During the late summer and the fall of 1918 the attention of the United States was more or less concentrated on the progress of events on the western front. Yet during the month of September when the Allied forces in France were commencing the last great offensive in that theater of war, the Egyptian Expeditionary Force under Allenby was achieving a victory over the Turkish arms which had a stupendous influence on the war as a whole, and the importance of which may not be fully realized. By the crushing blows which were dealt the Turkish Army the submission, not only of Turkey, but also of Bulgaria and Austria was hastened, and Germany was left alone to face the ever increasing Allied pressure in Europe.
In any case, the last six weeks of the campaign in Palestine and Syria, while perhaps lacking the sentimental appeal of the operation leading up to the taking of Jerusalem in the previous December, are worthy of the closest study from the military point of view because of the superb cooperation manifested between the component parts of the force including the Palestine brigade of the Royal Air Force. By his employment of his splendid force of cavalry, the desert mounted corps, Allenby taught the world that, despite its relative unimportance in France, the mounted arm was still a potent factor in war. The campaign also showed that, instead of the air force replacing cavalry, it in fact had enhanced rather than decreased the value of a highly mobile mounted force.
Colonel A. P. Wavell, formerly brigadier general of the General Staff, with the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, in discussing the campaign and its lessons, states:
These campaigns of the Egyptian Expeditionary force are of great strategical interest. For the military student they will always remain classic examples of the use of mounted troops and of the value of mobility. Conditions of war change, and it may be that some mechanical form of transport will entirely replace the horse as the means by which mobility can be secured. But the power of mobility as a strategical weapon, in the hands of a commander who has the knowledge and the determination to use it as did General Allenby, will only be enhanced. A second strategical lesson is the advantage gained by a commander who can conceal his intentions from his opponent.
During the last few years the phrases “control of the air” and “air supremacy” have been used many times, but it is doubtful if there has existed in any campaign a more striking example of veritable control of the air than was furnished by the situation in Palestine in September, 1918. The air supremacy at that time achieved by the Palestine brigade, R.A.F., under Brigadier General A. E. Borton was so complete as to render the enemy air service practically useless while the British command at all times realized to a remarkable degree the advantages of an effective aerial information service, of absolute security against enemy reconnaissance, and of the free use of an offensive arm of splendid efficiency. In the words of the Official History of Australia in the War,
The airmen, daily growing bolder as their supremacy became clear, by August completely dominated the German pilots, ranged incessantly over the enemy’s territory, and by their aggressive and thorough system of defensive patrols kept the British lines and rear almost entirely free from aerial observation.
After the capture of Nazareth the war diary of the German air detachment was found, and in it one reads a record of failure and defeat in phrases such as: “Owing to the extraordinary lack of pilots, limited flying only can be carried out, in spite of the arrival of twenty new D.F.W.’s,” and in references to a scarcity of pilots “owing to sickness and other causes.” The “other causes” were the bullets and bombs of the British aviators who had been forcing the fighting and decimating the German formations by continuous, vigorous offensive tactics.
Schuz, who commanded one of the German squadrons in Palestine, mentions some
of the logistic difficulties experienced by the German air units in maintaining themselves far from an adequate base and in endeavoring to carry on with a minimum amount of aviation material. He says:1
1The German Air Force in the Great War, Neumann.
Tie forces at our disposal had been decimated by a terrible famine, brought on by Turkish indolence and the hitter feeling among the population of the country, who were no longer cultivating their fields, owing to the vigorous system of requisitions. Numbers of horses, camels, mules, and donkeys were lost, and the result was a catastrophic disorganization of our transport system. It was in vain that the German airmen fought with the courage of despair; it was in vain that they used to fly across the lines in the face of eight or ten times as many hostile machines, for which, day and night, petrol and other necessaries were being provided, as well as for their mechanical transport.
At the very last moment our squadron broke away from the enemy, and, since their retreat to Aleppo was cut off, arrived after infinite trouble by way of Mardin, Malatia, Sivas, and Amasia at Samsun on the Black Sea.
