EDITOR'S NOTE: This paper is a translation made by Commander W. P. Beehler, U. S. Navy, Retired, who was our naval attache at Berlin after the war. The original paper was prepared by Captain A. Gayer of the German Navy and read by him as a lecture at the Admiralty. The writer's style was academic rather than popular, and the translator has adhered as closely as possible to the spirit of the German author. Special permission was obtained from author for this translation and to publish in the Proceedings.
Beginning in the German Bight in the North Sea and the Baltic, the submarine warfare expanded in the various theaters in accordance with the military preparations previously made in the course of the war, and assumed ever greater proportions. As early as the end of 1914, German submarines operated off and on from the Flanders coast, until 1915, when a regular base was established there, which was continued until the end of September, 1918.
In the Baltic, Kid and Danzig were the original bases. After the capture of Libau, in the beginning of May, 1915, this port became the main base for submarine operations in the Baltic.
In the Mediterranean, submarine operations were commenced in May, 1915. The principal bases were Pola and Cattaro. Auxiliary bases on the coast of Asia Minor began to assume importance as well in the early part of 1915.
In August, 1915, the operations expanded into the Sea of Marmora and the Black Sea.
These submarine operations in the Baltio and in the Black Sea were only of local importance and played a minor role in the larger mission of submarine warfare as a whole. The sinking of the Russian cruiser Pallada by the submarine U-26 was the first of our successes in the Baltic.
Although even at this stage the submarine bases embraced a very considerable area, this was even further extended by the increased radius of action of our submarines. In September, 1916, the U-53 made the first submarine cruise to America.
About the same time, submarine operations were undertaken which extended as far as the Polar Ocean, while in November, 1916, three other boats operated regularly as far as the Canary Islands. This submarine cruiser warfare was pushed into the far West and South Atlantic with regularity by the end of' 1917.
Over seven years have passed since our last torpedo reached its target, and the memories of the wide field we then controlled seem like fairy tales in the light of our present helplessness.
We shall try to show in the following condensed resume how this weapon, insignificant at the beginning of the war, was called to great deeds; how it developed and came into conflict with politics, which resulted in its downfall and the loss of a favorable peace for Germany. Also, other points will be touched on, aside from the unholy political interference with submarine operations, which may hold lessons for the future.
Prefacing these remarks, it should be stated that when one refers to submarine operations one generally means those operations against merchant shipping. This, however, does not hold in our historical resume, and all forms of submarine operations in war will be considered.
As our eighteen war-serviceable boats stood out to the North Sea towards the latter part of July, 1914, no one thought at first of operations against merchant shipping, but hoped to make contact with enemy forces in joint operations with the High Seas Fleet. The maneuvers in May, 1914, had shown that the possibilities for joint operations with the fleet were very favorable, and that by such means some measure of equalization could be obtained against a superior enemy force. True, before the outbreak of the war, one of our best technical experts on this weapon, Lieutenant Commander Blum, had calculated the number of submarines necessary to conduct cruiser warfare against England, and had placed this number at 200. That his calculations were about right is shown by the fact that during the war we never had more than 150 submarines in service at any time; and at that came very close to success. Further, in time of peace, no special provision had been made for construction and fitting out of these boats for this service. As a result of the operations orders at the outbreak of the war holding the fleet in reserve, no joint operations with the fleet were possible; rather, as it developed that the enemy was not inclined to penetrate the German Bight except with submarines, our boats were more and more diverted to individual operations against enemy warships. This method of employment together with others to be mentioned was continued until February 18, 1915. The first success was the sinking of the Pathfinder by Lieutenant Commander Hersing with the U-21, near the Firth of Forth, on September 5, being the first submarine success in history. The sinking of the Hogue, Aboukir, and Cressy, near the Maas lightship on September 22, and of the Hawke on October 15, by the U-9, Weddigen ; the sinking of the English submarine E-3 near the mouth of the Ems and the aircraft tender Hermes near Calais on October 31 by Lieutenant Commander Wegener, U-27; the destruction of the gunboat Niger near Deal on November 12, 1914, by Lieutenant Commander Forstmann, U-12; and finally, the sinking of the battleship Formidable during New Year's night, 1915-16 near the South Coast of England, by the U-24, under Lieutenant Commander Schneider, are the outstanding successes of this period. Aside from these sinkings in the early period of the war should be mentioned certain eventful cruises which paved the way for other operations later on, namely, the first cruise through the Dover Strait by the U-18, under Lieutenant Commander von Hennig; the penetration of this boat into Scapa Flow; the first cruise circumnavigating England and Ireland by the U-20, under Lieutenant Commander Droescher ; the penetration of the U-16, under Lieutenant Commander Hansen, into the harbor of Lerwick in the Shetland Islands; as well as the first operations from the Flanders bases (Zeebrugge and Ostende) by the U-5, Lemmer ; U-8, Stoss; U-11, Suchedeletz ; U-12, Forstmann; U-24, Schneider. Notable as were these achievements in themselves, many cruises were needed in preparation for them before results could be obtained. In these individual operations of the submarines, the means of luring the enemy warships into positions favorable for submarine attack were lacking, and many opportunities were missed by the fact that the low submerged and surface speeds of the submarines prevented their attaining a suitable position for attack.
So it came about that, quite unconsciously, ways and means were sought at the front to increase the effectiveness of the submarine operations. Joint operations with the fleet were sought at first and finally obtained. Thus, in the middle of August, a raid was made to the Hoofden by the cruisers Stralsund and Strassburg, accompanied by two submarines, which, however, had no opportunity for attack, since the cruisers came only in contact with enemy destroyers and attacked at long range. When the High Seas Fleet made its first offensive on November 3, with the object of bombarding the English coast near Yarmouth, the available submarines were disposed in such a manner that they could give warning of approaching enemy forces and cover the retreat. Since the German cruisers were not annoyed by strong naval forces, the submarines did not come into action. In the coast bombardment of December 16, 1914, this branch of the service cooperated in the following manner: two scouting trips were made by the submarine U-27, under Lieutenant Commander Wegener, in which the mine fields were charted and safe courses for the fleet laid out for the proposed bombardment. Otherwise, the submarines did not participate in these operations, as the other boats were then engaged in individual enterprises.
It was such an undertaking which caused Lord Jellicoe to express his astonishment that the Germans had not used the submarines in joint operations to cause the enemy forces to run into a trap, such as actually occurred on our side on August 19, 1916. Had our submarines been employed in this raid (in the manner in which they were actually used on August 19) they would probably have discovered that the Second British Battle Squadron was in such a position between our main body and the battle cruisers that further operations to the westward would have probably resulted in the destruction of the enemy Second Battle Squadron. That such an event would have had far reaching influence on the course of the war is clear.
During the raid of the German battle cruisers Seydlitz, Moltke, Derfflinger, the armored cruiser Bliicher, and their screen of light cruisers and destroyers near the Dogger Bank on January 24, 1915, the cooperation of submarines would have been of the greatest importance, since this raid was carried out without the support of the Battle Fleet. As early as the afternoon of the twenty-third, four submarines were stationed at the mouth of the Ems and two near Helgoland, ready to proceed toward the objective of the battle cruisers. These could then have been used on the twentyfourth during the battle as well as against those British ships which were being towed after the battle. The flotilla commanders at the Ems and Helgoland did send out their boats to engage the superior British battle cruisers as soon as the signal was received from Admiral Hipper that he was engaged; but it was too late, as the fight was broken off, as the British themselves reported, before they came into the area of German mines and submarines. So again, opportunity failed to bring the submarines the long sought chance of a shot at the enemy battle fleet.
Since these methods had not produced any very effective results, the idea of using the submarines as commerce raiders was considered relatively early. Even before Weddigen's great accomplishments, conferences had been held with the Commander Submarine Divisions, Commander Bauer, to consider action against England's commerce. This concept was shattered on the question of the means to be employed to attain the end in view. The English author, Sir Conan Doyle, had written a pamphlet before the war describing how a small country, with the aid of only seven submarines, could force Great Britain to sue for peace. Since the problem appeared so easy to Sir Conan Doyle, it possibly explains why such remarkable optimism existed in high places in regard to our own problem. They were possibly influenced by Doyle's expose. (In time of peace, no particular preparations were made for the employment of submarines as commerce raiders.) The thought was expressed from the front in the form of a memorandum from the Commander Second Squadron to Berlin, and caused Grand Admiral von Tirpitz to sound out the American correspondent, von Wiegand, as to the attitude of the United States toward a commerce war instituted by Germany (November, 1914). Tirpitz sought in this manner with the best motives to clear up the political complications of a submarine offensive against commerce. Naturally, the interview meant the disclosure of military operations, and had the disadvantage that notice was given to Great Britain to prepare for a counter-offensive. The idea of a commerce raid with submarines spread more and more tmtil on October 20, 1914, Lieutenant Commander Feldkirchner in the U-17 sank the small British ship Glytra near the Norwegian coast, in accordance with the recognized principles of international law. Further sinkings followed this until the declaration of the submarine blockade on February 18, 1915, when about 20,000 tons had been sunk. These were individual operations which could not in the nature of things have any important results, but which did stimulate the English to greater offensive measures.
