IN ALL the discussion of the varying phases of promotion by selection there has been no mention of those invisible but subtly powerful factors included under the general head of human psychological reactions. Nor can these matters be approached in any formal scientific manner, even so accurately as by the use of the percentages in the tables of the actuaries. The science of psychology is yet in its infancy. Many of its basic factors remain to be determined; it undoubtedly contains some erroneous conclusions; and the field is largely one of speculation. Nonetheless some of its inferences and conclusions have reached such a state of stability that they are used to advantage in other branches of human endeavor, and might be of advantage if applied to the Navy. Whatever may be the tradition of officers as upright men they yet retain their heritage of human weaknesses, conscious or unconscious, and a predilection to act upon their impulses which cannot be totally eradicated.
It is the purpose of this paper to enter upon this purely speculative field relative to the possibilities involved in the principles of competition introduced by selective promotion. One of the chief arguments for introduction of the principle of selection was to the effect that the element of self-interest would, as in the business field, bring out greater personal efforts, more ability, and better results. And while, in some measure, these results may be or may have been accomplished, the concomitant faults in business competition, mainly psychological so far as the Navy is concerned, have received little or no attention.
Any investigation into such a speculative field should include the matter of probable survivorship in the changed environment. This should be followed by a study of the characteristic normal temperament of this survival type, including compensating faults normally incidental with the inherent virtues and especially those of a subconscious nature. It is quite certain that the environmental conditions are radically changed, and toward the conditions obtaining in the business world. If the new elements induce those phases of the business world excused by the remark, “Business is business, and the competition is fierce,” the implications of damage to the Navy grow serious, though probably the situation will not be irremediable until the modified temperament is as prevalent as is now the case in the business world.
Fear and self-interest, however deeply overlaid by the concepts of civilization, remain the actual basis of much of human motivation. Prior to the entrance of the competitive spirit these elements were greatly reduced in the consciousness of officers by the expedient of seniority promotion, which, as a principle, has many faults but still retains many merits, not the least of which is a feeling of security—a powerful psychological factor in all human actions. The added complication lies in the fact that the official records of the higher officers available for selection show almost uniform excellence, so that any slightest adverse comment by a superior upon a fitness report may mean the difference between promotion and elimination.
It has not been many years since the prospect of a “row” with superiors did not fill a junior with an abject fear, to say the least. “Going to the mat” with another officer over some phase of justice or procedure was frequent and sometimes extended to a point just short of disobedience of the orders, though it was all done with the good of the Navy uppermost in the minds of the combatants. In such a situation the officer issuing the order at least had the benefit of clear and forceful criticism, and it is as true in the Navy as in the courts that “The greatest force toward a clear decision is a firm minority opinion.”
The fear complex now enters the situation. In some cases of small differences of opinion, the junior is apt to remain silent. A notation on a fitness report that a junior is “lacking in the spirit of cooperation,” as compared with other officers, may result in failure of promotion. At conferences in the presence of the senior no one officer would be inclined to be the first to voice an objection, and those present would tend to become what is known in the business world as “yes- men.” And this consideration will probably govern many of a group including the fairest of superiors and the most honest and outspoken of juniors under normal conditions. For the fear in the junior is frequently subconscious; he cannot even realize he has it. And the satisfaction of the senior at having his plans approved is such that he unconsciously forgets to search below that approval for the possibility of a real but unvoiced disagreement.
Practically, selection is at best very narrowly based upon what is termed the ability to obtain results” in spite of difficulties, without reference to the method of accomplishment, and the survivors may equally well include the “driver type” or the type that succeeds through basic intellectual superiority. It is to be expected that the driver will eventually displace other types because of the more picturesque quality of his accomplishments and thenceforward he will tend to perpetuate his kind by a propensity to admiration for similar work in his subordinates. Such a type normally has little capacity to consider the comparative value of students and specialists. His normal reaction would be to place such men in the category of a necessary evil. The business man so regards the civilian intellectuals but fortunately he has not the means to eliminate them from appreciation and a certain amount of influence and power. But the quiet intellectuals, who have been necessary to the accomplishments of the naval driver, will be eliminated. The drivers of future generations will be in the difficult position where their assistants will simply not have the intellectual and temperamental capacity to execute the details of general orders.
