Professional Notes

PROFESSIONAL NOTES

Prepared By Lieutenant Commander F.W. Rockwell, U.S. Navy and Lieutenant Commander J.B. Heffernan, U.S. Navy

 

GREAT BRITAIN

 

Service Paper Editorials.—New Construction.—According to an Admiralty announcement quoted by a London evening paper on Thursday, "it is intended to start on the building of two new battle cruisers in the coming autumn." The use of the term "battle cruisers" in this connection is probably a journalistic slip, since it is most unlikely that the new vessels will belong to that type. On a displacement of 35,000 tons it would be impossible to provide a high turn of speed without unduly forfeiting offensive and defensive power, to both of which qualities the Naval Staff is known to attach great importance. In well-informed circles it is regarded as improbable that the speed of the new ships will be in excess of that of modern battleships, the fastest of which are the Japanese Nagato and Mutsu, said to be good for 23 ½ knots at full power. It the tactical doctrines of prewar days still governed design there would be some reason to anticipate very high speed in the new vessels, with a corresponding sacrifice of protection, but today the trend of naval opinion is rather the other way. In view of the enormous weights involved by the armament and defensive features now in vogue, there would be but a relatively small margin for the machinery in a vessel of 35,000 tons, and if Sir E.T. d'Eyncourt contrives to rival the Japanese Nagato in this respect he will have accomplished a remarkable feat. The statement that the two battleships will be laid down in the coming autumn is at variance with previous official announcements. In the First Lord's memorandum on the current estimates the date of commencing the work was given as "early in 1923," and the smallness of the vote for new construction during the present financial year renders it improbable that much progress could be made on the vessels up to the end of next March, even if they were begun at an early date. So far, however, no major contracts for the work have been awarded.

 

Vanished Squadrons.—The Engineer publishes some striking figures to illustrate the enormous reduction which the material of the Royal Navy has undergone of late years. After pointing out that the withdrawal of the last six ships condemned under the Limitation Agreement will bring the fleet down to eighteen battleships and four battle cruisers, it goes on to compare this establishment with that which was maintained respectively in August, 1914, and at the date of the armistice. When the war began we had twenty-two dreadnaughts and nine battle cruisers ready for service, in addition to forty pre-dreadnaughts and thirty-four armored cruisers, while ten battleships and one battle cruiser were building or fitting out. In all, therefore, we had forty-two all-big-gun ships and seventy-four armored vessels of the older type, representing a grand total of 116 ships. During the war we added three battleships, which had originally been ordered by foreign Governments, and two battle cruisers, these five ships exactly balancing our war losses in the dreadnaught class. Our strength in this type, therefore, remained constant, but the heavy wastage among the pre-dreadnaught material was not replaced. When the fighting ended we had in service the following: dreadnaught battleships, thirty-three; battle cruisers, nine; pre-dreadnaught battleships, thirty, and armored cruisers, seventeen—exclusive of several other ships used for subsidiary duties. Of these eighty-nine vessels only twenty-two now remain, a fact that reveals the thoroughness with which our scrapping policy has been carried out. The pre-dreadnaught fleet has completely disappeared, together with fifteen all-big-gun ships. Minor vessels have, of course, been discarded in still greater numbers. Roughly speaking, seventy-five per cent of the destroyers have gone, and the submarine flotilla has been reduced from 130 boats to fifty-eight. Even when the deletions made under the Washington agreement are taken into account, it will be found that Britain has scrapped far more fighting ships than all the other Powers combined.

 

Retrenchment in Australia.—It is obvious from the details given in our columns last week that the demobilization of the Royal Australian Navy has been much more drastic than is indicated by the official list of ships available. Altogether there are thirty-three units under the Australian flag, and of these no fewer than twenty have been placed out of commission. The remaining thirteen are not all fighting ships, five of them being auxiliary or depot vessels. There are six submarines of a very effective type—J class, of 1,200 tons, with a surface speed of 19 ½ knots—but they have all been paid off. As the result of this sweeping system of retrenchment, a sudden emergency would now find Australia unable to send to sea more than three or four light cruisers, three destroyers, one sloop, and the auxiliary ships mentioned. Even if sufficient officers and trained men were at hand to provide complements for the vessels now laid up, it would be a considerable time before they could be regarded as efficient for war service. Especially would this be the case with the submarines, whose war value is largely a matter of prolonged and intensive training. In spite of this radical cut in naval expenditure, the Australian papers continue to express alarm at the growth of Japanese sea power, yet few of them advocate the only policy by which this uneasiness could be allayed, namely the maintenance of an Australian fleet unit as strong and efficient as the resources of the Commonwealth would permit. Such a squadron could probably be kept up by a smaller contribution per head than we at home are called upon to pay for national defense. It appears, however, that the late Admiral Dumaresa's plain words to his compatriots on this score have not yet taken effect.—Naval and Military Record, 23 August, 1922.

 

Dominions and Naval Defense.—The cable from the Morning Post's Wellington Correspondent contained in the issue of the 21st inst., giving a summary of the Admiralty suggestions regarding New Zealand's naval development, is the first information made public in this country concerning the matter. As it may be assumed that the general principles expressed by the Admiralty refer also in varying degree to naval assistance by other Dominions, it is of interest to examine the suggestions in detail.

 

The governing idea is that during the period of financial stringency, which is affecting the Dominions as it is this country, the organization of Dominion Navies should be such that they are capable of rapid expansion when times improve. The basis of this organization is a seagoing squadron, while the means of expansion are light cruisers and ocean-going submarines. The Admiralty further suggest that all reserves should be supplied locally, and that the necessary provision for the local squadron in the matter of bases, docks, reserves of stores and fuel should be made. Trade protection, in so far as it concerns local waters, is another responsibility which the Admiralty are seemingly desirous of delegating to the Dominion, to which end it is suggested that storage for guns for defensively armed merchant vessels, together with trained personnel for their operation and to form the crews of escorting vessels, should be provided by the Dominions. The elaboration of the mobile defense of ports, including mine-sweeping organization, completes the purely local measures that have been suggested.

 

In the matter of the wider Imperial sphere the idea is that the Dominions should assist financially, or by the provision of material, toward equipping the Empire with naval bases. The suggestions, therefore, fall into two clear divisions, local and Imperial. They also appear to have been framed with a definite strategical object in view, and mark a considerable advance in the putting forward of clear-cut principles.

 

This is not the time to discuss the question of local navies as opposed to an Imperial Navy; but it is possible to infer from the Admiralty suggestions what is the strategical object they have in view. To take first the Imperial sphere—the equipment of the Empire with naval bases. This is no doubt aimed at increasing the mobility of the Navy as a whole, and rendering it eventually possible to move rapidly a large force to any threatened quarter of the Empire, and to maintain it there for a prolonged period if necessary. At present, owing to a lack of fully-equipped naval bases and fuelling stations outside home waters, the mobility of the fleet is very seriously prejudiced and a grave risk is thereby incurred.

 

But, however mobile our main fleet, circumstances are conceivable which might render it necessary for the Dominion naval forces, aided by such squadrons of the British Navy as were on the spot, to deny to an enemy the control of local communications until such time as the main fleet could arrive and occupy a strategical position from which it could either contain the enemy's main fleet or bring it to action. The action of the local forces under these conditions would necessarily be of a delaying character. Indeed, it could be no more.

 

There is but one form of naval force which can adequately perform the function of delaying a superior force in the attainment of its object, which may be assumed to be the control of local communications for invasion or other purposes a fleet in being. A "fleet in being" may be defined as "a fleet strategically at large, not itself in command of the sea, but strong enough to deny that command to its adversary by strategic and tactical disposition adapted to the circumstances of the case." The submarine, owing to its power of submerging at will, is capable of maintaining itself strategically at large under conditions which would inevitably require a weak fleet, composed only of surface craft, to shut itself in a defended harbor in order to avoid annihilation.

 

On the other hand, submarines can only remain strategically at large until such time as the other side have developed fully their countermeasures. But that takes time, and time, in the case under discussion, means everything. It also follows that the greater the radius of action of the submarines, the longer before the full force of counter-measures can be applied. Therefore, for a modern fleet in being or delaying force, oceangoing submarines with long range are preferable to small submarines tied down to coastal waters. In addition, until his counter-measures are in full operation, they, in conjunction with aircraft, prevent an enemy establishing himself within easy striking distance of his objective. Considerations such as these have, no doubt, influenced the Admiralty in urging on the Dominions the employment of ocean-going submarines.

 

The suggestions regarding local protection of trade, bases, docks, and mobile defense speak for themselves and do not require elaboration.

 

The Prime Minister of New Zealand is reported as having said that in present conditions it was impossible to do everything, but they must make a beginning. Evidence of this goodwill is forthcoming in the report that a sum of £400,000 is to be spent on naval defense next year, but it must be admitted that this will not go very far in meeting the Admiralty suggestions. Australia, on her part, has been drastically pruning her Navy. There are now in full commission only three light cruisers, one flotilla leader, two destroyers, and a sloop. All the six J class submarines, belonging to Australia have been paid off, together with nine destroyers. It will be recognized that, under such conditions, any form of combined training of all arms is out of the question.

 

Canada has gone to the length of paying off the whole of her seagoing squadron, consisting of a light cruiser and two destroyers. The latter will be kept in reserve, but Canada's active Navy is now represented only by four trawlers, two on the Atlantic and two on the Pacific coast. These trawlers are to be used for training Royal Naval Volunteer Reservists. South Africa, of course, has only just made a beginning. She, too, is concentrating on the enrollment and training of R.N.V.R., and has two trawlers and a sloop for the purpose.

 

It is obvious, therefore, that a very great deal remains to be done before we can have an Imperial Navy organization on the lines suggested by the Admiralty. That the need for it is urgent and pressing, nobody who has studied the situation will deny; but it seems that it will not be brought home to the great bulk of the people at home and in the Dominions until the case is put fairly and squarely before an Imperial Conference on Naval Defense, which should be called without delay.—London Morning Post, 24 August, 1922.

 

Battleship Comparisons.—The backbone of our post-war navy is formed by the ten battleships of the Royal Sovereign and Queen Elizabeth classes, nine of which are kept in full commission. Small though it be in point of numbers, this force is a compact, homogeneous, and formidable battle fleet. The oldest ship, Queen Elisabeth, was completed nearly eight years ago, and the last to enter service was the Ramillies, which hoisted the pennant in September, 1917. So rapid have been the developments in naval science during the past few years that all these fine vessels would soon have become obsolete but for the Washington limitation scheme, which, by cancelling most of the post-Jutland ships building for the principal navies, has given their predecessors a new lease of life.

 

Compared with all but the very latest addition to the American and Japanese fleets, the ships we have, named are, relatively speaking, still in the front rank, and will continue to occupy that position so long as the naval holiday lasts. For this reason, the expenditure of fairly large sums on refitting them from time to time is quite justifiable. The Royal Sovereign rejoined the flag lately after a long spell in dockyard, where she was fitted, among other improvements, with bulge protection. The Royal Oak, it is understood, is now receiving the same treatment, one result of which is to increase the beam of the ship by about thirteen feet. When this job is finished all the five ships of the Royal Sovereign class will be equipped with that form of bulge which has proved so valuable a defensive against underwater attack, and it is believed that each could stand the explosion of at least two modern torpedoes without sustaining mortal injury. Owing to the addition of the bulge and other structural modifications, the normal displacement has risen to about 29,350 tons, increasing at full load to 33,500 tons. According to "Jane," they are fine and steady ships, those with bulge protection being splendid gun platforms, but they "suffer rather from reduced freeboard."

 

Partly as a result of the publicity which she received at the time of her launch, and partly owing to her dramatic appearance at the Dardanelles early in 1915, the Queen Elizabeth has for long been regarded by the general public as the most powerful type of battleship afloat. So she certainly was when completed, but today there are other ships which surpass her in fighting power. On paper she is inferior to the Royal Sovereign, for she lacks that special underwater protection which has come to be regarded as a sine qua non, but even so there are many officers who believe her to be the better all-round ship. Bulges could, of course, be fitted to the Queen Elizabeth and her four sisters, but to do so would bring down their speed by at least a knot, and probably more, and apparently it has been decided that the sacrifice is not worth while. These ships are sometimes compared with the very latest American and Japanese battleships, to which they are in some respects inferior, but it is fairer to match them with a contemporary, such as the U.S. Nevada, when the comparison is more favorable to them.