The declaration of the submarine war area on February 18 (known as the submarine blockade) introduced the second phase of submarine warfare It has been very much disputed as to whether or not this undertaking was not rather previous. Tirpitz himself was not in agreement with the early date set. Also, at the front, opinion was divided as to whether the submarine service was sufficiently strong for the undertaking. The blockade offensive could only be carried out in the North Sea with a number of trained boats which never exceeded twenty-five before it came to a sudden end in October, 1915. As late as February, 1915, eight of these boats were fitted with gas engines which were notoriously unserviceable for war, and very few of the boats were even equipped with guns. In itself, the declaration was somewhat sharp and did not depart fundamentally from the principles of an intensive submarine offensive. But even before the actual operations were commenced by the boats, the severity of the methods, as stated in the declaration, were considerably modified. As early as late February, orders were issued concerning the careful treatment of neutrals, and particularly the Italian and American flags. For the Scandinavian countries a "free safe lane" was ordered for trade with England until the end of March. Further restrictions resulted from individual sinkings which will be treated later.
During the period of this submarine blockade (until the end of October, 1915), eleven of our boats were lost to the enemy. The boats had to be trained to this new manner of employment, and the dangers which threatened had to be learned by experience. Among these were: traps through the misuse of neutral flags, concealed guns on apparently innocent looking craft, joint operations of enemy submarines with enemy merchant ships. Possible counter-measures were: to avoid submerging or emerging at short distances from a steamer capable of carrying good armament, avoidance of stopping after sinking to render attack from accompanying submarines more difficult, and the prompt evacuation of the area after a successful attack. It proved advantageous to carry merchant marine officers as war pilots on the submarines, as these officers possessed particular knowledge of enemy and neutral shipping. After these pilots had become accustomed to the methods of operation with the submarine commanders of experience, they became invaluable as advisers to new submarine commanders ordered to operate in the blockade zone. Further, it paid to take aboard competent radio operators, who, by deciphering enemy radio traffic, were enabled to render valuable service. In this manner, boats were frequently enabled to intercept news of measures to be taken against themselves. A good means of safeguarding the boats in these operations against the enemy was a careful training cruise by which all faults of material could be established beforehand. Careful avoidance of the tell-tale oil and gasoline tracks was a matter for the most careful consideration of the responsible division commanders.
The principal operation areas for the war on enemy commerce were in the neighborhood of the English Channel and the Irish Sea, the west coast of France and the approaches to these areas from the Atlantic Ocean. The shortest route to these areas lay through the Straits of Dover. At that time, even the larger North Sea submarines were able to pass through there unhindered. This route was first closed by nets early in April, whereupon the larger boats chose the route around the northern part of England. In May, 1915, the Mediterranean and, shortly after, the Black Sea, were added to these areas. March 29 was the real birthday of the base in Flanders, which was composed of boats sent partly by rail to Zeebrugge and partly by sea, consisting of the smaller B and C class boats. The B class boats carried torpedoes, while the C boats carried mines.
The number of boats operating from this base increased gradually to sixteen by October, 1915, while only two were lost during this time. At first, these small boats operated principally in the Hoof den, where they raided the commerce between Holland and England, while the mine layers laid minefield after minefield at the mouth of the Thames. These operations found the enemy particularly unprepared. The Dover Straits were passed first by the B boats early in July, while the C boats followed in August, laying mines with great success near Boulogne. As pioneers in Flanders, Lieutenants Steinbrink and Pustkucken rendered valuable service. It was rather astonishing what these officers were able to accomplish with their small boats propelled by only 60 h.p. engines. The Flanders coast thus became the high school of submarine art as early as 1915.
During this period the war was also carried into the Mediterranean. At first the operations in this area were not in the nature of commerce raids, but were intended primarily to relieve the hard pressed Dardanelles in their stand against the Allied then-of-war. The U-21, under the command of Hersing, was selected for this duty. On April 21, this boat put out to sea, taking the northern route by the Orkney Islands. On the Spanish coast he found opportunity for refueling, only to discover later, to his sorrow, that the fuel was worthless. Thus a difficult decision had to be made, whether to return to his base or attempt to carry out his mission. He held to his mission, and on May 13 reached Cattaro with forty-two tons of fuel on board. The Straits of Gibraltar were passed on the surface at early dawn, just as the British destroyers on patrol were steaming northward to be relieved. Seven days after arrival in Cattaro, Hersing sailed for the Dardanelles, passing through the Cerigo Straits and the islands of the Aegean. On May 25 he then torpedoed the English ship Triumph, near An Burnu, and on May 2 the British battleship Majestic, at Sedd el Bahr. On June 5 he steamed into the Dardanelles and was greeted in Constantinople with great acclaim as a deliverer. Aside from the U-21, the war in the Mediterranean was opened by a number of small boats which were transported by rail to Pola and assembled there under the supervision of a special commission. These consisted of six small torpedo boats and four small mine layers of the same construction as those on the Flanders coast. Three small torpedo submarines had preceded Hersing in the Dardanelles, but had achieved no marked success. As opposed to Hersing's operations, the five large submarines which proceeded to the Mediterranean late in the fall of 1915 immediately embarked on commerce raids. In the limited space of this article, the operations of the submarines in the Mediterranean will be briefly sketched out to the conclusion of the war. This is justified by the fact that from -1915 to the end of the war the commerce raids in this area were continued without variation, in contradistinction to the operations in the other war areas. In the summer of 1915 sinkings of 50,000 tons were not rare in the Mediterranean. Among other things, the best boats were sent there under the command of the most experienced officers (Forstmann, Kophamel, Valentiner) and operating conditions showed themselves to be unusually favorable; steamer routes were easy to find, weather and visibility conditions were considerably better than in the North Sea, and counteroffensive measures were almost entirely lacking. In the Mediterranean, the Allies did not possess a number of small boats suitable for submarine chasing, and could not organize in that area such a patrol as existed in the English Channel and the Dover Straits. It was unfortunate for us that we did not send more large submarines into the Mediterranean in the fall of 1915 when the submarine cruiser warfare was suspended. (This will be discussed later.) Not until 1916, when the submarine activities in the North Sea had been suspended .for a second time, were four more large submarines and one mine layer sent to the Mediterranean, to be followed shortly by six improved small torpedo submarines. One unfortunate fact was that a large submarine, the U-33, was kept for one year, and the U-38 from May until August, 1916, operating in the Black Sea, where they were able to sink only four steamers, four sailing ships, and two fishing boats, aside from the bombardment of enemy coast stations. In the Mediterranean, they would have been able to accomplish at least ten times that much. For the problems of the Black Sea, the small boats would have been ample.
One circumstance was particularly unfortunate. When we entered the Mediterranean we found at Pola an Austrian dockyard, and at Cattaro, a repair ship. We contented ourselves with these few repair facilities, simply supporting them with German personnel and material. No extensive construction work, such as was carried out at Zeebrugge under Captain Bartenbach, was undertaken here. Thus, it came about that from the end of 1916 to the beginning of 1918, when operations in the Mediterranean were at their height, the repair periods for the submarines became of longer and longer duration. By 1918 these delays took on alarming proportions. The chief of the Submarine Bureau in 1918 then took the situation in hand and ordered the construction of docks and shops on a large scale in both Pola and Cattaro. Further, the repair facilities at both Trieste and Fiume were considerably expanded. Owing to the Austrian collapse, the latter measures were not fully carried out. For us, the tragedy lay in the fact that we never consolidated the occupation of Avlona, which would have made the passage of the Straits of Otranto very much easier. The commerce raids in the Mediterranean brought a toll of nearly 5,000,000 tons of enemy shipping. This number was in accordance with previous calculations. Some individual commanders obtained astonishing results. Lieutenant Commander Arnauld de la Periere sank nearly 42,000 tons with the U-35 up to March 13, 1918, when he returned home to take command of a submarine cruiser, while the former boat was laid up for a long repair period. As successful commanders of the smaller boats, the following are outstanding: Lieutenants Steinbauer, v. Mellenthin, and v. Marschall. Submarine operations in the Mediterranean were directed from 1915 to June, 1917, by Commander Kophamel, and from that time to the end of the war by Captain (later Commodore) Pullen, a very fortunate circumstance. As time went on operative possibilities became clearer and the situation easier to control, so that by April, 1916, it was possible to carry on commerce raids under the rules of war for prizes. During the whole war, only seventeen boats were lost in the Mediterranean, due to enemy counter offensive measures. Only the month of May, 1918, was serious, when five boats were lost. In the early part of 1918 the English took the patrol of the Mediterranean seriously in hand, and took over the patrol of the Otranto Straits from the Italians, thus making it effective for the first time. Aside from the cruiser warfare, the submarines in the Mediterranean played a large role in coast bombardments and in transport service. As to the latter, some went to Constantinople. (during the time when the route through Roumania was not fully open to us) and some from Pola and Cattaro to North Africa, where the natives under Turkish leadership were supplied with war material for their operations against the Italians. In the main, the small minelaying submarines were used for this transport service. At times, the larger submarines were also used for this service, which unfortunately diverted them from their real mission—cruiser warfare. Aside from Hersing's success against the Majestic, the following men-of-war were sunk:
On June 10, 1915, the Italian submarine Medusa.
On July 7, 1915, the Italian armored cruiser Amalfi, both sunk by one of the small submarines.