There will undoubtedly result a lowering of that degree of general culture formerly found in officers who had leisure and inclination to make personal investigations of subjects beyond the rigidly scientific course presented at the Naval Academy. The study of history and sociology and political economy and international law, has, upon occasion, enabled officers to act fairly intelligently in foreign ports in emergencies. But if competitive efficiency in routine operation in time of peace is to determine promotion, there will be no time or personal inclination for such study. Continuation of education in young officers is at a low ebb as an examination of their bookshelves on board ship will disclose. Nor will practically constant communication with Washington obviate the difficulty when the emergency arises since the Navy Department is composed largely of similar officers and since a wide understanding of fundamentals is necessary, both for issuing orders and for their intelligent execution.
Loyalty has always had a large place in naval history and naval tradition. This has consisted of a general loyalty to the Navy, a “loyalty upward” to the known plans and intentions of superior officers, and a “loyalty downward” which was consideration for hardworking but mistaken subordinates. The principles of competition introduced by selection will, in the nature of men, tend to eliminate “loyalty downward” from the trilogy. Personal ambition cannot afford the assumption of responsibility for a subordinate. With the elimination of “loyalty downward” there must follow more or less failure of “loyalty upward” and with that the failure of loyalty to the Navy is at hand.
There is no place or time at the Naval Academy or on board ship for the study of psychology. In the race for operating efficiency there is no time to be devoted to such abstract, abstruse, and “useless” matter. Yet a young doctor told me he had spent only a small amount of time in assisting a gunnery officer to select gun crews, utilizing only the barest possibilities of psychological characteristics, and the ship placed well up the list in her class. And it could be utilized with considerable effectiveness in various phases of naval activity. Personality studies would indicate the imperfections inherent among the desirable features of one type and the value of certain other characteristics in other less spectacular types.
There is no place or time for the study of philosophy or logic. The driver type has less capacity for the details of logical analysis. Such a mind thinks it is logical but in the last analysis it will be shown that its possessor normally jumps to a conclusion and then goes backward to a justification. The formulation of campaign operation orders is required to include the known facts of the existing situation in order to obviate, as far as may be possible, an erroneous or prejudiced assignment of value to the varying factors. Other similar mechanical aids have been devised but they remain merely mechanical and do not reach the root of the problem.
There may be expected a much greater control of the Navy by politics and politicians than has been exercised in the past. The necessities of political exigencies will probably be more and more powerful over those who believe that the Navy should be an institution for the national welfare and free from the subterfuges of party politics. The political definition of the word “economy,” as differing from the usual definition of the word, is a case in point now in the process of development. Naval history alone will be able to record the result. To trace the possibilities of political control over free speech in and to the Navy’s foundations—complete reports following careful inspections—is mere guesswork though various trends of thought are available.
It is quite true that careful inspections and complete reports are encouraged and required in official documents. “Well tempered and constructive criticism” is apparently desired and in some instances it is received and acted upon. But it is nonetheless true, human nature being what it is, that officers will be afraid to voice a criticism or a suggestion that contains the slightest possibility of error. The slight fear is more powerful in the end than all the promises in the books, for even a slight derogatory remark may have an enormous effect upon promotion and a career.
It would be interesting to note the psychological reactions within a squadron of destroyers approaching another Point Honda. What would happen to a commander who reported that, in his opinion, the course lay dangerously close? What would happen in the circumstance, (1) that he was right? (2) that he was wrong? Suppose the same captain made two suggestions both of which turned out to be wrong. Would he take a chance the third time, and would he take a chance of having “timidity” on his record or would he take a chance with his ship? Yet it is those small guesses and fears which sometimes contain the truth. It is occasionally the inexperienced man who, by accident or by untraditional methods, hits upon a fault. The subordinate who protests and then comes under pressure to go ahead has always been in a difficult position but he is not helped by the existing situation, to say the least.
