In "Joint Army and Navy Operations," Part II, published in the Naval Institute PROCEEDINGS for January, it was stated that operations of the Army and Navy within the theater of Operations are of four general types:
(1) Independent operations of the Army and Navy, in which there may be cooperation in the selection of objectives and in the strategical plans, with but little or no physical cooperation in the execution of such plans.
(2) Physical cooperation in large operations, such as invasion, capture of an enemy fortified base, etc.
(3) Physical cooperation in operations undertaken with a minor strategical or tactical objective, such as the seizing of an enemy isolated base or the destruction of harbor facilities, etc.
(4) Physical cooperation as a result of circumstances, which cooperation has not been provided for by specific plans, as in the operations of coast defense.
The necessity for cooperation in the selection of the major objectives of the Army and Navy, and the great success which has attended such cooperation in the past, is often overlooked in the casual study of history. More often than not, in the past, such cooperation has resulted from conditions rather than as a result of definite plans. In the future joint plans should ensure the most effective cooperation in this respect.
The principal forms which such cooperation has taken in the past are:
(a) The Navy by attacking enemy trade and lines of communication, reducing supplies and reinforcements of the enemy army to such an extent as to cause its defeat by the cooperating Army.
(b) The Navy by suppressing trade and transportation to an enemy nation, so reducing its economic activities as to prevent the maintenance of its fighting forces at their maximum efficiency, thus aiding the Army to defeat the enemy army.
(c) The Navy, by attacks on enemy trade and colonies, forcing an enemy fleet to leave unguarded an area through which an army might be transported without danger of serious attack.
Perhaps the best example of the first form is found in the operation of the British squadrons in the Mediterranean following Napoleon's landing in Egypt.
The victory of Nelson's squadron at Aboukir, and the destruction in Alexandria of many of the ships which had been used by Napoleon's Army, together with the blockade operations which the British, because of their victory, were able to carry out effectively, prevented the supply, or adequate reinforcement of the French Army in Egypt, and eventually forced defeat upon this attempt to overthrow England's power in India.
A somewhat similar experience happened to the British at the seige of Yorktown. A British squadron with supplies and reinforcements for Lord Cornwallis was off the capes of the Chesapeake but, due to the strength of the French squadron in the bay, it could not come to Cornwallis' relief and his army was defeated.
A good example of .the second form is found in our own Civil War. There were no Confederate squadrons, in the sea-going sense, and the primary duty of the Federal Navy became that of blockade and the protection of commerce against privateers and raiders. It is doubtful if the effect that this blockade would eventually have on the Confederate Army was fully realized at the time. It did have a determining influence on the result of the war, for, by suppressing trade between the Confederate states and Europe, the Confederate Army was deprived of arms and ammunition and eventually medicines and clothing. The Confederate Army was defeated largely because of the exhaustion of essential supplies.
Under modern conditions of life and the developments of modern war, nations are more than ever dependent upon trade with foreign nations to provide those materials which are not supplied within their boundaries by nature. In each succeeding war freedom of transportation will become more essential to the development of maximum military and naval power, because as populations increase, nations become less and less self sustaining.
This form of cooperation is also seen in the use of the German raiders and submarines in the World War. These raiders and submarines had destroyed so much shipping that, in the late summer of 1917, it became a question as to whether it would be more advantageous to the allies to send United States troops to France or to stop transportation of troops and use all vessels in the transportation of food and munitions. Had the German submarines been able to keep up their successes of the spring and early summer, April to June, 1917, there can be little doubt but that Germany would have won the war through the exhaustion of the Allies' supplies. This shortage would have so weakened the allied armies that the German Army would have defeated them.
The third form is best illustrated by Napoleon's attempt to force the withdrawal of the British Fleet from the English Channel in order that he might invade England. His plan was to concentrate, at Martinique, the French and Spanish squadrons from Toulon, Cadiz, Ferrol and Brest, and, without engaging the British squadrons which it was hoped would be sent after them, these squadrons were to return to Boulogne as a combined fleet, thus giving the French command of the Channel for a period sufficient to complete the invasion of England. This plan was well conceived but failed in execution because of the inefficiency of the French and Spanish Navies of that date, and of the many difficulties attending strategic concentrations in a period during which communication was limited to visual distance.