 

It must not be forgotten that vessels like the Japanese Mutsu and the U.S. Maryland were designed several years later by constructors who had a good deal of war data to go upon and a much larger displacement at their command. That we- could have produced something better than the Queen Elizabeth in the way of battleships if the building of such vessels had continued in this country is evidenced by the Hood. Although this ship was designed in 1916, she would not have been outclassed to any serious extent by the American or Japanese battle cruisers which were laid down several years later. The American ships, it is true, were to have been 1 ½ knots faster and would have carried 16 in. guns, but their protection was from all accounts much inferior to the Hood's. It is a pity that the plans for the "modified Hood" class, since abandoned, cannot be disclosed, for they would have shown our post-war designs to be second to none as regards boldness of conception and the practical adaptation of war experience.—Naval and Military Record, 5 September, 1922.

 

Building Contracts for New Battleships.—There is something almost pathetic in the eagerness with which the industrial world is awaiting the release of the new battleship contracts. A few years ago the impending allocation of two new capital ships would have caused only a ripple of interest in labor circles, but today it is regarded as an event of supreme importance. The shipbuilding yards throughout the Kingdom are in urgent need of work. Not only is naval construction almost at a standstill, but there is also an unparalleled slump in mercantile tonnage, and the two phenomena, coming together, are having a most serious effect on the economic situation. In these circumstances it is not surprising that the placing of every new Admiralty contract should excite tremendous, interest. Labor leaders who ordinarily condemn the building of warships on principle are as eager as "capitalists" to secure for their districts a share of the work, and in recent months those behind the Parliamentary scenes have been edified by the spectacle of Labor stalwarts pulling every wire within reach to accelerate the laying down of the new super-dreadnaughts.

 

It has been evident for some time past that the Royal dockyards were hopelessly out of the running, in spite of the efforts made by their Parliamentary representatives. The heavy cost of enlarging the slips at Portsmouth and Devonport has been cited officially as a reason for disallowing dockyard claims in this connection, though Admiralty spokesmen have admitted that the slips will have to be lengthened sooner or later. The real grounds for the decision to build the new vessels by contract are probably to be sought elsewhere.

 

According to the latest information, the contracts for the new battleships will be awarded late this autumn. The drawings are ready down to the last detail, and the delay in placing the orders is simply due to financial causes beyond the control of the Admiralty. Rumors that the building of the ships is to be held up indefinitely or altogether abandoned in deference to the views of the anti-battleship school may be dismissed as inventions. We learn on good authority that no such step has ever been contemplated.—Naval and Military Record, 13 September, 1922.

 

Overgrown Aircraft Carriers.—According to the Navy there is a strong probability that Japan will not persist with her scheme of transforming the half-built battle cruisers Amagi and Akagi into aircraft carriers. Our contemporary adds that Japanese constructors have prepared plans for a smaller type of carrier, which is thought to be more suitable for the purpose than the 33,000-ton vessels into which the battle cruiser design would have to be modified in order to keep within the limits of the Washington agreement. In another part of the same issue attention is directed to the menace that the low-flying aeroplane dropping small bombs —as the Snipes did in the recent Agamemnon test—will represent to the big aircraft carrier, which would be rendered unserviceable if her flying deck was badly holed by the explosions.

 

We have repeatedly called attention to this danger, which would be intensified if the ship were exposed to the fire even of small caliber guns using high-explosive shell. In our opinion it is a powerful argument against building these huge aircraft carriers, and one that may have influenced the Admiralty in designing the Hermes on a basis of only 10,950 tons. Provided such a ship meets the essential requirements, it would seem much the wisest policy to build three carriers of this type rather than, a single ship of thrice the displacement. Another objection to the practice of converting battle cruisers which has been adopted abroad is belief, widely held in our service, that a really satisfactory aircraft carrier has to be designed as such, and cannot be improvised.

 

Destroyer Development.—The destroyer Worcester, having completed her trials at Portsmouth, is to replace the Violent in the Fourth Flotilla of the Atlantic Fleet. The new boat is the last of a very large batch, known as the W class, designed in the latter days of the war, and, in fact has been under construction since 1918. Her displacement is 1,325 tons, and with turbines of 27,500 shaft horsepower she is designed for a speed of 34 knots. In no type of naval unit has the relative growth of size been so great during the present century as in the destroyer class. If we hark back to the Navy Lists of twenty years ago we shall find that the biggest destroyer then in commission was the Success, of 350 tons and 6,000-horsepower.

 

The war did not result in any great increase in the tonnage of torpedo craft. In 1914 we possessed a large number of destroyers ranging between 000 and 1,000 tons, and of 24,500 shaft horsepower. The additional displacement since then has been applied to the mounting of heavier armament, and the increase of fuel endurance. Before the war the latest destroyers carried three 4-in. guns, which were outclassed by the weapons of the German submarines. The Worcester type mount four 4.7-in. guns, of fifty-calibers and very high muzzle velocity. They also carry about twenty-five per cent more oil than their immediate pre-war predecessors, which gives them a much wider sea-keeping radius.—Naval and Military Record, 12 September, 1922.

 

Disposal of Condemned Warships.—Mr. Amery (to Mr. Thompson): "No decision has yet been made regarding the method of disposing of the vessels to be scrapped under the Washington Treaty, but every effort is being made to secure such benefit to the National Exchequer and assistance to employment as is consistent with the fulfillment of the Treaty. The Admiralty have discussed the question in detail with the National Federation of Iron and Steel Manufacturers and this body, at the suggestion of the Admiralty, is at present negotiating with the ship breakers. One battleship is being used as a target for gunnery and bombing experiments." (To Dr. Murray, who asked whether ten large ships, including the Lion, are being sent over to Germany in order to be broken up there), Mr. Amery said: "If it is possible to get ships broken up in this country we endeavor to do so."—Army, Navy, and Air Force Gazette, 26 August, 1923.

 

New British Submarine.—The British public has begun to be interested in the submarine X-I, the biggest underwater craft ever designed, which is now rapidly reaching the launching stage in the housed-in slipway in Chatham dockyard. The very greatest precautions are being taken to prevent any information concerning her details becoming public, the end of the slip having been screened in order to prevent any sight of her hull being obtained from ships passing up and down the river Medway, but it is known that she is to be an epoch-making vessel, who embodies in her design all the lessons learned during the war and from careful examination of the German U boats that fell into our hands after the armistice. It is rumored that she is to be both bigger and faster than the famous K boats, which had a displacement of some two thousand six hundred tons submerged and a surface, speed of twenty-two knots with turbine engines. In other respects these K boats were not altogether favorites, and the new vessel is understood to have eradicated all their defects and to be the very last word in design from every point of view.

 

At all events, all submarine construction is waiting upon her completion and trials, and two boats of the L type which we thought worlds of at the time of the Armistice, and which were taken down to Chatham dockyard for completion when the contracts with the private builders were cancelled, have been laid aside in a basin without any effort made to put in the work necessary. It is all very well to talk of super submarines and to build wonder vessels of this sort, but they are useful for their purposes and their purposes only, and it is hoped that neither the authorities nor the public will forget that during the war most of the really wonderful work was done by the little old boats of the E type, some of which were certainly not in their first youth by the time they had finished worrying the Huns.—Our Navy. 15 September, 1922.

 

FRANCE

 

Comments on the Maneuvers: French v. Italian Naval Expenditure: Reviving the Dirigible Force.—The series of maneuvers just concluded between the Salami battle squadron and the Lequerre and Schwerer coastal forces are unimportant if judged by the size and number of ships that took part in them, but they have all the same provided splendid training for many thousand seamen and supplied valuable data, as they had for object no longer blockade or fleet action, but the study of the new problems of coastal defense under the changed aerial and ballistic conditions. Some light has been thrown on the value of coastal flotillas for the command of territorial waters and of narrow passages. Strategic strongholds such as Brest are to become factors of offense of ever-increasing radius of action through the multiplication of large submarines, seaplanes and dirigibles, and small islands such as Ushant, Groix, and Belle-Ile will henceforth play a momentous role in the defense of coasts. But it has also been found that a numerous and very costly force will be necessary, together with a totally new organization, for effectively guarding the towns of the littoral against deadly surprise attacks by seaplane mother ships, those capital ships of tomorrow.

 

The courteous remarks which Major Fea, of the Italian Navy, has been good enough to send to the editor of The Naval and Military Record concerning my articles imply (1) that France is leading the pace in the matter of armaments as compared with Italy, and (2) that no antagonism exists between the two navies. Arguments cannot alter facts. The former discrimination between military and naval expenditure has no longer any raison d’être. Army super-cannon and aviation have become naval weapons, and it is a fact officially established that whilst the fighting expenditure of France in 1922 as compared with 1914 Budgets has increased by ninety per cent, the percentage of increase for Italy is 372 (Budget Report by Signer de Vava), 290 for Japan, 275 for Spain, 181 for Great Britain, and 174 for America. Since 1914 up to the present year the "Imperialistic" Gallic Navy has not laid down a single surface fighting ship, not even completed the pre-war destroyer Gaholde, whereas Italian flotillas have received twenty-two Italian-built destroyers and seven leaders, totally reversing the pre-war situation to the detriment of France. The antagonism it would be futile to deny of the strides and pretensions of the fine Italian Navy the hostility of the Italian Press says enough. Frenchmen, while full of goodwill for la soeur latine, cannot be required to be blind and deaf: better call a spade a spade.

 

Noteworthy change is taking place in the situation of the French Navy in what concerns the utilization of dirigibles and preparedness for aeronautical warfare. Up to the first months of 1922, complete neglect had been prevailing in what regards both' the two zeppelins surrendered by Germany and the twenty odd serviceable dirigibles that had survived the war, this being the twofold result of lack of credits and of want of faith in the gasbags that have been profusely derided in service papers. Then French experts who made investigations in Germany and studied the possibilities of helium and of another non-inflammable gas, brought new facts to the knowledge of the Paris Admiralty, and when Admiral Lanxade (curiously enough a noted gunnery specialist), became head of the newly-created Aeronautical Department he decided to revive the gasbag service and to train dirigible crews in all heavier-than-air craft at all serviceable, and since May last, small and large dirigibles have been humming, as if by enchantment over all our naval bases in company with avions de chasse, to the great delight of military men who see in this aerial activity a compensation for France's maritime decline.

 

Although it is contended in service papers that the largest rigid, the 65,000 cubic-metre Dixmude, is being totally neglected, it is certain that at no time previously have so many French aeronauts been simultaneously in the air for the purpose of experiments and exercises, and—a fact deserving of notice in the light of the experience of rival fleets—no accident has up to the present marred that continuous aerial practice. The improved Zeppelin Mediterrance (25,000 cubic metres) has to its credit several interesting performances, including one of 700 kilometres at a fine rate of speed (up to 150 k.m. per hour), with on board Commandants Yvon and Rivet and ten officers de vaisseau. The Brest soft dirigible AT 10, in commission for coastal exercises, has kept the air days on end, advancing 200 miles to sea to meet the Salaun fleet, and directing by wireless the repeated submarine attacks which accounted theoretically for the Toulon Dreadnaughts.

 

Interesting tests have taken place with new bombing seaplanes and avions-torpilleurs that have once more convinced eye-witnesses that l'air domine la mer, and that the determining factor in European waters is no longer a supreme battle fleet, but a fully-efficient bombing seaplane fleet, screened by swarms of avions de combat, and backed by an adequate number of aeronautical and chemical factories and training centers—that is, a well-thought-out offensive organization capable of promptly making up for whatever losses are incurred and of periodically throwing into the air new squadrons, completely equipped for action over enemy strategic centers. It is easy to imagine the revolution in warfare which these new ways will mean. Formerly war was decided by one terrific blow dealt in fleet action, causing the issue to be a foregone conclusion. Henceforth no Trafalgar, no Lissa, Tsushima, or Jutland, but a wearing-out game, an unending fight, mostly baby-killing, extending over months, in which the advantage will go to the side offering the least vulnerable target. These changes were bound to come, but their advent has been hastened by the Washington farce. Est pris qui croyais prendre.—J.B. Goutreau in Naval and Military Record, 30 August, 1922.

 

Submarine Training.—Submarine training has been resumed on new lines. It comprises four branches of preparation, viz., attack and defense of a fleet at sea, endurance cruises, mine-laying, scouting, and wireless signaling in co-operation with seaplanes and dirigibles. Later, the utilization of the gun power of submarines will be the objects of tests and exercises. The second-class submarines Shilemans, Carissan, Reveille, Bellone, Gergone, and Daphne of the Channel Station, have had a few weeks' strenuous practice with the battle fleet, continuously attacking and dodging surface and aerial counter-submarines, and were commended for efficiency.

