Engineering Experience - It’s Value to the Captain
Motto: "Seek a Certain End"
By Commander P. W. Foote, U. S. Navy
In his excellent article, "The Part of Engineering in Command," in the February number of the Naval Institute, Rear Admiral J. K. Robison deals with one of the most important matters which affect our officer personnel today. He has set forth the wide and inviting field which engineering duty offers to an officer for rendering valuable service to the Navy and to the Nation, and he points out the need for more officers to perform this duty. To my mind, however, and I speak from some experience, a point of view which is even more important, is to emphasize what engineering duty and experience will do to an officer to enable him to become the "trained, capable captain," whom Admiral Wilson has so aptly described, an end that should be our highest ambition (the aspirations for flag command will be fulfilled if the captain's "job" is well done).
It is also important to point out what engineering will do TO an officer rather than what an officer will do TO engineering, because if the officers are convinced that this duty will be of real and lasting value to them, they will seek this duty just as they now seek gunnery duty. Then our objective would be gained; the MISSION of this problem would be accomplished, and there would be an adequate number of officers who would seek the assignment to engineering duty. This will be particularly so, if the officers are convinced that their professional fitness will be improved in a way that counts in extending their reputation and improving their chances of promotion. This attitude will be further favored if engineering performances, inspections, tests, etc., can be so vitalized that the natural taste for the exciting and somewhat spectacular features of the profession may be gratified, as it is in the gun shooting "game," and the "Rules for Engineering Performances" should be modified with this idea in mind a board of umpires could inspect or "rehearse" the engineering department preliminary to speed trials in a manner similar to the board which inspects the gunnery department preliminary to target practice.
My idea of this "Mission" may be a little different from that of Admiral Robison, but I would write it as follows: "To induce all officers to seek engineering duty so that they may be better captains."
Being a correspondence school student of the War College, the "Estimate of the Situation" is just now a live subject with me, and it occurs to me that this engineering officer "Situation" might be "Estimated" as follows (with due apologies to the more skilful estimators), and in keeping with the "Mission" above mentioned.
General Considerations
The general professional interest in engineering duty is not as great as it should be. Officers are more attracted to gunnery duties than to those of engineering. This results in a lack of sufficient officers to perform the engineering duties and also in having captains in command of ships without having had much, if any, experience in operating and maintaining the motive power of the ship, which is of equal importance to the gun power of the ship.
All officers could be ordered to perform engineering duty at one time or another, but demand for officers is so great for the various other duties in the Navy that, there being no definite policy to this end, no such practice has been established. This is influenced by the natural dislike for duty in the engine room which some officers possess.
"Enemy" Forces
Their Strength, Disposition and Probable Intentions
"Enemy" Forces
(a) Minor prominence to engineering accomplishments compared to those of gunnery;
(b) Corps advocates.
(c) "Specialists."
(d) Lack of contests which have a competitive "show down" on the spot, such as target practice.
(e) Natural dislike by certain officers for duty in the engine room, where it is sometimes uncomfortable.
(f) No romance in a steam pump.
(g) Day in and day out "plugging" to keep the wheels turning, with "form H" at the end of the month, something like a "class yell" of a correspondence school (postage stamp in upper left hand corner of envelope).
Own Forces
(a) Record of accomplishment by line officers in engineering which have improved the power of our fighting ships, such as their part in adopting electrical propulsion for battleships.
(b) All those who believe that a captain can better command his ship both in peace and in war if he has had experience in all parts of the ship.
(c) All those who disagree with "Enemy Forces" (b), (c), (e) and (f).
The "enemy's" principal force is, after all, a mental attitude wherein the majority of the officers place the duties with the guns, the work of navigation, ship handling, and all the "military" part of the ship's work ahead of the engineering work, or, at least, they LIKE the "military" duties better.
This attitude is enhanced by enemy forces" (a) ," "(d) ,” (e) ," "(f)" and" (g)."
There are a number of officers "(b)" and" (c) ," who believe that our highest efficiency would be maintained if we returned to the engineers’ corps, claiming that engineering has now become so complicated that only a "specialist" can properly operate the machinery involved.