At the beginning of the offensive of September 19, 1918, variously referred to as the Battle of Sharon, of Nablus, or of Armageddon, Allenby held a position running from the Mediterranean coast north of Jaffa easterly through the Judean hills south of Nablus to the River Jordan, and south to the Dead Sea, including bridge-heads east of the Jordan at Ghoraniyeh and Aujah. His forces included approximately eight divisions of infantry and four of cavalry. comprising 12,000 sabers, 57,000 rifles and 540 guns. Opposed to him were ten Turkish divisions, some 1,200 cavalry, and six German battalions; the whole estimated at about 4,000 sabers, 32,000 rifles, and 400 guns. The exact Turkish strength is difficult to determine since in spite of Allenby’s estimate given above, and General Liman Von Sanders’ figure which is smaller, 75,000 prisoners were taken in the subsequent British advance.
The British air strength was as follows:
Fifth Wing—(Assigned to Corps Command)—
No. 144 Squadron, RAF, RE-8, Corps, reconnaissance planes.
No. 113 Squadron, RAF. RE-8, Corps reconnaissance planes.
No. 142 Squadron, RAF. RE-8, Corps reconnaissance planes.
Fortieth Wing (Operating directly under GHQ)— No. 111 Squadron, RAF. SE-5 Single-seater fighters.
No. 144 Squadron, RAF. DH-p Light Bombers.
No. 145 Squadron, RAF. SE-5 Single-seater fighters.
No. 1 Squadron, AFC. Bristol Fighters (Biplane), One Handley Page heavy bomber.
Balloon Company.
The German air strength comprised Nos. 301, 302, 303, and 304 Squadrons of the German Flying Corps equipped with D.F.W.’s, Albatross and Pfalz single-seaters, and A.E.G. two-seaters.
The British plan of battle was to secretly concentrate a striking force of some five infantry and three cavalry divisions in the coastal plain of Sharon, break through the strong Turkish defenses in that sector, and then move the Mounted Corps through the gap cleared by the infantry to operate against the Turkish rear and communications and cut off the enemy lines of retreat to the northward. It is evident that the success of this plan depended on secrecy during the period of concentration. This secrecy was to be achieved by camouflage, by moving troops at night, and by the maintenance of security from enemy reconnaissance by a continued offensive in the air.
In Lord Allenby’s dispatch of October 31, he stated:
The chief factor in the secrecy maintained must be attributed however to the supremacy of the air which had been attained by the Royal Air Force. The process of wearing down the enemy’s aircraft had been going on all through the summer. During one week in June 100 hostile aeroplanes had crossed our lines. During the last week in August this number had decreased to eighteen. In the next few days a number were shot down, with the result that only four ventured to cross our lines during the period of concentration.
During the summer the British patrols were maintained and a most determined offensive carried out against the German air units both in the air and at their airdromes. In addition, four hundred square miles of country were mapped for the coming offensive. The last determined effort of the enemy at offensive reconnaissance was on August 24, when a German patrol of two LVG two-seaters and six Pfalz single-seater scouts crossed the British lines near the coast. It was attacked by an Australian flight of Bristol fighters and was beaten off after four German machines had been shot down. Only one of the German airplanes was able to reach its airdrome after the fight. From that time on German attempts at reconnaissance of the areas behind the British lines were limited to single machines at high altitudes except the one case of two LVG’s which were shot down in company on August 31. During the first two weeks in September the British airplanes made the most of their opportunities for attacking men, animals, and material on the ground and yet, so consistent and sustained had been their harassing activity, the imminence of the coming offensive was in no way disclosed. During the eight weeks preceding September 19, the Australian squadron alone shot down fifteen enemy airplanes.
The detailed plan of air operations for the coming battle allotted tasks as follows:2
2 Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18.
Squadrons of corps wing to operate with corps to which assigned and bomb objectives immediately behind the enemy lines.
Nos. 111 and 145 squadrons (single- seater fighters) to maintain continuous patrol over the Jenin airdrome all day, prevent any attempted enemy air action from that quarter, and to attack with guns and bombs all targets in the vicinity.
No. 144 squadron (day bombardment) to maintain bombardment of El Afule railway station and Turkish headquarters at Nablus.
No. 1 squadron (two-seater fighters) strategical reconnaissance and bombardment.
