Does The Navy Need A Naval Reserve Force?
By Lieutenant Commander H. R. Bogusch, U. S. Navy
The United States has no reason to believe that in the unfortunate event of another armed clash it will have command of the sea without fighting hard at the very inception of hostilities. Notwithstanding the provisions contained in the recent limitation of armament conference, the following words uttered by Theodore Roosevelt on December 3, 1901, hold as true today as they did over twenty-one years ago.
“The American people must either build and maintain an adequate Navy or else make up their minds definitely to accept a secondary position in international affairs, not merely in political but in commercial matters. It has been well said that there is no surer way of courting national disaster than to be opulent, aggressive, and unarmed.”
It is, therefore, submitted that preparedness still remains a better way to avert war than to trust to international brotherly love and honor. And this statement is made in spite of the recent utteranc.es of such noted men as Professor David Starr Jordan, who says that "the Limitation of Arms Conference leaves no one to talk war but knaves and fools."
In seriously considering preparedness one cannot afford to lose sight of the ever perplexing personnel situation. Ships without trained and sufficient personnel in time of battle will be vanquished. It is not possible to improvise an adequate personnel for our Navy after war breaks out. True, a certain proportion of raw men can be mixed with the highly trained, but this proportion is entirely dependent upon the amount of time the enemy places at our disposal after hostilities commence. An enemy worthy of the name and one who is not handicapped will not waste time before striking.
At the outbreak of the World War it is well known that our Navy was woefully undermanned. Due to lack of a sufficiently trained Reserve Force, it was necessary to detach large numbers of trained men from first line ships and assign them to duties requiring immediate attention. Armed guards were drawn from our Battle Fleet for auxiliary ships and vessels of the Merchant Marine. Trained men were needed everywhere. The large withdrawal of seasoned regulars from ships' companies wrought havoc. The sacrifice in fighting efficiency that such inroads made in individual ships' organizations was tersely described by one officer of a North Sea Division:
“Prior to the war the crew of the -- reached such a state of efficiency that the Gunnery Trophy, the Engineering Trophy and the Battle Efficiency Pennant were all three won for the ship. When war was declared, the officers and men felt that they were ready for a fight at a moment's notice. Instead of going forth to fight, however, thirteen hundred men were transferred out of the ship or through it to other vessels which were required to be manned. Petty officers and chief petty officers, nearly all of them went. Enlisted men or younger petty officers were promoted 'to fill higher positions than they were deemed competent to hold when war broke out. Many officers without any warning were detached from the ship. In their places naval reservists or raw recruits were received on board for training. When the -- reported to the Squadron Commander for duty in the North Sea it was estimated that ninety-five per cent of the gun pointes had never fired a shot, and a very large percentage of the entire crew had never even heard a gun fired.”
This ship did not meet the enemy, but its captain must have appreciated Lawrence's predicament on the Chesapeake in his losing fight against the Shannon. Training and discipline on the Shannon won the day. The scrub crew of the Chesapeake lost. In those days the crews -for our ships were recruited from seafaring men, men who had followed the sea for years. A few weeks were considered sufficient to shake down a green crew. The simple ordnance of 1812 was mastered quickly. There were no engines, no intricate steam or electrical appliances to comprehend and operate-yet real training was necessary.
A repetition of such conditions as prevailed in the personnel situation at the beginning and during the early stages of the late war may well prove disastrous in the next conflict. The lessons learned must not be forgotten, nor must the engrossing details of peace-time activities smother the effective prosecution of well defined plans for probable eventualities. A Navy without a full complement of highly trained men and an adequate reservoir to draw upon for men already trained, is a Navy that admits of no expansion. Such is our Navy today. The condition that exists, if not remedied, will cause the very same inroads that were made in ships' companies in 1917.
The total number of regulars allowed from year to year by Congress is never sufficient to man properly the ships and stations required to be manned. Today, owing to lack of men, the Service is robbing Peter to pay Paul. Ships' crews here and there are skeletonized to fill up ships' organizations elsewhere. This system of shiftings and transfers of men cannot be avoided as long as insufficient regulars are provided. However, this state of affairs is not conducive to efficiency or the fostering of individual ships' fighting spirit.
