WILL HISTORY REPEAT ITSELF?
By Major Edwin N. McClellan, U.S.M.C.
The old Biblical maxim that, "there is no new thing under the sun," is illustrated by the present efforts through proposed legislation to combine the Navy and War Departments into one Department of Defense.
The American Revolution was fought and won by an Army and a Navy administered by Congress through two separate Departments. The Navy and the Marines were practically disbanded at the close of the Revolution. Toward the close of the Revolutionary struggle—after the Naval Committee, Marine Committee, and Board of Admiralty had in turn administered naval affairs—Congress, on February 7, 1781, resolved to have a "Secretary of Marine" and prescribed his duties. Major General Alexander McDougall was selected to fill this newly-created office but the conditional acceptance of that officer was refused by Congress and the office was never filled. Naval affairs were then administered in turn by the Board of Admiralty, the Superintendent of Finance, and the Agent of Marine. Robert Morris filled the latter office until November 1, 1784, after which date the office remained vacant. The Board of Treasury, aided by the Commissioner for Settling the Marine Accounts, and by the Secretary to the Agent of Marine, wound up the business of the Navy of the Revolution. By 1785, the last ships of the Continental Navy had been disposed of. While the Articles of Confederation authorized the building and equipping of a Navy, no effort was made to take advantage of that provision at any time after 1785.
On January 27, 1785, Congress prescribed and outlined the duties of the Secretary at War, but no reference was made to naval matters.
Upon the adoption of the Constitution in 1789, Congress in April of that year, established an Executive Department, known as the Department of War. This was the Department of Defense because it administered all affairs relative to Navy and Army matters. The Secretary for the Department of War, among other things, conducted all affairs relative to "naval forces, ships" and all such other matter respecting "naval affairs, as the President of the United States shall assign to the said department." Thus, the administration of those affairs, which at the present time are conducted by the Secretary of the Navy, were administered by the Secretary for the Department of War. He acted in the dual capacity of Secretary for the Army and Secretary for the Navy. Since the Navy and the Army are the two principal arms by which war is conducted it was quite natural that they should be placed under a War Department; but when the Navy was taken out of the Department of War in 1798, the name of that department should have been changed to a name less inclusive—such as the Department of the Army, or some other appropriate title.
This Department of War conducted all the national defense affairs from 1789 until the summer of 1798. During this period several matters of importance with regard to the use of an Army and a Navy as instruments of national defense arose. There were: Shay's Rebellion, the Whisky Rebellion, Indian troubles, etc., at home; trouble with the Barbary Powers in the Mediterranean; possible trouble with Great Britain; and decided friction with France. Our two quasi-rebellions and other domestic troubles of this nature were easily quelled; a treaty with Morocco in 1787 removed causes of war; hostilities with the Algerines were obviated by the famous Bribe-Treaty of 1795; the Jay Treaty of 1796 smoothed out temporarily our British troubles; a "no tribute" treaty with Tripoli became effective in 1797; peace with Tunis was assured by the Treaty of 1797-99; but the friction with France eventually ended in a naval war with that country and caused the division of the War Department into two separate executive departments—one to administer affairs of the Army arid the other those of the Navy.
After vainly struggling with these various problems for nearly ten years, the serious difficulties with France brought Congress to contemplate the inadequacy of the Departmental machinery to administer properly national defense matters. Of course it was a more or less simple thing for the Department of War—or as it now may be called, the Department of Defense—to conduct both Navy and Army affairs when they were insignificant in importance and no war-clouds were on the horizon; but when war seemed imminent, a reorganization became imperative.
Having successfully experimented with separate departments during the Revolution, Congress placed all national defense matters under one Department in 1789, as has been described. The real reason for this change was a desire for economy. War seemed far off—even beyond the possibility of ever happening again. The spirit of the times was that of liberty, equality and fraternity. The American and French Revolutions had been expressions of these ideals. The sentiment in Congress, reflecting that of the people, was to eliminate, or at least reduce to a minimum, everything military. Many believed it would be better to bribe pirates than to fight them—if it were cheaper to do so. Therefore, it would be neither economical nor necessary to have more than one department to handle national defense matters. But when hostilities with the French became a probability a more practical spirit expressed itself in Congress.
Now here is what happened and how it happened. On March 8, 1798, Mr. Sewall's Committee of the House reported to Congress that a better economy might be introduced into the Department of War by establishing in that Department some officer who should be employed in the immediate superintendence of the naval concerns of the United States. This conclusion of the committee was followed by a recommendation that there be established in the Department of War, a Commissioner of Marine who should have charge of all naval matters entrusted to him according to law. If adopted, this recommendation would result in one super-executive department with at least two sub-divisions—Army and Navy—with a probability of more when conditions called for them.
After mature and serious consideration of this suggested plan, Congress emphatically refused to adopt it, and on April 30, 1798, established the present Navy Department. In thus separating the Navy and Army, Congress, of course, should have prescribed that the department administering the affairs of the Army be denominated the "Department of the Army" or some other proper title, rather than to have left it with the ambiguous title of the "War Department."
And so, through trial and corrected error, Congress finally concluded that the best plan was to have separate executive departments to administer the affairs of the Army and the Navy. It had tried and abandoned the method of having all matters relating to war or national defense—whether on land or sea—conducted by one department. It had considered and rejected the suggestion that naval affairs be conducted by a Commissioner of Marine acting under the Secretary of War. The question now is—will history repeat itself?