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FROM BISMARCK TO THE WORLD WAR—A History of German Foreign Policy 1870-1914.
By Erich Brandenburg, Professor of Modern History in the University of Leipzig. Translated by Annie Elizabeth Adams, Oxford University Press, New York, 1927. $7.00.
Reviewed by Rear Admiral W. L. Rodgers, U. S. Navy (Retired)
During the war, our prejudices and emotions were strongly developed by the propaganda for that purpose directed by the various belligerents. We should now be willing to modify the beliefs we then held, if we wish to have a true perspective of events. Abundant material is now available for writing history, as distinguished from propaganda. In all countries, prominent statesmen and soldiers have offered their apologies and, although all wish to speak well of themselves, even if sometimes at the expense of their colleagues, yet by comparing accounts, errors can be eliminated and we draw near the truth. But we have even more valuable sources available although yet incomplete. The two great countries swept by revolution—Germany and Russia, where the present governments arc without sympathy or relations with their predecessors— these have thrown open their archives. Unfortunately, the victor nations have been slow to imitate this example, for their governments today are composed of many of the same men who were in power before the war, and doubtless on many points complete frankness would embarrass some now in the national administration, as well as their friends in opposition who may succeed them at any time. In spite of this reluctance of the rulers of the victor nations, the revelations of the German and Russian archives necessarily throw much light on the policies and conduct of the other powers in the days preceding the war.
Mr. Brandenburg has availed himself of all these varied sources in an effort to explain how Germany was led to declare war against Russia on August 1, 1914. He has mastered the archives and the memoirs concerned; he knows what he wishes to say and he says it clearly, although the plan of his work involves some repetition of incidents which appear as principal in one chapter and as secondary in another. But the story which he develops with much plausibility, and with evident good faith, is that Germany never wanted war from Bismarck’s time until 1914, but that, nevertheless, she brought it on by her diplomatic blunders; and even in the last week before the war, when she was alarmed at its approach, she blundered in allowing other nations to force her hand when she earnestly desired peace and might have maintained it by wiser action. As he tells the story, it is a tragedy of blunders and not of malevolence, and is well worthy of reading as a corrective to some of our own prejudices, even if we do not accept his views in their entirety.
The book is learned, instructive and deeply interesting, giving a point of view far from the accepted one of the Allies and associates.
The writer begins with a brief sketch of the position of the great powers in 1871, at the close of the wars of liberation of the nineteenth century, which created the Kingdom of Italy and the German Empire. Of the six great powers of Europe, three, in the main, were satisfied, wishing for prosperity through peace, namely, Germany, England and Italy. Two were dissatisfied, France and Russia. France wanted to recover Alsace-Lorraine, and Russia wished to expand in the Far East to obtain the freedom of the Bosphorus and to aid the kindred Slavic peoples subject to Turkey. Russia’s internal difficulties rendered her not unwilling to contemplate foreign war as a preventive of domestic revolution. France and England already had secured control of most of the great areas open to colonial expansion, and Italy and Germany soon began to be jealous for openings in this field, but not to such an extent as to contemplate an European war for the purpose.
The sixth great power, the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, was different from all the others in that the two halves were united only by allegiance to the person of the Emperor and King. Moreover, both the Austrians and the Hungarians ruled and oppressed subject Slavic races who had sympathetic kindred in the adjoining countries of Turkey and Russia. In the face of the growth of nineteenth century democracy, Austria-Hungary was decadent. Her rulers felt obliged to be busy to stave off the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy and its further resolution into its component nationalities, which in any case could probably not be deferred beyond the death of the Emperor- King. Slavic Russia looked anxiously for the break-up of Austria.
Discordant Austria-Hungary, fearing for the stability of its Union, and feeling that a disturbance in the Balkans arising on her own initiative might perhaps be less objectionable than one originating otherwise, provided a continuous irritant. Here were the elements of the tragedy of the war. In this general situation, the policy of Bismarck was to make the maintenance of Germany’s leading position in Europe his cardinal point. Although he wished for peace and the quiet economic development of his country, yet, towards the last, he regarded with favor the acquisition of German colonies, but never did he contemplate a war for such gains, nor fail to consider them as wholly secondary to the maintenance of European peace, and of Germany’s position in Europe. All his alliances were made with a view to putting
Germany in such a controlling position that she could forbid a general European war. For he thought that the Empire which he had established by war could not really profit by further war, even if successful.
