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SELECTIONS FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HENRY CABOT LODGE. New York. Scribner’s, 2 Vols. $10.
Already there has been published an autobiography, an authorized biography, and various family letters of Theodore Roosevelt. There are other books on Roosevelt by authors who accent one part or another of the character of this great American. The future will doubtless yield more and more books on Roosevelt until a library comparable to that on Lincoln is published. But it is doubtful if any book, past or future, will reveal as much of the man Roosevelt, acting in his public capacity, as his own letters written from day to day throughout his public life to his intimate counselor and friend, Henry Cabot Lodge.
No life of Lodge has yet appeared. There is in press his account of the fight he led against the League of Nations. But Lodge played too large a part in our public and literary life to long lack a biographer. The catholicity of Roosevelt’s taste, his wide circle of friends, and his willingness to listen have caused many to believe they influenced his decisions. Roosevelt himself, in 1908, about a year before leaving the White House, said “For the past twenty-four years, I have discussed almost every move I have made in politics with him (Lodge), provided he was at hand and it was possible for me to discuss it; and as regards many matters of policy and appointment it would be quite impossible for me now to say whether it was he or I who first suggested the appointments I made or the course that I followed.” The letters published abundantly prove that Roosevelt’s statement was no friendly exaggeration of his esteem and respect for Lodge.
Roosevelt’s strength of character is too well known to account for this statement on any other ground than the extraordinarily sympathetic understanding that existed between these two eminent Americans on almost all political and literary questions. They were both writers, fond of outdoor life, devoted to history and “useless information”; both were of Harvard and the Porcellian Club; both were practical men with equal contempt for reformers too lily white to take part in vulgar everyday politics; both knew western Europe at first hand and had the same aversion for the American anglomaniacs who apologized in London for the Declaration of Independence as for the Irish and German Americans who brought their European quarrels to the United States; both believed in the United States, its future greatness, and had no mind to merge its destinies with other countries; both knew enough of world affairs to realize that the United States would get just the consideration from the other world powers, singly or in concert, that her armed strength justified. And being advocates of the United States playing a worthy part in world affairs, they both, throughout their lives, supported a large navy.
Roosevelt was always identified with the executive branch of the Government, Lodge with the legislative, and they made a formidable team in defense of the Navy at a time when such a defense was sorely needed. Therefore, naval officers would do well to read these letters which reveal the interest these two men took in naval affairs and to note the strides the Navy took in the period 1897-1909, due partly to the Spanish War, but, when the effect of that war had worn off, more largely to the efforts of these two men. In 1897 the United States was fifth in the navies of the world. In 1909 it was second. This is no coincidence, but, as shown in these letters, largely through the persistent and continuous efforts of these two men. When Roosevelt departed the White House interest in the Navy lagged, and, by 1914, the Navy had dropped to a bad third.
The letters commenced in the year 1884 when Lodge and Roosevelt were working for Reed against Blaine for the Republican presidential nomination. At this juncture, and until 1898, Lodge was much higher in the political firmament than Roosevelt, and he was coaching Roosevelt in political matters almost like an older brother. It may encourage beginners in politics to recall that in 1892 Roosevelt was not sure he could be elected a delegate to the Republican National Convention, while in 1908 he dictated the nominee for President to the Republican National Convention.
Most of the letters in the period 1884 to 1889 are taken up with literary matters, for the two scholar-statesmen were engaged in producing biographies of various American statesmen and other literary work. During this period Lodge produced his Life of Washington and Roosevelt The War of 1812 and the first volumes of The Winning of the West.
As early as 1888, Roosevelt, a private citizen in a minority report to the Union League Club, advocated “the employment of part of the surplus (of revenue) in building a Navy and providing adequate coast defense.’’ In the same year in another speech he states, “It is a disgrace to us as a 'nation that we have no warships worthy of the name and that our rich seaboard cities should lie at the mercy of any piratical descent from a hostile power. We are actually at the mercy of a tenth-rate country like .... Now we have ample means to prepare a Navy forthwith…He is both a poor patriot and a short sighted economist who longer opposes our doing so.”
