed immediately from the mind. If you doubt this statement, ponder over the lessons deducible from the experiences Europe has passed through in the last few centuries. Once reduce the question of national security to definable terms so that each state may feel itself reasonably secure from the encroachment of aggressors, and you have produced an attitude of mind similar to ours. This may help to explain why America is so pleased with the results of Locarno. It is the matter of national security which helps give the factor geography the great weight it holds in international affairs.
Next in importance is placed government. The form of the American government is unique. It is both a republic and a democracy: but it is not a republic in the sense that Rome was a republic; nor a democracy like Russia. Ours is a government designed to invest law with supreme powers. No favored class has, or can have in our peculiar form of government, vested rights which conflict with the rights of other interested parties. Neither are we an unlimited democracy. While the free will of the people always may be expressed, yet the form of government is such that the balances and safeguards are present, tending to prevent a free people from losing their sense of proportion to an extent that anarchy instead of freedom reigns. Nor have we ever admitted the divine right of kings. Our government is a constitutional government, a government by law, but never having passed through the feudal and monarchial stages, we give to the law of the federal state, the Constitution, a divine character which is believed no other world state does. It has greater force in regulating the affairs of state than has any other national document. One has only to study the Constitution and to note its workings, to see that we hold this instrument of government as having a character, an inspiration and a force, which imparts to it something unique in history. So long as we remain true to the principles laid down in our Constitution, we have a very suitable and effective instrument guiding us, which is bound to influence our motives and to determine our administrative and legislative action in matters concerning the Pacific as well as elsewhere.
The third factor consists of our four avowed policies: isolation from political entanglements outside our own realm; the Monroe Doctrine; the “Open Door” or the policy of equal opportunity; regulation of immigration. They are so well established in the minds of the American people, and seem to be so sane, that they are bound to influence our future attitude and actions. Though all may not agree, it is believed that America in Far Eastern matters has been less influenced by local expediency and has run truer to form in maintaining certain principles which she believes to be correct, than any other interested nation. This is not said with any air of finality or of criticism, but the more we study the matter, the more we are inclined to believe America’s general policies are not only reasonably correct, but that they have an air of finality about them which is consistent with our actions in the past and will influence our attitude of mind and actions in the future. In the enforcement of our national policies we have a very remarkable instrument, the Constitution, to guide us in our aspirations and acts.
Fourth is the Philippine question – a factor which brings us intimately into touch with other island and Asiatic peoples. The ultimate solution of this problem will mutually react on us and on the oriental races. Every man and woman who reads can form his or her opinion in regard to the matter. There is a principle at stake in the evolution of independent states. Freedom entails great responsibility, and once accepted it imposes grave duties upon peoples who desire freedom. There is a corollary to this principle. “In granting freedom it is easier to divest a controlling state of its legal responsibilities than of its moral responsibilities.” An onward march of events demands the recognition of those principles. International law recognizes no state which is not able ultimately to maintain itself with dignity and in consonance with usages and practices deemed essential for the preservation of law and order. Dignity and sovereignty must exist in the independent world state regardless of what its form of government may be.
Fifth, we have a highly important factor in the Hawaiian Islands. These islands lying midway in the Pacific, between the two civilizations, the occidental and the oriental, are today passing through a world phase. Here you meet a blending of the two civilizations to an extent which obtains perhaps in no other part of the world. Here you see that preconceived notions give way to actualities. In the Hawaiian Islands you see children of pure oriental extraction, whose forbears have for one or two generations lived there, smile as do our own American boys and girls. They have a light in their eyes which is in no wise different from the expression you see in the faces of our own, born here in America. What is the reason? Can it be that the spirit which had been carried to these islands by the first American settlers, a spirit coming straight out from New England, still lives in the Hawaiian Islands?
Last, limitation of armament is mentioned as an influence helping us to reach better understandings in our Pacific problem. It is mentioned last because it is a more technical matter, subject to change, and more passing in its permanent influence than any of the other factors enumerated above. Locally applied, it is a strong medicine. It may effect a temporary cure. Armament is not, however, the source of all evils. It follows that its limitation can not be a permanent cure. Neither should limitation of armament be confused with disarmament. This is a different thing. Disarmament is a medicine not to be applied until the attitude of mind of all nations is such that the law will prevail without the power to enforce it. Until the law reigns supreme, as a moral force, we may not do away with reasonable national security, any more than we may do away with our local security; we may not do away with our national force, any more than we may do away with our local (police) force.