One of the first indications of the resultant temperament should show up in a disinclination of younger officers to take those details in the Navy which lack opportunity for spectacular work which will call them to the attention of reporting seniors. In so doing, officers will strive to pass by such duties as involve steady consistent work and attention to detail but which serve as excellent training for future command in the knowledge of what ships and men are capable of doing and what is difficult or impossible and why. A commanding officer who has always had duty as gunnery officer and has never had duty as first lieutenant or as engineer officer must lack somewhere in knowledge and balance sufficient to obtain a real efficiency, though he may obtain “results.” Whether the material factors of a ship are relatively important or unimportant, they yet have to be assigned a definite value in the equation of real efficiency. A long cruise completed with the ship in a poor material condition can hardly be said to have been a successful affair. A commander who turns over his ship to a successor in such a condition in local, remediable matters has not, perhaps, been so efficient as his record in gunnery has testified.
The position of commander of a ship in poor material condition would not be enviable. If his inspections were careful and he reported the actual conditions, would the operating schedules be changed to allow the time necessary to do the necessary work; or, in view of the increasing pressure of the schedules, which will probably be competitive with previous schedules, would he receive orders to get the work done in spite of difficulties? Would it not be simpler to avoid the difficulties, both to himself and to his superior who also has pressure upon him, by not seeing the conditions, or by utilizing comparative standards for inspection reports rather than a standard of abstract perfection? The difficulty is not one involving deliberate dishonesty but lies in the psychological field of unconscious reactions to hidden human weakness. The unconscious psychological mechanisms involved in the mental processes of “forgetting” the undesirable are full of parallel illustrations.
It would seem natural that the next indication of the change of temperament would probably be suggestions for an increase in the possibilities of spectacular accomplishment through a multiplication of competitions. Further progress of the possibilities might then be an exaggeration of the competitive phases of operation as compared with an analysis of actual accomplishment, and would probably be indicated when the completion of a schedule or a ship’s presence at a maneuver became more important than the average results obtained or her condition while in the line. The analysis of the comparative difficulties of an attempted exercise and the comparative results obtained is admittedly difficult; and the process cannot be free from the human frailty of unconsciously favoring the appraiser’s own performance. It requires deep self-knowledge and perfect balance in superiors, including a knowledge of the “escape mechanisms” of himself and others.
The first fruits of the system would probably show in a series of minor accidents and insufficiencies. Explosions and wrecks and small failures would indicate that something was wrong, though reports and investigations might clearly trace the immediate fault to some subordinate individual. It must be clear that, if intelligent assistants and subordinates are afraid to disagree with or point out errors to superiors who are themselves disinclined to do “detail work,” something will go wrong. The inference of fear is not far-fetched, psychologically, at least. The compensating characteristics attached to the virtues of the driver include a dominance that “knows” it is right to the extent that criticism or suggested failure is almost intolerable. The end of the trail would be reached, of course, in failure in time of war.
Other possibilities and probabilities of speculation are involved, but some of them become attenuated or relatively unimportant. Consideration is here given only to those normal honest predilections of temperament and does not include the possibilities for the exercise of personal prejudice or favoritism by reporting seniors or by selection boards. The value of the officer in general society must become less than at present. It has not been long since there was considerable visiting from ship to ship but this has been practically eliminated entirely with a consequent lessening of practice in the social amenities. There is simply no time for such things in the fleet. There are very few social affairs as compared with the older days. These men are tired out, and, in their short periods of leisure, very naturally prefer to visit their families or to rest. This will affect the younger generation most of all since these officers are growing up in an atmosphere without outside contacts. A study of the mechanisms of character formation will indicate the trend of the young officer’s growth in the atmosphere about him.
The remedy for the situation is also too problematical for offhand statement, although, for those who demand “constructiveness,” it is suggested that the present principles are the reverse of what they should be and that selection should be applied among the inequalities of youth rather than among the practically equal officers of higher rank. This suggestion at least has the merit of approbation in the Platonian Utopia. With the present scheme of elimination among the higher ranks, the theory of stimulation of effort as found in business circles may result in some of the concomitant faults of the business caste which have no affinity for the place of the Navy in the nation’s welfare. That some of these may be as unexpected as have been some of the results of the prohibition legislation will not lessen their influence in the final analysis.