In 1886 Lodge was elected to the House of Representatives where he served until 1893, when he was sent to the Senate where he remained until his death in 1924. In 1889, largely through the efforts of Lodge, Roosevelt was appointed a member of the Civil Service Commission, an institution recently established to increase the efficiency of the civil service. At first the commission received little support from the President and Postmaster General; in consequence Roosevelt had various rows on his hands, but he appeared to enjoy the work and thought he had benefited the country and the Republican Party by his actions. The letters of this period are mostly of party politics and are of little interest to naval officers, except as displaying the fighting spirit of Theodore Roosevelt. These letters have been collected by Lodge who has modestly inserted many more letters from Roosevelt than from himself, although at this time Lodge enjoyed a higher position in public life than Roosevelt. Fortunately it is possible in most cases to infer from Roosevelt’s letters the substance of Lodge’s letters. An amusing postscript to one of Roosevelt’s letters asked Lodge’s confirmation of a rumor that John L. Sullivan, ex-champion pugilist, would run for Congress. And, in 1891, Roosevelt was very anxious to know the result the redistricting (gerrymandering) in Massachusetts would have on Lodge’s congressional district. In October, 1894, Roosevelt writes Lodge, "I do wish our Republicans would go in avowedly to annex Hawaii and build an oceanic canal with the money of Uncle Sam.” This remark was occasioned by Cleveland’s repeated refusals to accept Hawaii. In the same letter he paid his respects to one Edward Atkinson, who had been indulging in a little abuse of the Regular Army in the cowardly assurance that regular officers could not reply to him.
In 1895 Roosevelt left the Civil Service Commission and went to New York City as one of the three police commissioners. He immediately writes Lodge, “You need not have the slightest fear about my losing interest in national politics,” and he gives evidence of the truth of this statement in the letter of February 25, 1896: “The only thing outside of my present work in which I take a real interest is the question of our attitude towards foreign powers and, therefore, of our defense. What has been done in the Navy? Surely Tom Reed cannot be going to try to throw us down on a question of an addition to the naval forces and proper preparation for coast defense.” Lodge’s interest in the Navy is indicated by a prompt reply on February 27, as follows: “We are going to get a good appropriation for the Navy. The subcommittee has voted Boutelle down, who wanted to reduce the number of battleships from six to four, and whatever comes over we shall probably add to it in the Senate. Even four would be the biggest authorization we have ever made, so you see there is no danger of the Navy being crippled.” Again, on March 13, Roosevelt wrote, “More important than any other question is, it seems to me, the matter of providing an adequate coast defense and an adequate Navy.”
On April 29, 1896, Roosevelt and Lodge were attacked by President Eliot as "degenerated sons of Harvard.” Roosevelt’s retort was as follows: It is a fine alliance, that between the anglo-maniac mugwumps, the socialist working men, and corrupt politicians to prevent the increase of our Navy and coast defenses. The moneyed and semi-cultivated classes especially of the Northeast, are doing their best to bring this country down to the Chinese level, .... there is nothing that provokes me more than the unintelligent, cowardly chatter for ‘peace at any price’ in which all these gentlemen indulge.” On May 2, 1896, Roosevelt writes, “I have absolutely no patience with men who are willing to vote to recognize Cuba and to approve of protecting Venezuela, but who are not willing to provide the means to make our action effective. I think I hate nothing more than a bluff where the bluffer does not intend to make it good.” These remarks were aimed at people in Congress who were voting to recognize Cuba and to protect Venezuela and at the same time voting against an Army and a Navy. Unfortunately, this type perseveres to this day and men in Congress in the past few years have spoken in favor of restricting Japanese immigration and of reducing the Navy on the same day.
