Note:—The following communication has been received from the President of the Naval War College:—
This brief but comprehensive resume of the activities of the U.S. Naval Air Force in action during the World War was prepared by Lieutenant Commander Edwards at my request, and has been incorporated in the Reading Course of the Naval War College. It is accurate as to details and covers the salient features of our activities in this field of endeavor in a very thorough manner.
As Aide for Aviation on my Staff during the World War, and Chief Liaison Officer to the British Air Ministry, Lieutenant Commander Edwards occupied a position which enabled him to study the Strategy and Tactics of the Air in its relation to naval operations to an extent which, in my opinion, qualifies him to write authoritatively on this subject.
Wm. S. Sims,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy.
Editor.
It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that less is known of the activities of the U.S. Naval Air Force in action than any phase of America's effort during the Great War. This is, doubtless, due to two reasons: first, the work was not spectacular and, secondly, the Armistice intervened before our air program had fully matured. Almost without exception accounts of air operations have been written for popular consumption and have, therefore, concerned themselves principally with the romance of the air; with the records and thrilling adventures of American Aces, ignoring for the most part the vast amount of preliminary work, the careful planning and the arduous training which made these aerial fighters and their heroic exploits possible.
The mission of this paper, as I conceive it, is to sketch briefly and in a more or less technical way the organization, administration, and operation of the U.S. Naval Air Force Foreign Service during the Great War, and, by way of establishing my claim to write with some degree of authority on this subject, I beg leave to state that it was my very great good fortune to have served as Aide for Aviation on the staff of the commander of the U.S. Naval Forces operating in European waters from October, 1917, to April, 1919, with additional duties as liaison officer to the British Air Ministry.
Anticipating the inevitable question, "What did naval aviation do during the war?" I would submit the following by way of reply:
Officially the U.S. Naval Air Force Foreign Service executed thirty-nine attacks against enemy submarines, of which ten were considered to have been at least partially successful; it dropped 100 tons of high explosive on enemy objectives, and it had to its credit a total of 22,000 flights in the course of which it patrolled more than 800,000 nautical miles of submarine-infested areas. In point of fact it did immeasurably more than this, for these figures are very far from being a just or fair method of appraising the value of aircraft in naval warfare. I say this because almost always the damage inflicted by aircraft, when operating against surface craft, was of a contributory and indirect nature—"the seaplane summoned destroyers to the scene of action and the submarine was destroyed" describes what is meant by "indirect" in this sense. The destroyers almost always got the credit, whereas the aircraft, the indirect destructive agency, was really responsible for bringing about the action in which the submarine was destroyed. Again negative information is often as good as positive information—it is frequently just as important to know that the enemy is not there as it is to know that he is there—and so, too, a harmless submerged submarine was often just as good as a dead one. This was especially true in the case of convoy operations, with reference to which Admiral Jellicoe, writing to Admiral Sims under date of August 22, 1917, said in part:
To date there has been no case of a vessel being attacked by an enemy submarine when aircraft has been present, while in several cases the submarines have been sighted and compelled to abandon their attacks.
It is not intended to convey the impression that aircraft were content with keeping the submarines under the water, but this was their secondary mission in order to divert them from their work of destruction through fear of the consequences. Personally I hold strongly to the belief that during the war enemy submarines were much more afraid of aircraft than they were of destroyers, because of the greater range of vision of the former over the latter. Having spotted the submarine, it was then a simple procedure to summon such surface craft as might be in that area by means of radio or visual signals. Due to the shallow and discolored water of the North Sea and to a less extent the waters adjacent to the western coasts of England, Ireland, France, and Portugal, it was extremely difficult for aircraft to pick up submerged submarines, although there were several cases on record in which this was done to the ultimate destruction of the submarine. In certain localities, however, notably in the Caribbean Sea, the nature of the water and of the bottom are such that submerged submarines can be detected at great depths and from considerable distances.
In order then to form any just appraisal of the value of aircraft in naval warfare, one must take into account the "negative" results attained, of which a great many must, of necessity, have developed from the 800,000 miles of patrol duty which stand to the credit of our Naval Air Force during the war.