On November 5, 1915, the English submarine E-20, by the UB-14, under Lieutenant v. Heimburg in the Sea of Marmora.
On February 8, 1916, the French armored cruiser Admiral Charner, by the U-21, under Hersing near the Syrian coast.
On February 19, 1916, the French small cruiser Primula, by the U-35, under Lieutenant Commander Arnauld de la Periere near Malta.
On April 28, 1916, the English battleship Russell, the sloop Nasturtium, and the armed yacht Regusa, on mines near Valetta (Malta), which were laid the day before by the U-73, under Lieutenant Commander Siehs.
On December 27, 1916, the French battleship Gaulois, by the UB-47, under Lieutenant Commander Steinbauer, in spite of convoy of fishing vessels and light cruisers.
On January 9, 1917, the English battleship Cornwallis, by the UG-32, under Lieutenant Commander Hartwig, near Malta.
On March 19, 1917, the French battleship Danton, by the U-64, under Lieutenant Commander Morath.
On December 14, 1917, the French armored cruiser Chateaurenault, by the UC-38, under Lieutenant Commander Wendland, in which engagement the latter was lost.
Aside from this, about forty small warcraft and chasers were sunk. On his way to the Mediterranean past the Canary Islands, Lieutenant Commander Walther Hans sank the French battleship Suffren, near the Spanish coast on November 26, 1916.
When the collapse of Austria forced the German submarines to retreat from the Mediterranean to German ports, the UB-5o, under Lieutenant Kutat, sank the British battleship Brittania near Cape Trafalgar on November 9, 1918. This was the last action at sea by the weapon which had so brilliantly survived the collapse of our allies. About a dozen other small warcraft which were sunk during the war in the Mediterranean cannot be recited owing to lack of space. In February, the submarines took a large part in fighting against the sailors' revolution in Cattaro (U-35). Some of the large and some of the small submarines had to be destroyed in the evacuation of Pola and Cattaro, as they could not be made seaworthy for the trip home.
We will now turn back to the theaters of war near home, which we left temporarily with the entrance of the U-21 into the Mediterranean in April, 1915. The time of the submarine blockade brought with it many successes, and at the same time great losses. Weddigen was not to carry out any more raids in this warfare. Early in March he had proceeded from the mouth of the Ems through the Dover Straits with the U-29. Ostend was sought out for a short time, and then English newspapers spoke of important successes of Weddigen. After this, an ominous silence.
The rumor gained currency that he had fallen into a trap through misuse of neutral flags. Finally, after the war, Admiral Jellicoe lifted the veil in his book The Grand Fleet from 1914 to 1916. From this it seems that v. Weddigen did not go through the English Channel, but proceeded northward, arriving between Peterhead and Norway on March 18, encountering the British Fleet. Owing to lack of torpedoes he was forced to fire from his stern tubes, as a result of which his periscope was sighted and he was rammed and sunk by the Dreadnought. Whether or not a certain difficulty in diving, which was a defect of the boats from U-27 to U-30, was responsible for this loss we cannot judge. With Weddigen, we lost one of the pioneers of the submarine service whose efficiency and thorough understanding of the boats would have been of inestimable value to our service.
After 90,000 tons had been sunk in March, 1915, and 40,000 in April, came the episode which was to be the beginning of a series of political complications which lasted from that time to the declaration of war by the United States, in the spring of 1917.
This was the sinking of the Lusitania on May 7, Lieutenant Commander Schwieger, off the Irish coast near Kinsale. The commanding officer of the submarine was led to believe from official lists that the Lusitania was an auxiliary of the British Navy, and that she was engaged in carrying munitions from the United States to England. He was strengthened in this conviction by the fact that the German ambassador in Washington had cautioned the American citizens against traveling on this ship, as she was carrying contraband. As the result of this sinking, there began an exchange of notes in which our political leaders gave ground on each successive occasion, until finally a point was reached where submarines were forbidden to sink any passenger ship, even enemy ships. Otherwise, the cruiser warfare was continued. Among particular outstanding cruises at this time are to be mentioned the trip of the U-35 under Lieutenant Commander Kophamel to the west coast of Great Britain, which resulted in the sinking of fourteen craft of 24,000 tons total displacement; the cruise of the U-39 under Lieutenant Commander Forstmann between Scilly and Ushant in July, netting fourteen craft totaling 36,000 tons; the record cruise of the U-35 under Lieutenant Commander Valentiner, which in August accounted for twenty-two freighters, five fishing vessels, and three sailing vessels In St. George's Channel and the Bristol Channel, in all about 70,000 tons. In August, the Baralong incident is to be noted, which came as a result of the precautions which were ordered to be taken with American ships. The commanding officer of the U-77, Lieutenant Commander Wegener, who had distinguished himself in the beginning of the war, met his death here. The sinking of the Arabic by Lieutenant Commander Schneider on August 19, 1915, brought about a continuation of the political complications started by the sinking of the Lusitania. After Schneider had destroyed a benzine factory near Harrington on the Irish Sea, he was attacked by a large English steamer on August 18, without, however, receiving any damage. On August 19 he sank the Arabic, expecting from his experience of the day before that the ship was employing offensive tactics, since she appeared to be ramming him just as he was about to torpedo another vessel. Only when he returned to port did he discover that this was the White Star Line ship Arabic which had just sailed from Liverpool for New York with 170 passengers and a crew of 250 men. Further, there was about 8,000,000 marks worth of English gold aboard, and three American citizens who were drowned.
The German Ambassador in Washington stated, without official authorization, that the "submarine commander had exceeded his instructions and would be punished for the act." The Arabic case let loose a storm of dissension in general headquarters. Von Tirpitz and the chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Bachmann, took the stand that the submarine warfare should not be abandoned on account of the American attitude, while the Chancellor and the chief of Admiralty, Admiral v. Muller, took the stand that in spite of all the notes the still unsettled Lusitania case should be settled in a court of arbitration, and that in the meantime the submarine commanders should be ordered not to sink any passenger ships without due warning and without saving the crew. Although the Kaiser had decided in the sense of Tirpitz and Bachmann on August 26, the Chancellor on August 28 promulgated a new decision in accordance with his own views. This fateful dispatch was transmitted to America. Bachmann was forced to resign and was replaced by Admiral von Holtzendorff, who had been previously retired. The relations between Admiral v. Tirpitz and the Supreme Command were badly strained. It was distinctly felt at the front that the submarine warfare, even in this restricted form, was doomed to early extinction in the North Sea area; an idea that was strengthened by the detachment of the U-39 to the Mediterranean on September 16. One important order to the submarine commanders was delayed in transmission to the front. On August 30 orders reached the front prohibiting the torpedoing even of small passenger ships without due warning and rescue of the crew. This order could not be absolutely carried out. How could a submarine commander distinguish between a small passenger vessel and a freighter through the periscope? In the interests of the submarine commanders the commander-in-chief, Admiral v. Pohl, who had been placed in this position as a result of the episode of January 24, 1915, protested this order. The Kaiser overruled the protest. On September 20 the commanders of the submarine forces in the North Sea and in Flanders received an order from the Supreme Command to discontinue commerce raids of any kind on the coast of Great Britain and in the Channel. In General Headquarters, the fight had been won by the proponents of an understanding with America led by the Chancellor and the chief of the Admiralty.
This order suspending operations against merchant shipping was especially painful to the personnel in Flanders, as the number of boats there had been increased to seventeen, anti the long winter nights which were coming on made for greater and greater security and favorable operating conditions. They consoled themselves with the thought that the mine layers could continue their operations, however, since this could not be considered commerce raiding. Mines went to par. This forced inactivity of the North Sea boats led them to construct mines for the larger boats which could be shot out of the torpedo tubes.
The suspension of activity for the North Sea flotilla did not work quite so much hardship, since the loss of eleven boats and the detachment of six others to the Mediterranean left only thirteen, of which only four were available for operations on the west coast of Great Britain without undergoing extensive repairs. At the front, it was generally believed that all available boats in good condition should have been sent to the Mediterranean where good opportunities for success offered. Such a disposition of the boats would, however, have left the German Bight without the protection of submarines.
It is of historical interest to note that the number of neutral craft which were boarded, searched, and freed, since contraband of war could not be proven, was about 300; this during the period of February to October in the blockaded area. This represented about 700,000 tons, or more than had been sunk since the declaration of the submarine blockade.
The numerous restrictive orders, modifying the original concept of submarine cruiser warfare, had assumed such large proportions that they could not be covered in the space allowed this article. As a matter of fact, so many were issued that it was impossible for a submarine commander to learn them all, and many a time it was necessary for the helmsman or some other trusty support to bring the orders to the conning tower and hastily run through the mass to find out whether or not a certain vessel could be torpedoed. Even then it frequently turned out that "whatever you do is wrong." For a commanding officer to be continually harassed by the thought that he will be held accountable for this or that sinking, when returning from a long and arduous cruise, makes his task especially difficult. Thus, the second period shows that no matter how brilliant the military operations, nor how bravely carried through, the lack of a definite, clearcut, political objective brings the whole to nought.