 

The Toulon and Bizerta submersibles in commission. are, similarly, pursuing a methodical plan of training at sea. The ex-German Alarras and Autric, of 850-1,150 tons, have successfully accomplished a 50-days' endurance voyage from Brest to Toulon via Casablanca, carrying out on the way a series of signaling exercises by day and by night and of depth charge and gun experiments in co-operation with the aerial force. Importance attaches to endurance tests of this sort, that are to become a regular feature in submarine training, with a view to insuring communications with the French colonies in war time. German submarines, though lacking in finish, are robust and reliable, and French seamen and constructors alike have learned something from them.—Naval and Military Record, 6 September, 1922.

 

Marine Charts.—The sinking of the battleship France through the ripping open of the hull by uncharted rocks while she was proceeding slowly along the Teignouse passage into Quiberon Bay, has naturally brought the Hydrographic Department of the Marine under severe criticism. The explanation that the battleship must have struck some unknown rocks was at first received with skepticism, as it appeared almost impossible that such obstacles in home waters should have escaped detection. Divers, however, reported that the rocks existed, and that the top of one had been broken off by the impact. On behalf of the Hydrographic Department of the Marine it is explained that by the usual method of taking soundings it is quite possible to miss isolated rocks emerging from the sea bed, and it is stated that the only way to locate them is to draw a hawser along the bottom, which is to be done now that the disaster to the France has shown the necessity of verifying the charts of the particularly rocky coast of Brittany. The France was a super-Dreadnaught of 28,500 tons, launched in 1912, and, except for the Beam, which is not yet in commission, was the most powerful unit in the French navy. A preliminary investigation by experts shows that the re-floating of the battleship will be a very expensive operation, even if it can be done successfully, and in the event of the vessel being regarded as a total loss it is believed that the Government has no intention of replacing it, although the question of bringing the tonnage of capital ships up to the limit allowed by the Washington Conference can only be settled when the new program of naval construction comes up for discussion.—The Engineer, 8 September, 1922.

 

Book Review.—The Conduct of War, an interesting article in the August, Revue Maritime, is contributed by the well known Capitaine de fregate R. Castex, of the French naval general staff, on La Conduite de la Guerre. The author aims to show the importance and necessity of a central direction of naval operations in wartime, and to consider the effectiveness of the present arrangement in France whereby this central direction is vested in the Minister of Marine acting through a permanent naval general staff (etat major general).

 

To show the necessity of this central direction or control—over the commanders in chief in the various fields of operation—he points out: (1) that naval forces nearly always operate in several widely separated fields; (2) that only on land and at the seat of government is it possible to gather together the knowledge and information essential to the general direction of all naval forces; (3) that the value of such control has been recognized in most naval campaigns of history, as witness the authority of the British Admiralty over Nelson, of the American "Strategy Board" over Sampson in the Spanish War, of the Japanese General Staff over Togo, and of the various navy departments over the forces at sea in the World War.

 

In short, an efficient system for the general direction of naval operations in war should fulfill the following conditions:

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. • Create and firmly organize a central direction of operations,
   • Bring about a governmental organization which will enable this central direction freely and fully to carry out its important functions.
   • Arrange and facilitate the relations between the central direction and the government.

 

Turning to the situation in France, the author notes that it is more difficult in a republic than in a monarchy to secure the proper relations between the government and the military direction. In a monarchy, such as Germany, the ruler is at least nominally head of the state, and the military staffs under him suffer less from unwarranted interference on the part of governmental leaders. For the control of military operations in France during the World War, various systems were tried. At first the commander-in-chief on the Western Front directed all operations; then with the creation of forces in the East and elsewhere and the problem of co-operation with Allied forces, the Ministry and in particular the Minister of War took over general control; then expert professional direction reasserted itself with the appointment of General Joffre as "technical counsel in the direction of the war" (1916); then came the appointment of Petain as Chief of General Staff in 1917, with more extensive advisory functions; and finally the appointment to this position of Foch, who eventually became commander-in-chief in reality.

 

In the French Navy, according to the author, a more satisfactory arrangement existed from the outset. In his view the ideal system would provide that the minister of marine should "command and administer the naval forces." This insures the direction of operations from the center of government, and the essential close co-operation between the government and the military direction, the plan of operations being recognized as only a part of the plan of the war. The minister of marine's direction of naval operations, however, should be exercised through a general staff organized completely in time of peace to carry out its duties in time of war. In time of war, aside from necessary reinforcements, the personnel of the staff should remain unchanged, that is, until a change of leadership or policy were demanded.

 

The French system at present (Decrees of December 27, 1921) differs somewhat from this ideal. The admiral at the head of the general staff in peace becomes active commander-in-chief of forces at sea in time of war, his place on the general staff being taken by another. This modification the author is inclined to criticize, although it affects "only the summit of the edifice." In his opinion such a change, at such a time, might give rise to difficulties. His preference, to repeat, is for a system by which, in the army as in the navy, the minister is generalissimo or admiralissimo by legal right, and the chief of general staff is commander-in-chief in fact, with no change of personnel in passing from peace to war.

 

The article, of which what precedes is only a very brief summary, contains abundant historical illustrations, and is of great value in the study of this all-important problem.

 

JAPAN

 

Two New Cruisers to be Begun Shortly.—Tokio, Saturday.—The construction of two 7,500-ton cruisers will be begun shortly in Japan. The vessels will be named respectively the Kinugasa and the Furutori.—Reuter.—Naval and Military Record, 23 August, 1922.

 

American Built Unit for Japanese Navy.—His Imperial Japanese Majesty's ship Kamoi left the yard of her builders, the New York Shipbuilding Corporation, for her trials at the Delaware River Breakwater on September 6. The ship, of 13,000 tons deadweight displacement and 28-ft. draft, is electrically driven, using General Electric motors and fitted with water tube boilers and is expected to make 15 knots. On her delivery she will be a supply ship for fuel oil and coal to naval vessels of the Japanese Navy and will carry a crew of 185.—The Nautical Gazette, 23 September, 1922.

 

Japan Cuts Expenses of its Army and Navy.—Tokio, Sept. 12.—There appears to be a real intent on the part of Japan to retrench naval and military expenditures. The budgets for the two departments for the fiscal year 1923-24, made during the Washington conference, have been announced, showing a reduction of approximately $57,500,000 from the present fiscal year.

 

Other economies are slated by Premier Kato and it is believed that some will be carried out during the next year, but it will be the year 1924-25 before the real financial results of the Washington conference and of any subsequent reductions will be apparent in Japan.

 

The naval budget for the next year shows a reduction of $37,500,000. Ordinary expenses are listed at $60,000,000, a reduction of $7,500,000, and extraordinary expenses are listed at $99,000,000, a reduction of $30,000,000: In the army budget ordinary expenses are figured at $92,500,000, a reduction of $6,950,000, and the extraordinary figure is $16,500,000, a reduction of $12,950,000.

 

This means that instead of as in the past year, when forty-nine per cent of the national income went into the military coffers, only thirty-nine per cent of the national income will be devoted to the navy and army in the next fiscal year.—Baltimore Evening Sun, 12 September, 1922.

 

New Japanese Program Explained.—Japanese papers lately to hand contain more complete details of the modified naval program than were given in the cabled summaries. A statement issued by the Navy Department reaffirms the intention of Japan not only to observe scrupulously the clauses of the Limitation Treaty as to battleships and aircraft carriers, but to conform also to the spirit of the Treaty with regard to the building of supplementary vessels. It is explained that the bill providing for a squadron of eight battleships and eight battle cruisers was approved by the Diet in the extraordinary session of 1920. This bill authorized the following auxiliary vessels for completion by 1927:

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. • Light Cruisers.—Tatsuta, Tenryu, and fifteen other vessels which had either been built or were already on order, making seventeen in all. New construction projected: Nine vessels, including four of 8,000 tons. Total, twenty-six ships, aggregating 146,750 tons.
   • Destroyers.—Kazvakaze, Tamkaze, Nara, Kuiva, and fifty-three other boats already built or ordered, making fifty-seven in all. New construction: First-class boats, twenty-eight; second-class, fifteen. Total, 100 boats, aggregating 102,566 tons. (Another version gives ninety-four as the total.)
   • Submarines.—Vessels already built or ordered, forty-seven in all. New construction, forty-six. Total, ninety-three submarines, aggregating 82,852 tons.

 

It is then explained that in order to obtain greater homogeneity and more up-to-date design the various types of vessels not yet laid down are to be enlarged, while on the other hand a reduction is to be made in the number of new units and a further saving effected by the suppression of obsolete ships. As amended, therefore, the program of new construction now embraces the following:—

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. • Cruisers: four ships of about 10,000 tons and four of about 7,000 ton. Total, eight ships aggregating some 68,000 tons.
   • Destroyers: twenty-four boats of the first class, aggregating 33,600 tons.
   • Submarines: twenty-two boats (believed actually to be twenty-four, aggregating 28,600 tons.

 

With regard to expenditure, the statement points out that in the original plan there was a margin of only twenty per cent to meet the appreciation of prices, but in the modified scheme the percentage will be revised to make good the deficit. It is expected, therefore, that the new plan can be executed within the same financial limits. To this end the following vessels have been deleted from the original project: One cruiser, thirteen destroyers, and twenty-four submarines, representing an aggregate reduction of 13,399 tons—a reduction which, as the Navy Department emphasizes, sufficiently refutes the rumor that Japan contemplates an increase of her auxiliary ships in the post-Conference era. The scheme is to be completed by 1927, but the amount of new construction to be put in hand each year will be governed by the financial conditions prevailing, and in the meantime superannuated vessels will be struck off the list as they are replaced by new ships. When the exchange of ratifications of the Limitation Treaty has been concluded, other measures of retrenchment are to be adopted. These include the reduction of Maizuru from a naval base to a fleet station of secondary rank, the abandonment of Port Arthur as a secondary fleet station, and a decrease of about 12,000 in the strength of the Navy's personnel.—Hector C. Bywater in the Naval and Military Record, 23 August, 1922.

 

GERMANY

 

A German View of Cruiser Design.—Concluding his interesting survey of modern light cruisers in the latest issue of the Marine Rundschau, Herr Ahnhudt, the distinguished German naval constructor, foreshadows the probable development of the type in the years ahead. Observing that British cruisers of the C and D classes are fitted with a small hangar for aeroplanes, he considers it surprising that this feature has not been adopted for all cruisers in view of the great importance of aerial scouting. Each vessel of the American Omaha class is equipped to carry four aeroplanes on deck; the method of launching them has not yet been explained, but presumably it will be by catapult. Seeing that the British Raleigh cruisers were designed for long ocean cruises and patrolling wide areas of seas, it is remarkable that they are not provided with the means of carrying one or more planes, which would be of the utmost value to such ships in their duty of protecting commerce. As Herr Ahnhudt points out, however, to have an aeroplane always ready for flight it is not sufficient to carry it on the open deck, where it would hinder the working of the guns, and consequently a fixed hangar must be constructed for it. With regard to the evolution of the fleet cruiser, as distinct from types specially designed for service overseas, Herr Ahnhudt does not think the displacement ought to exceed 4,000 tons, and he would be 'prepared to give up armor protection in order to get high speed and adequate armament. Britain, he reminds us, moved in this direction as far back as 1907, when she built the Swift, an unprotected vessel of 2,20a tons, 35 knots speed, and four 4-in. guns. Owing to the high cost, however, this type was not repeated.

 

More lately Britain has been turning out flotilla leaders of 1,800 tons, with a trial speed of 36 ½ knots, reduced to 31 knots at full load, and a broadside of five 4.7-in. guns and six tubes. These ships may represent the beginning of a new type of small fleet cruiser. Italy is building similar vessels, and the 2,300-ton "destroyers" constructed in Germany during the war belonged to the same general type. It would therefore appear, according to Herr Ahnhudt, that the largest class of destroyers may eventually grow into flotilla leaders, while the fleet cruiser proper is becoming too large for its original duty of co-operating with destroyers, and thus losing its raison d’être. In the case of cruisers intended for duty overseas, large dimensions are an advantage, for which reason these vessels would probably grow steadily in size were it not for the heavy cost of construction. The C class cost £750,000 each, the D class £870,000, the Raleigh £1,500,000, and the U. S. Omaha 7 ½ million dollars without her guns. Therefore, notwithstanding the cry of every Navy for more cruisers, the number of these expensive vessels is likely to remain small, though every effort will he made to improve their protection. A further rise in displacement will bring us back to the medium armored cruiser, which a few years ago was thought to be extinct. As, however, the task of hunting down commerce-raiders necessitates the employment of many ships, and individual strength cannot compensate for lack of numbers, Herr Ahnhudt foresees the introduction of a new type of small ocean-going cruiser. His remarks have a special interest for this country, since the safety of its vast floating commerce must always be our chief naval preoccupation, and such protection can only be afforded by an adequate fleet of cruising ships.—Naval and Military Record, 23 August, 1922.