Will there ever be war in the Pacific? In the present state of world development, unsettled conditions, national aspirations, state morality, universal education and perhaps the individual attitude towards duty, responsibility, religion, law and order, make war in the Pacific area by no means impossible. In the Far East there are influences at work which at any time might precipitate such a catastrophe. The world condition is dangerous though not as acute as it was in continental Europe in 1914. At present the greater powers are war weary, and a determined attempt is being made by them to avoid war. The memory of the experience of war and its frightful costs is undoubtedly the strongest force to prevent war that exists on the Continent and in America today. As such it is of inestimable value. But we must not fail to take into account that just as the intensest war hatreds fade and change their direction, so too does the memory of war horrors and costs fade. Nor is there any doubt that the new generations will not feel as intensely as we do about the utter waste and frightfulness of war, simply because they have not themselves had the experience of war and what it means. Moreover, this war weariness, strong as it is in Europe now, is not so evident in the Far East. There is a spirit of unrest in the Orient, and amongst kindred races, which expresses itself in local disturbance. From a world point of view these may be placed in the minor category now. They have not assumed the character of major importance which marked the unsettled relations between European states prior to the World War, because the Far East is neither industrially mobilized nor nationally coherent. So far as may be seen, Russia is the only power which might welcome a world conflagration,—this because her state system stands alone and, in the openly admitted convictions of her leaders, cannot continue to exist unless other nations adopt a form of government similar to her own. Moreover, the present Russian form of government is antagonistic not only to the systems of the European states and to America, but is hostile to true democracy and to the older civilization of the oriental races. At the present day, due to the sum of all influences, all peoples, save one, regardless of race, color, religion, and state systems, have this interest in common, that if war come, they wish it to be limited to minor proportions and not to assume the character of a world conflagration. All have something to lose, whether it be cultural systems, state forms of government, religions, creeds, industrial systems, or established systems of law. Therefore as a fundamental principle, it is not only a moral duty but it is to the interest of all peoples that war should be limited in character and duration and not be allowed to spread to the size of a world war.
Even the neutral, who profits from the limited war, should recognize this, for a state of affairs may arise to sweep away all his previous gains at the expense of others. Two questions each nation must ask itself: “What must the state do, consonant with right and dignity, to keep out of war?’’ and “What should the state do to prevent or to limit the character and duration of war or to ameliorate and moderate the conduct of war?” The second question applies to all states, before war, and to the neutral and to the belligerent after war has been declared, for each has interests at stake in the question of world stability. A third question which intimately concerns us is “Will America ever be in such a war?” Granted that a certain answer to this third question is impossible, it remains that if all federal servants, the press and responsible people, bear in mind the first question, “What must the state do, consonant with right and dignity, to keep out of war” the answer will be simplified. There is, however, the presumption permissible at present under the conditions now existing in the Pacific, that if we are drawn into a Pacific war as one of the original belligerents it will be due to blundering. There is reason for this statement. It is true there are certain questions which might be a source of friction between us and other states, such as trade, territorial expansion, and racial matters, but these it should be possible to keep within the realm of arbitration and diplomacy. On the other hand, America has never been involved in a Pacific war, and this of itself is one of the best reasons why we might hope to keep out of war, and expect to be able to arbitrate our troubles before they reach such a pass that arbitration is impossible. In the main we represent a civilization whose progress has been advanced through the industrial arts, face to face with one developed by people whose major pursuits are agricultural. The two civilizations complement each other and should be able to avoid undue friction. Each has need of the other, and this need extends far into the realm of industry and trade.
There is also the factor "attitude of mind" which plays such an important role. We are not a warlike or an aggressive people. Neither is the Orient, in the main. Perhaps we fail to appreciate how blessed we are in our ability to feel secure from aggression. Undoubtedly it has contributed much to give us our present attitude of mind. Nevertheless it has had the effect of making us less tolerant of the attitude of other nations not naturally so fortunate as we in the matter of national security. Through our geographical position, inclinations, policies and traditions, "We are permitted and desire a large degree of aloofness in political matters, though we have to a high degree a benevolent and, definite business interest in the Pacific, and we should cultivate an intelligent and charitable understanding of the needs of others." To sum up "There does not seem to be any problem arising in the Pacific now, which could not, if properly handled, be settled through diplomacy and arbitration." On the practical side, diplomacy and arbitration carry small weight unless a nation is prepared to enforce these non-aggressive views, by more than mere words. The military and naval forces of a country take their aggressive or nonaggressive character from the political complexion and moral attitude of the state possessing them.