By sundown on the eighteenth all preparations had been completed. The divisions detailed for the attack, the 60th, 7th, 75th, 3d, 54th, and the French contingent, were in place, while the 4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions and the Australian mounted division were concealed in the orange and olive groves north and east of Jaffa.3 The British airplanes were in readiness at their respective airdromes. The Turkish command was still in ignorance of the concentration which had been effected.
3 Official Record, Egyptian Expeditionary Force.
At 1:00 a.m. September 19, the Battle of Sharon was opened by the departure of the Handley Page bomber from the Ramleh airdrome on the first bombardment mission. It placed sixteen 112-pound bombs on the objectives at El Afule and later in the night thirty-two 112-pound bombs were dropped on the Turkish Army Headquarters at Nablus and Tul Keram. The effectiveness of these raids is shown by the fact that when the British cavalry reached El Afule, which was the center through which all communications from the Turkish GPIQ at Nazareth ran south, it found that the bombardment had wrecked practically every wire and had almost completely isolated Nazareth from the front. The broken ends of most of the important wires were found in one or two bomb craters. Two hits were made on the communication center at Tul Keram and the building which contained the signal headquarters at Nablus was blown to pieces. As a result of this early action the Turkish Fourth Army in the Jordan Valley was at noon on the twentieth left still in ignorance of the disaster which had befallen the right flank nearer the coast. The GPIQ at Nazareth was, of course, immune from bombardment, but its isolation was equally effective. Throughout the forenoon the same objectives were bombed at intervals by the DH-9s of No. 144 squadron.
At daylight the first patrol of two SE-5 single-seater fighters equipped with fragmentation bombs arrived over the Jenin airdrome for the purpose of destroying or keeping out of action the eight single-seaters and three two-seaters of the German air squadron at that place. From dawn until dusk this patrol was maintained and it was most effective. The German pilots remained in their dugouts, any movement toward the hangars being met by a bomb and a burst of machine gun fire. At the end of each hour and a half relieving machines appeared and the retiring patrol dove down, emptied its bomb racks and magazines into the hangars and dealt out general destruction.
The initial infantry attack was a complete success. By noon on the nineteenth the Turkish resistance in the coastal area was broken and under the combined pressure from the infantry attack, the gunfire from the artillery assisted by the guns of the Druid and Forester, and the advance of the cavalry, the Eighth Turkish Army was soon in full retreat toward Tul Keram. That night the British center commenced its slow advance through the rugged and difficult country which was strongly held by the Turkish Seventh Army.
Tie Fifth British cavalry division crossed the Plain of Esdraelon, reached Nazareth and captured the headquarters and part of the staff of General von Sanders, together with 2,000 prisoners at 5:30 p.m. on the twentieth but Von Sanders personally was able to make his escape. By 4:30 a.m. of the same day, the cavalry were in possession of Beisan, Jenin, and El Afule, and the escape of the Turkish Seventh and Eighth Armies had been shut off by all routes except the road from Nablus southeast to the Jordan at Damieth.
In the meantime, the Bristol fighters of me Australian (No. 1) squadron, in addition to their reconnaissance duties, used their guns and bombs on the targets available and acted as escorts to the bombardment operations of the De Havilands of No. 144 squadron. A patrol of three Bristols found the road to Tul Keram crowded with retreating Turks, including 2,000 horsemen, 5,000 infantry, and some 600 pieces of transport. They dove down and loosed into this mass some 2,000 rounds of gunfire and emptied their bomb racks. On their return organized bombardment of the Tul Keram mad was commenced, the first attack being delivered at 11140 a.m. by a formation of five airplanes and the second at 12:30 p.m. A third attack by six airplanes was delivered to the west of Tul Keram where the routed enemy pressed into the road to Nablus in a confused mass. This road leads through a narrow defile and formed a trap in which terrific destruction fell upon the retreating column, while individuals who escaped into the hills on either side were soon taken prisoner by the advancing British cavalry. At this point two planes were shot down by the Turks but the pilots were rescued by the pursuing cavalry who, at this time, took fifteen guns and 2,000 prisoners. At about 5:00 p.m. another formation of seven airplanes again bombed the column with great effect. During the afternoon and evening the bombardment of the Jenin airdrome continued and by nightfall it was a rubbish heap.
