If the naval service is to be maintained at a high state of efficiency, new legislation affecting the commissioned line officer personnel is imperative. That this is recognized by the Navy Department is shown by the authorities having listed the Britten Bill as item number one for consideration by Congress at its coming session. That the necessity for such legislation is not apparent to a large part of the service is evident to the writer from conversations had with many officers. It is also apparent that of those who appreciate the need for new legislation, many are not in favor of the proposed bill, in parts or in toto, due either to a misunderstanding or misconception of the features involved, or to a belief that promotion by selection is wrong in principle and that the navy should revert to promotion by seniority.
The factors in the solution of the problem to determine the best laws for controlling our promotion and retirement are so many, so intricate, and so involved, that unless one has made a thorough study of the subject —one which includes the mathematics of it —the complexity cannot be appreciated. Having made such a study, the writer feels that a brief discussion may help to clear the atmosphere for those whose ideas are more or less hazy.
Accordingly, it is proposed here briefly to discuss: (1) The evolution of the present promotion laws; (2) The results and disadvantages of promotion by straight seniority; (3) The defects of the present statutes; (4) What the so-called Britten Bill provides, and the advantages which will accrue to the service by its adoption.
In looking backward through the evolution of the statutes which from time to time have regulated the promotion of the commissioned officer personnel of the Navy, several things are apparent.
First: The change in law in each case has been caused through pressure brought to bear by certain groups of individuals with a view to remedying the unsatisfactory situation for that particular group.
Second: In consequence of the legislation enacted, a relief was furnished, and for a short while the new law worked smoothly and satisfactorily.
Third: Within a few years it developed that the remedying of the situation for the particular group gradually brought about an unsatisfactory situation for another particular group.
Fourth: In none of the laws enacted was there a clear understanding of its effects on the service or on individuals at some future period—say ten to fifteen years thence.
Fifth: In practically all this legislation the guiding star has been the effect on individuals rather than on the efficiency of the Navy as a public servant of the nation. The younger officers, that is, those who entered the Navy subsequent to the enactment of the so-called “Plucking Board” law, do not know the situation with respect to the commissioned officer personnel when seniority was the controlling criterion for promotion. It is undoubtedly hard for them to appreciate that under those conditions:
- Ensigns were in that grade for ten years.
- Lieutenants were in that grade from eighteen to twenty years.
- On reaching the rank of lieutenant- commander most of the officers were over fifty years of age.
- From then on they passed rapidly through the upper grades, having only a short time in each.
- This method of promotion permitted some “dead wood” to reach the very top of the rear admiral list, while in the grades of captain, commander, and lieutenant commander there were many inefficient officers.
- That our gunboats of from 1,000 to 2,000 tons were all commanded by commanders of about fifty-five years of age, who, in many cases, were having their first thrill as captain of a ship; and that the executive officers of these ships were grey haired lieutenant commanders—some in the fifties.
It now seems strange that this state of affairs was allowed to continue so long. While it became apparent that as the Navy grew larger and as ships grew bigger our officer personnel needed revamping, it was not this general unsatisfactory condition which forced the change in legislation. The pressure was brought by some of the older officers (relatively to their contemporaries) to whom it was apparent that unless there was a change, they would either retire for age (sixty-two years) as captains; or, if promoted to rear admiral would not hold the rank long enough to hoist their flag either ashore or afloat, although in many cases they were the most efficient captains, and would have made the best flag officers. It was natural, of course, that these officers should seek a remedy.
The first remedial law provided for selection out. Each year the “plucking board” named a limited number of officers—those considered by them as the least efficient (professionally, physically or morally)—to be placed on the retired list in the next higher grade. Those selected out were limited to a small fixed number. If there were voluntary retirements, and there usually were, owing to the next higher rank inducement, the number plucked was reduced accordingly.
There is no question but that this method of selection resulted in the weeding out of many of the least efficient; but it had several pronounced defects.
- There was not sufficient elimination to increase greatly the stagnant flow of promotion.
- There was nothing to insure the most efficient reaching the top.
- The relief for the older men was not as pronounced as expected.
- The plucking out of an officer left a decided stigma, which, in some cases, especially in the latter years of the law’s operation, was not deserved.
