THE NAVAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR—The Stress of Sea Power, 1915-16. Vol. II. Thomas G. Frothing- ham, Captain, U. S. Reserve. Harvard University Press, 1925. $3.75.
Reviewed by Rear Admiral W. L. Rodgers, U. S. Navy, Retired
This very interesting work is a continuation of the volume published recently. The story is clearly told. One has no difficulty in following the course of events and grasping relations of cause and effect. It shows the lack of understanding and cooperation between the chief authorities as to the various actions in hand and their general lack of foresight. It conveys the same impression as the previous volume of the inaptitude of leaders on both sides to conduct war in the most profitable manner. In particular, the politicians played politics and the warriors played war, without playing into each other’s hands as good partners do at bridge. The writer’s plan of work is to show the general situation at each crisis, and then to trace the history of events until the next crisis when he again pictures the situation and comments on its evolution.
The volume opens with a description of the situation early in 1915, with the Central Powers besieged by land and sea. The objective of the Central Powers was to break the state of siege, and that of the Allies, to press it. But the leaders of the Allies, however, did not realize that they were to be faced by greater tasks than in the past. On the other hand, the Germans had a sound, and as it proved, a successful, plan. When the Germans made their spring attack on the Russians, it was necessary for the latter to have munitions from the manufacturing nations, their allies. It was necessary for the allied sea power to enter either the Baltic or the Black Sea to prevent the collapse of Russia. As narrated in the first volume, Lord Fisher had turned the efforts of the Admiralty to ship building for moving a Russian army on the Baltic. He did not propose immediately to enter the Baltic and stop communication between Scandinavia and Germany while supplying Russia.
Apropos of the German supply of war necessaries through Sweden, the writer does not emphasize as strongly as he might, the desire at this time of the British Government to stand well with English “business” and .how this disregard of trade control as a weapon of war delayed victory. It was not till the war was two years old that the British checked the leakage of hostile supplies through neutral countries. In the meantime, the United States, the one all-important neutral, was sending protests about interference with her neutral commerce through Holland and Scandinavia. She was offended by the British short-sightedness which led Britain, for the sake of home politics, to favor British trade with the enemy while checking rival American trade through enforcement of the rules of contraband and blockade. Diplomacy, home politics, and warfare were not harmoniously nor cooperatively conducted.
As an interjection, it may be remarked that English international lawyers are developing the idea that the next English war will be a war against property more than ever in the past, and, no doubt, they will have the rules to suit. In this we should encourage them, for it is our game, too.
After the fleet's failure at the Dardanelles, as told m the first volume, the Allies proceeded with their effort to clear the way there for the sake of Russian supplies. The second volume tells of the army attack. The army arrived at the Dardanelles unready to assist in the last naval attack on March 18, 1915, when there were good prospects of success for an immediate joint operation. Before the army was ready to act, the Turks had put Gallipoli in a good state of defense and the long drawn-out efforts of the army till its withdrawal in January, 1916, were costly failures. There was no high control from London of all the forces, political, naval, and military, to make concerted effort, and Russia collapsed in consequence. In the meantime, the Germans felt it necessary to open the sea to German trade. The overland rush at France had failed; a long war was in sight, and the Germans then decided to use their superiority in submarines, mines, and torpedoes, for a trade war.
If the submarines should be successful against English trade, the war quickly would be won by them, while if the English continued to control the surface of the sea, Germany would probably lose, although not so quickly. But the German submarine threat against passengers’ lives outweighed the British interference with commerce, in the estimation of the great neutral nation, the United States. Here the German weakness is clearly brought out by the author. The German military leaders did not seek to understand American psychology and the point of view of Americans. They understood the technique of war much better than the Allies, but they did not understand international politics, and when the German General Staff overruled the chancellor on this question of the United States, it was the fatal step that led to their defeat nearly four years later. In order that the Germans might sink British shipping and that the Allies might stop German commerce, the practice of the war violated all the canons of so-called international law. To cope with new conditions, new methods of warfare were necessary, and it appeared that international law lacked effective sanction. It became manifest that dread of neutral displeasure would be the chief touchstone of belligerent conduct. The allies were frankly deferential to American opinion and Captain Frothingham shows that, contrary to the general belief, Germany was sensitive, too; but, in the end, the German civil authorities yielded to military views as to warfare and incurred the penalty for violating the rules of war as they existed in the mind of the American people. The penalty was that America turned from neutrality to hostility.
