In view of the ever-increasing complexity of war, effective cooperation between the Army and Navy is becoming more and more difficult. The Board of Control of the Naval Institute hopes that these articles, which will review in a short and concise manner the lessons which may be derived from the past experience of many nations and will discuss many factors in joint operations which have led to efficiency or inefficiency, will form the basis of a discussion in regard to this important phase of warfare which will be of mutual benefit to the Army and Navy.
THE term “Joint Operations” is commonly used to designate operations in which army and navy forces cooperate physically to attain a minor strategical or tactical objective. In these articles this term will be used in a broader sense, namely, to designate operations in which the army and navy forces are employed in the attainment of objectives which have been determined upon by cooperation in the formulation of the plan of operations without regard to whether or not there is actual physical cooperation in the conduct of the operations.
Physical cooperation between the army and navy is usually restricted to the field of minor strategy or tactics. Such cooperation involves safe overseas transportation, effective disembarkation, successful local engagement, and temporary or permanent oversea supply. Effective cooperation in this field is dependent upon effective cooperation of the respective army and naval commanders, the indoctrination and training of officers and men, and the suitability, in kind and amount, of the personnel and material provided by higher authority for the accomplishment of the task.
In the broader field of grand strategy the army and navy forces may operate independently, but with objectives such that the accomplishment of the objective by one may insure the attainment of the other’s objective. Effective cooperation in this field is dependent upon effective cooperation of the War and Navy Departments in the formulation of a joint operating plan and upon the loyalty to this plan of the commanders-in-chief of army and navy forces within the theater of operations.
The instances recorded in history in which joint operations have been conducted efficiently are few in number compared to those in which cooperation has been inefficient, and, generally speaking, the larger the operation the more inefficient has been the cooperation.
The British Army and Navy have been conducting joint operations for centuries yet the history of the Dardanelles Campaign, their latest large joint operation, indicates that almost every known error was committed at some time during the campaign.
Situated as is the United States, it is impossible to conceive a war with a major power in which joint operations by our Army and Navy will not play an important part. The almost universal inefficiency of cooperation between armies and navies is, therefore, a cause for deep concern and the hope of finding a remedy for this condition warrants the most diligent study and analysis and the most frank and open discussion of all conditions which affect the efficiency of such cooperation.
It has been customary in the past to attribute inefficient physical cooperation of army and navy forces engaged in joint operations to jealousy, egotism, stubbornness, or lack of sympathy on the part of the admiral, general, or both, and to a lack of knowledge of the methods of operation of the sister service.
There are instances, no doubt, which substantiate this contention but failure to cooperate effectively has been too common to justify the assumption that the personal characteristics of the commanders, or a lack of knowledge of the operations of the sister service, can account for such frequent failures.
Later writers, those who have looked beyond the local situation for influences affecting cooperation, have reached the conclusion that efficiency or lack of efficiency in cooperation within the theater of operations may frequently be traced to effective or ineffective cooperation by the War and Navy Departments in the field of grand strategy or even in the still broader field of military and naval policy and administration. It is, therefore, necessary to include all phases of cooperation between the War and Navy Departments, if all of the conditions which affect the success of joint operations are to be considered.
Cooperation to be effective in war must be prepared for in peace.
Effective cooperation between the Army and Navy must be based upon mutual confidence and mutual understanding of respective functions.
Cooperation between the War and Navy Departments is a fundamental preliminary condition to effective cooperation by forces in the theater of operations.
Effective cooperation between the War and Navy Departments requires a permanent joint staff or board composed of responsible representatives of these departments to plan for effective cooperation between the Army and Navy, and a common superior to the War and Navy Departments to decide upon a definite course of action should differences of opinion exist.
The above principles are probably the most obvious and yet the most frequently violated of any of the principles governing joint operations.
Even at as late a date as the beginning of the World War, history shows that there was, without exception, an almost complete absence of cooperation between the War and Navy Departments of the various European nations. The organizations of their respective War and Navy Departments indicate that there was in no European nation a permanent joint staff or board for the consideration of army and navy cooperation in war. Even in Germany the army and navy appear to have had no medium for effecting cooperation.
In most European nations the direction of war is the responsibility of a war cabinet. The army and navy are represented in this cabinet, but as the cabinet is dependent upon the support of the respective assemblies of representatives (House of Commons, Chamber of Deputies, etc.), its policies, as a rule, are vacillating and subject to change with each change in the ministry. Councils are notoriously inefficient in the direction of the conduct of war.