Then, in 1890, the new young Emperor, jealous of Bismarck’s authority, dismissed him and discarded his policy with him. At this moment Germany was united with Austria-Hungary and Italy in the Triple Alliance for defensive purposes, and also was separately allied with Russia in a so-called “Reinsurance” treaty, the general effect of the two treaties being to restrain both Russia and Austria-Hungary from aggressive action in southeastern Europe. At the same time, the treaties isolated France, and thus secured a predominance to Germany which it was Bismarck’s purpose to utilize in maintaining general European peace. In the winter before his retirement, Bismarck was negotiating with Russia for a renewal of the Reinsurance Treaty and it was on the point of going through when he left office. His departure caused some hesitation to Russia and, finally, the German Foreign Office under its new management made the decisive refusal. Thus, within two months after Bismarck was dropped, no one remaining in office so much as understood his policy for the maintenance of peace and Russia was driven to seek elsewhere for support. Yet the new authorities in Berlin had no aggressive intentions, they simply drifted without far-seeing views, doing each day what the day seemed to require. This was the background of the events leading to the war.
The failure of the Reinsurance Treaty withdrew the buffer between Russia and Austria and to gain support against the British rivalry in Asia, Russia drew nearer to France. Accordingly the military convention between Russia and France was signed in 1892 and at first was undoubtedly merely defensive in purpose to protect Russia against German interference in case of Austro-Russian friction.
England was thus left isolated and in rivalry with Russia in the Far East and with France in Africa. She felt her isolation in the Boer War when Germany was expressing sympathy with the Boers. She therefore tried to draw near Germany, but Germany, although not unwilling, held aloof in order to make her own terms, believing that England could never agree with France and Russia over their disputes as to spheres of influence and the like.
But the unexpected came in 1902 when England and Japan made a treaty for mutual insurance. Next came the Anglo- French Entente in 1904, which settled the differences about Egypt and Morocco. Just at this time the Russo-Japanese friction over the Far East came to war in which Russia was rather encouraged by the Kaiser, who hoped thus to see Russia so occupied in the Far East that she would he unable to dispute with Austria about Turkey and the Balkans. But the defeat of Russia brought this hope to nothing, for Russia (distracted by internal disputes over the Duma) renounced her aggressive purposes in (lie Far East, and decided to rely for prestige on her conduct of affairs in the Near East in the way of developing the national aspirations of her racial kindred in the Balkans. However, the necessity for reorganizing and strengthening her army after the war rendered her fairly impotent against Austria and Germany for seven or eight years after the close of the war.
Germany had been powerful as the head of the Triple Alliance, so long as England and the Dual Alliance stood apart from each other, but as England drew towards France and then France drew her two friends together, Germany lost her position as arbiter. At the same time, Italy approached France. She always hated Austria and besides she wanted Tripoli, and so interfered with Austria’s wish to maintain Turkish integrity for the sake of Balkan peace. Thus the Triple Alliance itself became somewhat loosened.
In this situation, Germany saw no better policy than one of hectoring the other powers at every occasion in the hope of picking up some concession. It was thus she behaved in 1905 and 1906 in Tangier and the Algeciras Conference. She got little, but caused suspicion and strengthened the Anglo-French Entente.
Again in 1911 with the Agadir incident she was perhaps legally correct, but politically she was most unwise. Moreover, she declined the English proposition for a limitation of navies because she thought it best to make England fear her power. Thus she raised further suspicions as to her belligerent intentions when really she did not want war, but expected her opponents to yield because they thought she would fight. During all this period between the Russo-Japanese War and the Great War the Nationalistic Movement among the Slavs of the Balkans was increasing. Russia encouraged it, although not yet ready for war.
In 1908 the totally unexpected Young Turk revolution broke out and Austria was encouraged to annex Bosnia contrary to the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, under which she had administered the province and was its practical ruler. War was avoided with great difficulty. Russia was deeply offended by this act and only her military weakness prevented war. In the end the treaty was modified to cover Austria’s breach. Germany was indignant at her ally’s act but stood by her as “her humiliation is our humiliation.’’ Some of her leading people began to doubt the wisdom of their vigorous and powerful country being tied to a decadent ally whose capricious acts could not be controlled.
About this time, thinks Brandenburg, Germany should have made the great decision to abandon Austria-Hungary and its convulsive efforts to prolong the frail existence of the discordant Dual Monarchy and turned to Russia and England to settle the whole Balkan question at the expense of Austria and Turkey, Germany taking the German provinces of Austria into the German Empire. Thus France, always looking for a good opportunity for a war for Alsace- Lorraine, would have been helpless, and England would have been spared from the present French hegemony on the continent which, as he says, is now more galling to her than any Germany victory could have been.