There is no sanction to international law except the opinion of the world, and that opinion is effective only when some nation is willing to make war to enforce the rule. All this is evident in the narrative and is most instructive. An interesting point brought out is in regard to the provisions made by the English against an invasion of England and the entire failure to comprehend the actual situation as Germany saw it in that respect. The government maintained unnecessary troops in England for defense, and assigned a defensive role to the British Grand Fleet, whereas the British naval authorities should have insisted that any invasion was improbable and if attempted, should have been met by submarines, leaving the fleet free for duties of offense. But it appears that British naval officers were better as administrators than as masters of war. They accepted a defensive attitude against an attack never contemplated by the enemy.
Thus, by the end of 1915, the Russians had been defeated, Bulgaria had entered the war, and Serbia was overwhelmed. So the allied troops were withdrawn from Gallipoli and with others from France had established themselves at Salonica. This threat was maintained by sea power till the latter part of the war, when it materialized as an important factor in the final victories.
By their successes of 1915 the Germans were encouraged to take the offensive in 1916, both by land and sea. The unrestricted U-boat warfare was meant by the general staff to be the main feature of the naval work of 1916. This was opposed by the chancellor, who did not wish to offend the United States. The incident of the Sussex, early in 1916, and the emphatic protest of the United States led to the postponement of the submarine campaign and a consequent change in the policy of the German Navy. The Germans, thereafter, sought opportunities to draw out the British fleet and interpose between its detachments. For this purpose a bombardment of the eastern shores of England was undertaken in April, but little came of it.
At this time the German fleet was not prepared to make tactical use of its submarines in close cooperation with its surface fleet, but the British did not appreciate this and dreaded them unduly. On the other, hand the British naval strategy for 1916 repays examination. As Captain Frothing- ham says, Admiral Jellicoe should be considered not only as an individual officer, but as representing the prevailing doctrines of the British Navy approved at the Admiralty. The British commander-in-chief was anxious to destroy the hostile fleet, but he regarded it as of greater importance to maintain complete surface control of the sea, in spite of submarine and mine dangers of whose tactics and importance he was uncertain. He knew he was superior in numbers to the German High Sea Fleet, but he was resolved not to risk entanglement with submarines or mines while engaging the hostile fleet. This is the key to his conduct in the great battle of May 31. It appears from the author’s account that, at the Battle of Jutland, the British fleet was inferior to the Germans except in numbers and weight of broadsides. The German fleet was better protected, with better sights and fire control, and had better tactical training.
After the sortie of April, the German fleet remained in port till the middle of May when it was ready to repeat its April maneuver of bombardment to draw out the British fleet and seek an opportunity to attack it when divided. Submarines were sent to take station off British ports, and arrangements were made for reconnaissance from the air. But the weather was unfavorable for dirigibles and the fleet sortie was delayed until near the end of the U-boats’ endurance on the cruise. Then the aid of the airships was renounced, and the German fleet went out at daylight on May 31, moving towards Norway, whence it was the expectation that the battle cruisers would be reported to England and draw out the British fleet. Admiral Scheer thought this would be a safer move than one towards the British coast, which he had contemplated when he expected reconnaissance by air. However, the British Admiralty learned on May 30 that the Germans would probably soon get to sea and, accordingly, the British fleet got out on May 30, before midnight, and contact between the advanced light cruisers of the hostile force took place at 2:30 p.m. on the thirty-first, and between the battle cruisers at 3:30. During this precious hour, the battle cruisers repeatedly altered course and, although they were moving at reduced speed, Admiral Beatty made no effort to cause the fast battleships accompanying him to close up to support him, although they were only a few thousand yards off. In consequence, the British battle cruisers were severely punished in the ensuing engagement with the German battle cruisers. The German ships proved much superior. 'At 4:32, the German battleships sighted the engagement and the British turned north towards their main body, with the battle squadron now somewhat nearer the battle cruisers and following them.