Most officers who were plucked felt that a grave injustice had been done them. Some carried their grievance to Congress, with the result that the law was repealed, mainly on account of its effect on the individuals concerned.
Selection out is a drastic method to apply to the senior grades. It did not insure the most efficient reaching the top; and any law which does not insure this (insofar as humanly is possible) is bad for the Navy, as it is not productive of maximum military efficiency.
The selection out law was succeeded in 1916 by the personnel act which provided for selection up to the grades of rear admiral, captain, and commander. With this selection up were incorporated provisions for the retirement of officers who had not been promoted on reaching certain specified ages. This law was designed for the purpose of providing:
- Officers in each rank at ages most suitable for performing the duties of that rank.
- A reasonable and proper flow of promotion.
- The most efficient officers reaching command and the flag ranks.
Whether or not these intended functions have been accomplished is a matter of divergent opinions. A brief review of their workings may, for some, clear the atmosphere.
The World War coming shortly after the promulgation of this law prevented it from operating as its authors intended. This was partly due to the stress of war, and partly to the large increase of officer personnel. This augmentation in the number of officers provided the desired rate of promotion for a number of years, without the forced retirement provisions becoming operative. As a consequence until recently there have been very few retirements due to age-in-grade (or length-of-service), and this paucity of eliminations continues in both the commanders’ and lieutenant commanders’ grades. In fact, excepting in the captains’ grade during the last few years, the retirements due to non-selection can well be likened to the process of selection out under the previous law.
The conditions which made inoperative the provision of retirement for age-in-grade did away with the necessity for stringent selection in order to maintain the desired rate of promotion. Therefore, the policy of the selection boards, until this year, has been to select only from the tops of the various grades, and to pass over only a few who, to the board, seemed not so well fitted for promotion as others below them on the list. This is still the policy insofar as the commanders and lieutenant commanders are concerned. There has been much criticism of the various boards for pursuing this course of action. Is the criticism justified?
The members of the board in making their selections are governed by two main factors specified in the oath:
- The efficiency of the naval service.
- The fitness of the officers concerned.
Officers are prone to criticize the boards for not having selected the most fit from all those eligible. No consideration is given as to whether or not such procedure would be best for the efficiency of the naval service.
It is believed that the selection boards have (as a rule) struck a reasonable balance between the two main factors, and that they have acted wisely in their policy of (until recently in the captains’ grade) selecting only from the tops of the lists, and thereby eliminating only a few. The reasons for this belief are:
The great expansion in personnel has resulted in officers in all the upper grades being abnormally young. The senior captains only last year reached the ages contemplated by the law, and the senior commanders and lieutenant commanders are still considerably below those ages. Consequently, there has been a growing hump in the grade of rear admiral which is now working a hardship on those captains who happen to be at the top of the list. To have extended further down and picked up still younger captains would have augmented this hump, much to the detriment of the efficiency of the service. But now that the captains at the top of the list are at the age (length of service) contemplated, the board has commenced to reach down. And there is no doubt that this procedure will be followed with respect to the commanders and lieutenant commanders just as soon as the officers at the tops of those grades reach the limit of service prescribed by the law, thereby necessitating considerable elimination each year.
In other words the selection boards have followed and will undoubtedly continue to follow a course that might be likened to the law of supply and demand. That is; when no eliminations are necessary there will be very little selection; the more eliminations that must be made the more drastic will be the selection. This policy is best for the efficiency of the naval service, because, when there are sufficient vacancies in a grade to accommodate the natural supply from the next lower rank, there is no logical reason for eliminating good officers simply because they may not be quite so good as some others. Where all officers in the upper grades have reasonably good records, the necessity for rigid selection arises only when the supply in a grade is greater than the number of vacancies in the next higher one, and the excess must be eliminated in order that the proper rate of promotion can be maintained.
There is considerable service opinion that some officers have been selected for promotion who have not made as good rear admirals, captains, or commanders as some of the officers who have been passed over would have made. They hold that the selection boards have made mistakes. There is no doubt about this. To err is human. Therefore, so long as the selection of officers for advancement is left in human hands there will be mistakes. But we certainly must hold that such errors as may have occurred have been honestly made. There can be no good reason for officers doubting the integrity of the personnel composing the selection boards. If we must have selection (and I believe we must) there is no fairer way to do it than to leave it in the hands of our own officers.