The history of the Dardanelles Campaign shows clearly the hesitation and lack of decision of the British War Cabinet; the failure of cooperation between the Admiralty and the War Office, and the consequent failure to decide upon a definite objective and to provide the commanders in the theater of operations with the necessary material and personnel to insure victory.
In Germany the Emperor was the commander-in-chief of the army and navy, but there appears to have been no joint plan to govern cooperation between the army and navy. The Emperor retained the navy under his own direct command and refused in several instances to let the fleet cooperate with the army by operations on the coast of Flanders.
In Japan the Emperor is commander-in-chief of the army and navy. The chief advisers of the Emperor are the elder statesmen or Genro. The Cabinet is responsible only to the Emperor. The general staff wields great influence. The people have a military spirit and consider it the greatest honor to die for their Emperor and country. All of these are conditions favorable to effective prosecution of war.
The operations of the army and navy of Japan in the Chinese War, 1894, and the Russian War, 1904, are the best historical examples of effective cooperation of the army and navy in the strategical field. By the close alliance of policy and strategy, the determination of a clear concept of the war, the decision as to definite strategical objectives for the army and navy, and by the effective cooperation of the army and navy forces in the theater of operations, Japan set an example which went unheeded by the other great nations of the world.
In the United States the President is commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy. The Cabinet is an advisory body only. The President alone has the authority and responsibility for the approval and authorization of plans for the use of the Army and Navy in war. He is the common superior of the War and Navy Departments. The Joint Board, through the Secretaries of War and Navy, furnish professional military and naval advice to the President.
The organization of our government is particularly well adapted to effective preparation for and conduct of war, yet history shows that, due to failure to give adequate consideration to this subject during peace, war has always found us unprepared, and our conduct of war has been both uneconomical and inefficient.
Before the World War we had progressed sufficiently to have a Joint Board composed of high ranking army and navy officers but there appears to be no public record of any action taken by this Board to outline the plans for use of the Army and Navy in the event of our entering the World War. In fact, the President had forbidden the Joint Board to meet. The Joint Board, prior to 1919, seems to have restricted itself to the coordination of administrative activities and, previous to our entry into the World War, had fallen into innocuous desuetude.
Before the World War the members of the Joint Board did not all hold important positions of responsibility within the departmental organization. This error has been corrected and the Joint Board is now composed of the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations and other officers holding responsible positions in the departmental organization.
Since the World War more attention has been given to the subject of war plans and cooperation and the Joint Board has done a great deal to coordinate the activities of the Army and Navy, though to a large degree this coordination has been confined to matters pertaining to administration.
Effective cooperation between the Army and Navy, however, must begin with administrative considerations in which the departments also are concerned and, consequently, we have in the Joint Board the beginning of effective cooperation.
T0 obtain the maximum efficiency in joint operations there must be effective cooperation:
- Between the War and Navy Departments.
- Between the commanders-in-chief of the Army and the naval forces within the theater of operations.
- Between army and navy forces, operating together to secure a common objective.
Cooperation between the War and Navy Departments in preparation for, and in the conduct of war is based upon:
The Joint Army and Navy War Plan
This Joint Army and Navy War Plan lays down the concept of the war, the standards of readiness that the War and Navy Departments must maintain to meet the war situation, and an outline of initial operations.
The three principal features of the Joint War Plan may be stated: (a) The concept of the war; (b) Joint basic readiness plans; (c) Joint basic operating plans.
The above terms are not as yet commonly accepted by the War and Navy Departments but are adopted here as being suitable names for purposes of discussion:
The concept of the war is the accepted and approved idea of how the objective of policy, whether defensive or aggressive, may be attained by the use of military and naval force.
The concept is the decision reached by an estimate of the situation. It is general in its nature but definitely determines the character of the war. It forms a guide during peace to the formulation of basic readiness plans and basic operating plans, and, during war, constitutes a guide for commanders-in-chief and for the activities of the administrative branches of the War and Navy Departments.
Where the situation is complex, either politically or strategically, or in the case of a nation so weak in military or naval strength that immediate offensive action cannot be considered, the concept may have to be limited to the attainment of a certain desirable situation, after the attainment of which a new concept will be required.
In order that readiness and operating plans may be developed by the Army and Navy with a common understanding, the concept of the war should state:
- The method to be used by the military and naval forces in seeking to terminate the war, or to attain the desirable situation; and, in further explanation of this decision,
- The nature of the war: whether limited or unlimited, offensive or defensive, and whether primarily military or naval.