From now on, the task of the British forces under Admiral Beatty and engaged with the enemy was to guide the main fleet into favorable contact with the Germans. According to the author’s account, Admiral Beatty failed and so the commander-in-chief made a poor approach. In accordance with his well-considered doctrine, he was cautious in closing, for fear of submarines and torpedoes. The German fleet presented itself in a way most advantageous to its stronger enemy, yet, by superior handling, the former withdrew without much damage and was lost to sight of the British. But darkness was approaching, many torpedoes had been expended, and some German battleships had much reduced their ammunition supply. So, to effect a final break-away for the night, Admiral Scheer again approached the enemy, made a thrust with battle cruisers and torpedo boats, and again, by the most skillful handling, withdrew into the haze without much damage. Admiral Scheer then decided to proceed to port, fighting his way if necessary, but general fighting was unnecessary, for the British commander-in-chief, in accordance with his long-studied views, resolved to avoid night action and proceeded on a southerly course while the enemy crossed his wake on the way home. There was filing during the night and some losses to both sides, but the battle was over. The Germans had been maneuvered with far greater skill and suffered only half the tonnage loss of the much more numerous enemy. It is not a battle which will be a pride to the British Navy.
Nevertheless, mistakes are at least as instructive as successes, and the situation, as it appeared to the British commander-in-chief when he personally sighted the enemy, is worthy of the most thoughtful consideration by all naval people. He withdrew from the enemy to avoid torpedoes. He also might have dodged them by turning towards them as is now thought good practice. But to put it plainly, by this account, after two years of warfare the British fleet does not seem to have been well prepared for battle. Admiral Jellicoe adhered to his preconceived course of action arrived at by cold consideration long before, and refused a good opportunity to destroy the enemy in order that he might be sure of remaining in control of the sea after the battle. He did not take into account, as a factor, the probable condition of the enemy after two hours of fighting. They were short of torpedoes and the leading battleships were short of ammunition. In brief, as this reviewer has remarked before, the British leaders show more evidence of training in peace administration than for war, and we of the American Navy should profit by the omission, not to fail that way ourselves. From what is known on this side of the ocean of Admiral Beatty and his character, he would probably have been more controlled by his emotions, if in the place of the commander-in-chief who did not swerve from his plan, and Beatty would have closed with the enemy at about 6:30 and, perhaps, won a great victory even if there had been considerable loss. But as a subordinate, Beatty was not helpful to his commander-in-chief.
Admiral Scheer shines by contrast as a bold, admirable tactician, whose well-trained fleet was perfectly in hand and responsive to every demand upon it.
The German success at Jutland led the military leaders to insist on a renewal of unrestricted U-boat warfare, which was thought necessary to cut off English supplies. That the United States might enter the war did not seem of great military importance. The author indicates that the Allies also failed to appreciate the political influence of the United States at this stage of the war. They thought that their own submarine defense had checked the German U-boats, whereas it was the diplomatic protest of the United States. Consequently, when the Germans, after good preparation, again sent out their submarines in force, the Allies had not profited by the respite to improve their submarine defenses. The German High Sea Fleet was now to take the duty of facilitating and covering U-boat activities.
During the last three months of 1916, the U-boats were used in accordance with the rules for surface ships and brought about changes in the allied method of handling shipping to meet the losses. Nevertheless, the method of patrolled areas was not very satisfactory, and it needed the unrestricted attacks beginning in 1917 to cause the Allies to adopt the centuries-old method of convoy, which proved so much more effective as defense. During 1916 the general course of the war seemed to the Germans satisfactory. They had ruined Russia, overcome Roumania, the new belligerent, and held the Allies on the western front. They now undertook to win the war in defiance of public opinion of the one all-important neutral nation.