There are some who advocate the return to promotion by straight seniority. Do we want this? And have those who advocate this procedure taken heed of what happened to the service when this form of promotion was in effect? Do they realize that all of the evils then attendant will return?
A study of what would happen to the line of the Navy, should we adopt promotion by straight seniority, shows that in fifteen years from now:
- The average age of the ten junior rear admirals will be sixty-one.
- The average age of the ten junior captains will be fifty-six.
- The average age of the ten junior commanders will be forty-nine.
- Only those can serve long enough in the rear admiral grade to hoist their flag who happen to be the very youngest in their respective Naval Academy classes. And this irrespective of their relative efficiency with their contemporaries.
Do we want to go back to the situation where the senior lieutenant commanders are older than the officers now half way up the captains’ list? The answer is, obviously, No. An efficient naval service cannot possibly be maintained under those conditions. Promotion by seniority gave way to promotion by selection because the conditions under the former system were manifestly unsatisfactory, and detrimental to efficiency.
Some hold that the psychological factor of security is so important that it makes promotion by seniority more desirable than other forms. Can we subscribe to belief in the deleterious effects of some of these psychological factors on the commissioned officer personnel? If so, the feeling of security will promote indolence and mediocrity. From the evidence of books and lectures on psychology, the impression must be drawn that the so-called psychological factors employed in discussions on the effects of promotion by selection on the commissioned officers are not the real elements involved, but are only the type that bear considerable weight when dealing with children and the more or less weak-minded. They are mostly bunk insofar as they adversely affect real he-men such as the large majority of the commissioned officer personnel of the Navy.
Can we then believe that promotion by selection has lessened our efficiency or that it will weaken it if continued? Association with, and knowledge of, many naval officers must convince the unprejudiced that the Navy today, after eleven years of promotion by selection up, is more efficient than ever before. There has been no evidence apparent to the writer of that yellow streak which is implied by those who fear we will become addicted to the evil influence of misapplied psychological factors. As a class naval officers are above such degradation. To feel otherwise can be nothing other than a reflection both on the personnel composing our selection boards and on the personnel they have selected as being best fit for promotion.
The efficiency of the naval service is assured so long as we stick to promotion by selection, regulated by suitable laws.
The defects in our present statutes were not recognized at the time of their enactment, but have come to light with the passage of years. The chief of these are:
- Incorrect distribution of officers in the various grades.
- Incorrect ages (now changed temporarily to length of service) at which retirements are forced.
- No eliminations in the lower grades.
- Partial immunity given to certain officers, non-graduates of the Naval Academy, from the age in grade elimination features.
These defects if allowed to go uncorrected will, in a short time, produce a situation where:
- The senior commanders on the list will average forty-nine years of age. The senior lieutenant commanders forty-four years; and the senior lieutenants thirty-nine years.
- There will be abnormally large numbers of forced retirements of captains, commanders, and lieutenant commanders. These will be irregular from year to year and not properly distributed in the various grades.
- Officers will serve as commanders and captains for only five years each, as lieutenant commanders for less than five years, and in the three lower grades (excepting ensign which is fixed at three years) for abnormally long periods.
- The hump formed after the war by the commissioning of the large number of non-graduates of the Academy will be carried on indefinitely owing to the partial immunity of those in it from the age-in-grade retirement provisions, and will block all of certain naval academy classes from reaching the grade of commander.
- The inequalities in the numbers of promotions and eliminations in the different years due to the humps and to the irregularity in sizes of the Naval Academy classes will result in grave injustices to many officers, solely on account of their position on the navy list.
Most of these defects adversely affect the entire officer personnel. However, strange as it may seem, they were not the reason for the demand for remedial action. This demand was made, and a hearing forced, by the relatively older officers who felt that the age-in-grade retirement proviso of the present law denies to them a fair chance for promotion. Be that as it may, it is not the intention here to go into the relative merits of age-in-grade retirement vs. length-of-service retirement. It can fairly be said that no one can justly blame the older officers for desiring to better their chances of promotion. We can and should be thankful to them for forcing the issue, as their persistency brought out the necessity for the urgent changes in the law which finally resulted in the draft of the Britten Bill. This was drawn up by a board composed of Rear Admiral E. H. Campbell, Judge Advocate General of the Navy; Captain R. C. Smith, retired, a recognized expert on naval personnel, and Commander J. S. McCain, who for a number of years had been the officer in the Bureau of Navigation most intimately connected with personnel legislation.