The fallacy in this is that there is a great difference in the skill necessary to operate a machine and that required to build it. For the latter, "specialists" are required, but their number is small as far as officers are concerned, as the designing engineers of private manufacturers will fill the greater part of this requirement. For operation, experience has proven that the line naval officer of today can operate successfully any form of fighting machine that can be built. Experience has also demonstrated that greater progress has been made since the amalgamation of the engineer corps with the line than before.
It is not too much to say that the electrical propulsion of battleships, second only in importance to the transition from sail to steam in our Navy, has been a direct result of the amalgamation of engineer and line duties with the general dissemination of engineering knowledge which resulted. It is also probable that the lack of this personnel system in the British Navy is one principal reason why this method of propulsion has not been adopted by them.
Probable Intention
(a) Allow the present situation to continue
Under this plan, those officers who really have a fondness for engineering duty can get it; those who do not like it, may "take a chance" on getting along without doing it, and the Bureau of Navigation will ORDER only the number actually required to perform the duty. This will not result in all captains having had engineering duty.
(b) Establish another Engineer Corps
This would surely defeat our "Mission" and on the whole result in decrease in engineering efficiency as well as in fighting efficiency.
It is not likely to occur.
Own Forces
Their Strength, Disposition, and the Courses open to us
The strength of our mental attitude is inferior to that of the "Enemy." We should adopt measures that would put the routine work of the engineers in a battleship in the public eye. "Form H" is of great value, but the results are not known till the end of the month, and then this is only a table of standing pasted on the bulletin board.
It is realized that it is not practicable to accomplish the same dramatic effects in engineering results as in those of gunnery. Much improvement could be made, however. One thing would be to have competitive inspections for cleanliness and condition of upkeep once every three months, this competition being first held by the division commander between ships of his division and the winning ships of the divisions would be inspected by the squadron commander, the winners in the squadrons being inspected by the commander-in-chief, for the fleet championship.
The attitude of a large number of the junior officers could be greatly changed by lectures and discussion of this subject, giving engineering duty the prominence it deserves.
Courses of Action Open to Us
(a) Allow the present situation to continue-result-mission not accomplished.
(b) Induce the Navy Department to announce a definite policy that after an appropriate date, all officers will be required to perform a certain minimum amount of engineering duty AFLOAT preliminary to promotion to grade of captain.
Education of the Officers
This whole question has a direct bearing upon the education of our officers. By this I mean, training and experience; "education" in its broader sense, not that gained at tile Naval Academy - we GO TO SCHOOL there.
During the last five years, and particularly during the war, we have had greater demands for officers than could be filled with those of proper rank and experience. This resulted in the assignment of officers with inadequate rank and experience to certain duties, as, for instance, the assignment of lieutenants and sometimes lieutenants, junior grade, to command destroyers. This was, in some ways, good experience for these young officers, but they lost a good deal too, in that they were doing this command duty at the time when they should have been employed in certain subordinate duties where they ·would have been studying the details of their professional work. About two or three years ago, I heard a member of the Naval Examining Board say that the examination papers of the junior officers, lieutenants and below, showed a marked lack of knowledge of the technical details of their profession, that they were good at telling what the captain would tell others to do, but they were short on describing how certain things should be done, and that it seemed that we had too many "captains" in the lieutenant's grade.
For destroyers, the best policy, from the point of view of the interest of the officer, as well as of the service, dictates that no officer should be assigned to them with less work and experience than that of a lieutenant (j. g.), and no officer with less rank than a lieutenant commander should be assigned to command of one. For battleships no officer with less rank and experience than a lieutenant (j. g.) should be in command of a turret, and he should have had four or five years experience as a commissioned officer. An officer in command of a fort on shore of the size of a turret with three 14-inch guns would probably be a major in the Army.
The time seems to have arrived when we can give more attention to the need for better training of the ensigns. They can be assigned to duties where their training is the paramount thing, rather than their responsibility for operating or maintenance results. That is, they can all be assigned to engineering duty in battleships for one year!
The present indications are that promotion is soon to be much slower than it has been for the past few years and there will be more time and necessity for the performance of duties involving technical details than has been the case for some time.