Here the volume closes. It deserves the closest attention of students of politics and of war. It shows the necessity for wise combination of political considerations with military ones. Both sides failed. In Germany the military leaders overrode the opinion of the foreign office, seeing the military situation before it with the greatest clarity, but seeing nothing else. On the allied side, particularly in England, which was the chief maritime combatant, the civil view of warfare was predominant. It cannot be said that this view overrode the military view, for Admiral Jellicoe and the Admiralty themselves were inclined to the usual view of civilians, and were . more occupied with security for England and England’s trade than they were for the ruin of Germany. They were more preoccupied with what Germany might do to England than with what England might accomplish against Germany. There was no danger of an invasion of England, but the navy did not assert it and act on that opinion. This attitude of mind is one which does not lead to success in war.
For naval officers the lesson of this volume, as of the preceding one, is that of the inscription addressed to the knight of fable entering the enchanted castle: “Be bold, be bold, be not too bold.” The first part was applicable to English policy, the second to the Germans.
Since politicians throughout their careers are interested in the problems of peace and make little attempt to understand those of war, it seems necessary that the necessary liaison between diplomacy, policy, and warfare must be provided by requiring military leaders to be more or less familiar with international politics, diplomacy, and with the point of view of foreign peoples and governments in regard to the world.
TWENTY-FIVE Y'EARS, 1892-1916, Lord Grey’s Memoirs. By Viscount Grey of Fallodon, K.G. 2 vols. Stokes, 1925. $10.
The twenty-five years covered by Lord Grey include those immediately preceding the World War and the first half of that war. Lord Grey is the leading British authority on British foreign affairs, having been in the British Government as foreign secretary from 1905 to 1916. lie entered Parliament in 1885 as a Liberal; was under-secretary of state, 1892 to 189s, and a member of Parliament in opposition from 1895 to 1905.
To enable the reader to understand his Twenty-five Years, Grey outlined the situation existing immediately prior to 1892 in English foreign affairs, which in brief, was:
Britain generally sided with the Triple Alliance—Germany, Austria, and Italy then the most powerful European alliance, and opposed Russia and France in all parts of the world.
Under Beaconsfield, Britain barred Russia from the Mediterranean; under Lansdowne, she barred Russia from the Persian Gulf; under Balfour, she opposed Russia s entrance to Port Arthur, and when her resistance was unavailing, seized Wei Hai Wei as a counterpoise. During this same period she opposed France generally throughout the world and especially in Africa and in China. Her navy was avowedly built to equal that of Russia and h lance, her two nearest naval competitors. In Europe the Triple Alliance— Germany, Austria, and Italy—was opposed to Russia and France. The continual bickering between England and Russia, and England and France, gave Germany, the leading spirit in the Triple Alliance, opportunity to put pressure on either party, and Grey says Germany made England pay for German support against France in its peaceful penetration of Egypt.
From 1895 to 1899 the relations between Britain, Russia and France became more strained. The war with the Boers in 1899 revealed to England that she was completely isolated in Europe and that she must add Germany to her potential enemies. The same year Germany refused an alliance with Great Britain, offered by Chamberlain, the father of the present British foreign minister. By 1900 Germany’s determination to build a big fleet became apparent to Great Britain. Deprived of European allies and alarmed at her isolation, England went to the Far East and allied herself with Japan in 1902.
One purpose of the Japanese alliance was soon accomplished, namely, the defeat of Russia in 1905, but before this time British policy had found it necessary to take a more decided stand in regard to European alliances. Britain could no longer afford her “splendid isolation,” the boast of the previous British generation, and France, smarting under repeated German threats which culminated in the forced removal of Delcasseé, her foreign minister in 1905, welcomed England’s friendship; the two countries quickly settled their colonial problems and then agreed to give diplomatic support to each other in all parts of the world. The entente between England and France was initiated by the Unionists but the Liberals acquiesced heartily and Grey emphatically voices his approval of the era of good will that set in between England and France.