Having reviewed briefly the accomplishments of our Naval Air Force, it now seems logical to proceed with a description of how this force was assembled, organized and operated.
In common with all the nations involved in the Great War, save perhaps Germany, America was unprepared in aviation. There was some excuse for this in the case of Great Britain and of France, for aeronautics was hardly beyond its beginnings in 1914, but this offers no explanation of the lack of attention paid in America to air preparedness. Nor is it an excuse to say that we could not foresee our participation in the general world upheaval, for events proved that anything was possible, and a reasonable amount of foresight in preparation would have been of incalculable value during 1917. Indeed, it is more than strange that Americans should have noted the enormous expansion of aerial activities in Europe, and read the accounts of results obtained by the air squadrons both on land and sea, and yet remained so inert in demanding at least a nucleus of an air force.
Yet, such was the situation. An inventory of our effects in the spring of 1917, showed that we had practically nothing in the way of material and very little in personnel. In fact, prior to 1916, no appropriations, save small ones for experimental purposes, had been made for aviation, the first appropriation of any consequence, $1,000,000, being made in 1916. Yet it must be admitted that we had something that was worth infinitely more than all we lacked—"the will to victory." And behind that lay American ingenuity and the vast resources of our great country. We knew that we could not lose in the long run, but the important question was, "Would our intervention be sufficiently prompt to insure success?"
That our outlook in aviation at the moment of our entry into the war was gloomy, to say the least, is obvious; we were not only unprepared but we had very little idea of how to prepare for aerial warfare, as is evidenced by the following cablegram from the Secretary of the Navy to Admiral Sims under date of April 20, 1917:
Immediate and full information is desired by the Navy Department as to the present development by the British of their naval aeronautics. What style of aircraft is most used and what is most successful over the water? What is the method of launching at sea when carrier vessel is under way? For coastal patrol and submarine searching what are the types of aircraft used?
This request was complied with in minute detail, and sufficient additional information was furnished the Navy Department to enable it to put forward plans looking to the construction of seaplanes and their accessories. The submarine campaign had at this time reached such an acute stage that it was deemed advisable to request priority of shipments of naval aircraft over those intended for army use and this was granted.
Meanwhile, an "Estimate of the Situation" existing in Europe was prepared, and read as follows:
ENEMY FORCES—THEIR STRENGTH, DISPOSITION AND PROBABLE INTENTIONS
(Fall of 1917)
The number and types of enemy submarines are well known and their probable intentions can be predicted from their past performances. Generally speaking they operate in the lee of the land during bad weather insofar as is possible.
The English Channel, the Irish Sea, and the south coast of Ireland are favorite localities during the winter months. During the summer months enemy submarines as a rule extend their activities to seaward and to the southward into the Bay of Biscay.
The east coast of England, and Scotland and the Mediterranean Sea are operating areas throughout the entire year.
The enemy maintains command of the air over the North Sea from Dunkirk to the northeastward.
Enemy anti-aircraft defenses are efficient and compel increasing altitude when flying in their vicinity.
From this information we deduced our mission to be:
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- To make our primary air effort a continuous bombing offensive against enemy naval objectives.
- To make our secondary air effort a patrol of those areas frequented by enemy submarines in readiness for a tactical offensive.
- Troop and merchant convoy escort duty.
This general policy was endorsed by Admiral Sims and agreed to in principle by the Navy Department, and while the personnel and the material essential to our war operations were being assembled in the United States we, on the other side, proceeded to dig ourselves in, so to speak, by building the several air stations as shown on the diagram on the following page.
In spite of our relative unpreparedness in aviation, it is a noteworthy fact that the first American force to land in Europe was the First Aeronautical Detachment, consisting of six officers and sixty-three enlisted men. This detachment reached France on June 5, 1917, and immediately went into training for active service. From this modest beginning our air force grew steadily until at the date of the Armistice, November 11, 1918, it included in its organization 1,147 officers and 18,308 enlisted men operating more than 400 aeroplanes and seaplanes, 50 kite balloons, and 3 dirigibles. It had to its credit a total of 22,000 flights and had patrolled over 800,000 nautical miles; all of this with only nineteen casualties. Truly, a record of which the American people may be justly proud!