The desire to attain higher and more responsible duty at a young and tender age is very commendable, and youth and energy are much to be desired in positions of responsibility, but this can lead to undesirable extremes. Our old friend "Experience" is still a big factor in the "good judgment" which makes for success.
We read of the necessity to concentrate on improving the "quality" of the material of our Navy, now that the "quantity" has been reduced by international agreement. It seems logical that the same principle of improvement should apply to the personnel.
It has been said that our profession is too extensive in character for anyone man to master it, and "specialism" is proposed. The answer is, that this is not the case as far as the principal features, engineering duties and gunnery duties, are concerned, but the field is so large that certain feasible and many methods of training must be carried out continually and consistently.
Decision
(1) That every officer should be assigned duty in the engineering department of a battleship within six months after graduation from the Naval Academy and should be RETAINED in that duty for ONE year. (This would not prevent these officers from having a gunnery battle station.)
(2) That every officer should be assigned to duty as the engineer officer or an assistant engineer officer of a battleship or cruiser for a period of two years before he is promoted to captain and in ample time for him to perform this duty before his "number" for promotion is "made" on the navy list.
If this policy were adopted there would be no longer any lack of "Engineering in Command" or in the captain.
Results of Engineering Experience
In October, 1909, I had the good fortune to be assigned to duty as the Senior Engineer Officer of the Louisiana, after having just completed two years duty at the gun factory. After completing the cruise in the Louisiana, I was assigned to duty as inspector of engineering material at the General Electric Company. From practical experience in the shops, and from a theoretical correspondence school course, I increased my knowledge of electrical engineering and had some part in the discussion of the plan to apply electrical propulsion to battleships.
From this duty I went to gunnery officer of the Nevada, after which I have moved on to various executive and command duties.
Speaking from this experience, I can strongly testify to the great value that my engineering experience has been to me in exercising command, both in dealing with the personnel as well as in taking action in regard to upkeep and repair of material, and also in actions affecting the movements and operation of the ship.
A recent experience in the Patoka will illustrate. We arrived at Gibraltar and found that the harbor inside the breakwater was filled with British ships and that the boarding officer did not think there would be a place for us inside. Due to this and to the necessity for beginning work on a crank bearing of the main engine without delay, I decided to begin work on the engine shortly after anchoring outside the breakwater and before calling on the British officers, and gave the engineer officer authority to disable the main engine. I did not like to do this as there is always danger of a gale from the southwest which might cause the ship to drag her anchor, although no one could say that he had ever seen a ship drag her anchors there.
When I called on the British commandant at the dockyard, he very kindly offered to moor the ship at a buoy inside the harbor if I could get underway before dark. I gladly accepted this offer and said I would have the ship ready to move by 4:00 or 4:30 P. M. When I returned on board, however, the engineer officer said the engine could not be properly assembled to get underway before dark. I did not accept this and told him it must be assembled by 4:30 P. M., and implied if he could not do this, I could. He was really a very capable officer, but he simply feared that he could not meet this demand, then also, there was the unpleasant job of reassembling the engine, getting underway, and then pulling the engine down again. He went at the job cheerfully and efficiently and at 4:50 P. M., we were ready to move and we went inside the harbor, there we were protected from the gales and where the work was readily done. The point is, that I was able to decide whether or not I could reasonably expect the order to reassemble the engine to be carried out as desired; from my engineering experience I knew it could be done.
Someone may say that any captain could order that done whether he had engineering experience or not. Quite true, but suppose the order could not have been executed with safety and the captain had insisted upon its execution over the protests of the engineer officer and damage had resulted; then the captain's blind use of his authority would not have worked so well.
In the War College Book (Pye), I find that Clausewitz, Frederick the Great, Furse and Napoleon, all agree that "Knowledge is Golden," or words to that effect, and experience is the best kind of knowledge.
It is a pleasure to have some definite knowledge of the machinery when inspecting the engine room, and to make suggestions for improvements when things are wrong. If the engineer officer can tell his troubles to a captain who understands, there is much happiness in the heart of that engineer. If the captain commends the work of the boilermaker and of the turret captain with equal understanding; the morale of the crew is improved. In other words, the captain should not be an "Alice in Wonderland" in any part of his ship.
