Review of Books
The Russian Navy in War and Revolution, by H. Graf, Commander I. R. N. (Translated from Russian) Printed by R. Oldenbourg, Munich.
This book is a personal account by an officer in the Russian Navy, of affairs in that service from the beginning of the war in 1914 until the dissolution of the Russian Navy by the revolution. It is worthy of serious historical consideration. The author served most of the war as executive officer of the fine destroyer Novik. He writes from his own knowledge and experience of affairs in the Baltic Fleet, and from documents and recollections of officers of the Black Sea Fleet in regard to affairs in that force.
The first part of the book deals with operations against the external enemy up to 1917, when the revolution broke out. During this time the Russian Navy was of course greatly outnumbered in the Baltic. It nevertheless was able to conduct any skillful and successful operations against the enemy. It main object was ever the defense of the Gulf of Riga and the Gulf of Finland against attempts f by the Germans to land troops behind the Russian armies along the coast. In this the Russian Navy was successful. Not until the revolution had demoralized the Navy did the Germans succeed in forcing the Gulf of Riga, or dare to make any serious attempts against the Gulf of F inland. The Black Sea Fleet, quite otherwise, held and exercised command of the sea in that area. It skillfully supported the right wing of the Russian Army in the Caucasus; it soon seriously injured and contained the Goeben and Breslan; in Constantinople, as well as rendering ineffective the ships of the Turkish Navy.
It can thus be seen from the book that the Russian Navy, while from its size and position had no vital mission to carry out, nevertheless, did, in the early part of war, what it had to do, and did it in a thoroughly satisfactory manner.
The second part of the book concerns itself with what happened in the Navy from the beginning of the February revolution up to its final collapse as a fighting force in 1918. The conditions and situations described seem literally unbelievable. Yet they occurred. How could that force so cohesive and disciplined in 1916 have suddenly fallen to pieces as it did? The answer must be found in Russian character and government.
These pages are well worth study. A clear expose is given of the methods of the Revolutionists. Knowing as we do the expressed intentions of Moscow to foment revolution in all western nations, we might well be on the lookout against any similar methods being attempted in our service.
Fortunately we have at least one tremendous advantage over the Russians. Our men are intelligent, and not easily to be swayed by specious" doctrine from Moscow. I would not like to think what would happen to any Red agitator who tried to sew seeds of sedition amongst our crews". But they would undoubtedly try it if they thought they could "get away with it." Let forewarned be forearmed!
The author speaks feelingly of the great difficulty that the Russian Navy had always experienced in obtaining seamen to man its ships. This problem is one with which we of the United States Navy can sympathize. A nation of large continental area, having small extent of sea coast, they found it very difficult to get properly trained men to man their ships. They utilized the conscription, and trained their men as best they could. Most wanted some technical training that would serve them after leaving the navy. These trained men would not re-enlist. There was not enough cruising at sea to train the men, to make seamen of them. And this lack was felt when the revolution arose. Seamen, with the seaman's external outlook would not have been so deeply disaffected. It is not in the seaman's nature to be disloyal to his service.
Here also we can learn a lesson
The appearance of the book is· not commensurate with its importance. Yellow paper cover, poor paper, full of misspelled words and grammatical errors, it shows itself what is, a translation into English, of a German translation of the Russian original. "Traduttore Traditore" very truly in this case.
Let us quote the final passage " . . . and so St. Andrew's flag is no more. Where it once waved now the Red flag flies; it has the color of blood, of civil war, of torture and treachery. Our ships, the pride of our former days, have been dishonored as the whole of Russia has been.
"It is death then? For these skeletons of ships it is death; but for the idea of the Navy it is but a long sleep. The time will come when ... Russia rises from the dead, and the Navy will revive. And then on the masts of its new ships, St. Andrew's flag, white with a blue transversal cross, will wave again in the wind."
R. C. S., Jr.
The Essentials of Transformer Practice, by Emerson G. Reed, published by D. Van Nostrand Co., New York, 1923. Price $3.00, 265 pages.