The building up of the personnel and equipment, however, was but a part of the task; the men and the machines must be housed, landing fields and repair shops be provided—in fact, everything necessary to render offensive operations possible. This meant the construction of bases. Some idea of what this "digging in" process was may be obtained by the realization that it involved the use of 21,384,000 feet of lumber, or sufficient to build a boardwalk, one foot wide, from New York City to the island of Malta—a distance of 4,127 miles; that the total cubical contents of all structures erected, if assembled and made into one, would represent a box in which ten Woolworth Buildings could be housed; that 500 miles of telephone wires were run and hangars were assembled sufficient to cover forty city blocks if made into one.
The total appraised value of all this construction work was approximately $11,250,000,—the total sum expended in aviation was $52,256,398—a large sum of money, but an investment which would, I think, have returned us handsome dividends had the war continued. Indeed, by the summer of 1918, we began to see and feel the results of our efforts, for eleven stations had been built, of which six were in operating commission with planes which we had borrowed from our Allies.
The mission of the operating base or station was to do all possible damage to the enemy. The conditions determining the use of aeroplanes in land operations are, of course, familiar, and are vastly simpler than the problems confronting the seaplanes, which must operate over the sea, patrolling submarine-infested areas, escorting troop and merchant convoys, searching out mine fields, and making general or specific reconnaissance flights. The following statement gives an idea of the activities of one of our seaplane bases situated on the east coast of England, covering a period of about four months (July 20 to November 11, 1918):
Sea miles patrolled 57,647
Hours of flying 968
Number of flights 233
Average duration of flights 4 hours, 10 minutes
Number of ships escorted 6,243
Number of forced landings 35
The efficiency of the personnel and material of this station is emphasized by the small percentage of forced landings, which, by the way, was typical of all. This indicates that when our seaplanes finally did arrive they were superior to any in existence. Five and even six hour flights in them were the rule rather than the exception. The record was a flight of 9 1-2 hours' duration made by personnel attached to our air station at Queenstown, Ireland. Another notable flight was one of nine hours' duration, the machine carrying a full military load, which was made by personnel attached to our seaplane station at Killingholme, England.
While, as is indicated by the table, the majority of our stations took part in military operations, the most active were those in England and Ireland, Flanders and the Adriatic. Of them all the one at Killingholme, on the east coast of England, near the mouth of the Humber, was not only the most important but in one detail the most interesting. The station was created for the purpose of trying out a scheme for raiding the enemy bases in the Heligoland Bight which had been originated by the British Admiralty. This was, in short, a scheme to transport seaplanes on lighters, or floats, towed by destroyers to within easy striking distance of Heligoland, Cuxhaven, Bremerhaven, Emden, and Wilhelmshaven. When the float had reached its station, it was given an inclined position by flooding a rear compartment, the seaplane rising from the deck. Although preliminary trials demonstrated the entire practicability of the plan, it was subsequently abandoned because of the fact that the British, in their enthusiasm, let the cat out of the bag by making a test flight in the vicinity of the Heligoland Bight, during which operation a Zeppelin took photographs 4hus destroying the element of surprise upon which the entire undertaking was based. Furthermore, after the fusion of the Royal Naval Air Service and the Royal Flying Corps into the Royal Air Force the co-operative spirit between the army and the navy sank to a very low ebb, and when these lighters had been built the project had to be abandoned because the Admiralty decided that they could not spare the destroyers that were necessary for the execution of the project.
This experiment is further interesting for the light it throws upon the wartime psychology of the British; upon their will to victory. We all know of their strange and new devices for winning the war, which were successful; of their "hush ships," their camouflaged fleets and their "Q" ships. These were successful, but few of us have heard of the many schemes proposed and tried out, often at the cost of hundreds of thousands of pounds, all to no purpose. Nothing, apparently, was too fantastic to be given a trial, and if it failed it was shrugged aside as part of the game.
