On returning to the United States in September of last year, after floating on the Pacific more or less peacefully for a period of nine days, I found the country in a state of turmoil. I had the impression of being thrown into the midst of a great “battle royal,” where everybody was fighting everybody else, each for himself.
It appeared at first that the bone of contention was whether or not aviation of this country should be advanced, but on closer scrutiny it became plain that all participants in the fight were of one mind on that subject, all agreeing to the affirmative. What the fight was about was how this improvement should be accomplished and there were almost as many methods proposed as there were contestants and, so it seemed to me, almost as many contestants as there were people in the United States.
The principal classes engaged were the army aviators; the navy aviators; the other officers of the Army; the other officers of the Navy; civilian aviators; the aircraft manufacturers; the newspapers, and the general public. The main event was being held at the Capitol building with Dwight W. Morrow and eight other presumably disinterested distinguished gentlemen acting as judges.
Ninety-nine persons, (one of whom was myself) representing all the various classes of contestants, appeared as witnesses before the judges and their statements indelibly written down and printed in a book almost six inches thick will be available for posterity to read, no doubt with amusement, in the light of future developments.
After four weeks of taking testimony, the judges closed their doors for deliberation. It is my opinion, although I never saw behind the doors, that another “battle royal” took place among the judges. Their report announced a draw and recommended that the spoils be divided equally among all the contestants except the newspapers, for there was nothing sensational in the report.
Of course, nearly all contestants were disappointed. The aviators were disgruntled because they did not get more and the old line were irritated because the aviators got so much; the aircraft manufacturers and civilian fliers could not see where things were improved for them, etc., etc., but as time goes on, no matter what class of contestant he belongs to, one cannot help realizing more and more the constructive and real value of the report.
The Morrow Board could only recommend to the President and he, in turn, to Congress. It remained for Congress to say, finally, whether the prize should be awarded or not. It is now approximately a year since the smoke of battle has cleared away and a good time to take stock of the spoils.
Here is a list of the twelve recommendations of the Morrow Board for the Navy, each accompanied by a statement showing what legislation or administrative action has been taken to carry it out.
1. The appointment of an additional Assistant Secretary of the Navy under the conditions and for the purpose discussed elsewhere in this report.
The Morrow Board, in connection with this recommendation, makes the following remarks:
In suggesting remedies we rest upon the sound principle that no solution proposed at this time can be lasting. It is, therefore, of the first importance to lay the emphasis upon the best method of achieving the desired result. To that end we rely chiefly upon the appointment of an additional Assistant Secretary of War, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and Assistant Secretary of Commerce, to devote themselves under the discretion of their respective heads, primarily to aviation and jointly to coordinate so far as may be practicable the activities of their three departments with respect to aviation.
Notwithstanding this statement, there were some who thought that such an Assistant Secretary would be superfluous. The fact is, that this triumvirate of Assistant Secretaries is the board’s answer to those who demanded better coordination between the three branches of aviation. It does not, however, disturb the established organization.
Besides cooperating with the Assistant Secretaries of War and Commerce, for the air, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy will have to coordinate for the Secretary the various aeronautical interests within the Navy Department. He will have to nourish, but not overfeed, the aircraft industries, and have to get from Congress sufficient authorizations and monies to keep the Navy’s aviation up to a high standard. In all these matters he will act for the Secretary.
Dr. E. P. Warner, late professor of aeronautics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and a leading authority on aerodynamics in this country, has been chosen to fill this billet, and no taxpayer need have cause to worry that this valuable young man will not earn every cent of the munificent $7,500 salary which the government pays him. Judging by his record, it is expected that before long he will, while retaining his place as a leader in the science of aerodynamics, occupy an equally high position in the all-embracing science of “Bossing the job.”
2. The carrying as extra numbers, and at their own request, of officers (line or staff) of the grade of captain, commander, and lieutenant commander, who have specialized in aviation so long as to jeopardize their selection for the next higher grade and thus insure such promotion as would be otherwise due.
Legislation has been passed which protects those coming up for selection for captain and commander against being passed over because of lack of experience in general duties. Also, the Bureau of Navigation and the Bureau of Aeronautics have announced the policy to insist on all aviators having enough sea duty in the future to qualify them in the eyes of the selection board for promotion.
3. The giving of temporary rank as captain, commander or lieutenant commander to any officer of a junior grade when he is detailed to duty requiring specialization in aviation and for which the higher rank is proper.