In addition to the necessary intra-fleet transfers, there is a staggering change caused from discharges each year. This loss is made up in numbers by expensive recruiting and reenlistment systems. The present turnover from discharges alone forces the service to assimilate thousands of raw recruits annually. Reenlistments and raw recruits per annum mount into figures approaching 86,000. It is truly remarkable that so high a state of efficiency as is constantly maintained in our Navy is possible. It is a glowing tribute to the untiring efforts of the permanent officer personnel and the continuous service men.
Permanency of enlisted personnel under present enlistment conditions is not possible. Lengthening the enlistment period is one solution. However, officers on recruiting duty are fairly well convinced that lengthening the regular enlistment period will make recruiting far more difficult than it is at present. But such a step would greatly stabilize the existing situation in the regular establishment. Much of the money now spent in recruiting and in training raw recruits could be used for the building up and maintaining an efficient Reserve Force-and such a force is of vital necessity in an emergency.
If transfers seriously affect the efficiency of a peace-time organization, what havoc will such transfers wreak in the fever heat of naval expansion on the imminent approach of hostilities, particularly, when the enemy is seeking battle at the very outset? We will no longer be able to rob Peter. Trained men must be provided to fill up the complements of all fighting units, and trained men must be provided for the many auxiliaries to be commandeered. From where will these sorely needed men be drawn? If no adequate source of trained men is provided in peace time, the needed numbers will be drawn from hastily organized, swollen receiving centers. Details and drafts will be made from unequipped, raw recruits. Sorting men for jobs in accordance with their ability will not be possible; in consequence, a bank clerk will most probably be made a coal passer, a furnace stoker a yeoman. To obviate such conditions, an adequate Reserve Force is necessary. This means an effective organization, not the decadent one in existence today.
Before entering into the discussion of the Reserve situation as it exists at present, it is well to review quickly past incidents in this organization.
On June 30, 1921, the personnel of the Naval Reserve consisted of 26,376 officers and 203,666 men. This force consisted of six different classes, the preponderance being in Class 4. Approximately fifty per cent of all reservists were in this class and were known as the Naval Coast Defense Reserve. Originally, the members of this particular class were exempt from general service and could only be inducted into general service upon their own volition. This fatal defect was subsequently remedied.
The Naval Reserve Force as a national organization was brought into being by the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916. This was the Navy's first official venture in reserve work. Heretofore, the auxiliary organization was known as the Naval Militia. The organization was under state control. Naturally, the Navy's first venture in reserve work was not one hundred per cent perfect. The many classifications of reservists led to confusion, unnecessary expenditure of money, and last, but not least, volumes of paper work.
On September 29, 1921, the Navy Department in the wake of the economy wave that swept the country was forced to disenroll all members of Classes 2, 3, 4 and 5. The members of these classes were drawing retainer pay and in a haphazard way rendering some training service. This wholesale disenrollment affected 223,951 reservists, or the entire Reserve Force, with the exception of 6,091 in Classes 1 and 6.
This wholesale disenrollment of over 2 0 0,000 reservists wrought chaos in the organization. The Bureau of Navigation and the District Commandants were deluged with paper work in the forced process of cashiering the reservist and in writing "Finis" in the form of an honorable discharge to the involuntary, abrupt ending of the reservist's career. The reservist was mustered out but in mustering him out he was asked to join the Volunteer Naval Reserve (Class 6), an organization bearing a name and little else. Few reservists availed themselves of the opportunity to transfer to this class, with the result that today the Reserve Force is a very defunct organization. With little or no inducement to remain in the Reserve Force, the enlisted men left by the thousands. This exodus took the majority of skilled men mechanics, engineers and electricians. Recently the organization, in some districts, had an officer for every enlisted man on the rolls.
Among the officers still remaining in the Reserve Force, there are excellent, good, fair, indifferent, and an abundance of dry rot members. This is a sweeping statement, but nevertheless true. The abundance of dry rot is due to lack of specific instructions, indifference, and in some instances clue to stress of work on the part of the original enrolling officials. True, the Reserve Force in its inception was a new undertaking. Bars of qualification had to be erected. These were erected, but not until the organization was cluttered with a lot of useless material. In the sweeping disenrollment of the reserves in September, 1921, much of the good material was lost, also some of the chaff.