The original Killingholme project was one of these wild experiments that failed, yet the success or failure of the original plan had no effect upon our subsequent operations there. The location of this base, situated as it was on the east coast of England, directly opposite the Heligoland Bight, was most important from a strategical point of view. It was accordingly developed as a base for ordinary aerial operations, becoming eventually one of the most powerful in existence, with 46 seaplanes and a personnel of 1,928 men; 404 flights were made by these machines covering a distance of nearly a hundred thousand miles. Shortly before the Armistice was signed it was decided to reinforce this station with seaplanes that had been operating from our stations on the French coast. This was accordingly done, and had the German High Seas Fleet taken the seas it would most certainly have felt the pressure of American planes in the North Sea and we would have been in a position to judge of the value of aircraft in a naval action. The ease with which these planes were flown from France and housed at small improvised stations in the immediate vicinity of Killingholme speaks well for the flexibility of this arm of the service. Although it is somewhat of a digression from the subject in hand, it may be well here to invite attention to the fact that the fundamental principles of aircraft are the same the world over and hence in an Allied campaign they are interchangeable, which is a decided asset from a military point of view. We could fly British, French, or Italian planes with little or no preliminary training, but it is doubtful if we could have operated their vessels had the personnel situation demanded such an expedient.
The concentration of enemy submarines off the Irish coast made that area one of great importance, and accordingly after conferences with the British Admiralty it was decided that we should undertake the construction there of four large seaplane stations and one kite balloon station. From a political point of view it was considered by many in authority that it would be advisable for us to take over all aerial operations in Ireland, but this was not done. We did, however, carry out our agreement to construct and operate these five stations, from which many excellent patrols were made and at least one submarine accounted for.
It would seem from an examination of the chart of sinkings in this area that had these stations been in existence in the early days of the unrestricted submarine campaign the losses suffered would have been greatly reduced. During the month of April, 1917, more than one hundred vessels were sunk within reach of the aircraft which we subsequently had based on Ireland, but by the time our stations were in operation the submarine campaign had lost its effectiveness and was already doomed to failure. The fact that the British did not foresee the importance of establishing aerial stations in Ireland can only be explained on the grounds of insufficient personnel and material or as a strategical blunder on the part of the Admiralty staff. Certainly the creation of these five stations in 1917 would have saved millions of pounds and hundreds of lives.
The establishment of our naval/air stations in France was brought about in a curious way. It will be remembered that the first American aviation unit to reach Europe landed in France on June 5, 1917, and consisted of six officers and sixty-three enlisted men in command of an officer of the rank of lieutenant. This officer had written orders to proceed with his detachment to France and upon his arrival to keep the naval attaché in Paris advised of his whereabouts. Before leaving this country he sought further and more detailed information with respect to his duties, but was unable to obtain either instructions or advice except that if he wanted to go to the war zone he had better leave at once before a change of policy would revoke his orders. Accordingly, upon his arrival in Paris, he proceeded forthwith to enter into negotiations with the French Admiralty, during the course of which he agreed, on the part of the United States, to establish certain naval air stations on the French coast. This was done entirely on his own initiative, and even his presence in Europe was unknown to Admiral Sims until the subject was brought up for discussion at a meeting of the Board of Admiralty, when Admiral Sims was asked to explain the reason for his secretive policy in concentrating a large air force in France when the most vital areas of the enemy submarine campaign lay in and adjacent to the coasts of England and Ireland. In reply Admiral Sims was obliged to explain that the entire commitment was as much of a mystery to him as it was to them; that he had no knowledge of any officer being empowered to represent the United States in France; and, admitting the contention that England and Ireland offered a much more fruitful field for aerial operations against submarines, that he would investigate the matter without delay. To this end he summoned the Lieutenant from Paris, and found that in the absence of any orders or instructions he had proceeded on his own initiative to commit the United States to the construction of the several naval air stations as shown on the diagram. In view of this it was considered that his assumption of responsibility and his display of initiative in doing what he did was most commendable.