The second type of cooperation is: Physical cooperation in large operations.
As was pointed out in the previous article, cooperation of this nature requires important strategical decisions and can be made effective only by the exercise of joint directive command.
In this type are the following forms of joint operations: Those in which army interests are usually paramount:
(1) Invasion.
(2) Seizure of enemy colonial possessions.
(3) Use of an army overseas to create a diversion.
(4) Army cooperation with an allied nation.
Those in which navy interests are usually paramount:
(5) To seize a base for fleet or joint offensive operations.
(6) To destroy an enemy fortified base.
(7) To destroy a blockaded enemy fleet.
(8) To exert or relieve economic pressure.
All of these operations require the transportation overseas of large armies, and are among the most difficult of the operations of war. There are certain conditions which must exist prior to undertaking any of them,
A decision to attempt operations involving the movement of large armies overseas presupposes:
(a) That the Navy has gained command of the sea, or is sufficiently powerful to maintain command of the sea in the vicinity of the landing, and permanently to insure the integrity of the lines of communication.
(b) An available merchant marine adequate to the transportation of the Army, to the maintenance of the fleet and Army in the theater of operations, and to the maintenance of effective war time trade.
(c) An Army adequate in size, and suitably organized and equipped.
(d) A satisfactory state of training for joint operations in the Army and Navy.
(e) Available bases suitably located with reference to the strategical objective.
There is no condition so necessary to successful joint operations as command of the sea, and it must be thoroughly understood that, in these modern days, command of the sea means not only control of the surface of the sea, but control of the air above and of the water below the surface.
These added conditions, due to advent of the airplane and the modern development of the submarine and mine, have added greatly to the difficulty of conducting joint operations in the vicinity of the enemy coast or naval bases. An army is never so impotent as when embarked on unprotected vessels for transportation overseas. The fleet is never so handicapped as when escorting a large convoy of transports.
So disadvantageous is a situation requiring the movement of large bodies of troops by sea that it has become almost an axiom that command of the sea shall be gained by the defeat of the enemy fleet before such movement shall be attempted. The adoption of such an axiom is an error, for the danger from the enemy fleet is dependent, not only on its relative strength but also upon many special conditions.
The British Army was transported across the Channel before the German Fleet was engaged. In this case conditions permitted the movement of troops in small numbers, through restricted waters, and to friendly ports, and was comparatively simple compared to moving a large army and its equipment in one operation. The Japanese in the Russo-Japanese war moved troops into Corea before the Russian Fleet was defeated, but the Japanese Fleet maintained a blockade of the Russian Fleet during this period. In neither of the above cases was the landing opposed. If opposition to landing is encountered the operation is much more difficult.
History relates few instances of successful attacks on troop convoys, but, in this case, the operations of the past cannot be used to prophesy the future, for conditions with regard to motive power, accuracy of navigation, means of communication, and available means of attack have completely changed.
As a consequence of the greater effectiveness of modern weapons, modern ships, air scouting, and radio communication, and of the increase in size of armies and of the complexity and amount of their equipment, large joint operations are becoming increasingly difficult.
In the types of large operations in which army interest is usually paramount there are certain advantages which favor the offensive. Some of these advantages pertain to the period prior to landing and others to the operations after landing.
The advantageous conditions favoring the offensive prior to landing are:
(1) The initiative; the offensive force, proceeding by sea, has the choice of the time and place of attack, and of the route of approach.
While the value of the initiative is always great, in modern times it is of less value than in the past, because modern systems of communication and transportation permit concentration of the defense with an accuracy and speed undreamed of in the past. Although dispersion of force is an inherent weakness of the defense, such dispersion is not now so much a function of distance as of time to concentrate.
(2) The ability to make feints and ruses.
This advantage is inherent in the offensive, but is perhaps more valuable at sea. By virtue of the speed of modern vessels a convoy can move a hundred miles during one night. Transportation of a defensive force on shore to meet such a movement would probably disorganize land transportation, especially if it were done several times.