The following period, from October, 1915, to the end of April, 1916, shows definite operations only in the Mediterranean. In the North Sea and in Flanders the picture is blurred. The commanders of the North Sea flotillas held to the letter of the orders, and military operations of the boats were conducted in such a manner that sinkings played only a minor role.- In addition to this, bad weather considerably hindered the operations, as much time was lost due to the necessity for extensive overhaul periods and the work of modernizing the boats. A commerce raid of the U-24 to the west coast in December, 1915, broke in on this period of restricted activity. These operations were ordered by the Admiralty for fear that England would shift her counter-offensive to the Mediterranean in the event that no further activity whatever was evinced by the North Sea flotillas, since only a few of the Flanders flotillas were forcing them to maintain the channel patrol. This cruise was at the same time in the nature of an experimental winter trip, on which Commander Schneider sank about 15,4900 tons although he was expressly enj9ined against sinking passenger or neutral vessels. Mine laying expeditions of the larger submarines near the English coast, mine scouting cruises with the fleet under Admiral v. Pohl, and numerous transport cruises played a large role during that winter. Thus, the U-20 assisted in the mine laying expedition of the auxiliary cruiser Moewe on the north coast of Scotland and the Orkney Islands by scouting for mine fields in these areas, during the mouth of November; while in January, the U-70 escorted the steamer Marie on her trip from the German Bight to East Africa.
In Flanders, until February, 1916, there was great activity among the mine laying submarines. The small B boats were engaged on patrol duty on the Flanders coast. From November 21, 1915, on, ships under the enemy flags which entered or left French ports between Dunkirk and LeHavre could be sunk without warning. Hospital ships, passenger ships, and neutral vessels were excepted.
On the Flanders coast the work of the boats was made increasingly difficult in the summer of 1915 by the fact that in addition to the unapproachable and improved mine fields, the British had erected a net barrier at about the latitude of South Goodwin Lightship, which ran from there on bearing 110 degrees. This net was held up by large buoyant bodies, buoys, and flasks; and the submarines were forced to pass this barrier at night on the surface, as otherwise they would become entangled in the net. Since the enemy had to take care not to get into the net himself, a number of light buoys were attached to same, in addition to a number of warning beacons. In the course of time, these beacons became the most trusted friends of the Flanders submarine flotillas. They were all numbered, and were the greatest navigational aids in the passage of the Straits of Dover. Also, large unlighted buoys, which the enemy set out as navigation aids for his own vessels, were very advantageous to the submarines; one at Lat. 510-20’.6 N, and 20-7’.2 E was a large latticework buoy which bore the designation "Tonne 2501," and was used as a range to steer by for all boats approaching from the north, attempting to pass the Straits of Dover. Boats lay on the bottom in the vicinity of this buoy, where they awaited the tide and favorable opportunities for passing the straits. It is astounding what dangers these small easily handled boats were able to avoid under experienced commanders. Thus, by self-schooling and experience the flotilla was brought to a very high state of efficiency. In this period the UC-9, UC-5, and the UB-26 of the Flanders boats were lost. The UC-8 was interned in Holland after going aground near Terschelling. Beginning in 1916, the enemy counter measures against the Flanders boats became sharper and more effective. These were directed first against the mine layers, and later against all the Flanders boats, in that large nets with attached mines were placed fifteen miles from and all along the Flanders coast the nets being patrolled constantly for months, beginning in April, 1916. Aircraft and patrol boats which were guarding this net sought to force the submarines under, thereby chasing them into the net. The aircraft became an ever increasing source of trouble to our submarines.
One step on the road toward the resumption of cruiser warfare was the entrance of Bulgaria in the war on the side of the Central Powers. The chief of the General Staff, Field Marshal General v. Falkenhayn, believed the moment ripe for the resumption of cruiser warfare, inasmuch as there was little danger of other neutral countries declaring war after Bulgaria had come in on the side of Germany. The chief of the Admiralty, Admiral v. Holtzendorff, supported this view to the upmost. Von Tirpitz also favored this stand, stating that the moment had now arrived for a decisive campaign with submarines, as replacements had been made and further delay would be dangerous. The conferences between the naval and military leaders took place in the Ministry of War in December, 1915.
This was followed by two memoranda from the Naval Staff on January 7 and February 12. In these was expressed the expectation that with a drastic submarine campaign the English resistance could be broken inside of a half year, this specific interval being set as a result of a caustic question from the Chancellor v. Bethmann-Holweg. The danger of a break with America was considered squarely, but opposed to this was the view that in any event the war must be concluded by the fall of 1916, since otherwise the possibility of obtaining favorable peace terms would have vanished. The second memorandum was sent further to a number of technical and industrial experts, who agreed that the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare would bring to Germany the only possible assurance of success.
The Kaiser himself, in a decisive address at Wilhelmshafen on March 6, 1916, overruled the vote of General v. Falkenhayn for the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare in certain well defined areas. (Neutrals and others to be sunk without warning in individual cases, hospital ships and such excepted.) Tirpitz, who had been striving for a decisive submarine campaign, was ignored by not being invited to attend. This was followed on March 17 by the resignation of v. Tirpitz. History has shown him to have been right. Even had America declared war against us immediately, there is no doubt but that the counter-offensive measures at the disposal of Great Britain at that time were far less than those at the time when the unrestricted warfare was actually decided upon on February I, 1917. There were relatively few armed merchant vessels at first. How much time would have been required to assemble and mount the 20,000 guns, which according to our calculations would have been necessary to arm all the enemy steamers?
Jellicoe's idea of strewing the German Bight with mine fields, was shattered because at that time no suitable type of mine for such an offensive had been developed. This was first accomplished in 1916, whereupon mo,000 mines of this type were ordered. These would not have been effective before the end of 1917, according to Jellicoe's own estimate, by which time we should have, in all probability, won the war with a decisive unrestricted submarine campaign". Hundreds of enemy patrol boats and chasers were in the process of construction. They were completed in 1917.
A further question is whether we ourselves had a sufficient number of submarines available in March, 1916, to begin such an unrestricted cruiser warfare. The list of available submarines, as of March, 1916, was as follows: In service, twenty-five large and forty-three small boats, under construction; nearly ready, fiftytwo large and eighty-nine small boats. . The twenty-five large boats were, with three exceptions, completely fitted out and manned by war experienced personnel. The boats which were designated as about to be completed were being finished with unprecedented rapidity. The monthly quota of commissioning was never so favorable as between April 1, 1916, and January I, 1917.
The monthly rate of commissioning in 1916 was as follows: March, nine; April, eight; May, nine; June, eight; July, nine; August, ten; September, ten; October, eleven; November, eleven, and December, fifteen. Such a favorable increase in the rate of construction was brought about by the efforts of the Submarine Bureau from November on. Due to these efforts, the average monthly rate would have been about twenty-seven boats both large and small from November, 1918, to November, 1919.
Although a renewal of the unrestricted submarine warfare was prohibited by the Kaiser's order of March 6, 1916, still the efforts of the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet (Admiral Scheer since January 15, 1916), the Admiralty and Naval Staff were not without results.
After orders had been issued on the eleventh of that month that armed merchantmen were to be treated as warships, February 24 saw the reopening of cruiser warfare on the west coast of. England, where the old stations on the south coast of Ireland were to be resumed. It is noteworthy that throughout the years 1915, '16, and '17, it was always the month of February that brought some decision as to the use of the submarine. This is no coincidence, since this month always brought with it the hope of renewed success with this weapon, as the spring promised better weather conditions and opportunities.
On February 24, the Commander Submarine Flotillas, Commander Bauer, gave the submarine commanders their instructions for the resumption of the cruiser warfare, a method of procedure which did not differ essentially from the rules for prizes. Hope was revived in the various submarine commanders that some effective use might at last be made of their branch of the service, but the fact that this restricted form of submarine warfare was to collapse after two months was veiled by the future. Toward the end of the month, the U-22 and U-32 stood out to sea for the west coast. Until the end of April, the cruiser warfare in the North Sea showed promising results.
Sinkings of from 200,000 to 300,000 tons were achieved by the U-79, under Lieutenant Commander Wunsche, the U-44, under Lieutenant Commander Wagenfuhrer, the U-69, under Lieutenant Commander Wilhelms, the U-66, under Lieutenant Commander v. Bothmer, and the U-20, under Lieutenant Commander Schweiger. The month of April showed results of 86,455 tons, which gave great promise for the ensuing summer months with improved weather conditions.
In Flanders, the order for the resumption of cruiser warfare coincided with the arrival there of the new improved type of boats. The UB-18, Steinbrink, and U-B-29 put to sea for pioneer work on the far side of the Dover Calais Straits. But just at this time came one of those unfortunate episodes in our conduct of the submarine war—the sinking of the steamer Sussex by the UB-29 on March 24, 1916. According to her painting and the large number of troops on board, the submarine commander was forced to conclude that she was a troop transport. Since she was a passenger vessel, and the investigation was able to establish with certainty that she had been torpedoed, it gave the English further opportunity to instigate another note from America. This note exchange dragged on for about a month, and resulted in the famous "knockout" note which declared that submarines must carry on warfare in accordance with the rules for prizes.