It is not proposed that the captain should be able to fit a brass or run a lathe better than the machinist's mate can do, but he should know what to expect from a good mechanic, and this he can know through a moderate amount of practical experience when a junior officer.
As Admiral Wilson has remarked, a ship's company is a team and the captain is the leader of the team who inspires everyone to do his part efficiently and cheerfully, and it is evident that this can best be done if he has some personal knowledge of the difficulties each member of the team encounters.
A battleship is a great fighting machine composed of two principal parts, her guns and her engines (and, of course, her armor), and the captain fights with both and he who knows them both is more likely to win the battle. Neither part is more important than the other. Rojestvensky's engineers could move the Russian fleet from the Baltic to the Sea of Japan, but his gunners could not hit when they got there. The Oregon could "move" and hit too!
It is true that in the Oregon there were two distinct classes of officers, the line officers and the engineer officers, and they wrote a brilliant page in their country's history. This does not prove, however, that the system then in vogue should be followed for all time. Such a tradition or belief would be a bar to progress.
Traditions which are of the spirit and which inspire heroic and courageous action are fundamental and should live forever. Tradition as to material things are apt to be a fetter to progress. Some people are today “ploughing the ground with a forked stick” because their forefathers followed this method.
The work of the officers of the former engineer corps must not be forgotten. Their accomplishments, both individually and collectively, and both before and after the amalgamation law, have formed a splendid record. Many of our most successful line officers today were members of the engineer corps, and many of the engineering records of the past twenty years have been made by line officers. This illustrates the versatility of the American naval officer. It is an asset to be proud of and to be continuously developed. One of the things which excited the wonder and admiration of the British fleet, when our battleship squadron joined it, was the report that in one of our battleships, on the way across the Atlantic, the navigator and the engineer officer changed duties. The British, with their system, could not understand it.
Who can foresee what the next great step forward will be if "all hands" are devoted to the common thought that a ship is a fighting machine from the bridge to the engine room. We thought that the Oregon and her sister ships at Santiago had made a great record for Yankee marksmanship. But Admiral Scott of the British Navy sprang his idea about shooting guns on the world, and when we adopted these ideas under the leadership of Admiral Sims, our records in gunnery soon made those of Santiago look small in contrast.
We must avoid being “one-sided.” An engineer officer in the Navy should not consider that engineering is in itself a definite end, but that he is to use the engines as a weapon for fighting.
Admiral Scott speaks amusingly of the day when "house-maiding" in the ship was the chief employment. There is a lesson in this, however; the chief reason for the existence of the ship had been partly overlooked.
Things which make for progress are frequently simple, once they are thought of. Admiral Scott thought of the "dotter" and the methods followed for some two or three hundred years for shooting guns on board ship were revolutionized.
Last year we were short on fuel allowances. We found a way to maintain six destroyers on the port fuel allowance for one, and millions of gallons of oil were saved and target practice and tactics were carried out. We were fighting with oil! If we "THINK" more about engineering in the Navy, we will fight better.
There is no "mystery" in engineering. It is simply a case of "off coats and at it." Even an electrical wiring diagram will fall to pieces if one will take a pencil and start tracing it. But it looks "bad" at the start.
Needless to say, these remarks are principally addressed to the younger officers (the junior commanders and below), who are mapping out the courses which will lead to their best professional fitness. The record of accomplishment of our captains both in the past and at present is too high for anyone to feel that any attempt has been made to cast any improper reflections on any one. I know I have spoken of my own experiences at the risk of being criticized for trying to "blow my own horn." I have taken this risk, however, in order that I might illustrate my conscientious belief as to the path which will lead to improvement in our fighting efficiency.
This is a problem for line officers - those principally charged with fighting the ship in battle, not an engineering problem. Shall we tacitly or actually acknowledge our failure to solve it? I do not think so.
Admiral Robison is the Engineer-in-Chief of the Navy, but he is also a line officer. From his high position he has seen the need which exists; he has sounded the call.
Let us answer with "Three cheers," and the day will soon arrive when every line officer in the Navy is equally at home in the engine room and on the bridge.
"Seek a certain end."