The success of a manager in a navy yard for the cycle commencing with July 1, 1921, is likely to be measured by the Department's opinion of the results accomplished (a) in reducing costs and (b) in getting work finished on time. This order, it will be noted, would be reversed in time of emergency.
The most important section of the manager's organization, the one having the greatest influence on these results, is the Planning and Estimating Section. Properly organized and directed, the Planning and Estimating Section is necessary to efficiency. The combination, planning and estimating, is a logical one. The navy yards must submit estimates for much of the work for the necessary information of the Department before the work is ordered, and also some work which is being handled on a competitive basis just as private plants submit bids. The navy yard estimate is a statement of an amount it is decided the work should cost and the private plant bid is the amount for which the work will be undertaken and may be an estimate of the actual cost or it may include a profit, etc., depending on circumstances.
An estimate is either (1) planned or (2) approximate. For a planned estimate the job is investigated in detail and a plan of the work is prepared, this plan being made use of later by the planning section. An approximate estimate is not a planned estimate and may be based on data which has been collected covering similar work on other ships, or at previous times. Such a collection of data should include, also, standard estimates which have been made for such standard articles as have been made, these standard estimates being revised and added to from time to time.
Definite progress along the line of establishing an estimating section, or a planning and estimating section, was evident at nearly the same time, about 1909-10, in the navy yards at Mare Island, Puget Sound, and Boston. These steps were taken independently so far as the Boston yard was concerned and probably also as concerns the two West Coast yards. Since that time planning the work in a navy yard has been in and out of favor—mostly out—and at the present time cannot be said to be enjoying a promising look-in. There is no better example of the fact that experience must be acquired and cannot be passed along to a beginner. The complications in this particular case, however, are special. There is no continuity in the officer personnel, nor in the organization of navy yards, and the satisfactory installation of a planning section requires, above everything else, that steps be taken only after enough investigation to be certain of the principle involved and thus ensure that steady progress which cannot possibly be obtained with changes, certainly with frequent changes, in management. Changes in navy yard organization could hardly have been more frequent and more radical than since about 1909, when the introduction of modem management methods in navy yards was first seriously studied and undertaken.
Before that time, when estimates had to be prepared, the methods in use were not worth much and the estimates were of corresponding value. At the best an estimate was simply a guess and based entirely on such incomplete records as had been kept of estimates made and costs reported on more or less similar earlier jobs. There can be no better data than similar cost figures; but the way costs were kept and charges were made in the early days made the data valueless for comparisons. Even if all charges had been accurately made and recorded there were no operation costs recorded—only total job order costs. The master workmen or foremen made the estimates on short notice, that is they actually spent very little time on them, and added a percentage which they thought would make the totals large enough. The officer in charge of the preparation of the estimates would accept the figures handed in or he would add his percentages based on his experience with the individual foremen.
The estimates were not estimates but guesses at probable costs prepared by men whose primary interest was to see that the figures were made large enough. The master workmen were accustomed to doing all sorts of additional jobs for the ships and it was easy if there were some catch-all estimates with enough margin to stand the charges. There has always been an aversion on the part of ship's officers to putting in writing requests for items of work on a ship undergoing overhaul which have been thought of after the original list was sent in. Often the head of the department on the ship who wants the item does not desire to convince his commanding officer of the necessity nor to explain why it was forgotten originally; often other generally similar reasons apply. Therefore the yard representative in charge of the work is approached. If he is hard-hearted other efforts are made until finally the necessary persuasion or pressure is brought to bear and the item is ordered. According to the way work was handled this was done by selecting the most appropriate job order number to which the charges could be made. The new item usually had no connection whatever with the item covered by the job order to which it was finally charged, and such new items undertaken without special authority during the progress of the work and which the estimates did not cover, often amounted to a large percentage of the total cost of overhaul on the vessel.
The estimates finally submitted) were a joke so far as being accurate estimates was concerned. Yet there are officers today, and in positions of high responsibility, who say that is the way to prepare estimates—to abolish the planners and estimators and to return to the former methods, inaccurate and unreliable as they were.