Even while negotiations over this were in progress, Admiral Scheer, as commander-in-chief, had stated as his opinion that the submarine warfare should either be conducted unrestrictedly or the boats used for purely military purposes; but in no case in accordance with the prize rules. This sentiment was echoed by all submarine officers of experience at the front, and it was hoped that in some manner a decision would be reached which would put an end to the eternal vacillation of the leaders. The commander of the Flanders flotillas supported the view of the commander-in-chief, and one of the most experienced submarine officers, Lieutenant Commander Schweiger, U-2o, stated in a report that he was extremely pessimistic over the results which were possible in accordance with the rules for prizes, as pertaining to submarine operations. So long as one could hope for the cancellation of the order of April 25 (cruiser warfare according to the rules for prizes) there was a possibility of achieving results under the orders permitting sinking without warning of all vessels in the blockaded area (with the exception of hospital ships) which came under the designation of warships, transports, or armed merchantmen. As for other areas, the rules for prizes could be accepted. As it was seen, however, that the political leaders were to accept the Wilson note, the submarine commanders in the North Sea flotilla and in Flanders changed their opinion. Strictly "military service" for the thirty North Sea submarines meant practical inactivity since two years of war experience had shown the impossibility of coming to grips with the British Battle Fleet. Flotilla commanders and commanding officers were therefore anxious to have the order changed. It was further proposed that submarine warfare in accordance with prize rules outside the area of enemy patrols might be carried on with good results in case a steamer were halted at a great distance, approached submerged and finally boarded and searched, using another steamer to assist in the search, thus reducing the risks to the submarine. This suggestion made some impression at Wilhelmshafen, but the Commander Submarine Forces, Commander Bauer, had to put to sea on a cruise to the English coast with the U-67. His suggestions were handed over to the commander-in-chief on his return, who forwarded them on to the Admiralty. The Chief of Operations for the Fleet, Captain v. Levetzow, was at this time in Berlin. On his return, he brought with him such decided views on the conduct of submarine warfare as expressed by the Admiralty and the Naval Staff, that the commander-in-chief was forced to disapprove any measures for submarine operations which were not in strict accordance with the previous order which tended toward more intensive operations. Thus, this plan for submarine warfare in accordance with prize rules was vetoed.
In spite of the refusal of the commander-in-chief to permit further commerce warfare, the Admiralty could still have ordered it; this, however, did not occur and the months of May, June, July, August, and September, 1916, were lost as far as commerce raids in the North Sea were concerned. The decrease in tonnage sunk due to the suspension of operations must be estimated conservatively at 1,200,000 tons in the North Sea and 400,000 tons in Flanders. There are certain officers among us who estimate that the failure to continue the submarine offensive under prize rules cost us 1,600,000 tons as a certainty. Since the war even former enemies have stated that the suspension of submarine operations in 1916 proved to be the salvation of England.
An early summer lay over the waters of the German Bight as the submarines, returning from their .last raiding cruises and overhaul periods, assembled at their bases. In accordance with the policy to use the boats for "strictly military purposes," long intervals of time elapsed while the boats waited at their bases for preparatory movement orders. As the British Fleet began their offensive on May 2 and 5 to support a seaplane attack from the vicinity of Horn Reef, U-24 was able to make contact with the British battleships. Efforts made by this boat to call the U-51,
U-70, and UB-22, which were in the vicinity on patrol in order to bring them into position for attack, failed. Meanwhile, the U-24 failed to attain position owing to the fact that the coupling between Diesel engine and electric motors was on fire, and sufficient speed could not be maintained to follow.
Patrol cruises in the North Sea early in May carried out by boats acting independently brought no results. In the early part of May, 1916, the plans of the commander-in-chief to deliver a blow to the British Fleet were matured. The original plan as worked out was to attack the English coast in the vicinity of Sunderland, thus bringing the enemy out from his bases and to engage him in the vicinity of the Firth of Forth, or to the southward of this point. In preparation for this contemplated attack, scouting operations were to have been conducted on a large scale in the North Sea between England and Norway. Following this, the submarines were to take station in the vicinity of the enemy bases, in order to attack the British Fleet when entering or leaving port after they had been drawn out by our fleet. Boats were to be stationed by the Orkney Islands (Scapa Flow), the Firth of Moray, the Firth of Forth, and the mouth of the Humber, while other important strategic positions were occupied near the Terschelling Lightship. Meanwhile, the Flanders boats were to occupy stations near the Thames and the Hoofden. Thus, the plan was painstakingly and carefully prepared. In accordance with these plans the boats soon put out to sea.
On May 13, the U-74 stood out on her mission to lay a mine field near the Firth of Forth, extending on course from Bass Rock to the south and eastward. On May 17 the U-43, U-44, and U-52 took up scouting positions in the northern North Sea. On May 18, the U-24, U-23, U-63, and U-7o stood out. On May 20, the U-47 stood out to sea; her mission being to make a final scouting cruise toward the coast near Sunderland for the purpose of locating mine-free routes fot the fleet, checking the aids to navigation and observing the commercial traffic, after which she was to take station near Kinnaird Head.
The UB-21 and UB-22 proceeded on May 21 to the Humber, the UB-27 to the Firth of Forth, in order to take station near May Island to attack warships, and the U-72 proceeded to the Firth of Moray to lay a mine barrier on course, Stotfield Head toward Kinnaird Head.
On May 22, the U-46 and U-67 took up their stations near Terschelling Bank. The Commander Fourth Half Flotilla, Captain Prause, took passage on the U-67 in order to direct operations in case several boats were engaged. These boats had skirmishes for eight days with enemy submarines which passed Terschelling Light on their way to the German Bight. Also, destroyers and speed boats were sighted frequently by them. The condition of both personnel and material was excellent in these boats; a fact that was to stand them in good stead later.
On May 23, at 2 :00 A.M., the U-47 reported to the commander-in-chief that the fleet need have no hesitation in approaching the coast at the point planned. Admiral Scheer, however, was not able to make use of this fortunate circumstance, because the weather continued to be too severe- for airship scouting until May 30. The admiral did not deem it proper to dispense with the advantage that air scouting would give him, as he would then be fighting the enemy in their own waters and could only rely to a small degree on the scouting reports from the submarines. As regards the opportunities for submarine successes, this decision not to engage near the enemy coast was much to be regretted, since in that event, there was every probability that the submarines could make contact. Admiral Scheer waited until May 30 in the hopes of favorable weather, but at that time was forced to bring on the action if the submarines were to be utilized at all. Then the decision was reached to steam to the northward toward Skaggerak, the fleet supporting the light craft which were to engage in commerce raids. There are still a few of the preceding events to relate.
On May 28, the U-72 reported that owing to a breakdown of her fuel oil pump she was not able to fulfill her mission of laying a mine barrier near Moray Forth. On May 29, the UB-27 returned to port from her cruise to the Firth of Forth. Cruising submerged she had explored the Kirkaldy Bight and the coast as far as Inch Keith, without sighting enemy warships, but had made contact on May 24 with four old armored cruisers and destroyers near North Carr Light. This boat had been caught three times in nets and the port propeller was foul.
On May 30, at 8:00 A.M., the U-46 returned to the Ems from her position near Terschelling Light, with her only periscope badly damaged. Lieutenant Commander Hilebrand had therefore been obliged to abandon his station. He reported numerous floating mines near Terschelling Bank, many enemy submarines, and had been attacked once with gunfire and once with torpedoes by enemy submarines. In view of the general situation, the U-46 was sent immediately to the Ems mouth for renewal of her periscope.
During the night of May 30-31, the fleet put out to sea. At 7:00 A.M., May 31, the U-32 reported from her position 155 miles east of the Firth of Forth, two large battleships, two cruisers, and destroyers on course S.E. At 9:00 A.M., a report was received from the U-66 of eight battleships, small cruisers and destroyers in a position sixty miles east of Kinnaird Head on northerly course. The U-66 attempted to attack but could not obtain position, for a shot owing to strong' screen.
From these reports, it was apparent that the enemy light cruisers were out in force, and that the fleet had made contact with enemy ships. At 10:00 P.M., signal was sent by commander submarine forces for all available submarines at the Ems and the U-67 to proceed to the northward and report positions at 6:00. The U-67 could not be communicated with, as she was on the bottom, submerged, resting from her two weeks' activities. At 11:45 P.M., the U-19 and U-64 left the Ems.
At 6:00 A.M., the U-46 left the Ems mouth to join the attack to the northward. No one dreamed at the time that this, the last boat to stand out, would be the only one to come to grips with the enemy battleships. While the first three boats were searching for the sunken cruiser Elbing on orders received from the commander-in-chief at 8:57 A.M., our radio direction finding station reported a damaged English ship about eighty miles west of Horn Reef, on course WSW. Since the U-46 was already on a favorable course, she was ordered to stand on a course to intercept this vessel. At 12:30 P.M., the U-46 sighted the enemy, which was the battleship Marlborough, torpedoed in the action on the previous day, and standing in toward her dockyard, convoyed by a destroyer. Since the Marlborough was on a retiring course, the U-46 could only close to about 3,000 yards. At the moment the shot was fired the ship turned out six points and the torpedo missed. No opportunity presented itself for another shot. It was very unfortunate that the commanding officer set a course to proceed to the northward to reach the scene of the battle instead of maintaining contact with the damaged ship which could only make twelve knots; since then he could have called the Flanders boats or the U-67 to the attack. The latter sought the Marlborough without support from the U-46, but since contact was lost the search was in vain.