Grey became foreign minister in 1905 in the midst of the first Moroccan crisis and his first important decision was to permit the high command in the British Army to arrange directly with the French military attaché the methods of cooperation between the British and French Armies. As the members of the British Government were all electioneering in various parts of the country, Grey was only able to consult with the Prime Minister and Secretary of War, who consented to the arrangements for possible participation of the British Army in Europe on the side of France with the distinct understanding that the British Government was not committed to war and would not be committed unless British public opinion favored entering the war. Meanwhile, Great Britain would energetically support France by all diplomatic means. This crisis passed without war but it revealed to Germany that England was definitely committed to the Dual Alliance. Grey did not inform the other members of the cabinet of the arrangements being made between the British and French Armies until several years later. He carefully explains the reasons for this omission; but his explanation did not convince all his colleagues and he was severely criticized after the war by Lord Loreburn, a member of the Government, who was kept in ignorance of this important decision.
England realized that as a potential ally of France she could not consistently continue her opposition to Russia, and sought an understanding with Russia. Negotiations between Russia and England crystalized into a convention signed on August 31, 1907, containing arrangements on the subject of Persia, Afghanistan, and Thibet. This agreement between Russia and England, which logically followed the agreement between France and England, caused the British Government considerable trouble. It was opposed by many of the Conservatives who did not believe in the good faith of Russia or the wisdom of the alliance, and by many of the Liberals who were opposed to any form of agreement with the czardom. To remove the constant friction with Russia over Persia, England joined that country in the partition of Persia under the euphonious term of “spheres of influence.” The memoirs indicate that Grey did not thoroughly approve of this procedure but he considered the friendship of Russia and England so necessary to the peace of Europe that he consented to a “lesser evil.” Grey acquiesced in Russia’s expulsion of Morgan Shuster, the American financial expert who was reestablishing Persian finances, but eventually was forced to warn Benckendorf that if Russia continued her policy of making trouble in Persia, the friendly agreement between England and Russia might cease. The Czar’s action in suspending the Duma in 1906 put a great strain on the entente, but Grey was resolved to resign rather than abandon the Anglo- Russian entente and managed to weather these squalls.
The foreign office under Grey found it necessary to oppose the Young Turks who overthrew the sultan, Abdul Hamid, commonly called “the butcher,” in 1908, although British public sentiment was on the side of the Young Turks. This action had important consequences, for it definitely aligned Turkey on the side of the Triple Alliance. Turkey would have eventually been found on the side opposed to Russia in any event, but the resentment of the Young Turks threw them into Germany’s outstretched arms, and led to the Germanization of the Turkish Army in 1914.
Grey describes the various crises which arose between Germany and France over Morocco and the support given France by Britain. He omits to state that the price of the British support of France in Morocco was French support of Britain in Egypt and Soudan. He tells of the seizure of Bosnia by Austria in 1908; of Tripoli by Italy in 1913; and of the Balkan War of 1913. He modestly refrains from recounting the important part he played in making peace in the Balkans in 1913, which was the outstanding diplomatic achievement of that decade, comparable to Roosevelt’s making peace between Russia and Japan. He brings into relief those events between 1908 and 1914 which showed the deep hostility between Austria and Russia over the Balkan states and the inevitability of war unless one country or the other gave way.
It had been the policy of Britain to oppose the acquisition by Germany of ports or coaling stations in any part of the world. Grey at one time considered the advantages of changing this policy, but did not, and observes that in the light of Germany’s conduct during the war, and the advent of the submarine, this policy of opposition to Germany was wise.
As secretary of state, Grey was an ex-officio member of the Council of Imperial Defense, founded by Balfour in 1904. He was in regular consultation with the responsible officers of the British Army and Navy and probably knew that European statesmen believed with Clausewitz that “war is only a continuation of state policy by other means.” Grey says he was under no delusions about the selfishness of the German policy and that he really did not expect any altruism in foreign affairs, that British foreign ministers were guided by the interests of Britain. Yet, in another place he says, “great armaments lead inevitably to war,” develops this idea and his conclusion is “that competitive armaments are the primary causes for war.” This statement of Grey, in view of the frankness with which he has discussed the foreign relations of Great Britain, is astonishing. His own book contradicts this conclusion and indicates most clearly how the conflicting interests of various European nations gradually led to the competitive armaments and when the conflicting interests could no longer be compromised at the expense of weaker and more backward nations the big powers went to war, not willingly but rather than give up any of their interests.