And so it was that our air stations in France had their beginning. It is probable that had their establishment been the subject of a conference between the Allies and ourselves part of this force would have been diverted to England or to Ireland. As it was, however, these stations were very largely instrumental in driving the submarines from the French coast and in forcing them out to sea, where the concentration of shipping was less great and where in consequence less damage was suffered. Generally speaking, therefore, the concentration of our naval air effort on the French coast was sound, but in excess of that which was justified by the exigencies of war.
Our aerial activities in the Adriatic began in the early winter of 1918, when, at the request of the Italian Government, we occupied the two Italian stations at Pescara and Porto Corsini. Obviously, our targets were the Austrian naval establishments across the sea, and, although these two stations were not completely finished when the Armistice was signed, we had already accomplished some very effective bombing flights from them and we were making our effort felt in that area.
With reference to our work in the Adriatic, the following dispatch from the chief of staff of the Italian Navy to the Italian naval attaché in London, dated August 25, 1918, is of interest:
American aviation recently began its support for our operations in the Adriatic. An American squadron energetically attacked and forced to return to Pola Austrian aeroplanes met near the Istrian coast. During the pursuit one American machine was obliged to land but a very intrepid aviator took the pilot on board and destroyed the machine. Military works at Pola and especially aviation installations and submersible bases were bombarded by day on the twenty-first, during the night of the twenty-second, and at dawn on the twenty-third, by several Italian machines and some Americans. Four tons of explosives were dropped and numerous explosions and fires were seen. One of our hydroplanes is missing. Large Italian squadrons twice bombarded Durazzo on the same day and dropped 1,500 kilogrammes of explosives on military works starting large fires. Also bombarded military works at Curzola. British aviation units continued to attack Cattaro, damaging bridges, hangars, submersible stations and railway station at Zelenika. Enemy chaser machines undertook some futile counter-operations. We made vigorous counter-attacks, one enemy machine fell in flames and another was obliged to descend. One British machine missing. Enemy aviators attempted to rally. A few Austrian planes on the night of the twenty-first, dropped thirty bombs on Venice, one killed and three wounded, no damage to military works. One dead and four wounded at Cortellazzo attacked the same night. Five enemy machines again attacked Venice on the night of the twenty-third. Dropped a few bombs, no damage done, one civilian slightly wounded. During the night of the twenty-second, there was raid on Porto Corsini. Some damage to military establishments, six civilians wounded. Other attacks on Fiume, no damage. Our efficient anti-aircraft fire compelled the enemy machines to fly very high making their bomb dropping ineffective. One enemy seaplane was forced to come down near Lido. The crew of three was captured.
Entirely aside from the military advantages gained, our presence in the Adriatic was of the greatest value in maintaining the morale of our Italian Allies, and again our acceptance of the offer to occupy these two stations gave us a foothold in that area which would have been greatly strengthened had the war continued.
Of all our aerial undertakings in Europe, the most ambitious and the most enterprising was the establishment of the "U.S. Naval Northern Bombing Group," which was created for the purpose of bombing enemy submarine bases, on the Belgian coast, particularly Ostend, Zeebrugge, and Bruges. As originally planned this unit was to consist of twelve squadrons of bombing and fighting planes, of which four squadrons were to be operated by Marine Corps personnel. In addition, it called for the establishment of an assembly and repair base. This was eventually created at Eastleigh, England, the outfitted planes flying across the Channel to their fighting base. In a subsequent decision of the Navy Department the complement of this group was reduced to eight squadrons, four day and four night, only a part of which had been assembled when the Armistice was signed.
Inasmuch as the planes used by the personnel of this group were of the land type and similar to those used by the army, there was considerable criticism from certain quarters of our having undertaken work which belonged to the army. It is quite true that the planes used were of the army type, because they were best suited to the work in hand, but that we did not encroach upon the army is fully confirmed by the following extract from an official letter addressed to the Secretary of the Navy by the Secretary of War under date of April 10, 1918:
Referring to the confidential memorandum on Dunkirk-Calais on operations against submarines and the inquiry contained in paragraph 3, the War Department agrees with the Navy Department in its decision that the extension of operations against submarines in their bases as recommended from abroad is purely naval work.
This letter went on to discuss arrangements for the supply of fighting aeroplanes to the navy by the army and other pertinent subjects.
