Let us approach this subject in a different manner from other writers who have aired their views in the INSTITUTE. Instead of trying to make readers with decided opinions believe this discussion upholds their side of the question, only to find the writer actually showing that bias in his arguments which he has repeatedly disclaimed in his introduction; instead of such pussyfooting, we shall state boldly, that we are firmly and absolutely against amalgamation. We trust that such a plain statement will crystallize sentiment, and that those in the service who have thought upon the subject, and those who have not previously given it thought, will now consider the seriousness of the question, will make decision, and rally to the standard, for a fight to the finish against projects of this nature.
The proposed amalgamation contemplates joining the duties of the line, supply corps, construction corps and civil engineers. The arguments for amalgamation between any of these corps are quite similar. The arguments against amalgamation of any two of these corps are similar. In order to simplify verbiage the words "staff corps" will be used in this article to indicate all corps excepting the line; and the proposition will be considered as an amalgamation between the line and any one of the staff corps. It is considered that the same general objections exist against amalgamation between any two of the staff corps.
The writer chose the line of the Navy for his life work. All his training and education have tended toward perfecting him for the higher positions in the line. The vast majority of other officers in the line at the present time have gone through the same years of training and education. Had we desired duty in a staff corps, we would have lived a different life and prepared a different foundation. Any argument which tends to prove that the Navy would be benefited by our assumption of staff corps duties is specious and misleading. Denial of this obvious fact can come only from failure to appreciate the highly specialized nature of staff officers' duties, and the vast field of special information which a staff officer of ability must have at his command,—such information and underlying education being entirely different from anything that we have obtained in our own work.
It seems proper for us to assume that the years of watch standing, the hours we have spent on the bridge, in stormy weather and fog, our experience gained during the intensive period of training of the war, and our years at sea in peace, have better fitted us for the positions of higher command in the line than anything else we might have done. If that is correct, it is palpably absurd to claim that by study and general knowledge gleaned through association with line officers in one or two cruises at sea, the average member of any of the staff corps is in a position to emerge as a fully qualified line officer, after a short intensive time of study and an examination. We do not claim to be fit for selection as members of any other corps, and considering the ramifications of our training it is inconceivable that members of these other corps are fit for commissions in the line.
It might be well at this time definitely to oppose the proposition that seems to have grown up in recent years, that the successful passing of a theoretical examination is sufficient to qualify any man as a commissioned officer of the line or of any other corps. The experience of most commanding officers during the late war seems to have been, that for line duties, line officers of experience were best, line officers of little experience second best; newly commissioned Naval Academy graduates being better, as a rule, than any except the very best of men obtained from the other branches of life. To disagree with this is to claim that our entire system of training and education is at fault. That it is not at fault, is shown by the preponderance of opinion expressed, privately and officially, by the majority of commanding officers during the war. Doubtless the higher officers of the other corps found similar conditions true, through experience with their subordinates.
We grant the feasibility of a general ground work education at the Naval Academy for the combatant corps. This is done at present for all excepting the supply corps. But once an officer is grounded in his specialty, he should become an integral part of that branch and should strive to perfect himself for the work of that corps. Close liaison and friendship between the corps is essential, but a general merger of the combatant corps would probably produce specialists of inferior ability for the work in each corps, without a compensating increase in efficiency of the Navy.
Would the proponents of this question of amalgamation have dared to mention the subject to Paul Jones, Farragut or Porter? We study their lives, tactics, plans and campaigns. Let us also study their common sense in dealing with personnel, and acknowledge frankly that these best men in the history of our Navy have wanted and asked for seamen and seagoing officers, when they wanted naval efficiency. Has the Navy so changed that sea experience and seamanship have lost their value? Is a few months' study of seamanship, and a successful examination, the equivalent of four years at the Naval Academy and years of watch standing? If not, then let us insist on sea experience and concentration on the duties of their corps for all officers, both young and old, and not be led astray by hopes of a millenium, where all officers know all things.
Proficiency in the line is obtained through study and experience at sea. Proficiency in the supply corps, construction corps and civil engineer corps is obtained by actual work and study in the specialized duties of those corps; and the assumption that the average officer in the Navy would be a better officer, if he had a thorough knowledge of the duties in all of these corps cannot be upheld by any practical application in civil life nor in the Navy; excepting in a few individual cases which do not refer to the vast majority of our commissioned personnel.
We shall not bring forward the arguments of those who would amalgamate. They have been shown to best advantage by writers who favor the proposal. It seems proper, however, for the personnel of the Navy, to treat this matter frankly, and ask, "What is the guiding motive that prompts a bill of this nature, which on the surface is so contrary to Navy tradition?"
During the last ten years (and before that time) there has been a steady drive to merge the staff corps into the line. This drive reached its culmination in the abolishment of the distinctive colors on uniforms for staff officers, and the granting to commissioned officers of the staff corps the right to the traditional titles of rank previously held only by officers of the line. With the reasons for this campaign, and with its results, this paper has nothing to do, except to show that this spirit of encroachment has actually existed, and to a great extent has gained its point in the past. Whether this same spirit which is now engaged in the effort to amalgamate the line and staff corps will gain its end this year, or in the future, is dependent upon those officers who appreciate the value of their own corps, and its necessity for existence as now organized. If we who oppose this bill sit idly by, as we have done in the past, such amalgamation will certainly take place, for it will be pushed by some people who have an abiding interest in it. But if we oppose it with united front, and hold this proposition up to the light, where all may see it, it will receive the ridicule and eventual death which it deserves.
It is not our intention to insinuate or charge that the present amalgamation bill is backed only by members of the staff corps, or supported by all members of those corps. The frequent defenses of the construction corps appearing in the NAVAL INSTITUTE completely refute any such statement, and the opinions of our personal friends in the staff corps who are proud of the achievements of their corps show them to be against it. Much of the backing for this bill seems to come from officers of the line, who misled by the success of engineering amalgamation, are willing to extend the idea in order to rid the service of corps friction, without duly considering the seriousness of the step.
As a counter measure, it might be well to initiate a new movement, based on fundamental requirements of the Navy, and backed by the traditions of the service. This move will be to enhance the prestige of each of the several corps. Let us train civil engineers to be proud of the technical abilities required of the officers of their corps. Let the supply corps be jealous of the achievements of their corps during the late war; and the magnificent record the officers of the supply corps made during the period of demobilization, and the numerous economies they have effected in the financial operation of the Navy. Let the members of the construction corps glory in the fact that they are selected from the highest graduates in the Naval Academy, that the work they do, and have done, can best be done by constructors who have received their training and education; let the engineers who have chosen that branch for their life work make it a name to boast of, and by their advance in naval engineering design and operation, gain world-wide fame; and let the line content itself with its own work, and with the history of what the line of the Navy has done when called upon in the past wars of our country.
To do this will put spirit into each of the corps. It will make the civil engineer proud to be a civil engineer, the supply officer take greatest pride in being known as a supply officer, the constructor as a member of the construction corps, and the line officer as a line officer. Let each do his best in his own specialty, and by working together with what the nation gives us, we can place and keep the Navy in the high rank it deserves. The existence of specialized corps is itself proof of their necessity in the past. Let us not destroy the structure of our organization, without deep thought as to the necessity of corps in the present and future.
Everything moves fast and changes quickly in these modern times. Men who speak of tradition, and do not rashly rush ahead with projects regardless of the consequences, are spoken of as reactionaries. At times to be reactionary, is to be sane. The progressives have had power for many years. The time has come to call a halt, and consolidate our position. Let us get "back to normalcy," and make the best of our present situation, before we embark on new adventures.