In early April, 1897, through the persistent efforts of Lodge, Roosevelt was appointed Assistant Secretary of the Navy and acknowledged his appreciation in a telegram dated April 6, “Sinbad has evidently landed the old man of the sea.” Roosevelt’s efforts to improve the efficiency of the Navy, particularly the efficiency of the fleet, have been abundantly recognized. His position as assistant secretary was delicate as his interest in the Navy exceeded that of Secretary Long, and Lodge, still acting as his political mentor, occasionally cautioned him against appearing to dictate the policy of the Navy Department. In August, 1897, Roosevelt got a “wigging” from the Secretary of the Navy for a speech he made to the Naval Reserves of Ohio in which he said, “that the United States should decide whether or not it will annex Hawaii wholly without regard to the attitude of Japan or any other power.” This remark was occasioned by the protest Japan lodged against our annexation of Hawaii; this protest has never been withdrawn and is still the official attitude of the Japanese Government towards our occupation of the Hawaiian Islands. On August 8, 1897, Roosevelt wrote, “I have the armor board at work, and the cruising squadron of battleships and torpedo boats under my eye. With the docks I have nothing to do; I believe we need a radical revision of our whole dock system.” Knowing Roosevelt’s interest in all matters naval, I am safe in the prediction that he would have been glad to take over the docks as well as the fleet.
Lodge about that time was doing his best to bring about the annexation of Hawaii and paid his respects to Moorefield Storey as follows: “Our friend, Moorefield Storey, has been making a speech in which he has denounced the annexation of Hawaii; the reason being that because we cannot govern New York and Boston with perfect success we ought not to undertake anything else. I simply mention this to show you the direction which our best thought is taking.”
During the month of September, 1897, Roosevelt wrote “He (President McKinley) is evidently by no means sure that we shall not have trouble with either Spain or Japan; and, though he wants to avoid both, yet I think he could be depended upon to deal thoroughly and well with any difficulty that arises. I told him that I thought we ought to have some warning in the Navy Department, and that we ought not to be kept ready all the time .... that I would guarantee that the Department would be in the best possible shape that our means would permit when war began; and that, as he knew, I myself would go to the war. He asked me what Mrs. Roosevelt would think of it, and I said that both you and she would regret it, but that this was one case where I would consult neither. He laughed, and said that he would do all he could, and thought he could guarantee that I should have the opportunity I sought if war by any chance arose. To my great pleasure he also told me that he intended we should go on building up the Navy. . . . .” On a drive with President McKinley, Roosevelt gave him the positions of all the ships in the Navy and sketched an outline of the disposition he would recommend for them in war.
Contrary to contemporary opinion Roosevelt was genuinely fond of Long, the Secretary of the Navy, and writes Lodge in September, 1897, “Long is just a dear He has wanted me to act entirely independently while he was away, and to decide all these things myself, even where I have written him that I was going to decide them in a way that I doubted whether he would altogether like…He is a man of whom one really becomes fond and I am looking forward to his return.” This fondness did not prevent Roosevelt prodding Long in regard to keeping up the Navy and, on September 29, he wrote as follows:…“I asked the Secretary’s permission to day to talk to him very seriously about the need for an increase in the Navy…He listened .... and I half believe that I made some impression on him.” The results of his efforts on Long he gave in a letter on November 5. “Now, in strict confidence, we have won as regards the principle of extension of the Navy with the Secretary; he will recommend one additional battleship, and additional torpedo boats. It is too little, but it is a recognition of the principle that we are not to stop. He carefully explained to me that he had always intended this; and that I must be careful not to give the impression that he was converted.”
Roosevelt’s record as a “rough-rider” is too well known to describe, but his letters give a vivid description of the chaotic condition in the War Department during the Spanish War which will interest any naval officer. As a result of his career in the war, Roosevelt was given the Republican nomination for governor of New York and was duly elected in the fall of 1899. Although immersed in the affairs of New York state, he did not forget his interest in the Navy and was continually looking forward to a national career for himself. He wished to be either Governor General of the Philippines or Secretary of War. The exigencies of Republican politics made him the nominee for Vice President of the United States. Lodge advised him to accept the nomination because he would likely become the logical candidate to succeed McKinley in 1904 and because Lodge feared the local political situation in New York with Platt as “boss” would discredit Roosevelt in the remainder of the United States, and he wished to get Roosevelt out of the governorship of New York without impairing his national reputation.