 

German Waters now Cleared of Mines.—Berlin, Sept. 26.—The work of clearing the German seas of dangerous mines, planted during the World War, has been successfully completed without the loss of a single life.

 

German mariners, ending their three and a half-year task, today announced that the 47,000 English mines, the 10,000 German mines and the hundreds of Russian mines planted in the North and Baltic seas have been taken from their watery beds and that the seas are free again.

 

In February, 1919, German sailors began their hazardous work. Their first effort was to clear a lane wherein ships from Northern European ports, Kiel, Hamburg and Dantzig, could safely ply.—Baltimore Evening Sun, 26 September, 1922.

 

UNITED STATES

 

Board to Appraise Shore Establishment of the Navy: The board recently appointed by Secretary Denby and which will meet on October 2, is acting under the following precept.—"The Board will recommend the bases, yards and stations it considers necessary to the maintenance of the efficiency of the fleet and its effective operation in peace and war. It will report specifically its recommendations as to:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. • The shore stations and parcels of improved and unimproved real-estate now in the custody of the Navy Department which it considers will not either in peace or war contribute to the maintenance of the efficiency of the fleet or to its effective operation.
   • The shore stations that under present conditions it considers should be kept in operation for the efficient maintenance and effective operation of the fleet.
   • The shore stations that should be retained but kept closed or on a reduced operating basis yet ready for service in the event of an emergency.
   • Shore stations in addition to those recommended under (b) and (c) above that are in the opinion of the board necessary for the effective operation of the fleet in peace and war including recommendations as to their location and characteristics.
   • Shore stations that may be closed, reduced or disposed of when the shore stations recommended under (d) have been created."

 

Torpedo Plane Tests.—The possibilities of the torpedo plane have been well known- for several years but the first practical test of actual torpedo firing iron airplanes was held on the Southern Drill Grounds on Wednesday, September 27. Eighteen planes, each equipped with one 18-inch Whitehead torpedo, comprised the attacking force, which was assisted by a dozen or more scouting planes and one blimp. The battleships Wyoming, Arkansas and North Dakota, steaming in line, comprised the target group.

 

The practice was held to test the equipment which has thus far been developed, and to furnish a basis for the development of torpedo plane tactics. The conditions imposed by the rules preclude the drawing of any reliable conclusions as to the value of the torpedo plane as a weapon. The tests mark another step in the practical development of aerial warfare.

 

Vice Admiral John D. McDonald, commanding the battleship force, Atlantic Fleet, sent the following despatch to the Department upon completion of the practice:

 

"Torpedo plane practice completed at 11.17 a.m. under most favorable conditions of weather and sea. Zero hour 9.00 a.m. Dirigible observed at 9.35 a.m. keeping low over battleships during the practice. Scout planes observed 9.55 also keeping in vicinity of battleships. At 10.18 sighted torpedo plane squadron and maneuvered at high speed to keep planes astern. Plane squadron divided and attacked from both flanks, battleships maneuvering to keep planes ahead and astern. Arkansas sustained seven hits out of seventeen torpedoes fired, all fired close aboard."

 

The Associated Press correspondent, who witnessed the tests from the bridge of the Wyoming, described the practice as follows:

 

"Under most favorable conditions that gave attacking force practically ninety per cent advantage, three squadrons of torpedo planes today fired seventeen torpedoes at battleship Arkansas and scored seven hits, theoretically sinking that ship. The test was held under the most favorable weather conditions, the planes coming within a few hundred yards of the battleships and discharging their torpedoes at will, the dreadnaughts depending only upon the skill of their officers and their rudders to evade theoretical destruction. The planes in leisurely fashion attacked the target ship Arkansas, while the fleet was steaming at high speed. When the planes were sighted the battleships maneuvered to keep them ahead and astern and avoided a number of hits fired point blank at battleships."

 

The torpedo planes used in these tests were old planes converted for the purpose, yet they held up very well. All but one fired their torpedoes—the one failure being due to trouble with the releasing mechanism. Three of the planes had forced landings on their return trip, but the Air Station at Hampton Roads reported them all safe.

 

The Navy's Aircraft Carriers Lexington and Saratoga.—Under the provisions of the Act of Congress which provided for the conversion of two battle cruisers into aircraft carriers, work has been resumed on the hulls of the U.S.S. Lexington (Fore River) and U.S.S. Saratoga (Camden). Final plans have not been approved by the Department but they have been practically completed by the Bureau of Construction and Repair.

 

As battle cruisers these vessels had a designed displacement of 43,500 tons and a speed of 33.25 knots, with length 874 feet, beam 101 feet 8 ¼ inches and mean draft 31 feet. The power plant which will remain unchanged, will develop 180,000 H.P. through 16 boilers and General Electric turbines with electric drive.

 

While the Department is not yet ready to announce the details of their plans for the Lexington and Saratoga, Articles IX and X of the Limitation Treaty limit the tonnage to a maximum of 33,000 tons, and limit the armament to not more than eight guns of a caliber larger than six-inch while the maximum size of guns permitted is 8 inch.

 

U.S.S. Langley

 

The U.S.S. Langley is now on her shakedown cruise preparatory to taking her place in the fleet as the Navy's first airplane carrier. The new Langley was originally built at Mare Island as the collier Jupiter—famous as the first large ship in the world to have electric drive—and launched in 1912. The work of conversion was done at the Norfolk Yard.

 

The flying-off deck of the Langley is 520 feet long and 65 feet wide. Telescopic masts 50 feet high are housed like periscopes when not up in position. The ship is a combined floating aviation field hangar and repair plant for aeroplanes. The repair plant includes an armory, carpenter and wing repair shops, machine shop, blacksmith shop and foundry, metal shop and torpedo repair shop, besides photographic and aerological laboratories. There is an electric elevator for lifting fuselages and wings from the main deck to the flying-off deck. When lowered the top of the elevator forms a part of the flying-off deck. There are two electric traveling cranes on the main deck for shifting planes fore and aft, and there are four cranes on the topside for hoisting planes from the water to the flying-off deck. The navigating bridge is below the flying-off deck, and there are "T-booms" along the ship's sides for the auxiliary radio antennas. There are two catapults on deck, one forward and one aft—there is a testing room and stand for aeroplane engines, a pigeon loft, a kite balloon filling station, and all the features which make a large modern naval vessel, virtually a floating city. The ship has been converted from a coal burner to an oil-burner, and her armament is four 5-inch guns. The ship is fitted to accommodate ten ship's officers, thirty-five commissioned and warrant aviators, thirty-one chief petty officers, and 229 men for the crew.

 

The U.S.S. Wright

 

The U.S.S. Wright, at present flagship of the Air Force Atlantic Fleet, is a seaplane tender and kite balloon ship. The Wright was built at Hog Island and was one of the Shipping Board's type B ships. She was converted by Tietjen and Lang, Hoboken, N.J. Her dimensions are length 448 feet, beam 58 feet, mean draft 31 feet, displacement 14,240 tons. Her speed is 15 knots, furnished by six B and W oil-burning boilers and General Electric geared turbines of 6,000 horsepower. Her armament consists of four 5-inch guns, and she has accommodations for her captain, aviation detachment commander, twenty-eight wardroom officers, twenty junior officers, twelve warrant officers, sixty chief petty officers and a crew of 450 men.

 

British and United States Naval Air Services.—In commenting on the deficiencies of our naval air service, several writers have pointed with envy to the more advantageous position of the United States fleet, which has entire control over its aviation branch and is apparently well supplied with pilots and machines. It is, however, rather doubtful whether American naval flying is in quite so prosperous a condition as the superficial facts indicate. Although the present establishment of machines is larger than ours, complaints are heard of a shortage of up-to-date models in certain types, and it is also said that the paper strength includes many planes which for one reason or another—deterioration or obsolete design—are practically useless. Where the American naval air wing appears to lead is in respect of fighting machines and torpedo planes, types to the improvement of which special attention has been devoted. Several planes now in commission are capable of carrying a 21-in. torpedo at a speed and altitude that would be fully equal to war requirements. The latest combat machines are also of a most efficient type. For the time being, however, the development of naval flying is sorely handicapped by the lack of aircraft carriers. The ex-collier Langley is the only vessel of this type at present available, and her speed is much too low to permit of her co-operating with the fleet under all conditions. For this reason American naval men are anxious that the two battle cruisers selected for conversion into carriers shall be completed with all speed, but if Congress persists in its parsimonious attitude and continues to dole out money at the present rate it will be three or even four years before the ships are ready.—Naval and Military Record, 23 August, 1922.

 

Teapot Dome Oil Deal Sound.—One of the sensational "issues" in the 1922 political campaign will be the contract negotiated by Secretary of the Interior Albert B. Fall, acting for the Navy Department, for the development of Naval Reserve, No. 3, Teapot Dome, Wyoming, by the Mammoth Oil Company, a Delaware corporation, of which Harry F. Sinclair is the head. It is the evident intention of the Democratic orators who are attacking this contract, to read into the situation another Ballinger-Pinchot affair, and thus, at the start, to create a prejudice against the contract, which will operate conveniently in place of fact. If this is the purpose, it might be well for the promoters of any campaign of misrepresentation to pause and recall that subsequent investigations, both by Congress and by secretaries of the interior of a different political faith, have disclosed that the course of Mr. Ballinger was wholly proper and one that any other sound business man would have pursued, who was as familiar as Mr. Ballinger with the circumstances. But prejudice is an adroit and dangerous political weapon, and it was with some little prejudice in favor of the criticisms that your correspondent entered upon a personal investigation of the circumstances of Teapot Dome and the Sinclair contract. As a result, he is able to set forth certain facts which the critics have either distorted or suppressed.

 

It is a matter of familiar history that owing to failure to drill suitable offset wells in Naval Reserves Nos. 1 and 2, California, the Government has suffered a loss of 6,800,000 barrels of royalty oil through drainage. Teapot Dome lies south of and adjoins the great Salt Creek oil field in Wyoming, and exactly the same loss from drainage was threatened by private operations in the Salt Creek field to the north when the Harding Administration determined that naval reserve oil history should not be repeated. To this end Secretary Fall cast about to secure a development of Teapot Dome which should end the danger and secure to the Navy an adequate supply of oil, both for the present and for future use. It was, of course, argued with respect to the California fields that the Government would suffer no loss if the situation were let alone, but men like Mark L. Requa and Franklin K. Lane urged that the Navy should protect its reserves by drilling wells, and the sequel proved that their advice was more than justified. According to Dr. H. Foster Bain, director of the Bureau of Mines, "delay in properly protecting the boundaries of the reserves (Nos. 1 and 2, California) against drainage by wells on adjoining lands has resulted in a loss of ultimate total production from the reserves as a whole, as most conservatively estimated, as follows: Total production, 22,000,000 barrels; Government royalty, 6,800,000 barrels; value of royalty, $8,800,000."

 

Teapot Dome is supposed to contain, at approximately the same depth, the same oil-bearing sands developed in the main Salt Creek structure. For this and other reasons, according to Government experts who have studied Naval Reserve No. 3, the same presumption of loss through drainage exists as with reference to the California reserves. It is to be borne in mind, moreover, that another dangerous factor is the loss of gas pressure, the propulsive powder of the oil, which loss leaves the oil inert and incapable of coming to the surface except through expensive pumping or artificial air pressure. As Secretary Fall has said: "The undeniable facts, insofar as human judgment can ascertain them from expert evidence and otherwise, are that at least a certain portion of the north part of Naval Reserve No 3, the Teapot Dome, is now, or will be, disastrously affected through drainage by the drilling upon the lands outside the naval reserve, which drilling is now being carried on from day to day. Such drillings upon such lands is in accordance with the terms of the law itself (law of February 25, 1920), and those conducting such operations are protected by the law."—Boston Evening Transcript, 9 September, 1922.

