The attention of both the Navy and the general public has recently been engaged by the question of gun elevation and the relative effectiveness of the treaty fleets at long ranges. It appears that alterations in the main batteries of American capital ships to permit of higher ranges being used is to be denied indefinitely and that therefore, if other conditions are equal, the American battle fleet will be at a serious disadvantage in a fleet action.
At 21,000 yards and under, the effective main battery fire of the three treaty fleets is as follows:
Firing Britain Japan U.S.
Ships 20 10 18
Guns 166 96 192
At a range of 24,000 yards the effective fire of the three treaty fleets is as follows:
Firing Britain Japan U.S.
Ships 20 10 10
Guns 166 96 108
At 27,000 yards the effective fire would, with the aid of flooded blisters, be about as follows:
Firing Britain Japan U.S.
Ships 16 — 5
Guns 126 — 48
Not until the range drops to 21,000 yards can our six oldest 14-inch gun ships deliver effective gunfire. The range is extremely unlikely to drop to 21,000 yards in view of our inferior fleet speed and our superior gunfire at that range and below unless some factor is introduced to offset our disadvantage at longer ranges.
There are only two ways in which a protracted gun duel at un-favorable ranges can be avoided in weather which permits fire at those ranges; one is to reduce the enemy fleet speed by the attacks of torpedo, bombing and mining craft, both aerial, surface and subsurface to such an extent that our fleet can reduce the range at will. The other method, the one with which this discussion is concerned, is to provide air fighting strength sufficient to insure the free use of our own spotting aircraft and to prevent the effective use of enemy spotters. Thus the tables would be turned and the long ranges become most uncomfortable for the fleet which is denied aircraft spotting. If this can be done the enemy must either withdraw or come to close quarters.
Before proceeding on the assumption that our fleet is inferior at these ranges, let us examine as far as possible the spotting plane situation in the three fleets. We find that the three fleets have carriers and planes as follows:
U.S. Britain Japan
Carriers fin commission) 1 (experimental) 3 1
Carriers (under construction or alteration)
2/3 3/6 2/3
Planes in commission (approx.) 120 120 170
One can readily see that the fleets with superior gun elevations are prepared to utilize them by the use of spotting aircraft. Now spotting aircraft can spot effectively only when they are protected from the attack of hostile fighting aircraft, either by protecting fighters or by the fire of their own machine guns, preferably the former since it is a rather large order for an observer to spot main battery salvos while the spotting plane is engaging in aerial combat.
The spotting plane with which the battleships and light cruisers of the United States fleet are at present equipped, the UO-1, is a two-place plane carrying a pilot and observer, the function of the observer being to spot and operate the radio. So far as is known the only ordnance carried is one Very’s pistol. The U.S.S. Mississippi is equipped with two MO-1’s, three-place observation planes which carry a pilot, an observer and a machine gunner, but, as before stated, a spotting plane which is engaged in a machine gun action with hostile aircraft will have its effectiveness as a spotting platform rather greatly impaired. The pilot, even if he has no gun with which to fire back, will be maneuvering rather rapidly in an effort to make himself an unsteady target. If the spotting plane is equipped with machine guns the pilot will necessarily be engaged in maneuvers to develop the fire of his guns, both fixed and free.
To defend these spotting planes and to deny to the enemy fleet the advantages of aircraft spotting at the ranges which are dangerous to us, we have at present two naval fighting plane squadrons in commission. Of these two, one is equipped with VE-7’s which were originally designed as advanced training planes but which were adapted for use as ship planes for flying off turrets and which can best be classified as combat training planes. Their low speed, low rate of climb, low service ceiling, and single fixed gun disqualify them as service fighters. The other fighting squadron is equipped with TS single seaters of about 130 miles an hour speed and with a service ceiling of about 14,000 feet as a land-plane. These characteristics prohibit their consideration as up-to-date fleet fighters when pursuit planes making 170 miles an hour with a 27,000 foot ceiling are available.
It is very evident that the way to increase the effectiveness of the fleet in battle is to build up a force of naval fighting planes which can effectively protect its own spotters and which can interfere with enemy spotting planes to an extent which will prohibit their effective spotting at the ranges where our fleet is unable to fire. No provisions of the Washington Treaty can possibly be invoked to prevent this step and the huge sum of money which the recent decision not to elevate the guns of our battleships has retained in the treasury would provide a force of fighting aircraft without a peer. Incidentally, the same fighting aircraft, by securing control of the air, would greatly facilitate the reduction of enemy fleet speed and effective strength by torpedo and bombing aircraft, as well as assist in the tasks of tactical scouting. They would also be of great value in assisting in the air defense of a fleet lying at anchor, moored in crowded harbors, or passing through the Panama Canal.
The general battle mission of fleet fighters is to secure and maintain control of the air in the vicinity of a fleet action; or, to phrase it differently, to destroy such enemy aircraft as threaten the security of their own surface and air craft. Under this general mission they have the following specific missions.
- Protection of capital ships and carriers against air attack.
- Protection of torpedo and bombing planes against enemy fighters.
- Protection of spotting planes.
- Attack on enemy spotters.
The relative importance of the first two missions depends on the progress of the battle, the tactical situation, and on just when the opposing fleets launch their torpedo and bombing plane offensives. The relative importance of the last two missions depends on the main battery gun range and the number of ships delivering effective fire. When the range is between 21,000 and 31,000 yards attacking enemy spotters is, to our fleet fighters, supremely important.
Consequently, the whole subject of gun ranges of capital ships in their own and enemy fleets in their relation to aircraft tactics might well be the subject of study and indoctrination in fleet fighting squadrons. The importance of proper operation of fleet fighters with reference to capital ship characteristics, gun ranges and speeds, and the necessity for a rapid and accurate analysis of the surface tactical situation in deciding on the relative importance of the various lines of endeavor which present themselves, bring out very clearly the absolute necessity for fleet fighting units to be manned and led by seagoing naval officers. It is to be feared that a “separate air force” or army pursuit pilot would have difficulty in recognizing ships engaged, ranges in use, and in analyzing the situation with reference to main battery gunfire.