General Wolfe took advantage of this mobility of embarked troops during the seige of Quebec. By permitting the ships to drift up and down the river with the tide, he made it impossible for the French to determine his anticipated point of attack. The defense was forced to disperse to meet possible attack at varying points and was completely surprised when the attack did develop on the Heights of Abraham.
Types of ships are hard to distinguish at sea and it is quite possible that supply ships and fuel ships might feint at one point while the actual landing was being prepared at another. It will be difficult for scouts, either air, surface, or submarine, to determine the exact nature of auxiliaries accompanying a naval force.
(3) The covering fire from warships is the greatest possible concentration of modern artillery.
In order that the fire from warships may be of the greatest assistance in joint operations, it must be controlled from the air or from elevated observation spots on shore. The ammunition usually supplied to naval vessels is not suitable for use against shore defenses and the trajectory of the projectiles is too flat. These points can be overcome by preparation for this type of operations.
After landing is effected the offensive army with sea communications has several other advantages:
(1) Maritime communications reduce the percentage of troops required to guard the line of communications.
(2) Maritime communications facilitate the shifting of the base of operations to conform to the movement of the troops.
(3) The naval forces can assist in guarding the flanks where they rest upon the shore.
(4) The sea furnishes a secure line of retreat in case the operation must be abandoned.
There are, however, many difficulties, other than those created by the enemy forces, which must be overcome by the offensive force. Among these are:
(1) Unfavorable weather conditions.
(2) Unfavorable landing places.
(3) Difficulties of landing, especially if landing is opposed.
(4) Difficulties of transportation after landing, due to the limited amount of transportation equipment and to the destruction of transportation facilities by the enemy: i.e., roads, railroads, bridges, etc.
(5) Danger of having communications cut off by enemy or allied enemy fleet.
(6) Troops unused to seagoing, kept for any length of time on board transports, lose a certain amount of their fighting efficiency.
(7) Unless trained in landing operations troops will be awkward and unhandy in boats, and in operations immediately after landing.
Most of these disadvantages will be discussed in detail in a later article when the subject of the disembarkation is discussed.
Invasions.—History cites examples of successful invasions by way of the sea, but, likewise, it records many failures. The successes were mostly in the distant past, except for a few cases such as the war between the United States and Mexico where the efficiency of the invading forces was so superior as to insure success.
Perhaps the two best examples for the purpose of study are McClellan's Peninsula Campaign and the Dardanelles Campaign.
Each of these campaigns failed to achieve its major objective, although the fighting of the offensive troops, in both, was excellent. The campaigns failed through the mistakes, or lack of judgment, on the part of superior authority.
McClellan's plan, as approved by President Lincoln, was strategically sound. The transportation of troops down Chesapeake Bay was, under the existing circumstances, fairly well done; but later interference by the President, lack of cooperation by the Navy, disloyalty to the commander-in-chief, and a lack of force on the part of the commander-in-chief himself, caused the operation to fail with the consequent great loss of prestige to the Northern Armies and a corresponding increase in morale in the Confederate Army.
In the Dardanelles Campaign there was a thorough absence of cooperation between the Admiralty and the War Office, including the failure to determine a definite objective, and a woeful misconception of the force required for the success of the expedition.
Upon the arrival of the first army contingent at its base, Mudros, (which had been practically seized from Greece) it was found that the force was so disorganized and its equipment so poorly stowed, that it was necessary to send the transports to Alexandria where they could be discharged and reloaded properly.
Although the officers in charge of the base at Mudros, and the personnel assigned to the expedition, performed almost super-human feats in preparing for and in conducting the attack, the campaign failed. The failure should be attributed to the Admiralty and War Office, because of their failure to determine the forces required for the task and for their lack of support of the forces in the theater of operations.
As a result of the poor preparation of the allied forces and of the delay in the attack, due to lack of support from the military and naval authorities at home, thousands of lives were lost; allied prestige received a severe blow, and Turkish and Teuton morale was increased.