In fact, the topic that occupied the greatest space in all of our communications was the obtaining of aeroplanes. This was the greatest problem of all, and one not fully solved even at the close of hostilities. So little, indeed, did the output of planes keep pace with our construction work that the greater part of the bases were completed months before the planes were received. We tried to remedy this state of affairs by placing contracts with the Italian Government, which contracted to supply us with a number of bombing planes, for which it was to receive in turn cargoes of raw materials such as iron, lumber, etc. These contracts were consummated and some of the planes were delivered, but they proved unsuited to our requirements. The attempt was made to deliver these machines by air from Milan, Italy, to Flanders, but a large proportion were unable to stand this test and were crashed. This, however, was not strange for it meant crossing the Alps—a hazardous undertaking, but one more than justified by the necessity for immediate delivery of the planes.
The personnel of this unit, however, had not been idle in the meantime, for they were billeted as reinforcements with the French and British squadrons operating in the Flanders area, with whom they carried out many highly successful flights, during which they dropped about 100 tons of explosives on enemy objectives.
The group began active operations on its own initiative on October 14, 1918, at which time a raid was made on enemy railway lines at Thielt, day and night raids being made until October 27, eight raids in all being carried out. The "mission" of the Northern bombing group, however, was accomplished by the evacuation of the enemy's naval bases on the coast of Belgium. The naval situation in that area was, therefore, of an entirely satisfactory nature, but as conditions on land were not so satisfactory it was decided that the Northern Bombing Group should continue to operate in conjunction with the Allied armies in Flanders until the crisis that existed should have been overcome.
In a letter to the British Admiralty, dated October 15, 1918, Admiral Sims refers to this situation as follows:
Although the commander of the U.S. Naval Northern Bombing Group has reported his command to the Vice-Admiral commanding the Dover Patrol for orders and is, therefore, nominally under his command, the U.S. Naval Northern Bombing Group is at the present time operating under the orders of the officer commanding the 5th Group, Royal Air Force.
It is proposed, with your concurrence, that during the present offensive this U.S. Naval Aviation Unit should continue to operate in conjunction with the Royal Air Force Units for the destruction of those objectives possessing the greatest strategic value and as indicated by the Commander of the 5th Group, Royal Air Force.
This practically places the U.S. Naval Northern Bombing Group under the command of the 5th Group, Royal Air Force, and, inasmuch as I understand this to be entirely satisfactory to the Vice-Admiral commanding the Dover Patrol, I do not hesitate to express my entire agreement with the existing arrangements and sincerely trust that they will meet with your approval. I think the close co-operation established between the U.S. Naval Aviation and the Royal Air Force Units in this area will result in combined offensive raids against enemy objectives with excellent effect.
There are at the present time in operating commission three Capronis, four D. H.-9a’s and seven D. H.-4's actually operating under the command of the U.S. Naval Northern Bombing Group. In addition, ten Handley-Pages and nine Capronis are expected to be in operation within the next three weeks with a minimum delivery of ten Capronis per month thereafter. We are now engaged in the assembly and erection of fifty-four D. H.-9a's and fifty D. H.-4's, all of which will be allocated to the Northern Bombing Group as rapidly as they are ready for offensive operations against the enemy. In addition, there are 100 D. H.-4's in course of construction in the United States, upon which work is being rushed as much as possible.
Due to certain extenuating circumstances, it is impossible at the present time to give you exact dates when these squadrons will be completely organized and ready for duty. I shall, however, inform you in the course of the next week of probable dates which will, it is sincerely hoped, be realized.
It will thus be seen that, although the Northern Bombing Group was originally created to exterminate the submarines from the coast of Belgium it eventually wound up as a part of the British Army in the great drive of 1918, but not until after it had been offered to General Pershing and declined on the grounds that it could be used to greater advantage where it was and in conjunction with the British. During this drive it advanced successively from the operational command of the British vice-admiral commanding the Dover Patrol to that of the French admiral commanding the Flanders area, until it was finally placed under the orders of the Belgian authorities into whose command it had advanced and with whom it operated until the Armistice was signed.
