THERE has recently reoccurred a flood of wild statements and loose generalization relative to aviation in general and naval aviation in particular. This has been occasioned by the rather passionate though misguided efforts of those addicted to the phantom of a so-called United Air Service. In every age it appears that some human hope reaches out for its moon of universal panacea. Just now if we could believe, we are assured that a “united air service” will cure all of our ills, do away forever with the necessity of an army and navy, reduce taxes and generally bring in the millenium.
One of the misleading ideas which has been advanced by aviation enthusiasts, and one which, having been accepted by the public has done real harm to aviation, is the widely published statement that aviation is cheap; that it is an inexpensive method of warfare. Careful study of available figures does not bear out this statement. The idea that one plane with one bomb can completely destroy one battleship, in view of the fact that the plane costs but $20,000 while the battleship costs $40,000,000 apparently presents an immediate solution of the financial problems attending national insurance. However, upon investigation, we find that to get this one bomber into position requires the services of many other planes. In the first place, to insure that a reasonable number of planes reach their objective it is necessary that a whole squadron ranging in strength from eighteen to thirty-six be launched. To protect this squadron in its mission, combat planes in the proportions of two or three to one must be provided. Furthermore, such is the present state of the art of aviation in regard to reliability and operating radius that in order to keep one plane in the air, four planes must be available. One begins to notice now how our one plane has suddenly multiplied itself into the hundred class. Then with this number of planes to maintain we find it necessary to retain the services of still more planes at headquarters for messenger and liaison service. Also, if the enemy is not obliging enough to disclose his whereabouts, we must have squadrons of scout planes to go out and find him.
Going still farther, we see that a base must be provided for all of this aerial equipment which includes large landing areas, numerous big hangars, gasoline storage tanks, trucks, store houses for spares, barracks for mechanics and guard troops. The personnel as one can imagine is not small. For one thing, aviation demands a much larger proportion of officer strength than does any other combat arm. There is at least one officer in every plane and, in many, two are required. About this time we find also that our $20,000 plane has vanished, for planes to do the work outlined range from $20,000 up to $100,000 so that our average cost rises to approximately $40,000 or $50,000. Our attention is also drawn to the fact that, whereas the “official” life of a battleship is accepted as fifteen years, a plane’s life is but three. Furthermore, during that three years the plane’s different parts will have been replaced at least once. In other words, at the end of three years we will have to write the plane off our books at twice its original value. Without complex analysis it is still readily apparent that our aviation endeavor is going to cost very nearly as much as does the target.
The above assumptions have followed in general the ideas of masses of planes with which our aviation enthusiasts so easily darken the skies, and furthermore consider the easiest problem, that in which the enemy calmly comes into our immediate vicinity courting combat.
Suppose, however, he is inconsiderate enough to stay a few hundred miles at sea and from this position throttle the commerce and world-wide communications of the country? It is true that proponents of the plane (extremists) blithely send the planes overseas to where the enemy may happen to be, but in practice this is not so easily done. The army world cruisers (a modified navy type torpedo plane) may be accepted as a fair sample of a modern plane. The longest flight made by these planes was approximately 900 miles. To achieve this distance extra tanks of gasoline were built into the plane. This increased weight precluded the possibility of carrying any military load such as bombs, torpedoes, guns and ammunition. In order to accomplish a strictly military mission this peace time overseas travel melts like snow in the sun. In placing the machine guns, ammunition, bombs and bomb sights in the plane, gasoline must be sacrificed. When the machine is thus equipped we find her capable, at her most economical speed, of traveling about 400 miles, 200 off shore and 200 back. Not so good if that is our sole reliance against ships that roam the seven seas.