The chances for success of an invasion by forces transported overseas are becoming smaller and smaller. The greater facility of movement of forces on shore by railroad and motors; the rapidity of communication; the increase in power of mobile artillery; the increased efficiency of the submarine and aircraft, and the increase in size and effectiveness of regular armies and navies, have made invasion by sea almost an impossibility, at least until bases near to the scene of landing operations have been permanently secured, and command of the sea is permanently assured.
Seizure of enemy colonial possessions.—The operations required in seizing enemy colonial possessions are similar to those of invasion, except in extent. It is improbable that enemy colonial possessions will be as well defended as home territory and the lack of industrial facilities usually restricts defensive operations.
In the past, attacks on enemy colonial possessions have usually been carried on: (1) To destroy enemy trade; (2) to seize territory with a view to demanding its cession, or using it for trading purposes, when peace is made; (3) to force an enemy to engage in a theater of operations unfavorable to him.
The attacks by the British on the French possessions in India (Pondicherry), under Clive and Admiral Watson, is an example of an attack to destroy enemy trade. Even at that early date the British saw the possibilities for trade offered by India and southern Asia and seized the opportunity to destroy the French colony which threatened British supremacy in that region.
The capture of Formosa by Japan at the end of the Chino-Japanese war is an example of the seizure of an enemy colony with a view to demanding its cession in the treaty of peace.
The capture of Minorca by the British in 1798, although it had some strategical value as well, is an example of a capture made for trading purposes.
The transportation of armies to engage the enemy in a theater of war unfavorable to him is well shown by the use of British troops in the capture of Louisburg and Quebec. The British were at this time fighting France in alliance with the South German States, and Frederick the Great was able to oppose the French on land without British assistance. With Britain's control of the sea it was considered that the British Army could be used to better effect in defeating the French in Canada than as a part of an allied army in Europe.
The use of the British Army in these operations was likewise in the nature of a diversion, but as it was improbable that France could reinforce her troops in Canada, it was not truly a diversion. An effective diversion requires that the enemy shall be forced to withdraw from the main theater of operations a force superior to the force used in the diversion.
Use of Army Overseas to Create a Diversion.—Examples in which such diversions have been successful are not frequent, but during the period in which Pitt controlled the strategy of Great Britain, the Seven Years War, operations of this nature were successfully carried out by attacks upon the French coast, notably at St. Malo and Belle Isle. These attacks, in addition to effecting considerable local damage, caused the French to withdraw troops for defense which could have been employed more effectively in the main theater of operations. Lord Mahon, in writing of the attack at St. Malo, states: "There is no doubt that the damage done to the French shipping had been considerable, and that the apprehension of the approach of this expedition had effectually withheld the French from sending any succours to Germany."
Army Cooperation with an Allied Nation.—The joint operations pertaining to the transportation of an army to assist an allied nation are the most simple of any joint operations. This is well illustrated by the transportation of our armies during the World War.
With friendly ports in which to disembark, and allied supplies on which to fall back in case of temporary delay in transportation, the operation involves little more than transportation through waters which may be disputed by the enemy.
The joint operations in which the Navy's interest is paramount ordinarily have a definite strategical objective. As a consequence the enemy can usually determine this objective and it is probable that the defense will be strong.
To Seize a Base for Fleet or Joint Offensive Operations.—Modern fleets cannot operate without bases, nor is it probable that major joint operations can be successfully conducted without a base of operations in the vicinity of the major strategical objective. In planning for the seizure of a base it is necessary to provide not only for its capture but for the defense of the base after capture. The forces must be carefully organized and equipped for this double role. It is improbable that the defense will be very strong unless it is a defended base. It is seldom that a defended base would be seized first, as such an operation requires major operations of such magnitude that a temporary base from which to operate is essential.
The capture of Guantanamo Bay as a base of operations for the forces engaged in the blockade and operations at Santiago de Cuba, is an example of this type. In this particular case opposition was insufficient to require joint operations, as the Marines were capable of performing the required operations on land.
In preparation for the Dardanelles Campaign the British seized several Greek islands. They were not opposed. The bases would have been equally necessary had they belonged to Turkey and in such event a preliminary campaign to capture the islands would have been required.