 

MERCHANT MARINE

 

United States Shipping Policy.—When the Great War came to an end and the German Fleet had virtually disappeared it was popularly supposed in this country that the era of naval competition was past and that the British flag would henceforth wave in uncontested supremacy over the seven seas. This, of course, was a delusion, as we soon discovered. While Europe was preoccupied with her war troubles, great naval projects had been maturing in America and the Far East, and a rivalry which had as its original object the mastery of the Pacific now threatened to alter the world-wide balance of naval power much to our disadvantage. In 1919, both the United States and Japan were at work on huge shipbuilding programs, while the dockyards of Europe were comparatively idle. Had the American scheme been carried out in full it would ultimately have placed the United States in possession of the strongest fleet in the world. Such a prospect could not be viewed with equanimity on this side of the Atlantic. Anxious as we were to maintain those cordial relations with our American cousins which common suffering and sacrifice had fostered during the war, it was realized only too clearly that to accept a subordinate rank in the naval hierarchy would be fatal alike to the prestige, the interests, and, ultimately, to the existence of the British Empire. On the other hand, the thought of entering into a naval competition with the United States was wholly repugnant to our people, irrespective of the tremendous financial strain it would involve. In these circumstances the proposal of President Harding to discuss the question of future naval strength at a Conference of the Powers chiefly concerned was warmly welcomed here, and it can safely be said that no nation tried harder than Great Britain to make the Washington meeting a success. That it was on the whole a distinct success, especially as regards the limitation of naval armaments, is admitted everywhere save in France, where the Conference is still referred to as a "maneuver" and a "farce." If those terms are justified, we can only say that it is a pity the diplomatists of Europe have not staged a few maneuvers and farces of the same description.

 

With the signing of the Limitation Treaty all danger of a battleship competition between ourselves and America has been removed. That alone is a most gratifying achievement, a triumph of statesmanship without parallel in modern history. But although the United States has abandoned the ambition it seemed to entertain during the war of becoming the dominant naval Power, it has by no means given up the plan, conceived at the same time, of building up a great mercantile fleet and having the major proportion of its seaborne trade carried in American bottoms. On the contrary, strenuous efforts are being made to realize this aim by legislative and other methods designed to buttress American shipping against foreign competition. In pursuing this policy the United States is acting well within its rights, and, although the wisdom of certain measures which it has taken may be open to question, outside criticism is called for only if and when those measures prove unduly detrimental to the legitimate interests of other countries. The conclusion reached by the directors of American policy is that high wages and heavier running costs impose such a handicap on their ship-owners that without preferential treatment of a very definite kind there is no hope of maintaining the national merchant navy on a profitable basis. Hence, the various legislative measures which have been introduced recently, including the Ship Subsidy Bill, and the vigorous propaganda carried on by the U.S. Shipping Board to arouse popular enthusiasm for the Government's plans.

 

In British shipping circles the conviction still prevails that if America's mercantile marine needs all these artificial aids to keep it alive, its existence will not be of long duration, for sooner or later the American people will grow weary of paying heavy subsidies to an industry that cannot support itself. From the British point of view, the most unfortunate feature of American shipping policy is the somewhat aggressive attitude displayed by those who control it. The exceptionally able correspondent of The Morning Post in Washington, credits Mr. Lasker, who is chairman of the Shipping Board, with believing that the easiest way to rehabilitate the American merchant marine is to antagonize British shipping interests wherever possible, and use the power of his Government in a way which would not be sanctioned by private interests competing for trade. It is further suggested that some connection may exist between this policy and incidents such as that at Newcastle-on-Tyne, where the American Consular officials were charged with having abused their position in order to obtain business for vessels of the U. S. Shipping Board. This case was deemed sufficiently flagrant by the British Government to justify the withdrawal of the exequaturs of the officials concerned. One can only hope that the good sense of the Americans will soon convince them of the futility of attempting to bolster up their shipping interests by such methods. The Yellow Press talks wildly of the propaganda which British ship-owners are alleged to be conducting against the growth and development of the American merchant marine, but Sir Frederick Lewis, the president of the Chamber of Shipping, has made it clear that there is not one word of truth in this allegation. He ventured to remark, however, apropos to recent shipping legislation in the States, that "restrictions on freedom in commerce are surely retrograde movements, and not progressive." That is certainly the general opinion on this side of the Atlantic, and we shall be surprised if it does not eventually find acceptance on the other side as well.—Naval and Military Record, 13 September, 1922.

 

Libeling of Ships Unavoidable.—The Shipping Board's action in libeling the vessels of the Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company has excited much comment in shipping circles this week. It is an indication of the Board's policy in regard to the speculative pioneer purchasers of Government tonnage, and similar procedure is expected to be followed in connection with other companies in like circumstances.

 

In an article appearing in the August 12 issue of The Nautical Gazette it was pointed out that the policy of selling the notes made by pioneer purchasers in favor of the Board to cover the unpaid portion of the price of their ships, was an unwise one. It was contended that the Government should either demand the payment of these notes in full or regain possession of the ships. Since that time the Shipping Board, by its action in libeling the Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company's vessels, has given unmistakable evidence of the course it intends to pursue in these matters.

 

The story of the Board's dealing with this company is a long chapter of patient waiting for the fulfillment of promises. It is the first time that the transactions with any one of the pioneer purchasers have been made public, and the revelation is a justification of the Board's treatment of this concern.

 

Because of, its desire to have its existing services continued uninterruptedly and to develop owning operators of American ships the Board has granted extraordinary indulgence to the Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company and other pioneer purchasers. When the present Board assumed office over a year ago it was found that the Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company had obtained from the previous Board six ships for which it agreed to pay $9,314,137 and of which amount only $195,000 had been paid. Under this contract six ships, of a total of 54,000 tons, which were the very cream of the Board's fleet were delivered to this company with a down payment of two and a half per cent of the purchase price. This constituted delivery of these ships at a little over three dollars per ton, and no cargo ships have been delivered to any one else on a comparable low basis of down payment.

 

Since the present Board has been in office the company has not paid one cent of principal nor one cent of interest, so that by the payment of $195,000 and nothing else the company has remained in possession and operation of ships, which if marked down to present day values, would be worth approximately $2,000,000.

 

The Shipping Board had been constantly hoping that with this and other so-called "pioneer ship purchasers" who owe large sums on their ships some arrangement could be worked out whereby the Government would obtain at least current market prices for its property, and negotiations have been carried on continuously with the various companies to this end, the Shipping Board tendering ultra-liberal settlements. In no case has the Board asked its delinquent ship purchase debtors who were financially involved to pay it anything like the face of existing obligations.

 

These negotiations have dragged along, some companies settling on this basis; some few have not, but none of the companies that have not settled have paid the Board anything in the way of interest or principal. The Board has not pressed its debtors threateningly during this period, because its object has been to accomplish settlement and it wished to do nothing to embarrass its debtors from raising moneys.

 

Finally the Board was forced to conclude that those who had not settled were in fact drifting along without paying interest or principal to such an extent that a time limit had to be arrived at: many of these companies, the Board learned, not only could not raise the moneys to pay for their ships, but would be unable to remain financially sound for purposes of operation, and thus the Government's ships would be laid open to libel.

 

When the Board, after unremitting patience and sympathetic indulgence, reluctantly came to this conclusion, it determined that between September 1 and 15, either the amounts owing it must be liquidated on an agreed liberal settlement basis by its debtors, or the Board would have to proceed to bring about the return of its ships.

 

In the case of the Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company the Board was forced to take action when it did, because it learned that if it gave the company indulgence until the deadline time, the ships most likely would be libeled by outside maritime creditors.—The Nautical Gazette, 2 September, 1922.

 

Subsidies For Ship-owners or Shipbuilders.—The inability of the war afflicted countries of Europe to exchange goods with their neighbors or nations overseas on the same scale as before hostilities began, has caused a great shrinkage of international trade, with the result that a large proportion of the world's merchant fleet is idle for lack of cargoes. The chief sufferers from this state of affairs have been the shipping and shipbuilding industries which are depressed to an extent probably never before witnessed. This has led the shipping interests in most of the leading maritime states to ask for some form of Government aid to tide them over until normal trade conditions return. In the United States subsidies to ship-owners is the projected measure of relief, while in Italy, Japan and elsewhere the policy of granting subventions to shipbuilders seems to be most in favor.

 

The drawback to our Federal administration's plan of indiscriminate subsidies to all American ship-owners irrespective of the modernness or obsoleteness of their vessel fleets is that it would accomplish nothing for the advancement of our merchant marine. It encourages the retention in service of the vessels now afloat without regard to their age or efficiency and offers no premium for the replacement of existing units by up-to-date ships. In the opinion of many competent observers, as revolutionary a change is impending from steamships to oil-driven motor-ships, as took place around the middle of the last century, when sailing vessels were superseded by steamers. Instead of encouraging this change in the case of our own merchant, marine, the administration's ship subsidy bill would have a directly opposite effect, for it treats all American flag ships on the same footing, whether they are obsolete wooden craft or modern internal-combustion engined freighters.

 

By way of contrast the experts appointed by the Japanese Government to consider the best means of rehabilitating the nation's ocean services and meeting the threatened competition of American subsidized ships have recommended the building of a number of new fast Japanese merchantmen aggregating 500,000 tons, whose construction is to be made possible by a series of Government loans bearing a low rate of interest. This would lead to a revival of Japan's shipbuilding industry, and give the Mikado's realm the most modem and most efficient passenger and freight carriers. The Italian Minister of Marine is also of the opinion that any Government money devoted to the furtherance of his country's merchant marine should be expended on the construction of new ships, which would have the advantage of relieving unemployment and of supplying Italy with an adequate merchant fleet when trade returns to normalcy.

 

In giving subventions to shipbuilders, instead of ship-owners as proposed in this country, Japan and Italy would have as a result of their expenditures a number of modern liners and cargo carriers of the most efficient type. But as Signor Luigi Emandi pointed out in a recent article, the future cannot be gauged with certainty. In a time of depression like the present, it is impossible to foresee the kind of vessel that will be most required when trade again attains its normal volume. In building vessels by guesswork instead of in response to an actual demand, one runs the risk of turning out merchantmen not desired by anyone and which may have to be sold at a heavy loss if they can be marketed at all. Despite the force of this objection, Government aid to shipbuilders would result in something tangible towards the up-building of a merchant marine, which is more than can be said, of most subsidies to ship-owners.—The Nautical Gazette, 9 September, 1922.

 

Board Disposes of its Wooden Ships.—On a bid of $750,000 from George D. Perry, a lawyer of San Francisco, the Shipping Board has disposed of 226 wooden ships which comprise the greater part of its entire wooden fleet of 285 vessels which cost approximately $300,000,000. A few of the wooden ships still remain in the hands of the Board but with this sale the fleet has been practically disposed of. There were ten bidders at the sale, many of whom had come prepared to bid upon the fleet in lots rather than as a whole, but Sidney Henry, director of sales for the Emergency Fleet Corporation, stated that the Board would offer for sale the whole number of ships as a unit. The bid of $750,000 represents a little more than $3,318 a vessel which is considerably in excess of the bid of $2,100 a ship which was made some time ago and rejected by the Board.

 

Under the contract of sale the vessels will not be used for transportation purposes but will be promptly dismantled. Two hundred and seventeen of the vessels are of wooden construction, the other nine being composite wood and steel. Two hundred and eleven of the vessels are located at Claremont, Va., thirteen are in Orange, Tex., and two at Beaumont, Tex.—The Nautical Gazette, 16 September, 1922.

 

ENGINEERING

 

Japanese Fuel Supply Ship Has Many New Features.—The Kamoi, a 20,000 ton, 8,000 H.P. twin -screw fuel supply ship for service with the Japanese Navy, and the first vessel of any navy other than the United States to be electrically propelled, successfully completed the builders' trials off the Delaware Capes last week. For thirty-six hours the Kamoi was put through tests that brought into play every possible stress on all parts of her machinery and equipment and showed no signs of weakness.

 

The electric drive equipment of the Kamoi designed and installed by the General Electric Company, includes the use of synchronous motors for the first time in any twin-screw vessel. Tests demonstrated that the Japanese ship is the most economically operated steam vessel of her size afloat. Her electrical propulsion machinery gives unusual flexibility of control as well as economy of operation, and the mechanical simplicity of the driving unit affords exceptional reliability.

 

There is practically no vibration to the vessel as was shown by the balancing of a nickel on edge on the foundation of the main turbine while the ship was under way. While the ship was going ahead at full speed the propelling machinery was reversed to one-quarter astern in nineteen seconds, after which the engines were brought up to full speed astern.

 

The main propulsion unit consists of an 8,000 horsepower Curtis turbine generator, supplying power to two 4,000 horsepower synchronous motors directly driving the twin-screw propellers. There are also two 400-kilowatt direct current turbine generators which supply the excitation current as well as power to operate the auxiliaries such as the main circulation pump, main condensate pump, sanitary pump, blower motors, steering gear, radio apparatus, ventilators and lighting equipment.

 

There is also a 625 kilowatt auxiliary alternator which can be connected to either of the auxiliary turbines in case of the failure of the main driving unit or any of the auxiliaries. This small generator will supply sufficient power to propel the ship at a speed of about seven knots.

 

The vessel is a coal burner, equipped with four Yarrow type boilers which have oil spray boosters attached to be used when high temperature is desired quickly.