But German statesmen were not bold enough to break off and turn to a new policy which might have saved Europe.
In August of 1911 Italy took advantage of the situation resulting from Agadir to accomplish her long felt desire to occupy Tripoli. The most serious consequence of this occupation was that the Balkan states were emboldened to attack Turkey in the following year (November) as soon as they could form a union among themselves, and Turkey was overcome. Russia rather encouraged this war although not quite ready to fight herself.
In case of a general war at this time, Russia was sure of French aid against Germany, hut Great Britain was an uncertain element. The key to the situation lay in London, where, if Grey had given any support to his allies, war would have broken out then.
Peace with Turkey was signed in May, 1913, but at once the victors fell out over the spoils, and Bulgaria, Austria’s protégé, was defeated by Serbia, Russia’s protégé. The result of the two wars was most prejudicial for Austrian policy. Germany was alarmed about Austria’s uncertainty of aim and her insistence upon German support, but afraid to break with her only friend. In Russia, the leading statesmen believed in Germany’s peaceful intentions but doubted her ability to restrain her erratic ally.
On June 28, 1914, the murder of the Archduke at Sarajevo afforded Austria the long desired pretext for a settlement with obnoxious Serbia, but she overplayed her hand. At first Austria had general sympathy, but she went too far and Russia was now ready for war and determined not to permit undue punishment for Serbia. Austria was obstinate and Germany regarded it as necessary once more to back Austria because Austria would never forgive desertion. Thus she did, knowing that an Austro-Russian war would become a general one.
But Germany believed Russia was unready and relied on the restraining influence of England as in previous crises.
As events moved on, Germany became seriously alarmed and put strong pressure on Austria, and Austria agreed to negotiate with Russia, but it was too late. The latter was mobilizing, and Germany mobilized too and then declared war (August 1), being simple-minded enough to believe that the world would perceive that she was not the aggressor, but was merely taking military advantage of her quicker mobilization after Russia had decided for war.
France had been in the attitude of observer until war was declared, but when Sazonoff immediately asked Paris to support Russia, Poincare replied that it was better to wait and let Germany commit the first overt act against France and thus gain the support of the French people and the sympathy of the world. Germany declared war on August 3 as Poincare wished. More than any other two personalities, the author holds the Frenchman Poincare and the Russian Iswolsky guilty of having precipitated the war.
For France and Russia to win the war it was necessary to get England on their side, but Germany needed English neutrality. Germany made offers to guarantee French and Belgian independence after the war. But England refused to engage herself to neutrality on these terms.
To have England join, Russia did her best to make it appear in London that the Austrians were the aggressors. It was not likely that the British public would find a casus belli in the Austro-Russian dispute, but the Belgian invasion provided the needed impulse.
It had long been known that the German war plan required a march through Belgium. But the German Foreign Office had made no preparation for the diplomatic justification of this violation of neutrality.
The treaty of neutrality was by no means clear as to the passage of foreign troops. Gladstone had maintained in Parliament that the treaty terms were insufficient as guarantee, and the older French and British plans for entering Belgium in war had been allowed to lapse for the sake of throwing the onus on Germany. Instead of making use of these arguments the German Chancellor in the Reichstag acknowledged a breach of treaty and pleaded necessity.
On the English side it was clear that the Government was in favor of war, but Parliament was doubtful. The speech of Grey was directed to the violation of Belgium, where it was vital to England not to permit Germany to lodge, nor permit her to include that country, Polland and Denmark, in a German sphere of influence. But the guarantees that Germany had offered to Britain as to France and Belgium were unmentioned.
At midnight, August 4-5, England declared war.
Germany’s fatal error was in believing that in this case, as had happened before, Russia would be restrained by a stern display of Austro-German solidarity. For many years German diplomacy had recognized that the General War, if it ever came, would arise from Austro-Russian friction, but neither diplomatic nor economic preparations had been made. Except from a strictly military point of view Germany was unready.
The writer thinks only one explanation is possible, namely, the German leaders did not believe in the probability of a general war.
“Those who meet a great catastrophe thus unprepared,” the author says, “scarcely can have feared it in real earnest, certainly cannot have willed it, manifestly cannot have striven for it.”