The bullet of an assassin made Roosevelt President in 1901, he was elected President by an overwhelming majority in 1904, and throughout his administrations he followed his well-known saying of “speak softly but carry a big stick. ’ In 1908 he sent the United States Fleet around the world and is accredited by many with preventing a war between Japan and the United States by this action. At no time during his administration was it safe to murder Americans abroad and yet "he maintained the peace, proving his theory that “a just man armed” can go quietly about his own affairs. In 1903 Roosevelt appointed Lodge one of the American representatives on the Alaskan Boundary Tribunal, where Lodge very ably sustained the contention of the United States. Up to this point Lodge had been restraining Roosevelt, now Roosevelt found it necessary to restrain Lodge, who was vexed by the procrastination of the British members of the tribunal, and, on July 8, he wrote to Lodge as follows :• “While, on the one hand I should peremptorily decline to let the case go over until next summer, on the other hand I should feel that it would be an act of petulance and folly on our part to break off the negotiations if the British simply requested ten or fifteen days extra, or even a month. We should at once be putting ourselves in the wrong if we adopted such an attitude.” While careful to be courteous to the British, Roosevelt had already written Lodge as follows: “I dislike making any kind of threat but my judgment is that if the British play fast and loose the thing to do is to declare the negotiations off, recite our case in the message to Congress, and ask for an appropriation to run the boundary as we deem it should be run…The
English behaved badly in Venezuela despite the fact that we had behaved with scrupulous impartiality during the Boer War. I don’t intend that they shall do any shuffling now.”
One of Roosevelt’s great achievements was making peace between Russia and Japan and on May 15, 1905, he wrote Lodge as follows: “…it is evident that Japan is now anxious to have me try to make peace. Just as Russia suffered from cockiness and has good cause to rue her refusal to take my advice and make peace after Port Arthur fell, so Japan made an error in becoming over elated in turn after Mukden and then rejecting my advice to make peace.” His efforts took a more direct turn in the early part of June when he sent the following dispatch to the American ambassador at St. Petersburg: “Ambassador Meyer will at once call on His Majesty, the Czar, and say that he does so by personal direction of the President to urge upon His Majesty the desirability of his consenting to the request of the President to have representatives of Russia meet with representatives of Japan to confer as to whether peace cannot now be made.” After overcoming many obstacles Roosevelt succeeded in bringing these two nations to terms. In all probability he was the one person in the world who could have accomplished this task.
The West Coast was becoming increasingly opposed to Japanese immigration and in June, 1905, Roosevelt wrote concerning them, “These Pacific Coast people wish .... to keep out the Japanese immigrants . . . . , and with besotted folly are indifferent to building up the Navy while provoking this formidable new power—a power jealous, sensitive, and warlike, and which, if irritated, could at once take both the Philippines and Hawaii from us if she obtained the upper hand on the seas…I hope that we can persuade our people, on the one hand, to act in a spirit of generous justice and genuine courtesy toward Japan, and, on the other hand, to keep the Navy respectable in numbers and more than respectable in the efficiency of its units. If we act thus we need not fear the Japanese. But if, as Brooks Adams says, we show ourselves ‘opulent, aggressive, and unarmed,’ the Japanese may some time work us an injury.”
Roosevelt regarded the completion of the Panama Canal as his greatest contribution to the country. His manner of securing this territory has been severely criticized by the over righteous and his political adversaries made the most of his method of cutting the ‘‘Gordian knot.” As time goes on there will be fewer criticisms of his methods of dealing with an overreaching and not over scrupulous country.