To Destroy an Enemy Fortified Base.—The capture of an enemy fortified base is usually undertaken only when it protects an enemy naval force, or is required as a base for one's own force. Although the enemy fleet may not be using the base at the time, the base may have a potential value sufficient to warrant major operations to destroy it.
On several occasions during the wars between Spain and England, Cadiz has been attacked by the British, as have Brest and Toulon during the wars with France. While some of these attacks were in the nature of diversions, the strategical objective was selected because of the damage which could be done to these enemy bases and the shipping therein.
An attack on a defended base by joint forces from over sea is most difficult. The advantage of the initiative relating to the place of attack is lost. The enemy is prepared for defense and has complete local knowledge of the port and the terrain.
The advantages of the defense are such that a direct attack can seldom succeed and in most cases, in the past, landing has been effected at some distance from the port and operations similar to seige operations have been undertaken.
To Destroy a Blockaded Fleet.—The operations to destroy an enemy base, as in the case of Port Arthur and Santiago de Cuba, often have as a primary mission, the destruction of a blockaded fleet, or the forcing of it to sea in order that it may be destroyed by the naval blockading force.
The presence of a fleet in the base has a bearing on the tactical plan of the operation. Heavy seige artillery will be required, and Points from which such artillery can reach the blockaded ships must be taken.
The operations of the Japanese at Tsingtau in the Chinese War and at Port Arthur in the Russo-Japanese War, are interesting and profitable examples of this type of operations.
To Exert Economic Pressure.—Examples of operations undertaken primarily for this purpose are more or less difficult to find. The Dardanelles Campaign has been cited as invasion and, so far as the military-naval operation is concerned, it was an attempted invasion. The real objective, however, was to relieve economic pressure upon Russia, and upon the Allies. The defeat of Turkey would have opened the Bosphorus and permitted the Allies to furnish munitions of war to Russia in exchange for Russian wheat. Some of the allied operations in Asia were undoubtedly conceived with the idea of preserving the use of essential fuel oil to the Allies.
With the increasing demand for raw materials it is not inconceivable that weak nations within whose boundaries are found fuel oil, coal and iron, may be invaded to insure such raw materials for the use of a stronger nation in war.
The third type of cooperation is: Physical cooperation in operations undertaken with a minor strategical, or tactical, objective.
In operations of this nature the objective is definite and a plan can be prepared in detail before the operation is commenced. Strategical decisions are of minor importance and joint directive command is not so essential. Under usual conditions the forces operating on shore in operations of this type will be marines, but in the absence of marines, army troops would .be employed.
The primary objective is ordinarily the seizing of a minor base which is not defended by important fixed defenses, or the destruction of certain definite facilities belonging to the enemy. Command of the sea in the vicinity during the operation is essential. If the base is to be retained, defense against minor expeditions must be insured and the line of communications must be secure. If the objective is merely destruction of enemy facilities, command of the sea and security of the lines of communication is required only during the operation.
The fourth form of cooperation is: Physical cooperation as a result of circumstances.
Cooperation in offensive operations should always be the result of plans. Cooperation without plans is inexcusable except in defensive operations in which, by virtue of the enemy having the initiative, cooperation without definite plans may be required.
The regulations governing such cooperation have been quoted in a previous article. In general they provide, that if the enemy is approaching by way of the sea, the Navy shall have the paramount interest in the operation if the naval force available for opposing the enemy is approximately equal or superior to that of the enemy. If the naval force available is inferior to that of the enemy, it is assumed that the enemy troops can reach the shore and consequently the Army has the paramount interest.
The commander of the force not having the paramount interest shall cooperate under general direction of the commander of the force having the paramount interest. The governing idea is to place the paramount interest with that force which, under the existing circumstances, is best able to prevent the enemy securing his objective. This idea should govern all cooperation which arises as a result of circumstances and for which no definite plan has been made.
In the above discussion comment has been limited to general considerations with a view to pointing out the motives and objectives of joint operations. Later articles will deal with the details of such operations.
The objectives have a determining effect on the size of the expedition and its equipment, but there are many points common to all joint operations. Among these are: (1) The preparation of the forces. (2) The embarkation. (3) The voyage. (4) The disembarkation.
The subject of the preparation of the forces will be discussed in detail in the next article.