The principle of giving temporary rank to those specially qualified to perform a temporary duty and then, at the conclusion of this duty, requiring them to return to their original position in the line of promotion, is one which has long been recognized as a great advantage. Thus, in all wars, practically all regular officers are given temporary rank so that they may be used to command the officers brought into the service from the reserve. In our Navy, in time of peace, and with the authority of the law, we take advantage of this principle by promoting especially qualified officers from rear admiral to vice admiral and admiral, regardless of their standing on the Navy list, for the command of fleets. Also, specially qualified officers of lower rank than rear admiral are promoted to rear admiral for the purpose of becoming Chiefs of Bureaus in the Navy Department.
The object of this recommendation was to allow the utilization of the experience of junior officers who had long specialized in aviation, to temporarily take precedence in flying organizations over older officers with limited aviation experience. As the idea did not meet with much support from anyone, because of the anticipated difficulties which always result from preferment, Congress dropped the matter.
4. The maintenance of flight pay as at present, but with the conditions and in connection with the insurance study recommended for the Army.
Flight pay is still allowed but there has been no legislation in regard to insurance. The insurance proposition is unquestionably a fair one for dependents, but should be extended equally to all officers in the service, for an aviator when killed in line of duty is no more dead than a dead deck officer, nor is his widow any hungrier. But what about the aviator himself? According to statistics he has a 49.5 to 1 better chance of realizing on his insurance for his widow than the deck officer, but no better chance to enjoy it. Therefore, insurance can hardly be considered as a full substitute for flight pay. The ratio 49.5 to 1 is arrived at by averaging the rates per thousand of fatal accidents from 1921 to 1924 inclusive. The 1925 rate is not yet available.
5. Additional plans for, and suitable provisions for the training of reserves.
The question of training reserves is an important one. As fighting machines airplanes have one unquestionably great advantage over ships. Airplanes can be built, if we know exactly the type we want, in a comparatively short time after war has been declared; ships cannot. In order to profit by this advantage, however, there must be the nucleus of a readily expandable aircraft industry and a body of trained aviators sufficiently large to man the machines built immediately after the outbreak of war. There has been no legislation resulting directly from this recommendation but the regular Navy appropriation for this purpose is approximately $902,000 and more attention is being paid to the subject in the department. The Navy maintains training schools at Squantum, Massachusetts; Sand Point, Washington; Rockaway Beach, New York and Great Lakes, Illinois. Students are sent to one of these schools until proficient in flying, then sent to Hampton Roads or San Diego for advanced training. When this is completed the aviators are ordered to duty with either the aircraft squadrons, battle fleet, or scouting fleet for two weeks each year so that many have their annual training aboard ship. The Navy plans to have, eventually, twelve reserve squadrons, fully manned and equipped and ready for immediate war.
6. To the end that naval aviators should have the opportunity to present naval aviation problems to those responsible for the shaping of the policies and for the handling of the personnel of the Navy, we recommend that representation should be given naval aviators in details in both the office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Bureau of Navigation. We recognize that there are fundamental distinctions between the organization of the high command in the Army and the Navy. With a proper spirit of cooperation, however, we feel that the naval high command will find real opportunity to utilize the special knowledge and counsel of the naval aviator. This is analogous to the infiltration of air corps officers into the general staff of the Army. Here, as in the Army, the particular men chosen must be of the temper of mind to appreciate not only the special needs of aviation, but the needs of the Navy as a whole.
In accordance with this recommendation, we now have two naval aviators detailed in the office of the Chief of the Naval Operations; two in the Bureau of Navigation; one in the Bureau of Engineering, and on the same principle there are five detailed to the Naval Academy.
I believe that the presence of aviators under the direct authority of the other chiefs of bureaus will be found a great advantage, and in time relieve the chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics from the virtual responsibility in matters in which he has neither legal responsibility nor authority. It is my firm opinion that the time is rapidly approaching when aviation can be centralized under the Secretary of the Navy like the other branches of the Navy. The Bureau of Aeronautics will always be required to supply aeronautical material and information.
7. Selections for command or for general line duty on air craft carriers and tenders, or for command of flying schools, or for other important duties requiring immediate command of flying activities should be confined to those officers who, while otherwise qualified, are also naval aviators; and such a policy should be followed as will provide a sufficient body of officers thus doubly qualified.
In connection with this recommendation, the board says,
There is justification, of course, for the contention of the higher officers that to be competent to command ships of fleets, an officer must have sea experience. On the other hand, we feel that there should be a recognition of the principle that an officer with both sea and air experience should, other things being equal, be better fitted for command than an officer who has had sea experience only. As in the Army we find the direct command of flying men by non-flying officers is objected to. There appears to us justice in this contention.