At the close of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 Britain was in possession of the largest colonial empire in the world. This she had secured mainly as the result of wars waged against Spain and France. Yet, since '8/0, by simply possessing the strongest navy in the world, with no serious fighting except with the Boers, she had added to this empire, the following:
Cyprus, 1878 Upper Burma, 1886
Baluchistan, 1879 Soudan, 1898
Egypt, 1882-1914 Nigeria, 1884
British East Africa, 1884-87 Wei Hai Wei, 1898
Transvaal, 1899 Southeast Persia, 1907
She picked up other minor parcels of territory during this time but these are the important acquisitions.
Other European powers were doing likewise, particularly Russia and France. In 1908 Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1913 Italy annexed Tripoli. Germany, the strongest member of the Triple Alliance, was seeking to control Mesopotamia and to dominate the finances and industry of the Turkish Empire. If there had not been a trained soldier in Europe, or a single European gunboat, this land greed would have caused the European war and perhaps sooner than if these armed forces existed. The only occasion for surprise is that Europe preserved the peace for almost forty-four years in spite of scrambles for territory in all parts of the world.
These memoirs recite the difficulties Great Britain had in preventing neutral goods reaching Germany. Naval officers will gain some idea of the statesman’s point of view by learning the pains Grey took to avoid offending the United States. Public opinion in England, led by the military, criticized Grey for restraining the British Navy, yet severity of treatment of American commerce would easily have led to an embargo of American goods to the Allies which would have been disastrous. Grey’s great contribution to his country during the World War was his skillful handling of the relations with the United States. The personal confidence which existed between Page, the American ambassador, and Grey was an important factor in this success. The attacks of German submarines on American and other neutral ships strengthened Grey's position, and he, from his point of view, quite properly took advantage of American indignation with Germany to increase British interference with American commerce. He wisely provided payment for all American goods illegally detained. He frankly states the object of his diplomacy was “to secure the maximum of blockade that could be enforced without a rupture with the United States.’’
Perhaps the most interesting new information in the memoirs is the memorandum drafted by Colonel House in February, 1016, giving the conditions under which President Wilson offered to mediate between the belligerents, with the important proviso that if the conditions were not accepted by Germany, the United States would probably enter the war on the side of the Allies. The affairs of the Allies at the end of 1915 were in very bad shape but neither Briand (to whom the contents of the memorandum were divulged) nor Grey considered it feasible to propose terms of peace to Germany.
From the ripeness of his experience Grey gives valuable testimony concerning the relation of the civil and military authorities during war: “The part of a civilian government is to sec that the highest professional posts in the Admiralty and the War Office, and the chief commands in the Army and Navy are filled by soldiers and sailors best qualified for them; and that these are supported in the use of the armed forces.’’ And he describes the ideal civilian war minister as “one who knows and observes his own limitations, who sets himself with ability to discern, to organize the best military opinion, to focus and support it, and who by experience and training knows how to manage a cabinet.”
Grey generously offers to share some of the blame attached to Churchill for his Antwerp flair; he does Churchill’s reputation little good by exposing Churchill’s idea that one big German gun was the sole trouble and that Churchill’s inspiring presence would enable Antwerp to hold out until a British and a French Division could drive off the German investing force.
In a resume of the military features of the Dardanelles Expedition he practically leaves out Churchill, who played the largest part in that ill- starred expedition. Discussing the diplomatic features of the Dardanelles Expedition he lays bare the jealousies that prevented the Allies accepting the help of the Greeks, lest Russia be offended. He accepts full responsibility for refusing the Greeks’ offer to enter on the side of the Allies in September, 1914, lest Turkey join Germany, and Russia get more interested in Constantinople than in fighting Austria. After events have failed to justify this action, Turkey entered the war in October; Russia in the first moments of the war gave proof of her attachment to the Allies and Grey should have found some solution to Russian and Grecian counter claims. Russia was undoubtedly a difficult ally but Grey had built his whole foreign policy around Russian-British friendship and he had found ways of keeping Russia in line up to this time, and he should have made the attempt, particularly as he knew that Turkey would sooner or later join Germany.