Even if the total costs as finally reported covering the overhaul of a vessel, agreed fairly well with the estimates as submitted, that was no proof of accuracy of estimates. Unfortunately, but as was well known, it was usually a proof that the masters had been keeping cost records on the jobs. Accurate charges are most difficult to obtain at any time—the cost returns now of any job of reasonable size will be found on analysis to contain many errors, many of them large ones. Accuracy in those days meant even less. To constantly scrutinize the returns in the effort to keep the charges reliably accurate meant a great deal of arduous, tedious office work combined with a very accurate and complete knowledge of the status of each job, and the study of the detail cost returns had to be kept up-to-date or it would not result in necessary corrections, and such returns would not be worth much. The result was that they were not studied and watched in that way—there was not time, and it was not even possible except for a very few special jobs.
The experience as to inaccuracies in charge against job orders is not confined to navy yards. The conditions and results are similar in private yards. Some contractors issue special job orders to cover changes, or jobs for which they intend to submit claims for extra compensation as changes from the contract plans and specifications. These cost returns in the past on Government vessels (in some yards) have been open to the Board on Changes and the detail charges have been furnished daily—say the second day after the work was performed—to the resident inspector (officer) who kept the data for the Board. The inaccuracies constantly present in such charges are naturally very similar to those in navy yard returns. The very nature of the thing ensures such inaccuracies. Job order numbers are complicated; supervisors or mechanics who make out the time chits have other exacting duties which demand their time, and often have dirty hands and a stubby pencil with which to make their entries; figures and letters are not made accurately and legibly; and are easily read incorrectly; often accountants know little, if anything, about the work and they add to the errors by making other errors in transcribing from the time chits; and it means nothing to many clerks in the accounting office that a boilermaker is being put down in the final charges as working on the installation of a toilet in a bathroom or a sail-maker on the job of patching a bulkhead or a boiler. Indeed many wrong charges, even, sound plausible enough as many trades can be involved in many jobs and the possibility of error lurks in every charge. Real familiarity with the job is essential before the charges against it, for labor and for materials, can be studied and errors detected. When so many jobs are involved, the time for such study is not available. The officer handling the work can only expect to strike the high spots on certain jobs. There are not enough of us to go around in these days of shortage of officers, to have officers assigned who are able by experience to handle the work. Maybe the balance sheets average up in the long run—the total charge against a ship on which $100,000 has been spent may not be out over one per cent due to such errors; but the individual job orders are out very much more—and formerly the total charge against a particular vessel meant at the most that the total of this amount handed in against her might be approximately correct, although the list of the items of work done probably was not very complete. When the cost returns were made up no one knew much about them. Some knew from long experience, that they probably were very inaccurate. The outstanding requirement was that if the cost exceeded the estimate by a certain percentage, an explanation was required. The returned costs of job orders after completion of work on a ship was often a remarkable paper. The very large percentage of jobs for which the final costs were within the allowed tolerance of the estimated costs was very striking. Even so there were always explanations necessary and the total cost very frequently exceeded the total estimated amounts by very large figures. This is not surprising in view of the way estimates were made and job orders handled. The wonder is not that the final costs differ so much from the estimates. The wonder is why and how the estimates are so close. Will a man who made an estimate on work he is to do ever estimate too low or miss his estimate very far? Greatly overrun estimates could usually be traced to loading up the job with unrecorded extras. The estimate has to be made for many assumed conditions; such as the kind and amount of work in the yard; the location of the ship during the time the work is done; the particular supervisor, particular men, and the particular ship superintendent whom it is possible to place on the job; the conditions of weather; the number of times when the work has to be stopped on account of more urgent work for the particular gangs employed elsewhere in the yard, or on account of lack of funds, etc.; and other generally similar conditions, all of which affect final costs.