Congress was so impressed with the importance of carrying out this recommendation that they enacted it into a definite law, although normally it would have been a matter more properly left to administration. I feel sure this law is the result, not of advice of aviators, but of the popular conviction that aviators should be commanded by aviators, and of the belief that many officers of the Navy did not fully realize the importance of this principle. Ever since the Spanish War it has been held by our service that men to qualify for command of ships must not only have spent long years at sea, but have an intimate working knowledge, gained by experience, of the mechanical contrivances on board and the interior administration of those ships. The principle should apply equally to command of flying units up to and including command of aircraft squadrons. Hence, high commands in aviation are now being given to those who have had aviation experience, either in the course of their careers or as special preparation to taking up this command. Recently, two captains were qualified as naval aviators at Pensacola, and three others as observers.
The law defines a “naval aviator” as one who has completed the prescribed course and flown alone for seventy-five hours and been in the air 200 hours; and a “naval observer” as one who has completed the prescribed course and been in the air for 100 hours.
The law also requires that air stations be commanded by naval aviators and aircraft carriers by naval aviators or naval observers who are otherwise qualified.
8. An aviator assigned to general line duty for purposes of qualification in command should be disassociated from aviation to the minimum extent.
There are now detailed to each of eighteen capital ships and eight scout cruisers, two or more aviators who, in addition to their aviation duties, stand watch underway like the other officers of their rank aboard ship and some are also given additional duties in the various departments of the ship. The scheme is working out satisfactorily and gives great promise, indicating that in accordance with the hope of the Morrow Board, the Navy is developing officers doubly qualified for ship and aviation duties.
9. Junior officers in aviation who, for any reason, have not had the required sea duty should have that duty before being examined for promotion.
As already stated, this is a matter of administration in the Bureau of Navigation and is being attended to.
10. Special insignia for aviators should be retained, and a special decoration for extraordinary heroism or achievement in aviation should be provided, as in the case of the Army.
No action was taken on the tenth recommendation because there are already authorized sufficient number of navy medals to cover the case.
11. A study should be made to secure a method through which sufficiently attractive careers may be provided in order to retain qualified technical officers in naval aeronautic design and construction.
The required study of this recommendation has been made by a special board authorized by the Secretary of the Navy to consider matters pertaining to aviation personnel. As a result of this board’s study, a bill was referred to the Naval Affairs Committee, authorizing naval constructors and assistant constructors of the rank of lieutenant and above, who have specialized in aviation so long as to jeopardize their chances for selection in their own corps, to transfer to the line of the Navy in the status for “engineering duty only.” This bill also provided that assistant naval constructors of the rank of lieutenant arid lieutenant (j.g.) be given opportunity to qualify for general line duties, and then transfer to the line of the Navy. This bill, however, did not meet with the favor of those affected, and was not put through. No further suggestions have been made, nor does any action on this recommendation seem necessary as it is not clear that naval constructors are suffering because of their specialization in aviation.
12. A study should be made of the desirability of increasing the use of enlisted men as pilots in naval aviation duty.
This is, of course, a matter of administration purely, and plans have been made to form a squadron of fighting planes manned by enlisted men picked from the present enlisted pilots and trained in the battle fleet for this special type of work.
The Five-Year Building Program
The foregoing twelve recommendations include all that were made by the Morrow Board especially for the Navy, but the Navy profited most from the following recommendation made for the benefit of the aircraft industry: “The adoption of a policy of continuity in orders and standard rate of replacement.”
Long before the excitement last fall and before the Morrow Board had been thought of, the Bureau of Aeronautics prepared and the General Board approved, a general program by which at the end of five years the Navy would have all the planes called for in the peace-war plans with one-third additional for replacements. Thus, when Congress called upon the Navy for a policy of continuity in orders and a standard rate of replacement, Admiral Moffett had only to produce this plan. With some shaving down it was authorized in toto so that if Congress provides the necessary $85,000,000 during the next five years, in 1931 the Navy will have 1,000 planes, 667 in operation and 333 in reserve, for replacements. In addition to this, Congress also authorized two great dirigibles of 6,000,000 cubic feet capacity, of a type suitable for use as adjuncts to the fleet and one small experimental metal-clad airship. So far, however, no additional money has been appropriated to carry out the five-year building program. Consequently, next year will be the first year of the program.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it may be fairly stated that the Navy’s share of the spoils of the battle royal last fall, in spite of criticisms to the contrary, has resulted in the development of a more satisfactory situation. The interest of the Navy as a whole has been advanced in direct ratio to the advancement of aviation. There has been brought about a better understanding, and what appeared to be conflicting interests are merged into one interest—the development of the Navy as a whole.
For these results the Morrow Board is primarily responsible and the country, as well as the Navy, owes to it and to the naval committees of Congress, a debt of gratitude for the work performed and the sagacity displayed in the handling of a most difficult situation.
The navy seamen, subseamen, air-seamen, and landsmen, are, however, warned to keep up the good work, remembering this statement of the Morrow Board—
In suggesting remedies we rest upon the sound principle that no solution proposed at this time can be lasting.