Competing armaments acquired for aggressive purposes are harmful. America mistrusts those nations possessing such armaments whose motives she deems not so altruistic as her own. In the present state of world affairs America is justified in a reasonable degree of preparation consonant with her wealth, importance, and weight in world affairs. This degree of preparation is represented in naval strength by the terms of the 5-5-3 treaty, a principle which is sane and non-aggressive and should remain the law of our land until world conditions change. We see no prospect of war now, and it must be our aim to avoid it, but should we become involved, we have behind us the resources of one of the most powerful nations of the world. Then the united will of the nation must be determined to carry on until the fulfillment of America’s purpose is accomplished.
“What can the state do to prevent or to limit the character and duration of war or to ameliorate and moderate the conduct of war?” This very involved problem comprehends three major problems. To start with, there are certain agreements which countries universally may accept as binding, with penalties attached if the agreements be broken. A very fertile field for labor lies in the determination of what characterizes an act of aggression, together with what should constitute the penalty. A second field of work exists in thoroughly going over the question of the rights and liabilities of neutrals. Closely allied to this is the matter of “Belligerent Rights.” A thorough investigation of these fields of endeavor would comprise nearly all the international law of war, and in addition would augment the present law by such contributions as were made and universally accepted under the head aggression. Speaking rather bluntly, the last war proved that any attempt to make the neutral point of view prevail over that of the belligerent, when affairs had reached the state of a world crisis, was in effect a selfish point of view, though back of this view lay tradition, past practice, legal sanction, and national policy. These exaggerated conceptions of the rights of neutrals did not help to put out the conflagration of war except through the commission of acts bordering closely upon the realm of unneutral service. Under these circumstances is it not better to declare openly for one side or the other or completely withdraw? Within limits, it is not better for the neutral as a neutral to act as indicated, since he profits from a limited war. It is better, however, from the point of view of world stability that he give up such profits since the whole world pays for them in the resultant prolongation of the war. The preeminence of the neutral point of view will only hold in limited wars. It does not fit in with world wars. Any such doctrine as "freedom of the seas” does nothing to shorten or to limit war. Under conditions when all or most of the world is at peace, and war is limited, it serves well; but under any other conditions, it merely adds fuel to the flames.
Out of the chaos resulting from the last war there was born the knowledge that the international law of the past was unfitted to cope with the situations arising out of a world conflict. Even more important was the comprehension that steps must be taken (a) to prevent wars and (b) to limit war, if attempts to prevent them fail. It is towards (a), the prevention of war, that most efforts since 1918 have been directed. In the approach to this subject there are, broadly speaking, the two points of view:
- the late belligerent or Continental, and
- the late neutral or American. The point of view of the first class (late belligerent) naturally inclines to a determination of causes, and a solution along lines indicated through security pacts, agreements, and penalties for aggression. The American point of view inclines more to the application of the direct method—toward a limitation of armament. This latter is the safe and cautious method of approach, eminently suited to the needs of our country, though perhaps not entirely appropriate to the needs of Continental Europe. There is in all probability a happy meeting ground where satisfactory adjustment can be made.
To be in any way successful, the revision of laws and agreements on subjects indicated above should be undertaken and accomplished before another great war breaks out. The board that faces the task of revising the law should be free from political affiliations. Along the lines indicated above, there is great latent possibility of producing results which would tend to shorten the war or even to prevent it. However, to an extent that does not seem possible now, national mistrust must be laid.
The last part of the question, viz.: “How ameliorate and moderate the conduct of war” has two phases, one of which concerns any “board of review on international law,” working in peace; the second phase is the war phase. In this particular line of endeavor, the four questions which contain the possibilities of greatest contribution toward improved methods are: (a) the submarine, (b) the air forces, (c) the use of gas, (d) armed merchant ships. When rules governing the above are definitely accepted, it still remains for the belligerents to agree to two things, and this agreement should be made prior to war, or at the time of its declaration. Afterwards will be too late. First, belligerents might agree to continue limited arbitration into the realm of war. Second, they might promise to live up to the established rules of international law.