By the morning of the twentieth, the roads leading north from Samaria and northeast from Nablus were crowded with fugitives while the British cavalry was closing on El Afule from the west. Air reconnaissance east of the Jordan found the Fourth Turkish Army apparently still unconscious of events to the westward.
The air operations of this day consisted continual bombardment of the retreating enemy, reconnaissance and contact patrols for the benefit of the infantry and cavalry us, and artillery cooperation. In addition operations against the German airdromes continued. Bombardment and machine gun attacks centered about the Samaria-El Afule and Nablus-Ferweh roads.
At dawn on the twenty-first a patrol of two Bristols found the Turkish Seventh Army in full retreat along the road from Ferweh eastward to Ain Shibleh and thence northeast toward the Jordan. It was necessary that this force be broken up since, although escape via Beisan was prevented by the position of the Fourth cavalry division, the road across the Jordan was still open. A prompt report was made by radio and then commenced the most terrific slaughter of troops ever effected by airplanes. The history of war does not afford a more striking example of the destructiveness of the air arm when afforded freedom of action by an absolute supremacy of the air.
The Brigade Headquarters arranged that two bombers should pass over the Ferweh road every three minutes, and an additional flight of six airplanes each half hour. For this work every airplane available from all squadrons was used. The bombardment was delivered from a height of about two hundred feet in spite of the fire of rifles and machine guns and only two airplanes were shot down.
By noon some six tons of small bombs and 44,000 rounds of machine gun fire were accurately placed among the fleeing guns, wagons, infantry, and cavalry. Men fled and attempted to scale the precipitous banks of the defile and horsemen streamed down the road to the Damieh ford, but for the unfortunate animals there was no escape and the panic became general. Some vehicles were dragged over the cliffs by the maddened draft animals. The road was completely blocked. Officers and men were shot down, trampled on, or escaped into the hills.
An eye witness, Mr. W. T. Massey, describes the scene as follows:4
4 Allenby's Final Triumph, W. T. Massey.
I did not see the road until the next day. It was horrible.
Thousands of dead animals already made the air offensive. Horses, oxen, mules, and donkeys had met sudden deaths as they stood anchored in that long drawn out column of transport
There was scarcely anything standing on wheels except guns and not all of these had survived the bombs . . . . A whole army’s papers were distributed to the four winds.
General Allenby later reported5 that on five miles of this road, eighty-seven guns, fifty-five motor lorries, and 842 other vehicles were found, while the task of caring for
the surrendered Turks had become a difficult one.
5 Despatch of October 31.
On the twenty-first, Colonel Lawrence, the leader of the Arab Army operating along the Hejaz railway, was at his request brought by air to Ramleh and reported that the German airdrome at Deraa was proving to be a veritable hornet’s nest. Its planes had bombed his headquarters several times during September 18 and 19, had destroyed both of the two old airplanes with his force, and had greatly lowered the morale of his Arab auxiliaries. Three Bristol fighters were sent back immediately, followed by the Handley Page bomber which acted as a transport for fuel and supplies. In the next two days, the German squadron at Deraa, consisting of three Pfalz fighters and a number of DFW’s, was completely wrecked by air combats and the bombardment of its airdrome. It operated no more.
During the following weeks the operations of the Palestine brigade continued but decreased in magnitude as the Turkish resistance collapsed. By October 1, the Egyptian Expeditionary Force was in undisputed possession of Damascus and Acre and the Turkish power in Syria was completely broken.
The operations described are peculiarly interesting because they illustrate so clearly and forcibly the possibilities of the use of air forces against a retreating enemy and against enemy communications, and the dependence of air operations upon proper logistic provisions, but chiefly because they show the inestimable value to a surface offensive of supremacy of the air. Perhaps the most outstanding lesson of the whole operation is the fact that this absolute supremacy was won, not only by offensive fighting in the air, but also by continued operations against the enemy airdromes. It seems to be almost axiomatic that the most effective way to destroy an enemy air force is to conduct offensive operations against its bases. If this be true on land, it is even more true at sea, where airdromes are limited to the decks of a few vessels of most vulnerable characteristics.