The author in his preface says: "In short the men for whom I am writing and hope to interest are engineering students and operating engineers." The author has produced a book that will be very helpful to engineers, but he has not produced a satisfactory text for students. Twenty-five separate articles on the various phases" of transformer design, construction, and operation have been loosely tied together in book form. There is little in the way of a connected development of transformer characteristics from fundamental considerations, and in the whole book only five transformer vector diagrams appear. On the other hand with its wealth of practical information it should be a valuable reference book for advanced electrical students and practicing engineers.
L. A. D.
LA CAMPAGNE DE BRUIX EN M.EDITERRANE.E, MARSAOUT, 1799, by Lieutenant de Vaisseau G. Douin, Paris, 1923. Published under the direction of the Historical Service of the French Naval General Staff.
Review by Allan Westcott, Professor, U. S. Naval Academy
This volume belongs to a series of notable historical studies promoted by the French Naval État-Major, in line with similar research undertaken by both the army and navy general staffs of other nations, and designed as a preparation for the solution of future naval problems. The principle involved in this method of preparation is sound, for the problems of the future can be solved only by intelligence and imagination plus a thorough understanding of the experience of the past. With the passing of Mahan, the value of such historical study is underestimated in American naval training.
The lessons from Bruix's campaign lie chiefly in his failures. In 1799, after the battle of the Nile and the isolation of Napoleon in Egypt, Bruix was sent from Brest to the Mediterranean with practically the whole French fleet. It was a brilliant strategic move, so secretly planned that for weeks the British Admiralty were kept guessing as to its objective. Even without the aid of Spain, Bruix had a superiority over the British in the Mediterranean. At the end of three months he returned to Brest after a cruise almost barren of results.
The reasons for this failure may be grouped under three heads. First, there was a belief that mere superiority in the scene of war would cause the enemy to vanish, without energetic pursuit and destruction. With St. Vincent and Nelson as opponents, the psychology of this was fatal. Second, there were efforts to make assurance doubly sure by securing the co-operation of the Spanish fleet. This led to friction, slowed down operations, and prevented aggressive action. Finally, the fault lay partly in the character of the French commander.
To quote the author: "With Bruix imagination prevailed over logic. When two ships collided in his squadron, his whole plan was changed without valid reason. . . . Had he held firmly to his plan, he could have captured in detail all of Nelson's squadron scattered between Malta, Naples, and Palermo. After that, what would have prevented his joining the Spanish at a predetermined rendezvous, and with the combined fleet striking a blow at Minorca? He would then have been waging that methodical warfare without which there can be no lasting results, and which alone could have saved Malta and perhaps Egypt. But no; at the moment of action his arm swerved, his will faltered. There was lacking · in him that firmness of purpose which was Nelson's in an eminent degree. His spirit was less solid, less steadfast. He valued a clever maneuver as equal to a victory, and realized only later that his cleverness got him nowhere. Bruix's mind lacked clearness. Rarely did he perceive at once the right thing to do. He dreamed of enterprises that remained chimerical, and let the real one slip through his fingers. He exhausted his force in marches and countermarches, spoiling one of the most admirable strategic surprises that naval history has recorded, to accomplish an operation that a division of frigates could have done."
Operations of the 29th Division. Compiled by Major W. S. Bowen, C.A.C. The Coast Artillery Journal, Fort Monroe, Va., 1923. 6 x 9¼. 410 pp. Price $1.25.
This volume gives the operations of the 29th Division of the American Expeditionary Force, under the command of Major General Charles G. Morton, during the month of October, 1918, in the Meuse-Argonne sector. The period covered one of the most hard-fought campaigns of the Great War.
The book is a compilation of the reports of the officers commanding the various units in the division, from the division commander down to and including the platoon commanders. It contains also a complete record of the messages" sent from and received at division headquarters, and the various field orders covering the operations of the division, Including those of the First Army (U.S.) and the r8th Division (French). There is also an excellent map embracing the front occupied by the 29th Division, and showing in detail the country from Dannevoux to Verdun.
As these are the official reports, "written in the atmosphere of war, at a time when the writers had just concluded one offensive operation and were prepared to enter another," they are of special interest, not only to all who took part in these operations', but to the general student of the campaign as well.
In its completeness the book is not only an unusual record, but a valuable historical document. Altogether, it reflects great credit both upon the Division which with such thoroughness prepared the reports, and upon the compiler who with such care assembled them.
H. G. S. W.