Considering the merits of submarines and aircraft, with reference to the laws of war, there is no justice in demanding the abolition of one weapon which happens to work to the disadvantage of one nation, and permitting the unlimited use of another weapon which favors a different state. The only safe and sane way is to have one law which covers all types of warcraft. Nor in time of war is it safe or wise to have neutral rights prevail over belligerent rights in prescribed war areas. Such procedure tends to prolong the war and leads to the evasion of the belligerent’s right, as, for example, by the arming of neutral merchant ships, which itself might be termed an act of aggression or of unneutrality inasmuch as the arming is against one type of warcraft only. The reply, however, is not ruthlessness, but the promulgation of law beforehand and the establishment of sufficient penalties to make failure to adhere to it during war, by both belligerents, exceedingly unlikely.
We cannot hope to ameliorate the character of war and introduce better methods if on the one hand we attempt to proscribe one type of warcraft, the submarine, and permit to the air forces the very methods we condemned in the submarine, for this will smack of injustice to the aggrieved nation. From the smart of injustice to reprisal and retaliation is a short road. Previous to 1914 the general practice of belligerents is outlined in this quotation taken from Oppenheim on international law:
It must be emphasized that war nowadays is a contention of states through their armed forces. Those private subjects of the belligerents who do not directly or indirectly belong to the armed forces do not take part in the armed contention; they do not attack and defend, and no attack is therefore made upon them. This fact is the result of an evolution of practices which were totally different in former times. During antiquity and the greater part of the Middle Ages war was a contention between the whole of the populations of the belligerent states. In time of war every subject of one belligerent, whether an armed and fighting individual or not, whether man or woman, adult or infant, could be killed and enslaved by the other belligerent at will. But gradually a milder and more discriminative practice grew up, and nowadays the life and liberty of such private subjects of belligerents as do not directly or indirectly belong to their armed forces are safe, as is also, with certain exceptions, their private property.
This enunciation of principles must be followed if we hope to limit the conduct of war within bounds. This is not the practice nor the intent of the modern air doctrine of the independent air force. The latter advocates a ruthlessness not surpassed by the submarine in its worst days. Nothing would be gained by heading in the direction pointed out by these advocates. Temporary gains would be followed by inordinate losses. Through the large scale destruction of property, including whole cities, as advocated by the airforce and chemical units, much of the world’s recuperative power would be lost and the net result would be a return to desolation and barbarism. Better lose a war than gain a victory on those terms.
In the matter of the use of noxious gas, probably no country in the world could be as deadly an adversary as America, yet why should we advocate its use except under most circumscribed conditions? The power of reprisal in our hands is so deadly a weapon, that few opponents would care to invoke it. It is a safe rule to limit the use any weapon or agency of war to bounds of objective, time and space, within which its target is a legitimate war target, and may never be other than a legitimate war target. The other method is to proscribe ds use, and this attempt may not suit the views of all states. However, one of the two views must prevail if we hope to avoid a return to barbarism.
In the matter of the armed merchant ship much can be done to improve existing conditions. It was the arming of merchant sups which was really one of the bones of contention in the submarine controversy. Why a neutral should arm, unless it be for the purpose of enforcing neutral preeminence within the realm of belligerent right, is not clear, since to do this is to sacrifice strict neutrality. War is made in two ways, first through the action of armed forces against each other, and second by pressure applied against the national resources of a state contained within the borders of that state or in the process of transit to that state. The first method of war, direct action, is waged against both personnel and material; the second, pressure, is waged against state material, or that which may be converted into state material, not against personnel. A law defining the character of a public and private belligerent ship, m relation to the guns it carried, would be an immediate step in the direction of settling many questions which are now in the controversial stage, and which often lead to reprisal. If we would hope to make progress along the lines of ameliorating the conduct of war, as a first step we must return to and abide by the enunciation of principles as laid down in the rules of international law. Second, we must make one rule of conduct applicable to all types, surface, subsurface, and air. Third, we must scan closely the question of neutral and belligerent rights and probably revise entirely our previous ideas on the subject. Fourth, we must see that these rules are lived, up to under pain of penalties which it is practicable to apply.