This condition of the Reserve Force was known to the Department. In October, 1921, a board of six officers appointed by the Secretary of the Navy met in the Department from day to day for a period of thirty clays, in an endeavor to submit a complete report embodying the correct principles of organization and administration necessary to the creation and maintenance of an efficient Naval Reserve. The mature deliberations of this board were incorporated to a considerable extent in a Congressional bill for the abolition of the old order and the creation of a new Reserve Force.
The following are some of the principles laid down by the board appointed in 1921 by the Secretary:
(a) That the organization of our naval personnel be harmonious and well-balanced-to consist of the Regular Navy and the Naval Reserve.
(b) That the Naval Reserve Force be an integral part of the United States Navy.
(c) That the Office of Naval Operations be made responsible for the carrying out of approved Naval Reserve policies and coordinating the resultant duties imposed by such policies.
(d) That the Bureau of Navigation should remain charged with the duties pertaining to personnel.
(e) That the actual administration of the Naval Reserve Force should be committed to the commandants of the Naval Districts with sufficient officers and enlisted men of the Regular Service to carry on efficiently the administration of the reserve organization.
(f) That the development of the Naval Reserve Force depends primarily on the aid of the personnel and the use of the material of the Regular Navy that can be assigned to that task
The principles just enunciated are sound. But the Reserve Force will not thrive on logic alone. If the Reserve Force is really considered a vital part of the Navy it behooves those in the regular establishment to become acquainted with this integral part and to develop and train it. During the past two years the Navy has had to struggle had to maintain itself. It did not have time, or money, or inclination to sponsor the cause of the Reserve Force.
Since the war active training of reservists has been clone in a most slipshod and unsatisfactory manner. Some reservists have had their cruise on vessels tied up to the dock during their entire training period. Some have put in their training in lending aid to water carnivals and civic celebration. Others have clone their tour on ships in dry dock or on destroyers in inactive commission. Many have done training on obsolete craft under reserve officers. They have seen nothing of the Regular Navy, and have learned little. A few have had the good fortune to get real training duty on active, modern men-of-war. Their instructors have been regular, seagoing, commissioned officers.
In 1921 a few reservists did training duty on active destroyers. Their instructors had outlined an excellent course of instruction. The reservists did good work and went back into civil life ardent Supporters of the Navy and boosters for a Naval Reserve Force. In contrast with this kind of training, the majority of reservists in 1922 were segregated on Eagle Boats or on obsolete men-of-war. They made their cruises under reserve officers. They saw nothing of the Regular Navy. Their instruction was unsatisfactory. In most cases they finished their training duty discouraged and dissatisfied.
Late in 1922, reservists were authorized to take training on modern battleships. Unfortunately, this authorization came so late that the majority of reservists who shunned the earlier, segregated, non-military cruises, could not get away at that time of the year. However, many reservists will take advantage of such an opportunity in the future, if offered them during the vacation period. All that will be required is to give them advance information and afford them the opportunity to train during the months of July, August and September.
The following impressions and experiences of reserve officers will emphasize just what has been said with regard to their method of training:
“Lieutenant R-made an Eagle Boat cruise in 1922. He went aboard to learn. He found on board nothing but reservists, and the majority of these were officers. He was as well versed in naval science as his instructor . He learned little and finished his cruise with the intention of taking no more until the Navy wants reservists to do real training.
“Lieutenant M - made a cruise on the U. S. S. Litchfield, a modern destroyer. This ship was manned by regular officers and regular enlisted men. This reservist was one of a number who made this cruise. The ship had an active schedule of employment. The reservists were given proper instructions, and they ·learned much. They left proud of the Navy and glad they were in the Reserve Force.
“Ensign C- made a cruise in 1921 on a ship that never left the clock. The information gained by this reservist will be of little value to the Navy and the nation in time of need.