Grey’s statement that Rumania entered the war voluntarily is hardly accurate. Buchanan, the British minister to Petrograd, bears witness that the Allies, particularly Russia, had been offering Rumania various inducements to enter the war, and finally, when Brusiloff’s last offensive was under way, General Alexieff let it be known at Bucharest that if she allowed the present favorable opportunity to pass, her intervention would leave Russia indifferent. In view of Brusiloff’s proximity to Rumania this was practically an ultimatum.
Even Grey’s enemies testify to his straightforwardness and his earnest desires for peace. His peace credentials are written by Prince Lichnowsky, German ambassador, and Count Mensdorff, Austrian ambassador. His American friends included President Roosevelt and Ambassador Page. British policy under Grey was substantially the same as under Salisbury, Chamberlin, Rosebery, and Lansdowne, but he gave it a more pacific turn. He completed the conciliation of France and Russia, he brought peace to the Balkans in 1913, and was sincerely seeking, with fair prospects of success, an accommodation with Germany, when the strife between Serbia and Austria, backed by Russia and Germany, first engulfed Europe, and finally Britain.
W. D. P.
THE ROMANCE OF NAVIGATION. By W. B. Whall, Master Mariner. A Younger Brother of Trinity House. 292 pages, illustrated, 16s. London: Sampson Low, Marston Co., Ltd.
Reviewed by Rear Admiral J. A. Hoogewerff, U. S. Navy, Retired
An interesting and delightfully illustrated history of the sea from the earliest recorded times.
The book is not only interesting, but instructive, especially to seamen. In reading it, one looks again and again at the illustrations of old-time ships ; and I found it worthwhile to go over the illustrations with a magnifying glass to get the details of the rigs of the different periods and note the developments.
To the old sailor who remembers the days of sails, wooden ships, and long cruises, the book is a delightful call back to his youth, while those who now follow the sea as a profession or for recreation are reminded of their noble heritage and of the accomplishments possible with knowledge and means that in this day seem insignificant.
But now, as then, the same qualities of leadership shown by successful old-time mariners in Captain Whall’s book are necessary to great accomplishments at sea even with the means now available; and, for that reason if for no other, every man of ambition to excel at sea should read The Romance of Navigation, for, instinctively, it is permeated with a sailor’s viewpoint, and many of our histories are by landsmen with a landsman’s limitations.
While Captain Whall shows to the careful reader that study, determination, a definite aim, knowledge of how to handle men and keep them fit, and perseverance in the face of difficulties has been common to all great seamen, I wish he had brought out more clearly how necessary at sea is constant watchfulness and ability to read the signs of the sea and the heavens and to profit by them. In these days of refinements in navigation, we are prone to minimize the value of the lead and lookout with their many meanings to the initiated, and to put too much trust in the instruments and information furnished us, without remembering that it is the knowledge and proficiency of the man who uses them that determines their value.
May Captain Whall’s book be read, not only for the pleasure to be gained by reading it, but as an incentive to further reading about our profession and its masters, and may it encourage other sailors to add their part to the literature of the sea.
MARITIME CONNECTICUT DURING THE AMERICAN REVOLUIION, 1775-83. By Louis F. Middlebrook. 2 vols. Publication of the Essex Institute, Salem, Massachusetts.
SALEM VESSELS AND THEIR VOYAGES. By George Granville Putnam. Series III. Publication of the Essex Institute, Salem, Massachusetts.
Reviewed by Captain Thomas Frothingham, U. S. Navy, Retired
In these two most recent publications, the Essex Institute has continued its good work of transmitting to us the American traditions of the sea. The sea has been the breath of life for Salem and for Essex County, and the Essex Institute, within its walls and through its publications, is keeping this life of the sea vital for Americans. In this anniversary year of the American Revolution, the regard of Maritime Connecticut is most timely. In the conventional histories of the American Revolution too much emphasis has been given to the cut and dried accounts of military campaigns. The fact is that the formal battles of the Revolution did not give the true measure of this epoch-making war. On land and on sea it took a course of its own that was different from all former wars. On land, for the British to win set battles meant little, so far as concerned subduing and occupying the country. On the sea, the Americans, almost without a semblance of a Navy, accomplished astonishing results.