It is doubtful if any contribution that Roosevelt made to his country in his public capacity equals that which he made in his private capacity in I9IS- At that time, although Europe was ablaze with war, the American people had been lulled into a sense of security and had been persuaded that not only did preparation for war not prevent war, but made for war. Even naval officers succumbed to this sophism and one, at least, of rank said “that Europe was prepared for war, Europe is now at war, therefore, the way to avoid war is not to prepare for war.” Any child could prove the falsity of this proposition, but it took Roosevelt, ably seconded by Lodge and his son-in-law, Congressman Gardner, to awaken this country to its perils and to its unarmed condition in 1915. So great was the opposition to preparedness in some quarters that it took a year of organized effort, led largely by Roosevelt, to get a hill through Congress to provide a proper Navy. This was Roosevelt’s last contribution to the Navy. In 1916 he was already failing in health and only his remarkable will enabled him to carry on his many activities. He died in January, 1919, so no one can say positively what his attitude would have been on the questions which have since arisen, but it may be safely ventured that he would not have been far apart from Lodge who, through his life, was his confidant, counselor, and friend.
W. D. P.
AERONAUTICAL METEOROLOGY, By Willis Ray Gregg, A.B. The Ronald Press Company, New York, 1925. $2.50.
Reviewed by F. W. Reichelderfer, Lieutenant, U. S. Navy Those who take an interest in the ways of the atmosphere will welcome this convenient volume which brings under one cover the main features of our present knowledge of aerology, the science of the upper air. Aviators, especially, have felt the need for a book on the aerological conditions of the United States with special reference to aviation. Heretofore, the publications devoted to this field have been limited largely to brief sections in the manuals of aviation training schools and scattered articles and pamphlets. The term, upper or free air, used in aerology refers to that part of the atmosphere which lies above the range of ordinary surface meteorological instruments. Observations of this region must be obtained largely by kites, balloons, and airplanes.
In addition to bringing together the latest aerological researches in this country, the book contains the main principles of general meteorology so that the reader may have a foundation for the aerological structure. Since the presentation is limited to “handbook” form, the author does not delve deeply into the details of the subject. He has given sufficient material to meet the needs of the average aviator. Most of the upper air statistics and summaries have been prepared from observations made by Weather Bureau aerological stations. Since the author has for a long period of years been in charge of the Aerological Division of the Weather Bureau, this material has been prepared largely under his direct supervision. Further testimonial as to its authoritativeness is afforded by the list of manuscript t readers, in which the names of several prominent meteorologists appear.
The book opens with a few brief definitions, followed by chapters giving concise discussions of the general circulation of the atmosphere, the common meteorological and aerological instruments, and methods of observation. The vertical structure of the atmosphere is then taken up. This includes discussions of temperatures, humidities, and winds aloft. The fifth chapter gives the usual descriptions and photographs of cloud forms, including fog. There are also reprints of charts showing relative height frequency of the different cloud forms, as computed from observations at Blue Hill, Massachusetts, which are of interest in planning certain aviation operations, such as bombing. The charts are not, of course, applicable to all regions. In other chapters, weather elements of special importance to aviation—such as visibility and thunderstorms—are discussed briefly. The procedure of weather forecasting is outlined and a number of forecasting precepts are given, including some of the “local indications” found useful at naval air stations, and a few of the better founded weather proverbs. Other parts of the book cover briefly the subjects of cyclones, anti-cyclones, and flying conditions over the North Atlantic and in North Polar Regions. A very useful description of the distribution of weather advices by radio enables the aviator to determine what information is available, and a list, giving the headquarters of meteorological services of the world, tells him where he may seek more information. Near the back of the book, convenient conversion tables and a bibliography of many standard books and pamphlets on meteorology are given.
Probably the thing that most aviators will look for and fail to find in Aeronautical Meteorology is a definite and infallible answer to the question “What is the weather for tomorrow?” A few, simple, universal rules of thumb for determining the weather for the next twelve or twenty-four hours are much in demand among aviators. What a grand and glorious feeling for the forecaster if such rules were possible! A perusal of this book should help the aviator better to understand that the weather is not made up of a few self-contained cyclones and anti-cyclones whose characteristics conform loosely to a few cut-and-dried rules, the latter marking the limit of possibilities in forecasting, but is the result of definite physical processes relatively simple in themselves yet difficult to forecast because of the fifty-seven varieties of variables influencing them. It should help him to recognize that weather is the product of conditions in the vast upper air, as well as of surface conditions, and that future development of detailed forecasts such as he desires lies probably in more observations of the upper air—observations which he may materially assist in obtaining.