“Gunner's Mate first class G--made a cruise in 1922 on the U. S. S. New York. The ship was actively engaged in carrying out its regular schedule of employment. This reservist was anxious to ex tend his time of training. His captain was anxious to have him. He finished his training period and went back into civilian life a booster for the Regular Navy and for an efficient Reserve Force. His training cost the Navy less than that of the reservist who was segregated and did his cruise on a nonmilitary ship under reserve instructors.
“Lieutenant S-, of the Regular Navy, took passage on the Eagle Boat, officered and manned by reservists, during one of the cruises in 1922. These were some of his observations. No discipline. No training. No respect. The ship was overrun by reservists in gold lace. The rank of a reservist was no criterion for the position he could fill. The reservist was anxious to learn, but he had no instructor. The money spent in such training was an absolute loss.”
During the hey days of easy money, financial questions presented no difficult problems. Today, however, finances (or more correctly, the lack of finances) are the elements that bar nearly every scheme proposed for the enhancement of the Reserve Force. "Insufficient funds" is the answer to most questions. True, anything worthwhile costs money, but where the will is sufficiently strong, ways can generally be found to procure the necessary means. In the case of the Reserve Force, the Navy's effort has been too feeble to overcome existing obstacles.
In the first place, there is no practical working policy, and until recently there has been no kind of a policy laid down for the specific guidance of District Commandants. The commandants were groping in the dark. Their task of administration of the Reserve Force without a guiding policy was an undertaking foredoomed to failure. The results accomplished were unsatisfactory. Reservists were dissatisfied, discontented and in some cases disgusted. Every day the Navy was losing more and more of its worth-while members of this auxiliary.
The efficiency of any organization, civil or military, is based upon intelligent execution of every important detail of a well defined practical policy. Without a policy no execution is possible.
It has been suggested in an issue of the Naval Institute that the records of the individual reservist and the administration of the Reserve Force should be handled by the Service afloat, that such a procedure would be economical and would permit quick mobilization. It will require no lengthy discussion to point out the fallacy of such a contention. The Service afloat is a mobile organization. Units are dispatched here and there. An Atlantic ship will find itself in the Pacific and vice versa. A reservist residing in Chicago or New Orleans, when he receives orders for active duty, most probably, will find his ship thousands of miles from its home port, perhaps in the Mediterranean or even in Asiatic waters. To meet such conditions, an intricate, up-to-date correspondence system with each reservist is necessary. Even so, much transportation money will be consumed in peace time in handling reservists for annual training purposes. A figure as low as the average transportation of 141 miles per man, which is now met in the various districts, would be impossible. As for quick mobilization, a condition would exist in every naval port of the United States, upon the issuance of mobilization orders, that would beggar description; confusion, congestion and delay would be inevitable. Conditions would be a thousand times worse than are met in an attempt to sort out and return to proper ships in an orderly fashion a large fleet liberty party "half seas over."
The Navy's war and post war experience in Reserve Force matters should be solemnly heeded in all future work pertaining to reserve organization and training: The reservist should be made to feel that the Navy wants him and that the Navy knows exactly what its purpose is in training him. He must get completely over the idea that his training period is nothing more than a red tape requirement or a free touring excursion. The reservist must be handled with tact, but his treatment should not be such as to becloud the stern business for which he is training. Briefly, his training should be a strict businesslike affair, intelligently and painstakingly supervised. If the reservist is not willing to submit to such a method of training, he is not suitable timber for the Navy; and the sooner he is found out and dropped, the sooner will the Navy arrive at a worth-while Reserve Force.
In dealing with the reservist, the Navy can't get entirely clear of politics. This is a disadvantage, but this disadvantage can be turned into an asset if properly treated. If the reservist can be trained and indoctrinated and can be made to feel and appreciate that he is really a component part of the Navy, his indulgence in political issues, local or national, will work to the advantage of the Navy as a whole. If, however, the reservist is not trained and is not shown by concrete examples .that he is an integral part of the Navy, he will most assuredly drift away. He will work to bring about some state organization, as, in certain in stances, he is now doing. These state organizations will be patterned after the erstwhile militia. The Navy will have little or no administrative voice in them, but on the other hand these state organizations will endeavor to force the Navy to supply equipment and allocate ships for their use. The Navy will be called upon to do more than it is doing now.