- The location of the theater or theaters of operations.
- The nature and extent of operations required to secure a satisfactory termination of the war, or at least the attainment of the definite desirable situation.
- The probable duration of the war.
Wars are terminated by the destruction of the enemy’s will to win. This may be accomplished usually only by the defeat of the enemy armed forces.
Clausewitz maintains that “there are three general objects which confine everything else within them. They are the military power, the country, and the will of the enemy.
The military power must be destroyed. . . .
The country must be conquered. . . .
The will of the enemy must be subdued.”
These undoubtedly constitute the aims of decisive war but Clausewitz states that it is seldom that the will of the enemy does not fail before its entire military power is destroyed or its entire country conquered.
Forces operating on the strategical offensive determine on lines of advance or operations which will lead to forcing engagement upon the enemy or should such engagement be refused, to the capture of important political or industrial centers.
The complete defeat of the enemy’s armed forces gives to the victor the potential power to conquer the country and to break the will of the enemy. In many wars, however, especially where the combatant nations are not contiguous, the enemy’s will to win may be broken by measures short of those outlined above. These minor measures which may be sufficient are: Establishing supremacy in the territory sovereignty over which is one of the objectives of policy; and, suppressing the enemy’s economic activities to such an extent as to prevent the continuation of the war.
It is possible, under some circumstances, that two or even all three of these methods may be employed simultaneously. It is the duty of the supreme authority, upon advice of the War and Navy Departments, to determine which method or methods are to be employed, and this decision is stated in the concept of the war.
Naval victory cannot in itself assure a satisfactory peace except in so far as it assists in creating the potential strength to transport armies and to suppress enemy economic activities. In some cases the suppression of all transportation by sea might be sufficient to break the enemy’s will, but such a situation cannot be considered as our only aim.
It is possible, therefore, that the concept may indicate two or more stages of the war, the first, primarily naval, extending until the command of the sea has been gained by the defeat of the enemy’s fleet, and the other stages being primarily naval or military depending upon the use to be made of the command of the sea so gained.
It is most essential that there shall be a clear, concise decision as to the prospective use of the Army and Navy, for upon the concept of the war are based the basic readiness plans and basic operating plans.
The nature of the war.—The three main factors in determining the nature of the war are:
- The political objective, that is, whether or not the objective of policy can probably be attained without overthrowing the enemy nation itself, and, based upon this decision, the determination of the extent to which national strength and resources will be involved.
- Whether the objective of policy can best be attained by offensive or defensive strategy.
- Whether the war can be terminated most quickly and effectively by military or naval strength or the degree to which strength of each type will be required.
Wars between nations with contiguous boundaries are usually unlimited because decisive victory at any point constitutes a threat to the defeated nation’s capital or industrial centers. In wars of this nature joint operations on a large scale are seldom undertaken.
In limited wars the objective of policy can usually be attained by the capture of some colonial possession or the defeat of the enemy in a theater of war other than his home territory.
Wars between continental European nations furnish many examples of the first type, while the Russo-Japanese and Spanish- American Wars are examples of the second type.
It is manifest that to cause war policies of nations must be important and definitely in opposition. As a rule, however, the policy of one of the belligerent nations would be satisfied with the maintenance of the status quo, whereas the policy of the other belligerent demands a change in the status quo.
The strategical nature of the war, as it pertains to the offensive or defensive, ordinarily is determined by the nature of the antagonistic policies which have caused the war, that nation whose policy demands a change in the status quo taking the strategical offensive. This, however, is not a definite rule.
The policy of the nation which seeks to change the status quo is normally considered offensive although this active offensive policy may result from a cumulation of minor offensive policies of the enemy.
In this connection it is most important to realize that policy and military and naval strength may be interdependent. If a nation’s military and naval strength are insufficient to enforce its policy the policy must be changed to conform to the military and naval strength. The greatest defeats in history have been brought about by the failure to adhere to this doctrine.
The initiative in the declaration of war is seldom taken by a nation unless its rulers believe that sufficient military and naval strength is available to attain the objective of policy by war. It is usual, therefore, for the nation which takes the initiative in declaring war to likewise take the strategical initiative with its armed forces.