The estimate has to provide for all of these, and is now based, as much as possible, on returns of costs of operations, which are few indeed, in regard to most jobs. The accounting offices have not been able to furnish many cost returns, and those data therefore, in the planning sections are far from complete. The yards are prohibited by law from making studies—that is, time studies and the like—of jobs in progress, and therefore are un able to fix on satisfactory actual costs for standard operations, many of which otherwise could be collected and used in future estimates, and which would make them just that much more accurate. Also, as the work progresses, there must be numerous places where advantageous changes in the original plan are found to be possible, and many of them are made. There is not time, and in fact, often it is considered to be too much bother to issue revised or supplemental job order specifications and to make a revised estimate to suit each such change in detail. That should be done, but practically it often will not be done. The result of all these numerous things which affect the actual cost may make it differ widely from the estimated cost, and it would be strange, indeed, if it did not. Such cost data could not be much help later in preparing estimates for a lot of generally similar jobs of projected work on the same or a different vessel. The cost in 1893 of overhauling the anchor engine and anchor gear on the Chicago would not necessarily bear any special relation to an exactly similar worded order in 1895 on the Baltimore. The actual recorded cost of each job might well have been within fifteen per cent of $750.00; but that does not mean it was satisfactory practice to put in an estimate of $750.00 on that item on the Baltimore because the records showed that cost on the similar item two years earlier on the Chicago. It would be a coincidence, only, if the two costs were even approximately the same. It would be a much more likely guess simply on account of the nature of the work involved, to estimate on a bottom repair job on the Baltimore in 1895 at say, $300.00 for each bottom plate requiring renewal because a generally similar bottom job cost that approximate figure two years earlier on the Chicago, and yet comparisons of such apparently exactly similar jobs in different years but in the same yard, show the costs differ by 100 per cent. Such methods, however, are simply on the principle of accepting the estimate brought down by shooting into the flock of conditions surrounding a similar subject at some former time. Formerly some of the master workmen kept some returned cost figures of this kind; but most of them did not. They had no special place to keep such papers, and had to file and index them themselves, as no shop clerks were allowed until comparatively recently. Some officers kept copies of cost reports and the office files usually were full of them; but as a matter of fact such cost figures actually were not used much in preparing estimates covering similar subjects. Possibly this was because it has always been recognized that the similar sounding jobs would be very different in the final analysis, and it was known also, that charges against jobs had not been scrutinized very carefully and the final cost figures therefore, probably were very inaccurate. It was much too common an experience to be exceptional for the cost figures on a particular ship on which extensive alterations were being made, to be two or even three times the estimate.
The need of some better way of preparing estimates was obvious and the recognition of the principle that estimates are not primarily a function of men whose job is to produce work cheaply, quickly, and efficiently. The establishment of estimating sections in different yards followed. This estimating section, whenever practicable, was under the control of an experienced officer and included supervisor mechanics, expert mechanics from different shops, draftsmen, and clerks. The number in the section necessarily fluctuated with the volume of work.
The mechanics were drawn into the section from the different shops on nomination of masters and when the volume of work fell off, the corresponding numbers were returned to the shops. The total number constantly fluctuated to suit the work. The section was composed largely of the men who formerly had done the same kind of work directly for the individual masters and had done that work in the masters' offices. The time-spent formerly by them on such estimating work in the shops depended on many conditions, and the planning work not done by them under those conditions was mostly turned over to the workman on the job to do in the best way he could. The only records which were available in these shop offices were such as the master workmen had managed to gather together for their own records. As a rule such records were neither very complete, nor kept in a very orderly manner, because no competent persons were allowed for that purpose, so that the real value of such records was small. A central estimating section, however, would be fitted out suitably with necessary facilities, files, etc., and with all the cost data possible to collect together. These records would be filed so as to be immediately accessible and available for all. The officer in charge of the section would be responsible for the collection of cost figures from accounting office, and for having them analyzed and filed away for later reference. The drafting room is alongside, from which all necessary plans and calculations are obtained. The members of the section are assigned to work according to their particular experience and qualifications. These men are soon trained, their work becomes more accurate, and the lost time is very greatly reduced.
Reference was made above to the close relation existing between estimating and planning, and to the unit of the organization now existing in some yards and which has at different times existed in all yards, known as the Planning and Estimating Section. While the preceding has necessarily connected them in some of the references, it has dealt more particularly with the estimating end. The following similarly deals more specifically, although for many reasons only very generally, with the planning end.