In some districts many reservists have done everything possible to break away from naval control. State organizations have been attempted and in some cases formed. These organizations look upon the Navy more as a source of supply for ships, equipment and retainer pay than they do for naval administration and guidance.
There are two types of enrolled reservists. One is the reservist who is in the organization for all the emoluments without service that he can secure. The other type is the individual who wants to give and learn. This second type is the man the Navy wants and should train. He should receive moderate compensation for his services. T he Navy cannot expect to get something for nothing, although it need not give retainer pay as high as has been proposed.
A comprehensive survey of the entire Reserve Force is highly in order if the Navy is to have a real auxiliary to draw upon when the call for expansion comes. After such a survey has been made it will require energetic measures and careful supervision to build up and to maintain a reserve organization that will be worthwhile.
Much along these lines was accompli shed by the board which met in Washington in February, 1923. This board among other things recommended that the Navy's policy with reference to the Reserve Force shall include the following clauses:
To create, organize and train a Naval Reserve sufficient to provide the supplementary personnel necessary to mobilize the fleet arid all its auxiliaries.
To make the Naval Reserve secure in its status and organization as a part of the Navy and to guard its interests.
To cultivate a close association of officers of the active Navy and of the Naval Reserve.
To emphasize in the training of the reserves, the duties most likely to be assigned them afloat upon mobilization.
To be generous in assigning officers to duty with the Naval Reserve, and to educational institutions.
The recommendations just cited were approved by the Secretary of the Navy. Therefore, it is mandatory for the Navy to put these recommendations into effect. The general policy has been enunciated. It is now necessary to promulgate a far-sighted, working policy for the guidance of district commandants in organizing and administering the Reserve Force.
If the Service as a whole is actively interested in reserve matters and is brought around to realize that the Reserve Force is a component part of the naval personnel, ways and means can be found to administer and train the reservists in spite of any kind of money stringency. But so long as no far- sighted, clear cut, plan of action is put forth, no initiative can be expected from the Service. The Service administers and trains its regulars in an admirable manner, for the reason that it appreciates full well that good men and good ships are the powerful factors that make for assured success. If the Navy can't have both, it will fight with poor ships and good men. But it does have good ship. Perhaps not enough, and if so, then all the more reason why the personnel should be as near perfect as is humanly possible to accomplish.
The Navy's complement of regular personnel has been limited by Congress. The four-year enlistment period causes an enormous turnover of men. Each week the Navy loses from various discharge and other causes from five hundred to seven hundred men. Some of these losses are at present partly recovered by transfers and enrollments in the reserves. During July, August and September of 1922, the Reserve Force gained three thousand members from the Regular Establishment. Many of these new recruits for the Reserve Force are excellent, well-trained men. The bulk of these ex-Navy men are in Classes 1-C and 1-D. Unfortunately, under present restrictions, their services cannot be obtained in reserve work. They are not required to perform any duty. In consequence, their knowledge and ability in naval matters is permitted to grow stale, while the ordinary reservist from civil life goes begging for real Navy knowledge and training.
To make the Reserve Force an organization of vast potential strength it is mandatory that the individual reservist receive proper training on real ships, training under competent instructors not as it has been done. The kind of training that the reservists received in 1921-22 has in most cases been worse than no training at all! Yet such training has cost the Government approximately five hundred dollars for each individual who did no more than fifteen days active duty per year. In these piping days of disarmament talk, reduced appropriations
and budget paring it behooves the Navy constantly to guard against the expenditure of every unnecessary penny. An in efficient Reserve Force, administered half-heartedly and haphazardly will cost as much as an efficient Reserve Force, probably more. So why not make the Reserve Force an organization worthwhile, one that will attract the type of men that the Navy and the country need in time of stress?
It can be done, and to such an extent that when the emergency does come, the reservist will be trained, fully equipped and ready to report to his unit, and his unit of fifty or sixty men ready to proceed upon orders to the assigned station. In this way training stations will not be hopelessly swamped and the Service afloat held up clays, weeks and months for its men. Once the Service realizes that its war strength is going to come from the Reserve Force sufficient interest will be aroused to insure the maintenance of an efficient Reserve Force.