This board took extensive hearings, having before it many officers of all ranks. They made an exhaustive study of the entire situation, especially with respect to the effects of different suggestions on the naval service and on the individuals who compose the line of the Navy. What is more, and so far as known for the first time it has ever been done, the board made a scientific mathematical study of the outcome of the suggested provisions—not only for today, but for many years to come. Of course there were some compromises owing to influences over which the naval personnel has no control; but, in spite of these compromises, the finished product is a bill far in advance of any heretofore produced, and one which, if enacted into law, will be of such inestimable value towards increasing the efficiency of the navy that it deserves the support of the entire service.
It is not held that the bill is perfect. There are a few minor points which any individual who makes an exhaustive, detailed study of the bill might like to have a little different.
Having thus endorsed this proposed bill, it would seem well briefly to discuss just what it does, and wherein it is better than the present law.
1. It redistributes the personnel in the various grades by increasing the percentage of commanders from seven to eight, and that of lieutenant commanders from fourteen to fifteen. These percentages are more in keeping with the actual needs of the service. It can readily be seen that the increase in numbers brought about will improve the flow of promotion into those grades and reduce somewhat the number of eliminations of lieutenant commanders. It might even be better to increase the percentage of lieutenant commanders to sixteen or seventeen, as being still more in accord with actual service needs.
2. It redistributes the time officers will serve in each grade by changing from age- in-grade retirement to length-of-service retirement and providing that officers shall be retired in the various grades if not promoted prior to the completion of a definite number of years’ service after graduation from the Naval Academy, as follows: captain, thirty- five years; commander, twenty-eight years; lieutenant commander, twenty-one years; lieutenant, fourteen years; lieutenant (j.g.), seven years. It thus insures officers who remain in the service a definite rate of promotion and equalizes to seven years the length of service to be spent in each grade.* This is a vast improvement over the provisions of the present law, which if continued in effect a few years longer will produce great inequalities in this respect.
* Ensign and lieutenant (j.g.) considered as one grade.
There is one suggestion as to how it is believed this section might be changed to the advantage of the service. It is to reduce the combined time in the ensign and lieutenant (j.g.) grades from seven to six years, and to increase the time in the captains’ grade from seven to eight years, leaving it seven years in all other grades. There are a number of reasons why this seems desirable:
- It is held that an officer should be a lieutenant six years after graduation from the Naval Academy.
- The average age on reaching the various grades (excepting rear admiral) would be reduced by one year—a very desirable consideration.
- The percentage of captains which must be eliminated each year is far in excess of the percentage in any other grade, thereby imposing a decided hardship on those who eventually reach this rank. By increasing the time in grade from seven to eight years this percentage of eliminations is somewhat reduced.
- It provides for selection and elimination in the lower grades. At present promotion to lieutenant (j.g.), lieutenant, and lieutenant commander is made by seniority. There is no way to get rid of the dead wood excepting by failure on examinations. And we all know that many comparatively inefficient officers can pass perfectly good examinations. As a result of the neglect of the present law to provide for eliminations in tire lower grades, we find, on looking ahead, that unless a change is made it will be necessary, within a few years, to eliminate approximately sixty lieutenant commanders annually. This, of course, is an absurd situation. It will be much better both for the service and for the individuals concerned to make many of these eliminations earlier —while those who must go are younger. The new bill will bring this about.
It is felt, however, that in these lower grades selection out is better than selection up. We will dispose of the excess either way. But in overhauling these younger officers the process may be likened to the picking over of a barrel of apples. At first it is extremely difficult to sort out the best apples in the barrel, but it is quite easy to pick out the few that are spotted. So with the younger officers. They will not have had enough service for the selection boards to pick out the best. But the least desirable will be easily discerned. In fact, the selection up process for these younger officers will only result in eliminations at the tops of the lists, while an advantage of selection out in these lower grades is that when an officer proves himself undesirable or inefficient he can be eliminated immediately and not left for several years, maybe, until he reaches the top of the list.