Having reviewed briefly the reasons governing the strategical employment of our Naval Air Forces as of the time of the cessation of hostilities, it may be appropriate to outline what our plans for the future were when the war came to an end.
By the end of September, 1918, we had concluded conferences with the French, British, and Italian Governments as a result of which we had urged certain recommendations to the Navy Department, of which the following is a summary:
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- That seaplane operations from U. S. stations already built or authorized should continue with the exception of Dunkirk and without consideration of the Italian seaplane stations which will be the subject of conference with the Italian Government. The character of the operations to be adjusted to operating conditions.
- That the principal augmentation of cur air effort should be in bombing squadrons, the mission of which shall be the destruction of enemy naval bases, especially submarine bases.
- That naval bombing squadrons shall be composed of day and night bombing aeroplanes of the land type augmented as necessary by protecting squadrons of fighting aeroplanes of the land type.
- That in aircraft for fleet use each navy shall proceed as it deems most desirable.
- That conference with the Italian Government shall determine future American and British air effort in Italy with especial reference to the Adriatic area but that it is highly probable that British bombing operations against enemy naval bases in the Adriatic shall be taken over and augmented by the U.S. Navy in co-operation with the Italians. The British forces thus released to augment British forces in the Aegean Sea. Subject to further investigation this will probably require twelve night squadrons, six day squadrons and a few squadrons of fighting planes.
- That planes and production be started at once with which to begin bombing operations against enemy naval bases in and near the Heligoland Bight.
These recommendations met with the approval of Admiral Sims and of the Navy Department, the latter and the final authority, however, specifying that seaplanes only should be used in the Adriatic. No explanation of this decision was ever vouchsafed to us and in our opinion the efficiency of the entire project would have been reduced by at least twenty-five per cent had we been obliged to use seaplanes instead of land planes for operations in that area where the over water distances were small.
One further point in connection with these recommendations which is of interest from an historical point of view is the fact that they were approved and cabled to the Navy Department on September 30, 1918; this shows how little we expected armistical proceedings at that time.
The work of the U.S. Naval Air Force was all the more remarkable in that it was in the main accomplished by men who had no previous training or experience in aviation. In fact, the majority of the personnel was drawn from the Naval Reserve Force, recruited from every phase of civil life. No words can adequately convey the enthusiasm and devotion of these young men. It is an interesting commentary on the spirit, that, almost without exception, those who enrolled begged for billets at the stations where the service was most arduous and dangerous.
From its conception until the summer of 1918, the U.S. Naval Air Force, Foreign Service, was an independent command with its administrative executive located in Paris. As its activities expanded, however, to include England, Ireland, and Italy, it was considered advisable to amalgamate it with those other forces which were operating under the direct personal control of the commander of the U.S. Naval Forces operating in European waters. This change was accordingly made, and as aide for aviation the administrative director was located in London in immediate contact with his direct superior. Here a large subdivision of the staff was created which counted in its organization more than fifty officers with appropriate clerical assistance. These officers were, for the most part, technical assistants representing the several bureaus of the Navy Department. No direct orders were ever issued from London, as this authority was delegated to those detachment commanders under whom our air units operated. Obviously any other procedure would have been impossible. Our naval air station at Killingholme, for example, was placed under the operational orders of the British vice-admiral commanding the defenses of the east coast of England, and any specific orders which we wished to have transmitted to its commanding officer affecting its military control were transmitted via the British Admiralty. This principle was, in effect, the same as that upon which our destroyers based on Queenstown were operated. In all administrative respects, however, the stations maintained their identity as American units.
The functions then of the Aviation Section of the Force Commander's staff were to create, supervise, and to co-ordinate the efforts of the whole. As reinforcements became available from home, the subject of their most advantageous employment would be laid before the Supreme War Council, of which Admiral Sims was a member, and the decision in turn transmitted to the Aviation Section for execution.
