Sea Power and Pocket Books
(See page 2231, December, 1925, Proceedings)
Captain Elliott Snow (CC), U. S. Navy.—Sea Power and Pocket Books by Captain Dudley W. Knox, seems to point the way toward the ultimate appearance of another epoch making book on the order of Captain Mahan’s Influence of Sea Power on History, alongside of which it may well have place. But for the fact that the article here discussed deals with more than one subject, it might well have been called the “Influence of Sea Power on Industry.” It is, however, coupled up closely with a second which embraces the thought of “The Influence of Public Opinion on Sea Power.”
Let us hope, the ready pen and the industrious habits of Captain Knox will lead him soon to tell, in his own convincing and simple style, in book form, the whole story of “The Influence of Sea Power on Industry.” He might well commence with the days of Sidon and Tyre, reaching soon the day when the “Corn Grinders” of Rome lived in daily fear for years, of being thrown out of employment—the populace, oi being without bread, through a possible disruption of the line of communication maintained by the corn fleet of Rome. It is recorded that an Egyptian corn ship like the Goddess Isis (Circa 120 a.d.) arrived, discharged and departed every daylight hour in Imperial Rome.
His story might well include, too, a circumstantial and detailed recital of the starving families of the cotton spinners of England, due to the Union blockade of the Southern States, 1860-65. Completing his study, not with World War Conditions of 1914-18, but with those obtaining at the close of 1925.
But it is toward “The Influence of Public Opinion on Sea Power” this discussion is directed. Sea power is, more frequently than not, erroneously thought of, in the service as well as out of it, in terms only of naval ships, bases, and the personnel which controls and directs these activities. “American owned (produced, controlled, and operated) shipping (not alone ocean shipping as Captain Knox limits it) is the keystone without which the structure of Sea Power will fall.” The full development of our inland waterway transportation, as well as oversea transportation, will play its own peculiar part on elevating our sea power to its proper height.
When will our great railway operators awaken to the fact that, in our foreign and domestic transportation problems, their prosperity in peace, and ultimate safety from possible bankruptcy in time of war, are linked up inextricably with the sea power of the United States! When will they perceive that increase in inland water transportations, fed as it ever must be by those very railways, means an increase in passenger fares and freight receipts! There are many situations in which the prosperity and welfare of the people of the United States will be subserved better by closely interlocking the operation of railroads on land and vessels on the water.
A very important paper on this subject was presented at the last meeting of the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers (November, 1925). The discussion of this paper was disappointingly meager. Why was this so? May not the cause have been the small attendance at that particular session? Or does not the society, though a very important material asset in relation to our Sea Power, suffer from the same deficiency that Captain Knox points out with regard to the Navy—lack of participating actively— aggressively—in proper publicity. “The propriety of naval officers participating in proper publicity” and their duty so to do, is, according to Captain Knox beyond question. Many naval officers are members of great societies whose relations to our seapower are intimate and are, therefore, in a position to speak with telling effect.
All writers, or rather publicists, do not possess the balanced judgment and moderate phraseology of Captain Knox. We have seen more than once unjust criticism leveled at the Navy due lo ill-advised forms of publicity. The question naturally therefore presents itself “Who individually or what group of persons is to decide on what constitutes proper publicity t” A correct answer seems to phrase itself somewhat thus. “They who are not actuated by animus against their neighbor and who are very mindful of possible beams in their own eyes.”
Vaingloriousness, hypocrisy, and harping criticism represent attitudes of mind that are always a menace, as much (if not more), to the attainment of sea power in the United States as in other national endeavors. They engender the advocacy of false doctrine in many, who, if they had been given the facts in a whole souled and simple way, and not left like children to gain their impressions “away from home,” would have been strong wise advocates of sea power.
We need entertain no misgivings in respect to the writings of the author of Sea Power and Pocket Books. What he has now written, and whatsoever words were written aforetime by others in like spirit, were written for our learning. Read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest.