Book Reviews
BOOK DEPARTMENT Save money by placing your orders for all books, whether professional or not, with the Institute Book Department, which will supply any obtainable naval, professional or scientific book, and not only save you money but will save the purchaser a great deal of inconvenience by having one source of supply. Address Secretary-Treasurer, U. S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland.
FROM BISMARCK TO THE WORLD WAR—A History of German Foreign Policy 1870-1914.
By Erich Brandenburg, Professor of Modern History in the University of Leipzig. Translated by Annie Elizabeth Adams, Oxford University Press, New York, 1927. $7.00.
Reviewed by Rear Admiral W. L. Rodgers, U. S. Navy (Retired)
During the war, our prejudices and emotions were strongly developed by the propaganda for that purpose directed by the various belligerents. We should now be willing to modify the beliefs we then held, if we wish to have a true perspective of events. Abundant material is now available for writing history, as distinguished from propaganda. In all countries, prominent statesmen and soldiers have offered their apologies and, although all wish to speak well of themselves, even if sometimes at the expense of their colleagues, yet by comparing accounts, errors can be eliminated and we draw near the truth. But we have even more valuable sources available although yet incomplete. The two great countries swept by revolution—Germany and Russia, where the present governments arc without sympathy or relations with their predecessors— these have thrown open their archives. Unfortunately, the victor nations have been slow to imitate this example, for their governments today are composed of many of the same men who were in power before the war, and doubtless on many points complete frankness would embarrass some now in the national administration, as well as their friends in opposition who may succeed them at any time. In spite of this reluctance of the rulers of the victor nations, the revelations of the German and Russian archives necessarily throw much light on the policies and conduct of the other powers in the days preceding the war.
Mr. Brandenburg has availed himself of all these varied sources in an effort to explain how Germany was led to declare war against Russia on August 1, 1914. He has mastered the archives and the memoirs concerned; he knows what he wishes to say and he says it clearly, although the plan of his work involves some repetition of incidents which appear as principal in one chapter and as secondary in another. But the story which he develops with much plausibility, and with evident good faith, is that Germany never wanted war from Bismarck’s time until 1914, but that, nevertheless, she brought it on by her diplomatic blunders; and even in the last week before the war, when she was alarmed at its approach, she blundered in allowing other nations to force her hand when she earnestly desired peace and might have maintained it by wiser action. As he tells the story, it is a tragedy of blunders and not of malevolence, and is well worthy of reading as a corrective to some of our own prejudices, even if we do not accept his views in their entirety.
The book is learned, instructive and deeply interesting, giving a point of view far from the accepted one of the Allies and associates.
The writer begins with a brief sketch of the position of the great powers in 1871, at the close of the wars of liberation of the nineteenth century, which created the Kingdom of Italy and the German Empire. Of the six great powers of Europe, three, in the main, were satisfied, wishing for prosperity through peace, namely, Germany, England and Italy. Two were dissatisfied, France and Russia. France wanted to recover Alsace-Lorraine, and Russia wished to expand in the Far East to obtain the freedom of the Bosphorus and to aid the kindred Slavic peoples subject to Turkey. Russia’s internal difficulties rendered her not unwilling to contemplate foreign war as a preventive of domestic revolution. France and England already had secured control of most of the great areas open to colonial expansion, and Italy and Germany soon began to be jealous for openings in this field, but not to such an extent as to contemplate an European war for the purpose.
The sixth great power, the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, was different from all the others in that the two halves were united only by allegiance to the person of the Emperor and King. Moreover, both the Austrians and the Hungarians ruled and oppressed subject Slavic races who had sympathetic kindred in the adjoining countries of Turkey and Russia. In the face of the growth of nineteenth century democracy, Austria-Hungary was decadent. Her rulers felt obliged to be busy to stave off the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy and its further resolution into its component nationalities, which in any case could probably not be deferred beyond the death of the Emperor- King. Slavic Russia looked anxiously for the break-up of Austria.
Discordant Austria-Hungary, fearing for the stability of its Union, and feeling that a disturbance in the Balkans arising on her own initiative might perhaps be less objectionable than one originating otherwise, provided a continuous irritant. Here were the elements of the tragedy of the war. In this general situation, the policy of Bismarck was to make the maintenance of Germany’s leading position in Europe his cardinal point. Although he wished for peace and the quiet economic development of his country, yet, towards the last, he regarded with favor the acquisition of German colonies, but never did he contemplate a war for such gains, nor fail to consider them as wholly secondary to the maintenance of European peace, and of Germany’s position in Europe. All his alliances were made with a view to putting
Germany in such a controlling position that she could forbid a general European war. For he thought that the Empire which he had established by war could not really profit by further war, even if successful.