In order then to bring our aviation threat to the enemy ship we are forced to the consideration of an airplane carrier. Let us see what that procedure involves. We can build two real carriers under the treaty, with a possibility of development some time in the future of a carrier within the treaty restrictions of 10,000 tons. On each of these large carriers, costing by the way a matter of forty to forty-five millions each, we can crowd seventy assorted planes. Not all can be bombers because some fighting planes must be provided. If the carrier is to be used to seek out and engage our enemy battleship, our hordes of planes shrink to 140, of which possibly one third are bombers. And as these planes must be man-handled from holds and hangar decks onto the flying deck and from there flown off, proper allowance in time must be made for this maneuver. From the time the first plane takes the air until the last is off may take an hour at a minimum. To recover the planes will take no less time so that one hour is cut off the cruising time of the planes. This means that our carrier must approach that much closer to the target. In doing so she naturally subjects herself to the ordinary hazards of torpedo and gun attack with the added possibility that one or two enemy planes with light bombs may so cripple her large flying deck as to prevent the recovery of our planes.
The easiest problem for the defense was shown to be costly but the second problem is more costly still. We see that the lure of cheap warfare held out by aviation extremists vanishes like mist. We can dispense with the cheapness idea of aviation. It is most decidedly not a cheap weapon but a very expensive one.
There are two other statements advanced from time to time in regard to naval aviation which will not bear the light of actual fact. One is that the older and directing heads of the Navy are antagonistic to and oppose the progress of aviation. Also that the younger officers are so muzzled that the true condition (asserted to be backward) of naval aviation is not permitted to be known. Neither of these statements is true.
In performance of his aviation duty the writer has had at various times contact with many naval officers of high rank. Unfailingly and without exception, these officers have evidenced in speech and action their sincere interest in the advancement of the art of aviation. They have been most sympathetic in their attitude toward the demands of naval aviation and have gone much more than half way in fostering and encouraging this arm of the Navy. How anyone in a responsible position could be more liberal minded and interested in the development of aviation than the present commanders-in-chief of the United States fleet and battle fleet and still be human it is hard to see. Such officers have many factors to consider in the proper rounding out of their duties and it is safe to say that aviation has received and is receiving more than its proportionate share of their attention. They recognize the fact that aviation although important is but one factor among many that must be considered when modern warfare is contemplated.
As for the statement that younger naval officers are muzzled, the writer from experience knows nothing further from the truth. From his own observation during eighteen years of naval service he has never elsewhere observed the latitude allowed and sympathetic interest taken in the ideas advanced by younger officers. This is true not only within the aviation specialty itself, but in contact between such specialists and older line officers who have previously had little operating contact with aviation.
One conclusive proof of the interest which the older and experienced officers have taken in regard to aviation may be cited in the matter of war plans. All that the writer has seen and is familiar with have made careful and far-sighted provision for the proper development of naval aviation facilities and employment. Not only this, but these practical minded sailors have gone one step farther, and in accepting the prophecies of our own aviation experts, have made proper and ample provision for the advantageous employment of such advance in naval aviation as it is possible to conceive today.
Those charged with the material development of aviation in the Navy have been far from lagging in their efforts. In fact, the United States Navy is responsible for a considerable part of the advance which has been made in aviation since the war. With characteristic navy attitude no great shouting has accompanied these accomplishments. Being slightly irritated by the constant buzzing and stinging of irresponsible critics, the Navy decided to publish some of their accomplishments. So stopping the regular grind for a short time the Navy went out and annexed the record tor the fastest land plane in the world, then the record for the fastest seaplane in the world, (we already had the Atlantic flight, by Commander Read under our belt), and then one after another numerous duration, weight and altitude world records. Then we went back to work and left the rest to shoot at our marks. The Navy has not considered it worth the cost to keep actively in the racing game. Our money is expended in service craft and their operation. But when called upon we need take nobody’s slip stream. The Navy has developed the first reliable rigid, a system of water recovery from exhaust gases,1 reliable air cooled motors and several special aeronautical engines which for ruggedness and performance are well to the front. The Navy has further perfected the catapult to the point where the commander-in-chief, battle fleet, is justified in publishing the following comment:
The commander-in-chief, battle fleet, is pleased to note that catapulting of planes has now progressed sufficiently to warrant such operations whenever opportunity permits and plane service is desired.