The nation on the defensive is, nevertheless, equally at war and as ordinarily, such nation is weaker in military and naval strength, at least in the theater of operations at the commencement of hostilities, it is even more important than in the case of the stronger nation, that such strength be used efficiently.
The determination of the concepts of possible wars and the formulation of readiness plans and operating plans are not, therefore, the prerogative of the aggressor. Effective use of the means of making war which can be made available by the nation, and, during peace, wise counsel as to the military and naval needs to support the nation’s policies, can result only from the most effective determination of the concepts of possible wars.
The determination of a concept of the war is just as essential in the case of a war conducted on the strategical defensive in the defense of a policy as in the case of a war conducted aggressively to force the acceptance of a policy upon an enemy.
The determination of the theater of operations in which offensive strength can be exerted most effectively toward the enforcement of policy is most important.
In some instances, such as cases where the two belligerent nations are contiguous, the selection of the main theater of war is automatic. In such cases victory is usually sought by striking at the capital or industrial centers of the enemy by military force.
In other instances the object of policy is so definite as to fix the major theater of operations. In the war between the United States and Spain the objective of United States policy was the freedom of Cuba. Cuba was, therefore, the logical theater of operations.
An attempt to overthrow the enemy nation by invasion may not be warranted and may, under some circumstances, be physically impossible.
Japan could never have attained the object of her policy by attack on Russia. Her hope of victory was based on a belief, which proved to be well founded, that Russia would yield to Japan if the Russian forces in Manchuria were defeated.
In Western Asia, Japan could exert her maximum strength, whereas the Russian strength was greatly restricted by the distance to the theater of operations and the lack of sufficient transportation facilities.
The location of colonial dependencies may play an important role in the decision as to the location of the theater of war, especially when considerations concerning such possessions have influenced the respective policies of the antagonistic nations. Attacks on colonial possessions often have been made with a view to forcing an enemy to fight in a theater of operations less advantageous to him than would be a theater of operations in the vicinity of his home country.
The theater of operations may also be governed by economic considerations, military and naval operations being conducted to suppress enemy trade, or to keep open one’s own trade routes, or routes by which are received commodities required for the conduct of war.
One of the reasons for the Dardanelles Campaign was the opening of the Bosporus to Russian stores of grain to the Allies and of munitions of the Allies to Russia.
The choice of one theater of operations lies with the nation which takes the strategical offensive. The offensive in the declaration of war coupled with offensive strategy, assures to the aggressor the advantages of time and place of the attack.
The nation on the defensive must fight when and where the aggressor decides, or else take the initiative itself in another theater of operations which so threatens the enemy that he must conduct operations in two theaters or modify his original plan.
The third important decision in determining the character of the war is whether the war is to be primarily military or naval, or whether the war must be conducted in stages, and, if so, whether the first stage is primarily military or naval.
It has been previously pointed out that wars can seldom be brought to a definite termination by naval power alone.
The location of the belligerent nations may be such that military strength cannot be employed until command of the sea has been gained. Even though the operations may have for their primary objective the gaining of command of the sea, military assistance to the naval forces is frequently required.
In later articles operations of this nature will be considered in detail; it is merely desired to point out here that though operations may be primarily naval or military, operations of the sister service on a large scale may be required simultaneously.
The fourth decision of the concept requires the determination of nature and extent of the operations required in the theater of operations.
The decision must, manifestly, be general in its character, especially as to the extent of operations; nevertheless, it is essential to efficiency that every endeavor be made to reach an approximation with a reasonable degree of accuracy.
We know from the experience of the World War that all of the principal belligerent nations had far underrated the force that would be required. We know that in the early stages of the war material, such as ammunition, was being expended at a materially greater rate than that at which it could be supplied.
While the usual error is underestimating the required preparation, it is possible to err on the side of too much preparation or too great an expansion.
Finances now play such an important role that a nation at war must pay particular attention to the state of its credit. It is, therefore, essential that mobilization of personnel and industry shall be limited to that which can be profitably employed.
Under some conditions it is quite possible to determine with a fair degree of accuracy the amount of military or naval force required.
The war between Japan and Russia is an example of a war in which the forces required by one belligerent (Japan) could be worked out with almost mathematical accuracy.
The Russian Asiatic Fleet was of a known strength. It could not be reinforced without reducing the home fleet to a degree inconsistent with the French and Russian Entente. The Russian Black Sea Fleet was confined to that sea by the treaty restricting the passage of war ships through the Bosporus.