Meteorology naturally developed through a study of average conditions. The classical work of Maury lies mostly in the field of oceanographical and meterological averages. But the average weather conditions represent a so- called normal which rarely if ever exists, and it is the departures from normal of our every-day weather which largely determine the activities of the aviator. Reliance upon weather averages may spell disaster to him. It is easy for the reader to lose sight of the fact that the averages or normals given in a textbook are not representative of the day-to-day conditions he will encounter, and it is a common mistake to put weather averages to uses for which they are not applicable. The author has wisely given tables of extremes and mentioned departures from normals in various parts of the book. It might be desirable for meteorological textbooks to place more emphasis on this point, although care must be taken to avoid confusing the student. Perhaps, in the present case, actual aerological conditions as distinguished from the average, might have been vividly shown by tracing briefly the influence of weather conditions on a few of the outstanding, long-distance flights, and describing the difficulties encountered. A few samples of this sort would help the reader to remember that weather averages are not a substitute for current weather forecasts in carrying out aviation activities on any particular day.
Aeronautical Meteorology presents a good opportunity for the aviator to become more familiar with the sea of air which he navigates. It is hoped that it will stimulate his assistance in solving the problems of aerological research which, in the end, will contribute materially to the efficiency of aviation.
JANE’S FIGHTING SHIPS, 1925. Edited by Oscar Parkes, O.B.E., M.B., Ch.B., and Francis E. McMurtrie, A.I.N.A. Sampson Low, Marston and Company, Ltd., London. Price in London, 42S.
In the “Foreword” to the 1925 edition of Jane’s Fighting Ships, the publishers state that this is the twenty-ninth annual edition. This is an error, as this edition is really the twenty-eighth, the first edition having appeared in 1898. But when one considers the enormous mass of detail that these publications involve, it is not at all surprising that an occasional error slips in; and besides, whether twenty-eighth or twenty-ninth, the 1925 edition is up to the usual standard of excellence that has been maintained for so many years.
The new issue includes a greater amount of new material than has been found possible for some years past. Some of this new material, such as a complete list of British flotilla leader and destroyer pendant numbers, and an entirely new Japanese submarine table which shows for the first time the new numbering according to class, is of perhaps more interest than actual value; but these constant additions to the book serve to show the strenuous efforts made by the editors to include every bit of information that it is possible to gather. Much of the new matter is of great interest and value. Several sections are re-illustrated, many additional large size photographs, and many substitute pictures in cases where alterations have been made or better pictures obtained, are included.
In the section devoted to the United States Navy, chief interest attaches to the revised plan and sketch of the aircraft carrier Saratoga, which shows the new mounting of the eight-inch guns, amidships along the starboard topside.
The British section includes sketch plans of the Nelson and Adventure, together with many new or larger photographs of other ships. This section also contains particulars of trawlers, drifters, and so forth, which the editors say have been reinstated by request. But one notes with regret that absolute secrecy still surrounds the new County class—the 10,000-tonners— and that all details of these vessels are still withheld.
The Japanese section contains photographs of the altered Mutsu, and of the aircraft carrier Hosho, photographs of the new destroyer types, and a plan of the new cruisers.
The German section has been completely re-illustrated, and new plans of destroyers drawn to show the new arrangement of guns and tubes since reconstruction. Of special interest is the evident effort of the Germans to make the most of the ships at their disposal as shown by the additional seaworthiness given to the small cruisers and destroyers by alterations to the bows.
Other sections have been largely re-illustrated ; and, generally, brought up to date in accordance with the latest information obtainable.
The publishers invite particular attention to the new form of silhouette proposed as a substitute for the now almost universally used block sketch. The publishers feel that recognition would be facilitated by sketches which show the features of a ship as well as the mass outline; and if the reception of the new silhouette warrants the change, it is proposed to substitute the new form for the old familiar black one.
R. S. R„ Jr.