 

The radio equipment is also of General Electric manufacture, consisting of a one-kilowatt telephone and telegraph transmitter and two complete receiving sets, one with a range of 250 to 3,000 meters and the other from, 250 to 30,000 meters. An unusual feature of the telephone installation is five extensions from the radio room connecting with the captain's cabin, engine room and other parts of the ship. By means of this equipment the captain can remove the receiver from the phone at any one of five stations and put in a call for the officer of another ship and carry on a conversation by radio much as he might from an office on a land telephone.

 

The ship has a normal tonnage of 19,500, is 495 feet long and has a beam of 62 feet. It has a draught of 28 feet and a deadweight displacement of 13,000 tons. It is equipped to carry approximately 10,000 tons of fuel oil.—The Nautical Gazette, 16 September, 1922.

 

An Electro-Magnetic Inspection Lamp.—A portable electric lamp, which will be found a great convenience for inspecting machinery in darkened parts of the factory or workshop, is the Kendrick electromagnetic inspection lamp. It consists of a lamp-holder (complete with wire guard, bulb, and length of flexible) mounted on an electric-magnetic base, which adheres strongly to any iron or steel surface, leaving the operative's hands free, preventing the possibility of breakage, and ensuring efficient illumination of the work to be carried out without obstructing the worker. The makers (The Neale Magnet Construction Co., of 7, Suffolk St., Pall Mall East, S.W.I.) also make a high-voltage lamp for any circuit between 100-250 volts, for factories and industrial establishments, and a further model, approved by the Home Office, with special insulating and earthing arrangements to comply with the Factory Acts. A special type is supplied for motor-car inspection, which may be used in conjunction with the ordinary lighting set.—Engineering and Industrial Management, 7 September, 1922.

 

The Penflex Rivet "Gun."—The Penflex rivet "gun" of the Pennsylvania Flexible Metallic Tubing Company, Philadelphia, in use at the yard of the New York Shipbuilding Company, is illustrated in the Iron Age, for August 17. The "gun" and the forge are conveniently located at a distance, tubing leading to the job. As each rivet is heated and ready to be passed, it is set on a valve provided in an opening contained in the head of the "gun." The rivet opens the valve by its own weight and enters the machine. The valve closes then automatically and the rivet is sent on its journey simply by pressing a foot treadle, this placing the "gun" in communication with a compressed air receiver. The rivet "gun" has a distance capacity of 125 ft., delivering rivets up or down at the rate of 50 ft. every three seconds. It is claimed that the "gun" has exceeded this performance, shooting rivets 180 ft. in nine and a fraction seconds without subjecting the rivets to change of temperature. One of its outstanding advantages is that it eliminates the necessity of placing rivet forges in close compartments near the riveting work in hand.—Engineering, 1 September, 1922.

 

Pneumatic Tool for Removing Rust and Scale.—A pneumatic tool for breaking light scale from boilers and removing rust and old paint from constructional ironworks and ships' bottoms is being placed on the market by Sir W.G. Armstrong, Whitworth & Company, Limited. The action of the piston is so very rapid and the blow is so light that all risk of damage to the surface operated upon is obviated while the work is accomplished in a fraction of the time required when hand hammers are used.

 

On account of its small size and weight of only 4.75 lbs., the machine can be operated by boys without any difficulties. Its length over all is 23.5 inches and approximate consumption of air at 95 lbs., only five cubic feet. It can deliver 9,000 blows per minute.—The Nautical Gazette, 23 September, 1922.

 

An Electric Scaling Hammer.—Demonstrations have recently been given in this country of the Sandblom electric scaling hammer, which has been devised by a Swedish inventor and has had considerable application in Scandinavia. This tool, which is illustrated below, consists of a spindle making about 1,200 revolutions per minute and equipped with a number of short chains with small hammer-heads at their free ends. The number of these chains varies from eight to two, according to the class of work to be done. The driving power is supplied by a small electric motor of very light weight, and so adapted that it may be conveniently held by the workman. When the motor is started the chains are thrown outwards by centrifugal force. The revolving spindle with its hammers is then held parallel to the work, so that the hammer-heads come into contact with the surface to be scaled, striking the surface at the rate of about 10,000 blows per minute. It is claimed for the apparatus that it provides the most rapid and efficient means yet devised of removing scale, rust and paint from iron and steel work, and, moreover, leaves a smooth and even surface, without the cuts and indentations in the plate associated with the use of hand and pneumatic chipping tools.

 

Actual test made at a floating dock in Copenhagen demonstrated that the Sandblom hammer did the work of from ten to twenty-five men with hand hammers, and worked at about three and a half times the rate of pneumatic scalers.—The Shipbuilder, August, 1922.

 

AERONAUTICS

 

The Year's Progress in Aircraft.—What Jane and Brassey have done for the naval world, the Aircraft Year Book of the Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce of America promises to do in the broad field of aeronautics. Although the aircraft annual is but a few years old, it has grown so rapidly, and is edited with such care and comprehension, that it is distinctly comparable in scope and quality to the long-established naval annuals above referred to. Within its 250 pages will be found an answer to every question which a yearbook may legitimately be expected to answer.

 

The book opens with a review of commercial aviation during the year, in which the fact is brought out that aircraft have continued to demonstrate their utility equally in the fields of commercial transportation and of military service. Chapter two deals with the problems of aerial transportation, such as the need for capital for proper terminals, landing fields, etc., and the urgent call for thorough reliability.

 

So important were the bombing tests carried out a year ago, off the Virginia Coast, that a considerable part of the third chapter is given up to a discussion of these tests. Each series is taken up in its turn; and it is needless to say that this digest forms in itself a very thrilling story, ending, with the sinking of the battleship Osffriesland by bombs of 200-pounds weight.

 

One of the most valuable chapters of the book is that devoted to a review of aeronautics throughout the world, nation by nation; for here we have brought together a mass of information which only the facilities of such a body as the Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce render possible of collection. The fifth chapter on technical progress in aircraft construction during the year will be read with close attention by every aeronautical student. The subject is treated under the head of Army Airplanes, Naval Aircraft, Mail Airplanes, Commercial Airplanes, Racing Machines, Airships, and Aeronautical Engines. As a result of recent development, the Army Air Service possesses a two-seater, Dayton-Wright, night observation biplane, with a 300-horsepower engine, which has a performance superior to that of the DH-4B, fitted with the 400-horsepower Liberty engine. Another type developed for the Army is the GAX Ground Attack Triplane, which carries a 37-millimeter quick-firing gun, and eight machine guns. The Martin bomber, with its two 400-horsepower Liberty engines, has been improved, and is considered now to be one of the best military machines of its class in existence. Other machines are two semi-cantilever monoplanes, a long-range day bomber, fitted with the McCook Field 700-horsepower engine; the Loening pursuit biplane, fitted with a Wright 400-horsepower radial engine, and the Barling bomber, carrying six Liberty engines. Among naval aircraft there have been developed the Curtiss torpedo dropper—a notable departure in seaplane construction. Great promise is also shown by the Douglass torpedo dropper.

 

A notable feature of this annual is the number and character of the illustrations, which are well-chosen for their purpose of showing the various types of machine, and particularly those which have won for the United States various records for height and speed. These include some excellent photographs of the airship bombing test, and views of various useful services, such as forest fire patrol, in which the airplanes has found a field of usefulness.

 

The Historical Design Section, which constitutes the second half of the volume, is packed with information. It opens with a complete series of line drawings, including plan, front and side elevation of the various types of American aircraft. These are followed by pen-and-ink drawings of the standard types of motor; and the work closes with a statement of aircraft appropriations by the United States Government, aircraft production costs, the activities of the Mail Service, and of the Forest Fire Patrol. Finally there is a very complete chronology of aircraft happenings for the year 1921.—Scientific American, October, 1922.

 

The Logic of a Separate Air Force.—Among older officers of the army and navy, advocates of a separate air service have encountered very general opposition to their views based largely on tactical doctrines. These officers point out that unity of command is essential to success in war, and no one can question the truth of this; evils of divided leadership have indeed passed into a proverb. These officers assert further that true unity of command good team work, in other words—cannot be secured in war unless habitually practiced in peace; nor can anyone object to this dictum. From these major premises, they proceed with the further assumption that in time of battle, the air service must strictly conform to the work of the ground or sea forces, and from this logically deduce that the air service must be in war and in peace a component part of the army and navy. In the latter assumption lies the error.

 

Observation vs. Air Warfare

 

It is human to formulate general principles from one's own experiences, no matter how limited they may be. The average army or navy officer in the World War, if he had any contact at all with the Air Service, show nothing but the work of observation aviation. The number of officers of rank who had occasion to learn of the work of the air force—pursuit, bombardment, and attack aviation—is so small as to be negligible. Naval officers had practically no experience of air warfare except patrol. It is then, quite natural that officers of rank, whenever the word aviation comes under discussion, at once think of observation aviation, and mistakenly displacing the whole in their thoughts by a part, arrive frequently at erroneous conclusions. In their minds aviation connotes observation.

 

Were it true that the airplane had no role other than observation, there would be little that could be said in favor of a separate air force. Unquestionably observation must work in the most intimate liaison with ground troops on the fleet, and quite properly the observation units should form a component part of the land or naval unit to which they belong.

 

But observation aviation is far from constituting the bulk of the work of an air force. On the contrary, by the end of the World War, it comprised less than a fourth of all the airplanes on the western front, the remainder consisting of the airplanes of offensive aviation. Moreover, there is every reason to believe that the relative strength of the latter will tend to increase rather than decrease. There is no desire, of course, to underrate the inestimable value of the observation plane. But from a purely aerial point of view, it is of far less importance than the remaining branches of an air force. On the principle of the greatest good to the greatest number, it is obvious that air policy should be determined not by the needs of observation but by the needs of the air force, wherever the two should be found conflicting.

 

Fighting Over the Sea

 

Fighting over the sea is essentially the same as fighting over the land. The principles that govern it are derived from the air, which covers both alike. The same air force that today goes out to battle with hostile navies, tomorrow may attack his landing parties, and the next day join battle with the enemy land and air forces. In the first day it would co-operate strategically with the navy, in the last with the army; but throughout it would remain what it is in essence—neither army nor navy, but air force. Its liaison with both would be a very tenuous thing. It should be no part of army or navy, but should be a separate branch of the national defense, free to work out its own destiny, unhampered by the weight of older systems that utterly fail to answer its needs.

 

But what of observation aviation? Should it be a part of the army or navy, or should it "too be brought into a separate air service? There is no question that the co-operation between observation aviation and the army or navy units it serves, must be intimate. But it must also keep in close liaison with the air force, if it is to operate safely and successfully. From the standpoint of purely tactical employment, there is much to be said in favor of either assignment. But there is still another point to be considered. Pilots and observers must be trained and airplanes designated, produced, and supplied. This work could unquestionably be better done by a separate air service. It is not necessary to destroy tactical unity; air organization, on the contrary would be placed under the orders of commanders of army and navy units. But it is believed that a separate air force could supply to the army and navy units better trained and equipped for observation than these older arms could produce for themselves. As to the wisdom of uniting the air forces of the government into one group, few who know the needs of the air can doubt—Aviation, 11 September, 1922.

 

All-Metal British Aeroplane.—Orders to the value of between £200,000 and £300,000 are now being placed in connection with the increase in the strength of the Royal Air Force by twenty squadrons, something like 500 machines, including reserves. It is not the intention of the Air Ministry at present to put all-metal craft in production in any quantity.

 

Various all-metal and other types are already in course of construction, some of them being on the point of completion, and additional orders may be placed for all-metal machines in connection with the new twenty squadrons' scheme.

 

While attention has been concentrated to a certain degree on the new all-metal aircraft, other designs of ordinary construction are really just as interesting, if not more so, from the practical point of view of actual aircraft development.

 

It is well known, for instance, that the Air Ministry has had in course of construction for some time past very large types of flying boats for open sea reconnaissance work, some of which have been fitted with two Rolls-Royce Condor engines of 650-horsepower each, while others have been fitted with four of these powerful engines.

 

Other aircraft are now projected with a still larger engine of greater horsepower, the "Napier Cub," of over 1,000-horsepower. Probably one of the first craft to be fitted with these large new engines will be a bombing machine of very long range. About six all-metal machines of different types are already in course of construction by various firms at Kingston-on-Thames, Norwich, Byfleet, and Coventry. Some are designated as fighters, and others as troop-carrying planes, and for reconnaissance work of a character similar to that now being carried on in Mesopotamia.—Naval and Military Record, 23 August, 1922

 

Detachable Landing Gear.—Lawrence Sperry has added to his other achievements, the inventions of a skid device so constructed that by simple mechanical means the whole landing gear of his airplane is released and dropped to the ground and a landing is made on skids. Mr. Sperry in a Messenger plane that has a usual run of 400 ft. has landed in one tenth of the distance.