The War Staff Idea Afloat
(See page 2298, December, 1925, Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander F. S. Craven, U. S. Navy.—In his article on the “War Staff Idea Afloat,” Lieutenant H. J. Wright presents an important subject which deserves general Service consideration. It is hoped that his article will receive extensive discussion.
We shall presume to enlarge somewhat upon three points in Lieutenant Wright’s article which to me seem especially important. These are as follows:
Service1 repugnance to the idea of a general staff. Lieutenant Wright shows that logically this repugnance should not exist. I have come to believe that some officers refrain from advocating a general staff because they think Congress would be hostile to it., At least, I have heard that idea expressed several times. Congressional antipathy is subject to determination by actual test, and although I admit ignorance of Congressional methods and motives, I fail to see how an attempt to secure a general staff organization for the Navy could bring upon us any greater misfortune than failure to get it.
The advantage which the Army has derived from the general staff should be a powerful argument for extending it to the Navy. It is equally applicable to both services, as Lieutenant Wright shows.
All officers are not mentally and temperamentally fitted for war staff work. It appears to be the unwritten personnel policy of the Navy Department that all line officers should be “generalists,” able to undertake any kind of duty which comes within the province of the line. For instance, all line officers are expected to be operative engineers in the line, officers of ship propulsion, ordnance, radio, and general electricity, to be navigators, gunnery and communication officers, to be leaders of men, to be versed in military and international law, and to become strategists and tacticians. In the lower grades officers actually are allowed to specialize to. a considerable extent, but when they are promoted they are examined in all subjects.
I am not trying here to amplify contentions which I have made elsewhere .that this policy hampers proper and necessary specialization, but rather to point out that it is inconsistent with the fact that men are of different types. Some are fitted to be operatives—to execute. Others are fitted to be planners. Only a small proportion is fitted for both planning and executive work.
Our line officers consist of men of these three types in about normal proportions. It is true that they have survived a selective process, but this process has not discarded all except those fitted for both planning and execution. The personnel turnover incident to such drastic selection would be simply staggering.
But it is not conceivable either that we could or should attempt to discard all but this versatile type. In the first place, the reservoir of officer personnel available to the Navy is not large enough to provide a sufficient number of officers of only this type; nor could we hold this number if they could be found, because the salaries paid to naval officers would be inadequate to satisfy these men who would possess the capabilities from which our great industrial leaders are made. Those of this type which the Navy does hold, are held only by the fascination and interest of the life, not by their salaries or other material perquisites. In the second place, the Navy needs gifted planners for its highly technical work, and with a proper sort of specialization it need not require in these men an equal capacity as executives. Likewise it requires a large working body of operatives—a proportion of them much too great to offer any prospect that all of them could ultimately be received into the group of selected leaders who should comprise the top grades. Therefore, all operatives need also be gifted planners.
Lieutenant Wright has shown that for our war staff officers we require those by nature specially equipped for general functions—that is, for both planning and execution. These are also the qualifications for great naval leaders, just as they are for industrial and other leaders in the world's affairs. Then our war staff officers should be the natural reservoir from which to develop our higher commanders.
We should follow the Army’s lead in providing a machinery of schools and active service tests whereby these men can be identified, selected and trained. The Navy can no longer afford to follow its faulty theory that all officers can do all classes of work with satisfactory efficiency. It has, in fact, followed this theory far too long.
The Navy should develop its war staff now, while it has time during peace, because in our next war we cannot expect to have an ally to hold off the enemy while we reorganize.
Because the Navy did well what it had to do in the World War, many infer that our present organization must be good. They fail to remember that we took no part in the vital naval activities of the war which gave the acid test of conflict to ships and tactical theories and administrative organizations. To those who study carefully these features of our Navy, both upon their own merits and with respect to similar aspects of great foreign navies, there are abundant and distressing indications that we need fundamental changes. Of these one of the most important is the development of the war staff.
Lieutenant Wright has pointed out the sad consequences likely to be incident upon failing to make this and other necessary changes now, in time.
In conclusion, it seems to me that Lieutenant Wright has shown clearly that the war staff idea is not separable from the general staff idea. In fine, what the Navy needs is a general staff organization.