No account of the wartime activities of our Naval Air Force would be complete without a brief mention of the fusion of the British Royal Naval Air Service with the Royal Flying Corps to form the Royal Air Force. This amalgamation, or more properly speaking this annexation, of the Naval Air Service by the army took place on April 1, 1918, and was perfectly sound and fully justified at that time. The navy was, so to speak, resting on its oars; the submarine campaign was already doomed to failure and the German High Seas Fleet was powerless. On the other hand, the enemy was very far from defeat on land, and all possible reinforcements were needed to bring about a victory in this quarter. It was, therefore, perfectly logical that the Naval Air Service should have been called to the support of the hard-pressed army, and the easiest way to accomplish this was to amalgamate. It was in effect a virtue of necessity, and the Admiralty acquiesced with such grace as only true sportsmen can muster in the face of necessity. The very life of the Empire was at stake, and no sacrifice was too great to make for its salvation. And so the Admiralty sent its Naval Air Service as reinforcements to the army, but whether they were given or only loaned time alone will tell. To date the Royal Air Force is still in existence, but I venture the belief that in the heart of every British naval officer is the firm hope and conviction that eventually the Royal Naval Air Service will be returned to its own.
Although there can be no doubt that, for military reasons, the British were justified in amalgamating their air services when they did, for political reasons they were most anxious to have us do likewise and by so doing rout the critics of this new scheme. To this end several missions were sent to Washington to lay before the authorities there the advantages to be gained by such action. Fortunately for us, however, both Admiral Sims and General Pershing vigorously opposed amalgamation, and in view of this powerful opposition it did not take place although there were and for that matter there still are strong influences at work to bring it about. We may, at some future time, be forced to amalgamate just as the British were, in order to save the nation from defeat, but to do so before that time comes will seriously handicap the navy, and more especially the fleet, in its operations as a unit. Soldiers cannot run ships, nor can sailors run an army, and there is as much difference between naval and military air strategy and tactics as there is between the ship and the regiment.
And now, in conclusion, I desire to invite serious attention to the very important aspects of the late war in their relation to the employment of aircraft. In the first place, the naval war—the combat between surface craft—was practically over before the perfection of aircraft made that weapon one which must be taken into account in naval battles of the future. Had the British, or the Germans, possessed planes capable of carrying bombs of 1,900 pounds capacity and more, the story of Jutland might, and very probably would have been, a very different one from that which now stands. The sinking of the ex-German ships by U.S. naval aircraft in the summer of 1921 was a very impressive lesson and one to which we must give heed in anticipating the future. It was demonstrated at that time that the destructive effects of our aerial bombs were even greater from an underwater explosion than from a direct hit, so that to those critics who say that aircraft cannot hit the target this knowledge must come hard. As a matter of fact, aircraft can hit, not with the same degree of precision that the great guns hit, but much more accurately than our navy could in 1898. Aerial gunnery is now in the process of transition from the infant state to that of maturity, and it is only a question of a very short time until bomb dropping from aircraft will be accomplished with the same skill and dexterity as is now expected and in fact demanded of our warships in their target practices.
With respect to gas warfare, the possibilities are almost unlimited. Gas bombs have been perfected which explode upon contact with the water, against which the surface craft of today is impotent. This phase of aerial warfare then offers a tremendous field of employment unless poison gas is really prohibited in the next war.
In the second place, the progress which has already been made in aviation since 1918 makes our efforts of only four years ago seem almost crude in their simplicity. In 1914, the aeroplane was a toy; in 1918, it was a recognized weapon of legitimate warfare; and who can predict its future? A few very far-seeing and still intellectually-young men know what it will be, but unfortunately for us the majority are not only critical but exceedingly skeptical of this new arm of the service.
The Great War was almost lost by the Allies because of the fact that they could not, or would not, or in all events that they did not appreciate the military value of the submarine until it was almost too late—until the First Sea Lord of the British Admiralty was forced to admit to Admiral Sims in April, 1917, that "the Germans will win unless we can stop these losses—and stop them soon."
In order, therefore, to preclude the possibility of any nation or combination of nations reproducing a similar state of affairs in the next war with aircraft substituted for, or at least augmenting its submarine effort, it behooves us to give aviation full credit for what it has already accomplished and to view its future with optimistic fairness and with an open mind.