Insofar as the above matters concern America, as a Pacific problem of the future, we have a very fair field before us. Not having the background of previous wars to stultify our efforts, we might in time of peace be able to come to detailed agreements with certain of the Pacific powers, which would go far towards stabilizing many of the questions of international law now in the controversial stage. At least before we ever plunge into war, we should have such a document prepared embodying America s point of view. If those matters additional to accepted international law took the form of a fair and just statement of principles and proper conduct, we might get it accepted. Even if it were not accepted by the other belligerent, but clearly outlined America’s proposed conduct, it would be a daring opponent indeed that would adopt a course of conduct which was considered inhumane, as our power of retaliation is too great to reckon with in a casual manner. The matter which would require our own most careful attention is that as a point of honor, we live up most conscientiously to our own rules.
Arbitration, the World Court, and the League. Volumes have been written concerning the matters which are now spoken of, but is not a simple analysis all that is required if we wish to determine what is the best course of action for America to take in relation to the Orient? There can be no doubt but that in the solution of many of the world’s problems there is a distinct need for a permanent court of international justice in some form. It also seems probable that whatever form the League may take, it will never replace entirely the need for special courts of arbitration. In this connection it may be noted that even though the League made the award of Mosul to Great Britain under certain stated terms, yet the press reported that Great Britain proposed to arbitrate the matter with Turkey directly. Perhaps, also, it should be noted that had the League acted in consonance with the full powers with which it is accredited, it might not have been necessary to arbitrate. However, this power was not used, though it lay dormant within the League and could have been called into existence at the behest of the council. There can be no question that as an organization suited to European needs, the League has accomplished much and should accomplish more. Of the future problems which may confront America, the greatest will lie probably in the Pacific. What most interests us is whether the present League of Nations is better able to accomplish the task of solving them than America is herself. Will the League solution of Pacific and Oriental problems be a better and more equitable solution, when the rights of all are considered, than America’s solution?
The answer to this question we must work out for ourselves. The framework of our government, through the law of the federal state, the Constitution, is composed of three distinct bodies. The internal balances to our federal government consist of the states which have equal rights towards each other, and of the two political parties. We have thus a wise balance, productive of constructive results and not of discord. In our administration of government under the Constitution, the restraints to the executive power lie in the legislative and judicial bodies, who have no executive power, but who do constitute a balance and check upon the executive power. This is readily seen in the power of impeachment, in the right to confirm appointments, in the treaty making powers, and in certain articles regulating military power. In other words, it is impossible to impose over the equal sovereign states, which comprise the United States, a federal executive power which may not be recalled either through the process of the vote or through the action of the legislative body in case of the assumption of absolute powers on the part of the executive body of the federal government.
An analysis of the government of the League discloses the fact that limits and restrictions, similar to those imposed by our Constitution upon the executive power, are absent, and that in the League there is constituted a super-state with practically autocratic powers, if it chooses to use them. In its present form the League does not conform to our form of government, in spirit at least. The Covenant of the League of Nations forms Part I of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, known as the Treaty of Versailles. Let us now quote a passage from the American Journal of International Law, July, 1925, page 507, which appears to be relevant, as well as fundamental. If we accept those statements of principle, they are bound to influence America’s attitude towards international relationships, if by becoming a party to treaties we violate the spirit of the Constitution.
The principle that treaties are not the treaties of governments, but are entered into “between nation and nation,” is of vital importance. No less vital is the principle that the government, in the making of treaties, is trustee for the nation in this, as in every other exercise of power. In the words of the Federalist, “As between sovereign and sovereign, the treaty power is a trust power.” It follows that the Constitution purposed a stability and integrity of treaty obligations which has suffered an almost complete eclipse, if contemporaneous opinion is examined. Innovation by treaty upon principles of public law, established by the reason and usage of nations and embodied in the Constitution, is precluded under the authority of the United States, and would not be in pursuance of delegated powers nor consonant with the trust of government. New principles founded neither in justice, nor usage, nor the acknowledgment of nations, are not to be interpolated into the law of nations so as to bind the United States, or work material prejudice to characteristic features of its fundamental law or to its free institutions. Principles established by the Constitution and by the general law of nations may not be shaken by treaty of the United States, by legislative compact nor by executive agreement. A treaty in derogation of these principles, though negotiated by the President and ratified by the Senate, would not have been made conformable to the Constitution. This is the exception, never to be forgotten, as to the doctrine that treaties have the effect of abrogating all preexisting federal law in conflict with them, whether unwritten, a law of nations, of admiralty, or of the common law, or written as in the case of federal statutory enactment.