Then, in 1890, the new young Emperor, jealous of Bismarck’s authority, dismissed him and discarded his policy with him. At this moment Germany was united with Austria-Hungary and Italy in the Triple Alliance for defensive purposes, and also was separately allied with Russia in a so-called “Reinsurance” treaty, the general effect of the two treaties being to restrain both Russia and Austria-Hungary from aggressive action in southeastern Europe. At the same time, the treaties isolated France, and thus secured a predominance to Germany which it was Bismarck’s purpose to utilize in maintaining general European peace. In the winter before his retirement, Bismarck was negotiating with Russia for a renewal of the Reinsurance Treaty and it was on the point of going through when he left office. His departure caused some hesitation to Russia and, finally, the German Foreign Office under its new management made the decisive refusal. Thus, within two months after Bismarck was dropped, no one remaining in office so much as understood his policy for the maintenance of peace and Russia was driven to seek elsewhere for support. Yet the new authorities in Berlin had no aggressive intentions, they simply drifted without far-seeing views, doing each day what the day seemed to require. This was the background of the events leading to the war.
The failure of the Reinsurance Treaty withdrew the buffer between Russia and Austria and to gain support against the British rivalry in Asia, Russia drew nearer to France. Accordingly the military convention between Russia and France was signed in 1892 and at first was undoubtedly merely defensive in purpose to protect Russia against German interference in case of Austro-Russian friction.
England was thus left isolated and in rivalry with Russia in the Far East and with France in Africa. She felt her isolation in the Boer War when Germany was expressing sympathy with the Boers. She therefore tried to draw near Germany, but Germany, although not unwilling, held aloof in order to make her own terms, believing that England could never agree with France and Russia over their disputes as to spheres of influence and the like.
But the unexpected came in 1902 when England and Japan made a treaty for mutual insurance. Next came the Anglo- French Entente in 1904, which settled the differences about Egypt and Morocco. Just at this time the Russo-Japanese friction over the Far East came to war in which Russia was rather encouraged by the Kaiser, who hoped thus to see Russia so occupied in the Far East that she would he unable to dispute with Austria about Turkey and the Balkans. But the defeat of Russia brought this hope to nothing, for Russia (distracted by internal disputes over the Duma) renounced her aggressive purposes in (lie Far East, and decided to rely for prestige on her conduct of affairs in the Near East in the way of developing the national aspirations of her racial kindred in the Balkans. However, the necessity for reorganizing and strengthening her army after the war rendered her fairly impotent against Austria and Germany for seven or eight years after the close of the war.
Germany had been powerful as the head of the Triple Alliance, so long as England and the Dual Alliance stood apart from each other, but as England drew towards France and then France drew her two friends together, Germany lost her position as arbiter. At the same time, Italy approached France. She always hated Austria and besides she wanted Tripoli, and so interfered with Austria’s wish to maintain Turkish integrity for the sake of Balkan peace. Thus the Triple Alliance itself became somewhat loosened.
In this situation, Germany saw no better policy than one of hectoring the other powers at every occasion in the hope of picking up some concession. It was thus she behaved in 1905 and 1906 in Tangier and the Algeciras Conference. She got little, but caused suspicion and strengthened the Anglo-French Entente.
Again in 1911 with the Agadir incident she was perhaps legally correct, but politically she was most unwise. Moreover, she declined the English proposition for a limitation of navies because she thought it best to make England fear her power. Thus she raised further suspicions as to her belligerent intentions when really she did not want war, but expected her opponents to yield because they thought she would fight. During all this period between the Russo-Japanese War and the Great War the Nationalistic Movement among the Slavs of the Balkans was increasing. Russia encouraged it, although not yet ready for war.
In 1908 the totally unexpected Young Turk revolution broke out and Austria was encouraged to annex Bosnia contrary to the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, under which she had administered the province and was its practical ruler. War was avoided with great difficulty. Russia was deeply offended by this act and only her military weakness prevented war. In the end the treaty was modified to cover Austria’s breach. Germany was indignant at her ally’s act but stood by her as “her humiliation is our humiliation.’’ Some of her leading people began to doubt the wisdom of their vigorous and powerful country being tied to a decadent ally whose capricious acts could not be controlled.