 

The high speed of the Messenger, which is normally 99 m.p.h., was found to be 105 m.p.h. with the landing gear released. The object of dropping the landing gear is three-fold. First, dropping the landing gear gets rid of the weight and head resistance of the landing gear, thereby increasing the performance in climb and speed of the plane.

 

Second, dropping the landing gear and landing on skids makes it possible to land in a much shorter space than hitherto.

 

Third, dropping the landing gear and landing on skids makes it possible to land on rough fields full of knolls and ditches, and also on water, without damage. (For the latter purpose, fuselage would be made water-tight.) It can also be used to advantage for heavily loaded flying boats which can take off the ground or ice, drop the landing gear and continue to fly over the water.

 

Superior performance can be obtained by dropping the landing gear. However, this will apply more particularly to the high-Speed planes where the dropping of the landing gear will increase the flying speed some 10 m.p.h., depending upon the plane speed, at the same time getting rid of 90 or more pounds of weight.

 

The shorter distance of run with the skids is due to the friction between skids and the ground, whereby a run of one-quarter the usual distance is possible. This friction between the ground and skids is increased by the fact that the skids had been placed so that the machine presents a zero if not negative angle to the airflow. This means that at the beginning of the run there is no lift from the wings to detract from the friction of the skids and also no bouncing. The machine can be put on the ground at excess flying speed without bouncing. Landing on rough ground is made possible with skids because they have runners as in sleighs to bridge over ditches, thereby running more smoothly than with wheels.

 

The skids will permit landing on water, since the greatest obstacle to landing on water with the land machine is the landing wheels. The skids do not turn the machine over on its end on account of the fact that the center of gravity is so high above the wheels.

 

The plane used for the experiments was a Messenger. Releasing the landing gear is done by pulling a hand lever on the right hand side of the fuselage, which operates a cam, ejecting the four posts of struts simultaneously, so that it is impossible for one strut to remain fast and joining the release. Close to the landing gear under the fuselage is a small streamline case containing a small parachute weighing five pounds. The parachute is attached to the top of the four landing gear struts, so that the first thing to strike the earth is the tires, which transmits the load to the shock absorbers.

 

During all of the experiments the same landing gear was used, without injury when dropping. The parachute could be used in a like manner over water, the buoyancy of the tires would support the gear and the white parachute would act as a mark, so that it could be found easily and pulled aboard ship.

 

The skids are so arranged that it is almost impossible to nose over in the roughest fields, which has been demonstrated by Mr. Lawrence Sperry landing on bumpy ground and running over a country road; this is due to the low center of gravity of the machine and the skids projecting so far forward.

 

The shock of landing is taken up by first landing on the rear end of the skids, which tends to stretch the front shock absorber rubber up to a point where the tail skid and landing skids are in line. Any additional shock is taken up by the shock absorber between the landing gear V struts. A nose on landing or hitting a bump is taken up by the front strut shock absorbers which are double acting.

 

When making a landing with the skids it is necessary to stop the propeller horizontally. This is done on the Messenger plane, which has a radial engine, by releasing the compression in two cylinders, and have the propeller so arranged that it will stop horizontally on the third cylinder.—Aviation, 4 September, 1922.

 

Largest Airplane in U. S. to be Tested by Army.—Washington, Sept. 8.—Results of extreme interest to the science of aeronautics are expected by army aviation experts to be obtained from the forthcoming trials at Fairfield, Ohio, of the largest airplane ever constructed in the United States.

 

The machine—a super-bomber triplane with a wing spread of 127 feet and carrying six Liberty motors totaling 2,400 horsepower—will have an estimated speed of 100 miles an hour, with a carrying load of 20,000 pounds. Its construction was begun in 1919 and carried forward secretly at the Whitte Mann Aircraft Company's plant, Hasbrook Heights, N.J.

 

Parts of the triplane recently sent from the New Jersey shops had to be shipped by circuitous routes to the Ohio station in order to get tunnel clearance for them on the railways.

 

The six motors are set in three pairs with one puller and one pusher to each group. The total weight of the machine including the carrying load, will be 30,000 pounds. A cruising radius of 1,300 miles is called for by the specifications, exceeding by hundreds of miles the radius of bombing machines now in the service.—Baltimore Sun, 8 September, 1922.

 

ORDNANCE

 

Shrapnel and Time Fuses.—The training section of the Reichswehr-Ministry sets problems every year to be solved by the officers of the various arms. This examination appears to have the objects of (1) testing the professional capabilities of officers; (2) encouraging professional studies, and (3) collecting opinions on important points. The main point is the first mentioned and, accordingly, the examination includes various tactical questions, problems in fortifications, sketching, map-reading, military history, economic geography, foreign languages, mathematics, and science, as well as armament and equipment.

 

In 1921; the problems for Artillery Officers under the last head were: "Can light artillery dispense with shrapnel and with time fuzes." The recently published comments on the papers deal with these two questions as follows:

 

The opponents of the retention of shrapnel for light artillery take the view that shrapnel can be entirely replaced by explosive shell with sensitive (instantaneous) fuzes, delay action fuzes (for ricochet action), and time fuzes (map shooting and ranging for line), and by canister shot. They put forward the following arguments:

 

At over 3,000 metres range, the effect of shrapnel is frequently insufficient. This is explained by the loss of striking velocity, by the steeper angle of descent and, above all (sic!), by the fact that, for example, skirmishers hear the report of discharge before the shrapnel bursts and can throw themselves down so as to offer a limited target.

 

The penetrating power of the balls, especially if they are made of steel instead of lead, is insufficient. This is especially the case with horses and with an enemy in winter clothing.

 

The possibilities of taking cover or avoiding shrapnel fire are much greater than in the case of shell-fire with H.E.

 

The moral effect of shrapnel-fire is smaller than that of high-explosive shell, which is due in large measure to the small report of the detonation of shrapnel in addition to the reasons given above.

 

If it is impossible to regulate the height of burst, the shrapnel shell loses appreciably in effect. Bursts which are too high have little effect: bursts on impact practically none. Hence, shrapnel cannot be used in the numerous situations in which it is not possible to regulate the height of burst, (e.g., when shooting by night or with low visibility, fire preparatory to an attack, searching behind crests and woods.)

 

The value of shrapnel for enfilading trenches and roads is overestimated. For example, trenches can only be enfiladed when they lie exactly in the line of fire: but, even so, modern trenches, with their irregular form and numerous traverses, make an effective enfilade problematical. Roads, which are under observation within shrapnel range, bear little or no traffic in daytime, i.e., when it is possible to regulate the height of burst.

 

The use of the shrapnel time-fuze necessitates a different procedure to that of H.E. percussion fuze. Therefore the training manual would be much simplified by the abolition of shrapnel. Above all, it is much easier to master the art of shooting with H.E. percussion fuzes and delay action fuzes (ricochets) than that with shrapnel time-fuze: this is of great importance in war, when one must reckon with less well-trained forces.

 

The difficulty of storing large quantities of shrapnel in position warfare, so that the time-fuzes, which are subject to the influences of the weather, are adequately protected, must not be under-estimated.

 

The mass-production of a reliable time and percussion-fuze was a failure in the war owing to the lower care and skill of the labor available.

 

The incendiary effect of percussion shrapnel was wrongly estimated in peace time. Straw-stacks should be fired with H.E. shell, not with shrapnel; in the same way, at short ranges, H.E. shell have a better incendiary effect on thatched houses than shrapnel shells.

 

H.E. shell with delay-action fuze is more effective against masonry than shrapnel.

 

On the other hand the retention of shrapnel is urged because:

 

Shrapnel with time-fuze is excellent for use against visible living targets up to 3,000 metres range. Its claim to existence is based on the requirements of moving warfare. Stationary warfare is responsible for a reduced estimate of its value; but every power, when at war, will seek a decision in war of movement and in that shrapnel has fully substantiated its claim to existence.

 

The long forward-effect of shrapnel facilitates the searching of a large area, by the simultaneous use of various ranges, in a shorter time than is possible with H.E. shell. That is very important in the case of surprise fire on fleeting targets.

 

The advantage of the forward-effect of fire makes itself felt particularly against targets formed in depth. Every modern infantry attack offers such a target.

 

Shrapnel is of increased importance in situations in which the effect of H.E. shell with impact or delay-action fuzes is limited by the terrain or situation. Such is the case on marshy ground, on terrain covered with thick undergrowth or bushes, and at ranges up to about 1,200 metres, i.e., at the decisive point of the battle.

 

With shrapnel at short ranges, suitable fuze-setting produces a grapeshot effect, the most favorable fire effect for close-fighting.

 

The difficulty, which is alleged to have existed towards the end of the war, of achieving good results with the shrapnel time fuze, was chiefly due, not to insufficient training, but rather to the impossibility of regulating the point of burst with the badly burning fuzes. The English artillery is a proof of this, since, owing to superior fuzes, it could place the point of burst with absolute precision and obtained good effect. The English were, however, hardly better trained.

 

Weighing up the evidence of the opponents and supporters of shrapnel, one comes to the following conclusion:

 

If we do not succeed in manufacturing a thoroughly efficient shrapnel shell, with lead bullets and a fuze, which is independent of weather influences, and satisfactory powder in mass production, with less skilled workers, then the light artillery must dispense with shrapnel. If, however, it is possible to make such a shrapnel shell, for which a loud detonation is also desirable, then it should not be abandoned, for that would mean giving up a projectile, which, in special cases, is decidedly superior to H.E. shell. For the present, therefore, we cannot dispense with shrapnel.

 

The second part of the questions, as to whether the time-fuze can be dispensed with, is to be answered in the negative.

 

The time-fuze is absolutely essential to make calibration for map-shooting and testing lines of fire possible. With this object, some of the shells, including the C projectiles, must be provided with time-fuzes. Shooting for effect with H.E. time-fuze is seldom required, since the introduction of shooting for ricochet effect. The rarity of such cases would certainly not justify providing all shells with time and percussion fuzes. The H.E. time-fuze will be used for effect only against air targets.—The Journal of the Royal Artillery—September, 1922.

 

[Note.—Some of the arguments deduced against the employment of shrapnel shell are far from convincing. It should, however, be remembered that the German shrapnel shell was distinctly inferior in design and general efficiency to the British shrapnel.]

 

Navy Designs New Gas Mask.—Washington, Aug. 27.—Development of a new rescue breathing apparatus that permits the wearer to operate freely in smoke or gas filled compartments with his movements practically unimpeded has been perfected in the New York Navy Yard, according to report from the commandant, just submitted to the department.

 

Working in co-operation with the 'Bureau of Mines, the naval experts have succeeded in creating a new type of apparatus that weighs only fifteen pounds, overcoming all the objectionable features of the old types. The purpose for which the navy intends the new device is to permit entrance into compartments which are filled with smoke or deadly gases. The bulkiness of the old design makes it difficult for the wearers to go about rescue work.

 

The report to the department gives an explanation of the theory and practice followed in the design of the apparatus. In the process of breathing from ten to thirty-five per cent of the oxygen entering the lungs is absorbed by the blood; the remainder is exhaled with the nitrogen and carbon dioxide produced in the lungs. The exhaled air contains on an average about four per cent of carbon dioxide. If air containing as much as five per cent carbon dioxide is inhaled breathing is accomplished with difficulty; headaches and dizziness follow.

 

To provide an adequate supply of oxygen and to dispose of the carbon dioxide gas exhaled this new device has been designed to furnish a constant supply of oxygen at a respirable pressure and to eliminate as far as possible the carbon dioxide. It consists of a small cylinder of oxygen at 1,800 pounds pressure, sufficient for a half-hour's use; a rubber breathing bag which acts as an elastic chamber between the compressed oxygen and the lungs to facilitate breathing, and a canister filled with caustic soda or soda lime to absorb the carbon dioxide exhaled.

 

Headgears for holding the mouthpiece in place, gauges for indicating the amount of oxygen in the cylinder at any time and nose clips form secondary but necessary parts of the outfit.—Baltimore Sun, 27 August, 1922.

 

RADIO AND NAVIGATION

 

Sending Photographs by Radio Code.—The various methods of sending pictures by wire or by radio have usually depended upon the use of a cylinder, like that of the earlier phonographs, about which the pointer of the transmitting mechanism travels spirally, like the recording needle of the phonograph. The receiving mechanism called for a cylinder of the same size, revolving in exact synchronism with the transmitting cylinder.