All other efforts to bring the submarines into the engagement proved fruitless. The U-19, U-22, and U-64 received orders to proceed toward Peterhead and Scapa Flow, but encountered very heavy weather and were forced to turn back, although on June 2 they were in the same latitude with the British Fleet, but to the westward. The U-46 was ordered to proceed toward Flamborough Head and sighted four small cruisers and ten destroyers, but was not able to assume position for attack; nor were the other submarines able to attack the British Fleet entering their ports as this was done in the night of June 2-3.
Thus, the battle of Jutland brought no opportunity for the submarines to attack, in spite of the vast preparations and the long and energetic efforts made while lying off the enemy coast. Even the Flanders boats, which were disposed to cover the Thames ports, sighted only patrol boats, and obtained no results. In the submarine service one heard the opinion expressed after the battle that the submarines should have been employed on the field of battle, a plan of operations which might have brought success, since the enemy squadrons, in carrying out the zigzag courses, usually remained in the same vicinity. Sending the boats out about twenty-four hours ahead of time and establishing several lines of submarines near the fleet covering the area between Skagerrak and Horn Reef would probably have given the boats some opportunity for attack. At the same time, it would not have been easy for the submarines to maneuver submerged and distinguish between friend and foe in the mist and smoke; further, the heavy artillery fire and the swift destroyer attacks would have forced some of the boats to seek safety at greater depths. On the other hand, there would have been numerous opportunities for attack in the extensive field over which the submarines might have been disposed; and as it turned out, it might well have been feasible to attack those units of the British Fleet which could not engage at the height of the action, as well as the retiring squadrons which were withdrawing to the northward on June 1. However, the spirits of the submarine service were again revived on June 6 when it became known that the cruiser Hampshire with Lord Kitchener on board had run on a mine field which was laid to the westward of the Orkney Islands by the U-57, under Lieutenant Commander Beitzen.
After the battle of Jutland, the submarines were employed for the most part on patrol duty near the exits from the German Bight, as it was generally believed that the English would attempt to reestablish their title to supremacy of the seas, which had been challenged at Jutland, by a powerful concerted attack on the German Bight. This, however, did not occur. No successes against men-of-war were obtained by the two lines of submarines which were established on wide arcs in the North Sea from July 3-13 and from July 28 to August 4. On their own initiative, the submarine commanders renewed the war on merchant shipping. Since few opportunities offered in the North Sea from June to August, four of the large boats were detached to service in the Baltic by orders from the Admiralty. There they became unaccustomed to the methods of cruiser warfare as practiced in the North Sea; a fact which was particularly noticeable when these boats returned to the North Sea at the time unrestricted submarine warfare was renewed.
In Flanders, the mine laying operations were continued with vigor on the east coast of England, and near Havre, Boulogne, and Cherbourg, by the newly commissioned C-I boats continuing until October, 1916. In this manner, max) tons of enemy shipping was destroyed in the summer months of 1916. For the rest, this period in Flanders was marked by the stagnation caused by the order of April 25, suspending commerce raids, a situation which could not be remedied by the efforts of the flotilla commander. The small B boats conducted a strenuous warfare near the enemy barrier on the Flanders coast, and destroyed the buoys and navigational aids, which were continually being replaced. Navigation was difficult for the newly arrived B and C boats, as well as for the destroyers of the eleventh flotilla which were supporting the submarines. Operations near the mouth of the Tyne, conducted by the B-us boats, brought no remarkable success, either against warships or merchant vessels. As the chief of the General Staff demanded about the middle of July that special effort be made to hinder the transport of troops in the English Channel, the flotilla commander sought to enhance the results of the submarines by extensive mine laying operations near the French coast; and reported, further, that greater results could be obtained provided the order against sinking without warning were revoked. To support these contentions, the submarine commander in Flanders, Commander Bartenbach, ordered the UB-1-8, under Lieutenant Commander Steinbrink, on a scouting cruise to the mouth of the Seine. All told, Commander Steinbrink made forty-one approaches in daylight, but failed to fire a single torpedo because it was impossible to determine the character of the vessel approached, either by her markings or by the mass of troops assembled on deck. Under the then prevailing orders, Commander Steinbrink could only sink seven small steamers and ten sailing vessels. As the chief of the Admiralty visited Zeebrugge on August 7, 1916, Captain Bartenbach, as a result of this cruise, argued in favor of an area between the lines Cape de la Hogue, Portland, and Calais-Downes, in which vessels might be sunk without warning when on a north or south course. As a result of this argument, an answer was received from the Admiralty stating that the situation in the summer of 1916 was not so critical as to warrant a break with America, and that until further orders not even transports should be subjected to attempted torpedoing without warning.
Admiral Scheer decided on August 19 for another operation against the English east coast. This time the experiences of the battle of Jutland were to be made use of in a fortunate manner, in so far as pertained to the employment of submarines. The boats proceeded to sea shortly before the fleet, during the night of August 18-19, in order to occupy stations in the morning, consisting of two lines of submarines; one line of four boats near Flamborough Head and a second line of six boats to the northward in the latitude of Blyth.
The large number of vessels proceeding to sea from the German Bight was reported to the English commander-in-chief by the submarines on patrol duty; and Admiral Jellicoe states in his book that he deduced from the reports the fact that the German Fleet was about to engage in large scale operations, and he thereupon left Scapa Flow with the fleet on August 18. At daylight, on August 19, he was in the latitude of the Long Forties. As early as 7:00 A.M., on August 19, the screen of light cruisers encountered the submarine line near Blyth ; whereupon it fell to the U-52, under Lieutenant Commander Walter Hans, to sink the cruiser Nottingham with three torpedo hits. Soon the U-53 made contact with the British main fleet and was able to report position and course of same continuously. In this manner, Admiral Scheer was constantly informed of the disposition of the enemy forces, as well as by the numerous airships which accompanied the fleet. Unfortunately, a report from the L-13 at 2:20 P.M., caused Admiral Scheer to abandon his original plan of operations against the English coast and to turn to the southward to engage what was reported to be a "force of large warships." The L-13 was mistaken in both the location and the strength of forces reported. It proved later to be the Harwich Force under Commodore Tyrwhitt, consisting of the most modern light cruisers, and had Admiral Scheer found them he would not have been able to engage on account of their superior speed.
In the early afternoon, the line of submarines to the southward sighted the smoke of the British forces. The U-0 and the U-66 steamed to attack. Toward 6 :oo P.M., the U-66, Lieutenant Commander v. Bothmer, was able to attack the small cruiser Falmouth; but although the vessel was struck by two torpedoes she did not sink. The U-66 and the U-0 then tried to finish off this ship, but owing to the good screening of the destroyers this could not be accomplished before darkness set in. Only the next day did this ship fall a victim to torpedo attacks by the U-63, under Lieutenant Commander Schultze.
This was the most perfect case of cooperation between the fleet and the submarines ever attempted. Lord Jellicoe expressed his astonishment that the submarine trap as exemplified by these operations was not made use of earlier in the war. His views were shared by Captain Bauer, commander of submarine forces, who had expressed this wish since the beginning of the war.
Following up these operations, attempts were made to use the submarines against enemy warships during and in conjunction with aircraft attacks on the east coast of England, but without result. In the meantime, toward the end of August, Captain Bartenbach decided to send his B boats to the western end of the channel to conduct cruiser warfare in accordance with prize rules, since he could not obtain authority for unrestricted warfare on transports in the straits, and did not want to keep his flotilla idle. On September 1 the UB-r8, under Steinbrink, the UB-23, under Voigt, the UB-29, under Pustkuchen, and the UB-39, under Werner, stood out to the western channel. This opening campaign brought results of about 70,000 tons. Thereupon Captain Bartenbach sought to achieve even greater results against enemy shipping along these lines, even though operations were not very promising owing to the patrols (convoy), the arming of merchantmen, and the fact that boarding and searching transports was out of the question. They were further hindered by the low surface speed of these boats—barely nine knots—and the fact that they were armed with only 5 cm. guns. A re-armament of these boats with 8.8 cm. guns was immediately undertaken.
This decision of the Flanders flotilla influenced the North Sea flotilla to such an extent that during the operations against warships in September and early October, these boats began commerce raids on their own initiative to a greater or less extent. Thus, the U-57, under Lieutenant Commander Georg, sank a large steamer and twenty-one fishing vessels, near Flamborough Head, while the U-49, under Lieutenant Commander Hartmann, sank three sailing vessels and sent in one prize to the Ems.
These deeds were, however, not alone inspired by the activities of the Flanders flotilla, nor the results of the operations in the Mediterranean, but by another event of great importance. Hindenburg and Ludendorff had been appointed to the supreme command of the Army. These two leaders realized that if a decision was to be obtained, the most energetic employment of the submarines was essential. As early as August 30 conferences were held at Pless between the military leaders and the chief of the Admiralty regarding the renewal of unrestricted submarine warfare in the North Sea and Flanders. The Chancellor, v. Bethmann Hollweg, professed to believe that this would bring Holland and Denmark into the war. Although these fears were somewhat farfetched (our attache at the Hague, Captain v. Muller, and others denied any such danger) the military leaders decided to postpone the opening of unrestricted submarine activities until the situation in Roumania could be sufficiently cleared up to permit the mobilization of defense corps near the borders of Holland and Denmark. The fact remained that the idea of unrestricted submarine warfare was favorably considered and only the question as to the time for commencing it held in abeyance. It is tragic to note, however, that the decision as to new construction was not made at this time.