Would it have been right for America to accept the Covenant of the League of Nations, a matter of such vital world importance, coupled to a treaty, in a manner more casual than the way in which she accepted the principles embodied in the Eighteenth Amendment? But aside from any legal or political complexities, would it be well for America to envisage her oriental problems from the viewpoint of the League? Would
Would it be well for her to see her continental American problems from this angle? Finally, in the course of a generation or more, when some of the fog and the interest in the immediate European problems resulting from the late war have cleared away and abated, would it then be better to approach our oriental problems from the angle of the League or from the viewpoint of America? This is worth thinking about. For the method of approach is of necessity different, not only on account of past influences, but because the League maintains in its organization external balances of power, with fewer internal corrective balances than the American form of government has deemed wise and essential to the practical administration of true democracy. The American principle on the other hand does attempt to separate itself from external balances .of power, and does insist upon adequate internal balances in the administration of the federal state. Might we not, by deviating from past policy, lose that which may be the most potent influence America exerts in the Orient? Thoughtful men who oppose the league in its present form are not all enemies of peace. Nor, are they undesirous of having our country make every unselfish contribution which it should to world progress: But we are not true citizens of America if we do not do our own thinking, for it is the law and spirit of the land.
What is the most potent influence America exerts? If you look toward Continental Europe, it might be easy to say that our wealth, our resources, trade, industry, and political power are our most potent influences there. These are much stronger than any moral influence we have in Europe. We are wanted in Europe for practical reasons but we could give nothing of lasting benefit to Europe by mixing in her political problems. The sanctity of international obligations, of which the most obvious is foreign debt, is a principle not lightly to be thrown aside. No nation is morally sound who repudiates her obligations; and in our foreign intercourse, moral obligations must be weighed with visible obligations. It will take time for Europe and ourselves to come to a better mutual understanding. Nevertheless, in time, such understanding will come.
Looking toward the west, facing a different civilization what has been said above does not apply. In the Orient the most powerful influence America exerts is a moral influence. Military power and national wealth make no appeal to agricultural peoples. To the force of example, the sense of fair play, and to the educational movement, America owes her greatest influence in the Far East. In the past these have carried us far. Despite certain aggravating questions, the effect of these influences has been to give us an envied position in the Orient. Will our influence there continue? If we would have it so, then we must be Americans first; put our own house in order; abide by the principles of our Constitution; continue the work of enlightenment; do unto others as we would that they should do unto us. If Americans remember this creed, there seems no reason why the influence of our country in the Pacific may not be as great in the future as it has been in the past. If we do not follow this creed, then, regardless of our prosperity and our wealth and resource, our utterances will be in vain. We will not be respected; we may be feared; certainly those influences resting on a moral foundation will be lost. But never need we fear isolation in the Orient if we live up to our creed.
To Conclude. To dig down to fundamental underlying influences and principles has been the purpose of this paper. The student who views the Pacific problem from the aspects which it exhibits today may not be in entire sympathy with this discussion. There are at the present time many visible and conflicting cross currents running through the foreground of our Far Eastern picture. Each of these conflicting elements is the result of some phase of the occidental form of civilization, whose great advance has been due to commercialism, industry and competition coming in contact with the older oriental form. How far have western methods penetrated the warp and woof of the eastern fabric? Not very deep. Is it well that they should? Are we satisfied that there is nothing better to offer, than to carry on along the lines marked out by the history of past effort in the Western World? If so, then we must see our Pacific problem from this point of view. But let us face frankly the fact that we are bringing into a new field alien tendencies, aims and actions. In that case we have no reason to expect that the history of this effort will show greater world stability than Europe has shown in the past where temporary peace has led a tenuous life through balances of political power. There is, however, a very deep life, thousands of years old, which is purely oriental. It is not progressive; it is not enlightened, viewed from western standards; it is not competitive; it is not contentious as is our occidental life. On the other hand, it is calm, thoughtful, industrious, and in its true essence, i. e., apart from the western veneer, it is peace loving. It is the true Orient which America must envisage. We stand between the two conflicting civilizations. We have much to give the East. We have also much to learn.