About this time, thinks Brandenburg, Germany should have made the great decision to abandon Austria-Hungary and its convulsive efforts to prolong the frail existence of the discordant Dual Monarchy and turned to Russia and England to settle the whole Balkan question at the expense of Austria and Turkey, Germany taking the German provinces of Austria into the German Empire. Thus France, always looking for a good opportunity for a war for Alsace- Lorraine, would have been helpless, and England would have been spared from the present French hegemony on the continent which, as he says, is now more galling to her than any Germany victory could have been.
But German statesmen were not bold enough to break off and turn to a new policy which might have saved Europe.
In August of 1911 Italy took advantage of the situation resulting from Agadir to accomplish her long felt desire to occupy Tripoli. The most serious consequence of this occupation was that the Balkan states were emboldened to attack Turkey in the following year (November) as soon as they could form a union among themselves, and Turkey was overcome. Russia rather encouraged this war although not quite ready to fight herself.
In case of a general war at this time, Russia was sure of French aid against Germany, hut Great Britain was an uncertain element. The key to the situation lay in London, where, if Grey had given any support to his allies, war would have broken out then.
Peace with Turkey was signed in May, 1913, but at once the victors fell out over the spoils, and Bulgaria, Austria’s protégé, was defeated by Serbia, Russia’s protégé. The result of the two wars was most prejudicial for Austrian policy. Germany was alarmed about Austria’s uncertainty of aim and her insistence upon German support, but afraid to break with her only friend. In Russia, the leading statesmen believed in Germany’s peaceful intentions but doubted her ability to restrain her erratic ally.
On June 28, 1914, the murder of the Archduke at Sarajevo afforded Austria the long desired pretext for a settlement with obnoxious Serbia, but she overplayed her hand. At first Austria had general sympathy, but she went too far and Russia was now ready for war and determined not to permit undue punishment for Serbia. Austria was obstinate and Germany regarded it as necessary once more to back Austria because Austria would never forgive desertion. Thus she did, knowing that an Austro-Russian war would become a general one.
But Germany believed Russia was unready and relied on the restraining influence of England as in previous crises.
As events moved on, Germany became seriously alarmed and put strong pressure on Austria, and Austria agreed to negotiate with Russia, but it was too late. The latter was mobilizing, and Germany mobilized too and then declared war (August 1), being simple-minded enough to believe that the world would perceive that she was not the aggressor, but was merely taking military advantage of her quicker mobilization after Russia had decided for war.
France had been in the attitude of observer until war was declared, but when Sazonoff immediately asked Paris to support Russia, Poincare replied that it was better to wait and let Germany commit the first overt act against France and thus gain the support of the French people and the sympathy of the world. Germany declared war on August 3 as Poincare wished. More than any other two personalities, the author holds the Frenchman Poincare and the Russian Iswolsky guilty of having precipitated the war.
For France and Russia to win the war it was necessary to get England on their side, but Germany needed English neutrality. Germany made offers to guarantee French and Belgian independence after the war. But England refused to engage herself to neutrality on these terms.
To have England join, Russia did her best to make it appear in London that the Austrians were the aggressors. It was not likely that the British public would find a casus belli in the Austro-Russian dispute, but the Belgian invasion provided the needed impulse.
It had long been known that the German war plan required a march through Belgium. But the German Foreign Office had made no preparation for the diplomatic justification of this violation of neutrality.
The treaty of neutrality was by no means clear as to the passage of foreign troops. Gladstone had maintained in Parliament that the treaty terms were insufficient as guarantee, and the older French and British plans for entering Belgium in war had been allowed to lapse for the sake of throwing the onus on Germany. Instead of making use of these arguments the German Chancellor in the Reichstag acknowledged a breach of treaty and pleaded necessity.
On the English side it was clear that the Government was in favor of war, but Parliament was doubtful. The speech of Grey was directed to the violation of Belgium, where it was vital to England not to permit Germany to lodge, nor permit her to include that country, Polland and Denmark, in a German sphere of influence. But the guarantees that Germany had offered to Britain as to France and Belgium were unmentioned.
At midnight, August 4-5, England declared war.
Germany’s fatal error was in believing that in this case, as had happened before, Russia would be restrained by a stern display of Austro-German solidarity. For many years German diplomacy had recognized that the General War, if it ever came, would arise from Austro-Russian friction, but neither diplomatic nor economic preparations had been made. Except from a strictly military point of view Germany was unready.
The writer thinks only one explanation is possible, namely, the German leaders did not believe in the probability of a general war.
“Those who meet a great catastrophe thus unprepared,” the author says, “scarcely can have feared it in real earnest, certainly cannot have willed it, manifestly cannot have striven for it.”