We all certainly agree that it is most desirable to have a properly worked out plan before beginning any job. Therefore no discussion is necessary as to the general necessity and value of planning. The questions are rather who will do the planning, where will they do it, and how much will they do.
Any job is divided into two operations: (1) Planning, and (2) execution. Planning is the management's part of the job; execution is the workmen's part. Therefore the management must plan out the work or pass up to the workmen part of the management's job. The management has no right to expect a full day's work from a man if he must spend half his day planning. The planning carries the job from the time of receipt of the order to the time that the workman lifts his tool to work. It consists of:
- An analysis of the job and a division of the job into certain "machine" or "trade" operations.
- The working out of detailed instructions covering each of these operations.
- The routing of the work (to the machines) in the proper sequence.
- The providing of tools, materials, and everything to work with in advance.
In other words, planning defines the job and provides the proper conditions for its efficient accomplishment.
Planning does not mean outlining today a man's duties for tomorrow. It means rather outlining the means and methods of doing a job before starting it. The decision as to the means and methods of doing a job is perhaps the most important part of its accomplishment and for this the management relies upon the knowledge and experience of the master workmen and other supervisors, and it is necessary to inspire them to exert their best efforts. Having decided on the means and methods, the remainder of the operations of planning is largely clerical and should be handled automatically by the system.
The work in a navy yard naturally divides itself into two classes:
- Inside work, or work done in shops.
- Outside work, or work done outside shops, on the ship or in the yard.
For the inside work, all the planning is done in the shop and there is for each shop a central routing board in the master workman's office from which the status of any job in the shop can be seen at a glance. For the outside work of the yard—which is mostly the work on the ships—we would have the unit planning board on the ship; the central planning board, for the routing and planning of the outside work, would be in the main office. The method of handling this central planning board for outside work is somewhat as follows: The job in place of being forwarded to the master's office, is forwarded to the central planning office. From here, the master workman is called into consultation (it will be understood that this does not mean the master workman is called up to the main office building—as a general practice the planner confers on the telephone and makes an appointment as to time and place to suit the condition), and the job is gone over with him, after which the route sheet is prepared in the planning office and approved by the master workman before being issued, after which the instruction cards are made out. Thus the master workmen are given direct control over the methods and means of doing the work.
It will be noted that at any time when information is desired by the master workman or any one else as to the progress of any particular class of work in the yard, it is immediately available from the planning board by consulting it for any particular trade. If the arrangement indicated does not suit the urgency of any job the force can be immediately re-distributed to meet the demands. This system places the work intimately under the control of the master workmen. It permits them to determine before starting a job the exact method to be followed in doing it and it also lifts from their shoulders much clerical work and memory work, this burden being placed on the system, thus permitting the master workmen to devote their time to the actual supervision of the job and to the instruction of the workmen. This giving of instruction and assistance to the workmen is a very important feature of the system, certainly often much neglected, and it enables the men to do the work in the best way. This is quite different from an older system, all too common, of putting a man on the job and letting him work out his own salvation. Certainly this is an important part of a supervisor's duties and one of the principal duties for which he is appointed. He must be assumed to have better knowledge of the best ways to do a job than the workman and he is given the higher pay as a supervisor so as to secure benefit of his greater experience among the workmen assigned to him. To suppose that the ordinary workman is as capable as his supervisor in devising methods and means is an acknowledgment of the inferiority of the supervisor. We are after increased output and certainly the man working under proper instructions will do a great deal more work (usually) than the man who is allowed to follow his own methods. Is it a question of methods of work or of exact instructions as to what is to be done? A properly planned job usually does not leave alternate methods to follow. A ship-fitter could get out a bulkhead by templating every plate on the ship, but proper planning would require all the templating to be done from the floor (mold loft). In either case the method of preparing for fabrication and erection would be the same. Where work is not planned by those most competent to do it, the man on the job does it himself, usually with a tremendous waste of time and energy. Proper instruction assists men to higher ratings and improves the efficiency of the entire force. Where the work is not planned the master workman spends a very large amount of his time each day answering questions of those under him as to the job to be undertaken next; the urgency of this or that job; the distribution of this or that group of men; the extent of this or that job, etc. Most of these questions asked are questions which should be answered before any work is started on a job. Not only is time wasted in asking and answering and discussing such questions, but often the master workmen cannot reach a decision then and must consult further with the drafting room or the files.