The Russian Army in Western Asia was of a known strength and disposition. This army could be reinforced and supplied only by rail across Siberia. A large portion of this railway line was single track and it was possible to figure almost exactly the number of trains per day which could reach the theater of operations.
The variable factors, therefore, to which the Japanese should have given the most careful consideration were: the possibility of the Russians increasing the capacity of the railway across Siberia; the relative efficiency of Russian and Japanese personnel; the advantage of the tactical defensive which the Russians possessed, and the difficulties of transportation which would be encountered by the Japanese Armies as the Russians retired.
There can be little doubt but that these considerations were studied most thoroughly but history indicates that the factor of safety allowed was too small. It must be realized, however, that the Japanese finances were limited and that presumably Russia was becoming stronger in the Far East each year. This condition may have forced Japan to act without completing her preparations.
The naval operations resulted as Japan had expected, except that it required many more troops and far more casualties to destroy the Russian Fleet in Port Arthur than had been anticipated.
On land, the strong resistance of Port Arthur, the retreat of the Russian field armies, and the increase of traffic over the TransSiberian Railroad, secured by laying railroad tracks on the ice across Lake Baikal, prevented the Japanese Armies from obtaining a decisive victory.
The peace was not satisfactory to either Russia or Japan, but it appeared to both belligerents that to carry on for the attainment of their political objectives would demand a sacrifice of men and money which could not be justified and might possibly end in disaster.
The fifth decision of the concept is as to the duration of the war.
Naturally this is dependent to a great degree on the decision as to the nature and extent of the operations. It is, however, entitled to careful consideration.
Power is force multiplied by time. The time factor is most important. If victory can be assured immediately by the maximum use of available force, it would be uneconomical to do otherwise. If, on the other hand, victory cannot be obtained immediately the development of force must be systematically regulated.
For example, in a war with a minor nation the United States could develop sufficient power with its regular Army and Navy to gain an immediate victory. The development of additional power by calling out reserves, taking over industrial establishments, etc., would be uneconomical and inefficient.
In the event of a major war our procedure would have to differ materially. We would have to develop our power gradually. It is, therefore, essential to estimate, in general terms at least, the duration of the war.
The concept of the war forms the basis for joint basic readiness plans and joint basic operating plans.
Joint basic readiness plans must state:
- The degree of readiness for war to be maintained by the regular and reserve forces of the Army and Navy.
- The extent to which mobilization of labor and industry shall be carried upon the outbreak of war.
- The desired development of army and navy facilities during peace.
- The amount of reserve material to be maintained.
- The disposition of regular army and navy forces during peace.
Effective mobilization for war requires that the forces to be employed be assembled, trained, equipped and transported to the theater of operations in time to execute the operating plans.
This requires definite plans for readiness of personnel and material. The amount of material and the number of personnel to be provided naturally differ widely depending upon the strength and location of the enemy.
It will be remembered that during the World War both Germany and Great Britain were required to recall from the front men who were trained in certain industrial pursuits. It was reported that some thousands of British troops were recalled for work in the coal mines. Such mobilization is inefficient.
Certain industrial plants must be taken over for government production but careful consideration of our economic needs must be given in their selection.
It will be apparent from these examples that there must exist, if our operations are to be successful, joint basic readiness plans which constitute an outline of our peace strategy. Such plans must be joint plans for otherwise we will repeat the serious errors of the last war during which was presented the ridiculous procedure of the Army and Navy bidding against each other for material.
Joint basic readiness plans insure that forces required for joint operations will be available at the place and time required in the event of mobilization.
Joint basic operating plans must indicate:
- The strategical objectives of the Army and Navy.
- The extent of cooperative action within the theater of operations.
- The forces to be prepared by the Army and Navy for service in the theater of operations, with places and times of assembly.
Joint basic operating plans are required if effective cooperation is to be achieved in the early stages of a war. These flow from the concept of the war and are governed by it. Naturally, the extent of joint operations depends greatly on the location and strength of the enemy. If the strategical initiative, which is so valuable in war, is to be obtained, joint basic operating plans must be prepared during peace. The joint basic readiness plans and joint basic operating plans are interdependent. Our readiness plans must contemplate the provision of force required for the contemplated operations but our operating plans must not count on forces which are not assured by our readiness plans.
Perhaps the most important element of these plans is that which outlines the extent of cooperative action of the Army and Navy within the theater of operations. In the next article the nature of operations which require effective cooperation between the Army and Navy in the theater of operations will be considered.