Up to this time, the orders for a large number of certain types of submarines had been purposely avoided, since the continuous changes in the methods of employment of these boats prevented the selection of a definite suitable type. Further, the decision was held in abeyance until certain new types which were being used at the front could demonstrate their fitness before orders for them were placed on a large scale. Now these obstacles no longer existed. A large number of certain series should have been immediately ordered. Only in this manner could a full exploitation of the technical experience of the dockyards and the industries which supplied them be obtained. At all events, the dockyards building merchantmen should have been drawn into submarine construction at an earlier date. Particularly fateful was the decision of the Secretary of State for the Navy, v. Capelle, which was influenced by the fact that after the war a large number of submarines would be decidedly disadvantageous for the administration and the further expansion of the navy as a world power. The director of submarines in the Admiralty, Commander Spindler,1 in spite of urgent representations on his part, was only permitted to order new submarine construction after many delays, hindrances, and refusals. It should have been the other way around, i.e., the secretary should have expressly ordered the fullest utilization of the dockyards for new construction.
Thus it came about that after the conference at Pless in 1916 only two 800-ton boats, sixteen 400-ton boats, and nine submarine cruisers were ordered. In anticipation, it should be remarked that the orders for new construction in February, 1917, of six 800-ton boats and forty-five 400-ton boats were insufficient for the operations contemplated by the order of February I, 1917, for unrestricted warfare. Not until June and December, 1917, were large scale orders placed with the dockyards, due to pressure from the front. These were as follows: June, nine 850-ton boats, ten 2,000-ton boats, thirty-seven 500-ton boats, and thirty-five 450-ton mine laying boats; in December, twelve 850-ton boats, thirty-six 500-ton boats, thirty-four 450-ton mine laying boats, and twenty 350-ton single hull boats. Even these could not be considered a large scale building program. This point will be discussed later on.
The dispatch of the U-53 to America and the receipt of orders on September 15 for three boats to proceed to the Polar Sea, broke in on the monotony of the apparently useless "strictly military employment" of the submarines, and revived the hopes of the flotilla.
The U-53 proceeded on this duty on September 17, her primary mission being to attack the warcraft which were supposed to be near the entrance of Long Island Sound, waiting for the submarine merchantman Bremen. In addition to this, the U-53 was to carry out commerce raids in accordance with prize rules. On October 7 the U-53 entered Newport harbor. On the same day she proceeded to sea after an exchange of official courtesies. On October 9 she attacked and sank five English and neutral vessels, carrying contraband, near Nantucket Lightship, while American destroyers looked on and assisted in the rescue of the crews. On October 28, the U-53 arrived in Helgoland in good condition.
The U-43, U-46, and U-48 operated near the North Cape and along the Murman coast. They succeeded in sinking about 50,000 tons; and in addition the U-46 brought in to Wilhelmshafen a steamer carrying munitions and automobiles valued at forty million gold marks. While these boats were still at sea, on October 6 orders were received for the resumption of commerce warfare in accordance with prize rules, such as was already in full swing in Flanders, on the initiative of Captain Bartenbach.
It should be stated that the following period, up to February 1, was particularly favorable. New commanding officers on the U-49 and U-5o achieved sinkings amounting to 40,000 tons in the Bay of Biscay, while the older experienced commanders were equally fortunate. Sufficient experience had been obtained to equalize to some extent the hindrances resulting from the restricting operations orders. Thus, the commanding officers took steamers with them for the safe keeping of the crews of captured vessels, until the latter were filled up and could be sent into port. By skillful maneuvering the operations could be carried out outside the zone of enemy patrols. Results obtained near Cape Finisterre and further to the southward were particularly gratifying.
In Flanders the commerce warfare could only be carried out in accordance with prize rules by the B-11 and C-11 boats in the western approaches to the channel; and such operations did not offer such favorable opportunities as with the large North Sea boats which could choose their own field of operation. The small B-1 class of boats could not be used effectively in this type of warfare. Of especial note were the results accomplished in Flanders by the following officers: Lieutenants Wassner, Loss, Howalk, Viebag, Salzwedel, and Hunius, as well at the previously mentioned older officers.
After wearisome negotiations between the military and political leaders, on January 9 authority was granted to submarine commanders to attack armed merchantmen without warning; and this was followed on January 12 by the decision to commence unrestricted submarine warfare, the time for the beginning of the latter being set at February 1, 1917.
In spite of the lateness of the date set, the decision for unrestricted submarine warfare was greeted with joy at the front in that it appeared as an end of the continual vacillation of policy which existed up to that time; even though many a justified doubt was expressed as to whether or not it was too late in coming and whether the submarine service was sufficiently equipped from a material standpoint for such extensive operations.
Unfortunately, the declaration of the unrestricted warfare carried with it a bomb. This lay in the fact that in the spring of 1916 the Naval Staff had expressed the hope that with such means the English resistance could be broken in six months. This declaration had two consequences, viz.: (I) It led to a certain tension at the front, since, if the Naval Staff really believed by such means to end the war in six months, it followed that every boat should be made available in the shortest possible time and overhaul periods that would have been necessary for a longer period of operations should be very much shortened or abandoned. This principle appeared to justify the most extreme employment of the submarines.
With this in view, the idea was evolved in the North Sea flotilla, to attempt the passage of the Dover Straits as the quickest means of proceeding to .the attack, although since April, 1915, this route had been abandoned by all but a few of the North Sea boats. At all events, the Flanders flotilla had had considerable experience in passing the Dover Straits and were constantly able to overcome the renewed difficulties which were made by the enemy in the Channel. On these grounds, Captain Bartenbach advised the route through the straits for the North Sea flotilla. Thus, with the opening of the unrestricted warfare, about 50 per cent of the time this route was utilized in passage to the west coast of England. Great success was obtained in this manner by individual boats, particularly the U-85, under Lieutenant Commander Petz (December 17,50,000. tons) and the U-53, under Lieutenant Commander Rose (March 17) ; while on the other hand, many of the boats encountered considerable difficulty in the passage of the Channel, and owing to weather and other unfavorable conditions held to the northern route around Scotland. As the conditions for the northern route improved in March, the commander of the North Sea flotilla ordered this route to the northward of England for all large North Sea boats, as the usual method of procedure. His desire personally to explore operating conditions in the Channel on one of his boats was refused by the commander-in-chief, but his measures to avoid losses proved correct, since they were taken before any appreciable loss occurred.
(2) The hope of the Naval Staff to bring the war to a conclusion in such a short time halted the large scale building program. It has already been stated that the declaration for the unrestricted warfare found the submarine service considerably short of the required number of boats to carry out operations on such a large scale. Admiral Capelle said himself that he could not, under those circumstances, agree to the construction of a large number of boats which could not be completed within one year's time. By this sharper form of submarine warfare, the sinkings were noticeably increased from the start. In February they were double what they were in January, while in April and June they reached nearly a million tons.
In the North Sea area during 1917-18, the following officers achieved notable results: Lieutenant Commanders Schweiger, Rose, Wunsche, v. Georg, Adam, Dichman, and many others who cannot be mentioned in the limited space of this article.
England felt that she stood before a momentous decision and made extraordinary efforts to avoid the danger. Her counteroffensive measures toward the middle of 1917 took the following forms, viz.:
1. Further obstacles to the passage of the Dover Straits.
2. Increased net and mine laying operations near the German Bight. In the latter, the enemy obtained greater and greater practice. The fleet was engaged in greater activity in keeping clear the exists from the German Bight. Counter-mining was resorted to by us. This led to the loss of a number of English mine layers, as shown by the British list of losses, while on the other hand, several of our submarines were lost. Thus, on May 14, 1917, the U-59, under Lieutenant Commander v. Firks, was lost on our own mine barrier near Horn Reef, as in the fog he missed picking up the navigational aids which were laid out to the southward. The best route from the Ems lay to the westward along the sand banks off the coast of Holland, where the German submarines were able to coast near the banks with very few navigational aids as far as the area of reported British mine fields. From the middle of 1917 on, the commander mine sweeping forces and the fleet attempted to keep a large area clear of mines from the Ems to the outer limits of the English mine barriers lying to the north and westward of the German Bight. As far as this area the submarines were to be safely convoyed by surface craft, then they were to submerge and pass the outer mine barrier under water. On entering, the reverse of this procedure was to be followed. This scheme worked successfully at first, but led later to losses after the English submarines on patrol off the German Bight had observed and reported on the methods in use; whereupon the British, instead of laying out mine barriers, resorted to a system of nets with mines attached, placed at different depths. In this manner, a number of competent officers were lost in September, such as Lieutenant Commander Schweiger of the U-88 and Lieutenant Commander Berger of the U-50. Lieutenant Commander Hufnagel, on the U-106, was lost also on entering the German Bight on October 9, 1917. Since no decision was reached to undertake a forcible clearing of the barriers, the boats were forced to resort to the passage through the Baltic for the first time (standing out through the Little Belt and entering through the Sound).