The principal criticisms heard against the planning section in a navy yard are that the cost of doing the work is increased, and the time required is longer on account of work not being started promptly. It should not be difficult to convince anyone that these arguments are altogether wrong. Certainly any work properly planned must cost less than if it is done, without such planning and has to be sort of planned as the work progresses. Surely the planning can be done more cheaply by experts who are properly trained to do that particular work, and who are given all facilities necessary to do that work quickly and accurately, than if done by former methods where it was laid out piecemeal, if at all, and the workmen assigned to the job allowed to dally along while waiting for the next piece of information, or taking time to go to the shop to find the supervisor who could explain the next step to be taken, or sitting on the job and trying to plan it out for themselves, with the result that often happened of having to change the work later because it was not planned to suit the man higher up who ought to have planned it himself. Every job carries in its costs, the cost of planning, but while the cost for planners is definite and easily obtained, it is impossible to arrive at the cost due to haphazard instructions to the workmen, and the loss of time from the man puzzling the work out for himself.
Where the planning is properly charged with delay in starting work, it is the fault of the details of the system and not at all of the principle. There is no reason whatsoever why any job, no matter what it is, cannot be started exactly as quickly in a yard where the planning section is most highly developed as it can in that or any other yard where the planning section has been abolished or has never existed. It is not at all necessary for the workmen to wait for written instructions in order to commence the work. That is better, and should be followed where the conditions permit it; but where they do not permit, the work can be started as soon as the vessel is tied to the wharf. Jobs like the latter are exceptional and will not be many. They will be limited to the one, or perhaps two biggest jobs on the ship, and for them the immediate planning—that for the commencement of the work—can be done in person on the ship with the men, the planner and the master workman with the officer in charge of the planning of the work going to the job with the workmen who must commence the work. The job can be laid out in a few minutes, to last the balance of the day, and before that time the regular instructions can be gotten out for the succeeding step, and then it is easy to keep ahead of the workmen while complete planning of the job is being made. Criticisms that the jobs are unnecessarily delayed and take longer to perform because the work is commenced later are frequently thoughtless, and are made without taking into consideration the fact that when the job is properly planned out, the actual working time on the job will be less, and, of course, the job can start later and yet finish, earlier. The actual time a job is commenced is a very intimate part of the planning. Obviously all jobs cannot be started at once. The work must be carried on to suit the force, and jobs necessarily have to be started all along the line from arrival to departure of ship. It frequently happens that this apparent delay in starting some of the jobs is the cause of criticism of the planning system, when as a matter of fact this very delay is more often than not, the result of a careful plan for the completion of all work and not letting minor items interfere with major jobs. Also, we have gotten away from the idea that often used to prevail in many yards that the cost did not mean very much anyway, and the primary object was to get the work done. The cost does mean much and does enter into the plans, and necessarily so. And it may well be that the job does actually take longer but costs less, due to the proper planning. If that result does not interfere with the departure of the vessel, and therefore does not interfere with the necessary military arrangements involved, then the fact that the job took longer but cost less should be the occasion for commendation and not for adverse criticism.
The subject is big, and there are many points of view. It is only necessary to thoroughly understand what the planning is accomplishing for the efficiency of the yard and for the cheapness of production in order to approve it. The worst effect on the planning is the occasional abolishment of the planning section for the announced reason of improving or increasing the efficiency of the yard. That gives such a black eye to the system that it takes a long time to recover.
All that is accomplished in the naval service commencing with the instruction of recruits and midshipmen is planned, and planned in detail by people assigned that work as a major function whether it is called by that name or not. It is highly illogical to condemn the planning section for navy yards, or to cripple it, simply because figures as to what is paid for this service are segregated and easily accessible. All practical experience shows that this is the cheapest form in which this service is obtainable, but the very fact that any job handled on the hit or miss system carries extra costs all along the line renders it impossible to ever produce exact figures to prove the case.