This progress has been made possible only through the concerted efforts of all concerned and the general confidence of the fleet’s personnel results from the many successful catapult shots to date.
The commander-in-chief, battle fleet, desires that every effort be made to continue this development and that no failures or casualties, particularly those involving material and possible of predetermination, occur to mar the established good record or shake the confidence of the operating personnel.
1In connection with the Army and the Bureau of Standards.
When critics state that the Navy has not kept and is not keeping abreast of aviation advancement they are right only in that the Navy is leading in much of it.
Finally, those personally interested in a so-called “united air service” talk in large round generalities of the savings and economies to be realized by an amalgamation. Careful analysis will not disclose these economies. It is a fact which will not down that air mail, army and navy requirements are different one from the other, that the equipment proper for one is improper for the other, that the personnel of one performs duties almost totally different from the others. For mind you, the ability to conduct a plane about on its legitimate business is the least of a properly trained aviator’s duties.
To discuss the naval arm simply, we take our men and officers from the same training and concentration centers as do the other naval branches. Naval aviators must be familiar with ships and be sea-going, they must understand the tactics and strategy of scout ships, destroyers, submarines and battleships and their harmonious employment as fleets. They must have an intimate knowledge of the methods of gun control, because one of their important jobs is in connection therewith.
A so-called “united air force” would be required to supply personnel as well fitted to naval needs, and in addition, personnel to serve the Army in its manifold duties. Is one man to be able to do both? Very improbable. There is a limit to human endeavor. If two sets of personnel are to be developed within one organization with all the special equipment demanded by the circumstances, the organization will be much like a hen attempting the rearing of one chick and one duck. There will be plenty of distraction.
Some people stress present duplication of effort and feel this will be cured by amalgamation of all aviation. But is there duplication? And if there is, will it be cured? As a matter of fact there is practically no duplication of effort as regards the present administration of aviation under the Army and Navy. Planes and engines, ordered from manufacturers are not similar for the two services, nor are they likely to be except in special instances. Amalgamation of repair stations would not effect economies. Against a prevalent belief that manufacturing under one head is economical, we find that little or no manufacturing is done by the services. Repair and overhaul consists mainly in replacement and adjustment of parts and men qualified to work on one engine may not be qualified to work on another.
On the other hand, amalgamation of the two air services would immediately introduce duplication from the top to the bottom. First, we duplicate a whole new department in the government with a secretary, assistant secretaries, heads of bureaus, office space, clerks and messengers. There would be another recruiting bureau and staff, another academy, similar to West Point and Annapolis, for the training of officer personnel and training depots for the enlisted men. We would find the need for a corps of flight surgeons, a corps of quartermasters or pay officers, a corps of designers. The new service would take over some of the present air stations but there would immediately arise the need for acquisition of new sites. New and more buildings, motor boats, trucks and horses formerly supplied gratis by the mother services must be purchased. And finally there must be obtained carriers and tenders with all the appurtenances under control of the new service. If this does not entail duplication, what does? And then picture the air commodore and the fleet admiral getting together to give battle to the enemy. Or the commanding general and air commodore in land warfare! Each would be independent and yet each needing the other. What, without economy and lacking efficiency, is the excuse for this new service?
Every weapon has not only its possibilities, but also its limitations. Those who would master a weapon must be familiar with those limitations if they are to develop that weapon’s utmost execution. In discussing aviation, enthusiastic proponents have drawn largely from future possibilities but have neglected the inherent limitations of aircraft. The limitations of aircraft are many, and realizing this fact, the Navy has busied itself in incorporating the aviation branch within the fleet so that strength is afforded aircraft where they are weakest in order that they may, when the opportunity presents, deliver their maximum war effort.
Those who maintain that the Navy is derelict in its development of aviation within the limits set by the state of advancement of the art and the money provided by Congress do so with no foundation in fact. It is well for the country to know this. It is also well for the country to remember that the personnel operating our aircraft have passed all tests required for other naval personnel; they have performed the same duties on the bridge, in the turret and in the engine room. They know from experience the kind of service the Navy demands and are prepared and anxious to give it.