From September, 1917, on, the new commander submarine force, Commodore Michelsen, decided to return to the route through the Dover Straits. On September 28, the U-70, enroute to the Dover Straits, was caught by the stern in a net-mine, but was fortunately able to be brought in to Zeebrugge. In November, the U-48 and the U-94 were set on to the Goodwin Banks by strong westerly currents, and failure of the gyro-compass. The U-94 came clear after lightening ship, but the U-48 had to be blown up by the crew. On the other hand, Lieutenant Commander Rose, on the U-53, sank 28,000 tons on a thirteen-day expedition in October. After the unexplained loss in January of the U-87 (Speth-Schulzburg), U-84 (Rohr), U-93 (Gerlach), and U-95 (Brinz) during passage of the Dover Straits, and reports from the Flanders flotilla of additional barriers in the Channel, Commodore Michelsen thereupon ordered the route to the northward of England to be resumed.
3. One very effective counter-measure, which the English conceived during the height of our submarine activities in June, was the formation of merchant convoys. The assembly of from twenty to thirty merchantmen in convoys considerably reduced the opportunities for attack, and further rendered the attack technically more difficult on account of the convoying destroyers or other craft forming a protective screen. The convoy system was soon employed in all theaters of war, including the Atlantic Ocean, Mediterranean, and the North Sea, between the Shetlands and Bergen. The latter convoy traffic was so heavy that special submarine operations were directed against them. At first this was attempted with large boats, later with B-L boats, and finally attempts were made to disturb this traffic with surface craft.
Taken altogether, these counter-measures effectively prevented any increase in the sinkings over the maximum reached in July, 1917, although no very alarming falling off in the sinkings began to occur until May, 1918. However, the maximum sinkings of June, 1917, could have been maintained in spite of these countermeasures, had the number of boats at the front been increased. Had a building program been definitely initiated at the end of August, 1916, at the time when Hindenburg and Ludendorff decided on the unrestricted submarine warfare, the results would have been operative in the fall of 1917. On the other hand, the greatest number of boats available for use at the front in the North Sea, Flanders, and the Mediterranean, was 132 in September, 1917. From this time on, the number of boats varied from 110 in June, 1918, to 123 in October, 1918.
Under these circumstances, it is not to be wondered at that the personnel at the front began to consider seriously the question of speeding up submarine construction in the fall of 1917. The efforts of Commodore Michelsen and the commander-in-chief in this matter led to the establishment, in the latter part of 1917, of a separate independent department in the Admiralty for all matters pertaining to the material, personnel, and organization of the submarine service. (Previous efforts for the establishment of this bureau had been made by the administrative officers in the Admiralty, without result.) The time for the creation of this bureau was favorable in so far as one hoped to be able to enlist greater support from the industrial workers in submarine construction after the collapse of Russia. Unfortunately, this hope proved to be vain, since the military leaders did not believe the time ripe to transfer large numbers of workmen to this field, owing to the impending offensive on the western front. In the Submarine Bureau, the question was debated as to whether or not it would not be more advantageous to utilize the labor set free by the collapse of the eastern front for intensive submarine warfare instead of a renewed offensive on the western front. At the same time, the troops released from the east front could be used to crush Italy, which would go far to support the submarine offensive in the Mediterranean, since the latter had been reasonably successful in itself. Since a similar conception already existed among certain military leaders in slightly different form, the chief of the Submarine Bureau, Vice Admiral Ritter v. Mann, undertook to lay the matter energetically before the proper authorities. Unfortunately, no consensus of opinion could be obtained among the naval and military leaders on this point. At that time, too much confidence was felt by the Admiralty in the supreme military command (Hindenburg and Ludendorff) for the naval leaders to attempt to oppose their decision in regard to any question of military policy. Therefore, the decision to undertake the western offensive remained. However, the chief of the Submarine Bureau was enabled by exerting pressure on the military leaders to obtain small drafts of workmen, and by a reorganization to obtain better delivery of material from the inland industrial works, thus avoiding delays in construction. Further, the bureau undertook a large scale construction of repair facilities at the bases in order to shorten the overhaul periods. At the beginning of April, large construction programs were initiated at Pola and Cattaro. One tragic episode was the fact that the Pyovica docks near Cattaro Bay were just completed when it became necessary to evacuate the Austrian ports. In the home waters, the following construction program was undertaken, viz., the expansion of the Holm docks in Danzig, the establishment of a base at Lubeck, another base at Hamburg (now the Deutsche Werfte), and an expansion of the docks at Emden. As early as December, 1917, thirty large and ninety small boats were launched, and up to June, 1918, sixty-four additional large and 156 smaller boats. A number of dockyards not previously engaged in submarine construction were drafted into this work. Thus it came about that at the outbreak of the revolution 44o boats were under construction, of which 137 were the larger type, while 330 new contracts had been placed. Of these, 117 were large boats, which had been contracted for in September and October, 1918. For these contracts, negotiations were entered into with Hugo Stinnes, and the heads of the larger inland industries were called together in Berlin to arrange for a division of labor in such a manner that the overloaded dockyards could be relieved to some extent by the other industries. All of these extraordinary efforts of the Submarine Bureau were necessitated by the neglect in previous years. Thus, the bureau fought a losing fight, but as the delivery of thirty new submarines for service at the front became a certainty in September, 1918, the chief of the Bureau could feel that he had accomplished the maximum possible.
September, 1917, brought the opening of the submarine cruiser operations which are of sufficient importance to mention even in this abbreviated article. These were opened by the cruises of the U-152, under Lieutenant Commander Huesel, and the U-151 under Commander Kophamel, both being former submarine merchantmen. These cruises lasted three months and extended in the Atlantic as far as the Azores, resulting in the sinking of 40,000 and 30,000 tons, respectively. These cruises were directed by the Admiralty and were particularly promising since they could be conducted in areas where few counter-measures existed. A particularly successful cruise was made by the former submarine merchantman U-155, under Commander Eckelmann (January 14 to May 4, 1918) from the barrier near the Azores to the westward of Gibraltar with results of 50,000 tons. Another of the U-152, under Commander Kolbe (December 23, 1917, to April 19, 1918) to the coast of Portugal and Africa and as far as the Canary Islands resulted in sinking 30,000 tons. As for the submarine cruisers, only two more came into service up to the time of the revolution: U-139 and U-14o. The U-14o, under Commander Kophamel, was enroute to America from July 2 to September zo, 1918. This resulted in the sinking of about 30,000 tons. The U-139 and the U-140 were both hindered in their operations by leaks in the pressure hull and by poor stability on diving. Of the thirty-eight new submarine cruisers with two 3,000 h.p., Diesel motors, which were completed just before the revolution, none came into action; while the fast 1,200-ton boats, of which the U-I3.5 was the first to be commissioned, suffered the same fate. The new large mine laying boats of the U-117 series to U-126, carrying up to twenty-four torpedoes and forty-two mines, were partly available for war service. The cruise of the U-117 under Commander Droscher to the coast of North America, resulting in the sinking of 23,000 tons of merchant shipping, is worthy of note.
Undoubtedly, the three new types of submarines would have achieved extraordinary successes had the war lasted longer. The British regarded with great anxiety these new developments in the submarine weapon, and the greater possibilities which existed as a result of this expansion of submarine warfare. That these operations would extend far beyond the field of the British counter-measures was better understood in England than in Germany; hence their characterization that the Germans had given up their weapons "five minutes" too soon.
The previously mentioned falling off in the sinkings from May, 1918, on, is to be attributed in the first place to the fact that at this time the British obtained the upper hand in the submarine operations in Flanders. As early as January, 1918, the average monthly loss of boats in this area reached four. From April on, the docks at Zeebrugge were subjected to extensive air attacks. Any one who had visited the Flanders flotilla at this time knew that they were and regarded themselves as the right wing of the hard pressed western front; and that neither the Admiralty nor the flotilla- commander would initiate anything to restrict the activities of this base. It was the spirit of Leonidas and his band of heroes that ruled in Flanders. On the other hand, a careful consideration of the efforts made against the results achieved must have decided the Admiralty to undertake the gradual dissolution of the Flanders flotilla. The losses to the service of valuable experienced personnel and material were not replaceable by any means. It would have been proper to have detached these B-11 boats with their experienced commanders in the spring of 1918 and assigned them to the flotillas in the North Sea and the Mediterranean, respectively. After the commander submarine forces in the North Sea had abandoned the passage through the Dover Straits in February, 1918, a procedure had been established based on the experiences of Commanders Rose and Saalwachter, by which the average loss of boats did not exceed two per month.
Against this procedure, the great mine barrage laid by England and America, extending from the Orkneys to the Norwegian Coast, availed but little; only two boats are known to have been lost as a result of same, namely, the U-156, under Lieutenant Commander Feldt, and the UB-127, under Lieutenant Scherner. It is not to be denied, however, that the threat of this barrage was extremely unpleasant.
The acceptance of the fourteen points of Wilson in October, 1918, brought an end to the commerce raids in submarine warfare. Once more the idea of joint military operations with the Fleet under Admiral Hipper against the enemy flickered and died out. (Admiral Scheer had in the meantime been appointed to the supreme command of the Navy.) It was too late. The collapse of our High Seas Fleet called back the B-boats which had assumed outlying positions for attack.
The submarine warfare did not bring the expected results, and we have learned the reasons for its failure. Although the war with the submarines was not successful, still it exerted a powerful influence on the future sea power in that it altered the conception of what constitutes this power.
1. Editor’s Note—An article on submarines, by Rear Admiral Spindler, will appear in the May issue of the PROCEEDINGS.