- It smooths out the inequalities of promotions and eliminations, which humps and irregularities in the sizes of Naval Academy classes now produce. Under the present law we are approaching a condition where many officers are placed at great disadvantage solely on account of the size of their Naval Academy class or on account of their relative position on the list with respect to larger or smaller classes. This situation cannot be entirely remedied. But the new bill does this as far as possible by: (a) Guaranteeing to all grades a minimum amount of promotion every year; (b) Fixing in all grades a maximum amount of elimination that can take place each year.
These provisions are most important, .and secure the gradual elimination of all humps with the least possible violence to the individuals involved, and the least disruption to the service in general. As an example as to how this will work, the class of 1907 is cited. This abnormally large class is a decided hump. Under the present law not only are its members placed at a great disadvantage, but the classes next following are adversely affected. The provisions of the new law prevent an unduly large number of this class from being eliminated in any one year, and, while it throws a certain number back on the next class, still it guarantees to this next class a reasonable amount of promotion. All the humps will be treated likewise.
- It withdraws the special privileges now allowed certain non-graduates of the Naval Academy and places them, insofar as promotion and elimination are concerned, in the same status as the members of the Naval Academy class next following them on the list.
The large number of officers who were commissioned as an aftermath of the war, have been a source of much righteous worry to the officers following them, especially as certain of the officers forming the hump are by present law exempt for long periods from the provisions of age-in-grade retirement. The officers composing these two groups have much on their side, and both must be fairly looked out for as far as practicable. The new bill provides for this contingency in the best possible manner. Those officers composing the hump can feel that, if eliminated, the bill provides a fair compensation; those officers behind them can rest assured that there will be sufficient elimination to insure to them a fair chance for promotion.
- It provides suitable compensation for those officers who are eliminated. Some of the younger officers, in fact, a good many, seem to be opposed to the new bill owing to the elimination features in the lower grades. It is believed they labor under a misapprehension as to how these provisions will work out. They fail to realize that under the present law they will be junior lieutenants from seven to eight years, while the new bill fixes the period in this grade at four years; and that in order to do this there must be some elimination to prevent humps. The Britten Bill is a boon to the efficient younger officers as it insures to them a steady rate of promotion, without being held up by the dead wood of all grades, as would be the case if straight seniority were followed, and as is the case now in the lower grades (up to commander) under the present law.
The inefficient, or those who are not sure of themselves, may prefer straight seniority, but those who consider only the development of the most efficient officer personnel for the Navy, must surely see that promotion by selection is the only method by which this can be accomplished. However, there will not be as many eliminations in these grades as they imagine. It is also quite probable that those who will be eliminated as lieutenants or lieutenants (j.g.) would, under the present law, certainly be eliminated on reaching the top of the lieutenant commanders’ grade. Is it not better for such officers to sever their relations while still young rather than hold on a few years longer? This would seem especially desirable under the new bill which provides for adequate compensation of those who are eliminated.
- It guarantees to the government suitable return from those eliminated while young to compensate for the expense and time involved in their education, and the retirement pay which they will receive for many years. This is done by requiring officers who may be eliminated in the lower grades to be transferred to the naval reserves for a few years where they will be subject to call to active duty in case of war or national emergency. This is an important provision as it bolsters up our weak (in numbers) naval reserve and at the same time provides these officers with funds which should enable them to get a solid foothold in civil life.
A study of these compensation features convinces one that they are liberal and just. In fact they may appear too liberal for the Congress to accede to. However, it can be shown that even so it is cheaper for the government in the long run than will eventually be the case under the present law.
Before any officer actively opposes the passage of the Britten Bill it is recommended that he first make sure of the ground on which he stands. Let him get someone who has studied the relative merits of this bill and the present law to explain to him the differences in the workings of the two. Let him get some unprejudiced officer who experienced the evils of promotion by seniority to tell him about it. If this procedure is followed, it will be apparent to him that if the Britten Bill becomes a statute, the efficiency of the service will be enhanced far beyond what is possible under the present law, and more so than can occur under any other bill that may have been suggested.
The answer to the question, “Is enactment of the Britten Bill desirable?” is YES.