This last was the natural result of our origin. The American Colonies were only a fringe of settlements extending back from our seacoast. All their first settlers had come from over the seas. Before the Revolution, American sailors had been on every sea that was navigated in those days. They had learned to fight to preserve their ships. And, at the outbreak of the Revolution, they took to fighting on the seas as ducks would take to water. Anything like a Navy that could compete with the British Navy was out of the question, of course, but the Americans swarmed out to the seas in craft of all kinds—and the ravages of the American privateers actually became a decisive element in our war for freedom. In the Revolution they destroyed about 600 British ships of the value of $18,000,000— very great losses for those days.
This is not generally known, but in Parliament the one strongest argument for letting the Colonies go was this unprecedented loss of British shipping, for which no compensating loss could be inflicted upon the Americans.
The two volumes of Maritime Connecticut contain most complete accounts of the activities of the natives of the state on their coasts, on the adjacent waters, and on the high seas. It is a vivid picture of this phase of the Revolution. The work is no mere catalogue of ships. For in it the reader will find the whole atmosphere of our seagoing ancestors, their ships, their crews, their equipment, their lives, their songs.
The ventures and voyages of these Connecticut men reflect the origin of the United States Navy, which sprang from sailormen fighting sailor fashion, not from military forces put on board ship as was the case with other navies. The astonishing enterprise of these Revolutionary Americans of Connecticut also ranged from Arnold’s galleys on Lake Champlain to the American Turtle of David Bushnell. This last was truly an extraordinary product, as it was the ancestor of all submarines. An account of it is given in this work.
The two volumes are of fascinating interest, apart from their great value as records. The tables, documents, and letters give a picture of the “time that tried men’s souls.” This, from Sir George Collier, Commodore of the British Fleet in New England Waters, 1776-79, should be quoted as to New Haven: “That place is a spacious-and very considerable town; it has the largest university in America, and might with propriety be styled the parent and nurse of rebellion.”
The illustrations, diagrams, and so forth, are well chosen to add to the interest.
The third volume of Salem Vessels and their Voyages, as its name implies, is another record of the days when Salem men and Salem ships were engaged in trade over the distant seas. Their close touch with naval warfare is in evidence through the picture and description of the celebrated Salem ship America, the most successful of all the American privateers, which took over $1,000,000 in prizes and was never outsailed or outfought.
But most of the volume is devoted to more modern ships and their ventures in trade all over the world. These often came in troublous places, as was shown by the experience of one of the Salem captains with the notorious filibusterer, Walker, in Central America. The book has many pictures of Salem ships and of Salem captains, and the faces of these last are enough to show that they were a resolute lot. Their comments as to their ships prove that they regarded them as personalities. One of the captains wrote home: “I almost believe that the Sooloo could find her own way out here (Manila) alone, so many times has she been over the route.”
Those brave days had their climax in the clipper ships—and then the whole structure fell away rapidly. Of one of these Salem ships the New York Herald wrote in 1869; “The new clipper ship Highlander, now loading for San Francisco at Pier 11, East River, is well deserving of the attention of all those interested in the growth and prosperity of our shipping.” At this time captains and owners thought nothing could ever supplant these most graceful products of the American ship designers. Yet in 1888 appeared this: “The ship Highlander, 1286 tons, has at last been sold. For nearly two years she has been lying idle near the Wall Street Ferry, where she has been regarded by the dock-hands as a land, or rather water-mark.” This is an epitome of the course of events that drove our sailing shipping from the high seas. But the call of the sea is still strong in our American blood, as witness over 550,000 Americans in the United States Navy in the World War, a total far ahead of the personnel of the British Navy at its maximum. And it is reading such books as these two publications of the Essex Institute that will keep Americans thinking in terms of the seas.