 

Among the earliest experimenters with this type of apparatus was Dr. Arthur Korn, of Berlin, who attained very notable results about ten years ago, but without producing an apparatus that was a commercial success. Now, however, Dr. Korn has demonstrated a new method that appears to overcome some of the objections to the earlier work, in particular discarding the receiving cylinder, the accurate synchronizing of which constituted one of the greatest difficulties of the earlier process. The fundamental conception of the new method has the merit of great simplicity. The signals transmitted by radio are merely successive groups of letters of the alphabet; and the receiving apparatus (associated with the ordinary radio receiver) is merely a typewriter or other mechanical printer, so modified that it writes dots of various sizes instead of letters.

 

A description of Dr. Korn's new method, by which a photograph has been reproduced by radio across the Atlantic, is given by Arthur Benington in an article in Radio Age (Chicago) largely excerpted from the New York World, under the auspices of which newspaper the first successful transatlantic test of the method was made. After stating' that the code message for the picture was sent from Rome. Italy, to Bar Harbor, Me., by radio and briefly recording other successful transmissions, the following description of the method is given:

 

"If you look through a strong magnifying glass at a half-tone picture in a newspaper or magazine you will observe it to be made up of a multiplicity of tiny dots, the very light part being of small dots widely spaced, the very dark spots of larger dots close together. Professor Korn, on analyzing photographs and half-tones, realized that for practical purposes all the values of light and shade could be reproduced with from fifteen to twenty sizes of dots.

 

"Suppose, for example, we take seventeen different sizes of dots and give to each a letter, say A for the smallest and P for the largest, the intermediate letters being for the intermediate shades. Now, if we can construct an apparatus which will automatically translate these seventeen values into seventeen corresponding letters and print these letters on a tape, we have a code which can be sent by wire or wireless to any place in the world, and if we have a typewriter that prints, instead of the letters indicated on the keys, the large or small dots which correspond to those letters, we can decode, or translate that telegraphic or radiographic message into a half-tone picture.

 

"This is just what Professor Korn did.

 

"The machine which does the coding is quite complex. In making a half-tone picture direct from the photograph, a wire screen with larger or smaller mesh, according to the fineness of the half-tone desired, is placed over the face of the picture and a negative photograph is taken through the screen, thus producing the dots.

 

"The Korn apparatus uses no screen, but a point of brilliant light traveling over the photograph, being cut on and off rhythmically by a commutator in such a way that it strikes the picture at accurately spaced points, working very much like the light of a moving-picture machine. An ordinary cabinet size photograph receives the light at about 1,000 points.

 

"The light passing through the negative falls upon a selenium cell, the quantity passing through depending on the darkness or lightness of the spot through which it passes. Selenium is a mineral crystal endowed with the peculiar property of passing an electric current only when exposed to light and of changing its electric resistance according to the degree of light that reaches it.

 

"Professor Korn makes use of selenium by placing a cell of it in the transparent cylinder on which the negative is coiled, and as the latter slowly revolves the light that passes through the negative falls on the selenium. A current of electricity from a battery passes through the selenium, and its resistance is varied by the values of the light.

 

"Each variation of resistance—of which in this case there would be seventeen—controls a key which drops to print a letter on a tape the instant it is actuated by the electric current. The mechanism by which the present Korn machine does this is too complexed to describe here; suffice to say that it prints the letter which corresponds to the particular shade of the photograph.

 

"In 'coding' a picture we get about 1,000 letters. These are grouped by spacing into about 300 'words' which are sent by radio (or by telegraph) to any place. They are received by an ordinary telegraph, or radio operator or by an automatic telegraphic receiving apparatus.

 

"To decode or turn this word message back into a picture, a Korn decoding instrument is necessary. This is a form of typewriter into which a sheet of paper about twelve by fifteen inches in size is placed. With the printed message before him the operator copies it on the keys; these, however, do not print letters, but dots of the sizes and shapes corresponding to the letters. As the code allows for the blank spaces between the dots the result is a very much enlarged half-tone of the original photograph, and this needs only to be photographed down to the size wanted by the paper; the smaller it is, the finer the half-tone. This decoding instrument may be attached to an automatic telegraph receiving machine in such a way that the code letters are entirely cut out and the telegraph machine prints the dots directly.

 

"There are at present only two sets of Dr. Korn's apparatus in existence; one of these is in Germany, the sending machine, and the other is at Dr. Korn's laboratory at Centocelle, near Rome, and the receiving or decoding instrument is in America." The Literary Digest, 25 September, 1922.

 

Report on Depth Soundings by U. S. S. "Stewart."—1. Following is the report of tests of a new device; the Sonic Depth Finder made by the U.S.S. Stewart en route from Newport, R.I., to Gibraltar, June 20, to June 29, 1922.

 

2. The apparatus used for the tests was as follows:

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. • Standard Navy sound receiver.
   • Submarine Signal Company's Fessenden type of sound oscillator for transmitting sound signals.
   • Navy Sonic Depth Finder recently developed at the Engineering Experiment Station, Annapolis, Md.

 

3. The tests consisted of:

 

 

1. • Taking a line of soundings from Newport to Gibraltar, via Nantucket Lightship, Azores, crossing Josephine Bank and passing near Gettysburg Bank.

 

4. Test (a) For depths less than about ninety fathoms the depth was determined with standard Navy sound receiver, and depths greater than ninety fathoms were taken with the Navy Sonic Depth Finder, by measuring the time required for a sound signal to travel to the sea bottom and return. About 900 soundings in all were taken for depths varying between nine and 3,200 fathoms. This is an average of about 100 soundings a day. Except for one or two cases where the period between successive soundings was about one hour, the longest period between soundings was twenty minutes and the shortest period was one minute. The speed of the Stewart was maintained steady at 15 knots except about two hours when the speed was about 25 knots. During this latter period the Stewart steamed over depths varying between 900 and ninety fathoms. Throughout this part of the course soundings were taken with the ease at one-minute intervals by means of the Navy's new sounding device. A record of the sounding data taken is enclosed in the form of a contour curve drawn on a chart which covers the route taken, and on which the track of the Stewart is drawn. These data are clear and no comments are made thereon other than to say that the apparatus worked perfectly throughout the trip, and the results obtained have demonstrated that the contour of the sea bottom can now be readily determined with considerable accuracy.—Bureau of Engineering, Bulletin.

 

MISCELLANEOUS

 

Scrapping Program of United States.—The announcement by Secretary of the Navy Denby that no scrapping of new capital ships of the American Navy will be undertaken until all parties to the five-power naval treaty have exchanged ratifications, has served to emphasize the delay of France and Italy in action upon this and other treaties and agreements of the Washington Arms Conference.

 

Administration spokesmen deny that Secretary Denby's announcement indicated any suspicion of the nations which have failed to ratify, but in other circles there is frank skepticism particularly to the French intentions. A frequent expression is that France is taking this means in reprisal for our ignoring the frequent hints that we cancel the war indebtedness. Another interpretation is that she wants to have her hands free in order to have something to trade in the clashes she is having with England and possible eventualities in the Near East.

 

It was the Administration hope that the ratifications would come before election, for the reduction of naval armament is the one big achievement the Harding regime of which the Republican campaign orators meant to boast. But a year after the agreement, the naval reduction is still in the air, with all the countries holding all except the ships that would have been scrapped as obsolete without any conference.

 

The Administration still insists that ultimately all the treaties would be ratified, but that they no longer expect it in the near future.

 

The United States, Great Britain and Japan have ratified all of the treaties. Ratification was completed by the Senate months ago. Great Britain completed ratification August 1, and Japan on August 5. The British and Japanese ratifications are now on deposit in their respective embassies here and the diplomatic representatives of these powers only await the naming of a date by President Harding for the exchange of ratifications.

 

Portugal and China likewise have ratified all of the treaties and agreements to which they are parties, and their ratifications now repose in the Portuguese and Chinese Legations here.

 

The Arms Conference treaties have been discussed in the French Parliament and at its last session were referred to a committee of the French Senate with instructions to submit a report when Parliament meets again next month.

 

Even before the Arms Conference adjourned, Italian spokesmen made it clear that Italy would withhold action on the naval treaty pending its ratification by France. Apparently this policy is being strictly adhered to by the Italian Government, no action having been taken at Rome looking toward ratification of this or other Arms Conference treaties.

 

Belgium and Holland likewise have withheld action on the Washington treaties to which they are parties, and presumably they also are awaiting formal action by the French Government.

 

Senator Borah, among others, is decidedly pessimistic concerning the final outcome of the conference treaties and does not expect to see all of them ratified. Some naval experts are equally bearish, venturing the opinion that within a few years the nations will resume ship building.—Baltimore Sun, 27 September, 1922.

 

Vessels To Be Scrapped

Name of Vessel	Where to be scrapped	Present status of	Age completed
Maine	Sold to Hitner & Sons, Philadelphia	Now being scrapped at Philadelphia	June 1, 1901
Missouri	Sold to Hitner & Sons, Philadelphia	Now being scrapped at Philadelphia	Aug. 30, 1901
Virginia	To be sold at Boston Navy Yard	Being prepared for sale	Feb. 15, 1904
New Jersey	To be sold at Boston Navy Yard	Being prepared for sale	Feb. 15, 1904
Rhode Island	To be sold, Mare Island	Being prepared for sale	Feb. 15, 1904
Georgia	To be sold, Mare Island	Being prepared for sale	Feb. 18, 1904
Nebraska	To be sold, Mare Island	Being prepared for sale	?

 

Fleet Reductions and Comparative Strength.—It may be doubted whether the general public even dimly appreciates the enormous reduction which the Royal Navy has undergone during the past three years. That a considerable number of vessels in each class have been transferred to the disposal list, and sold to be broken up at home or abroad, is common knowledge, but the full extent of this unparalleled clearance of naval material is realized by few. Many of the vessels thus discarded would have been excluded in any case from the postwar reorganization of the fleet, owing in part to deterioration in fighting value and in part to reasons of economy. Others, however, would probably have been retained for some years longer as ships still capable of performing useful work, had not the Washington agreement prematurely condemned them to the scrap heap. How far the process of reduction has gone is revealed by the fact that the Admiralty last week gave orders for the last capital ships affected by the agreement to have their armament disabled, preparatory to their being sold. The ships in question are the Erin, Orion, Conqueror, and Monarch, battleships, and the Lion and Princess Royal, battle cruisers, all of which were launched ten to twelve years ago. It is interesting to recall that the Conqueror, Monarch, Thunderer and Princess Royal were the "contingent Dreadnaughts" voted in 1909, as additions to the normal program for that year, these four ships representing the fruits of a vigorous agitation waged by the Press in favor of extraordinary measures to meet the menace of German naval expansion. The Orion class, of which the Thunderer is now to be the only survivor, were; the first modern battleships to mount 13.5-in. guns, for which reason they were popularly referred to as "super-Dreadnaughts." At the outbreak of war they were among the most powerful units of the Grand Fleet. Still more remarkable, however, were the battle cruisers of the Lion type, comprising the name-ship herself, the Princess Royal, and the ill-fated Queen Mary. Laid down two months before Lord Fisher's long term of office as First Sea Lord came to a close, the Lion embodied his tactical ideas to a pronounced degree—very high speed combined with tremendous hitting power, but only moderate protection—his intention being that these ships should fight at very long range, where their powerful guns could inflict heavy punishment on the enemy without giving his lighter armament a chance of replying with effect. At the Battle of Jutland circumstances apparently did not favor the employment of such tactics, for our battle cruisers engaged the enemy at medium range and were thus exposed to the full weight of his counter-fire. From the engineering point of view, the Lion was a most noteworthy ship. In the preceding Indefatigable class, machinery of 43,000 shaft horsepower had been installed to attain a speed of 25 knots. As the Lion, however, was designed for a still higher velocity and was the heavier ship by some 7,550 tons, her turbine engines, constructed by Vickers Limited, were planned to develop 70,000 shaft horsepower, a figure that seemed prodigious for those days. On trial at full power, with her boilers burning coal only, she worked up to 73,802 shaft horsepower, her speed being 27 knots. Her sister ship Princess Royal improved upon this by developing 76,510 shaft horsepower and 28.52 knots, thus establishing a record, which remained unbroken till the end of 1914, when the Tiger realized 104,635 shaft horsepower and 29 knots.

 

With the deletion of the six capital ships named above, our fleet now contains only eighteen battleships and four battle cruisers. It will eventually be reinforced by the two 35,000-ton battleships which are to be laid down early next year, but their completion will automatically displace four older vessels—Thunderer, King George V., Centurion, Ajax—bringing the total of capital ships down to twenty. It is interesting to compare this establishment with that which was maintained respectively in August, 1914, and at the date of the Armistice, more than four years later. At the opening of hostilities we had available for service twenty-two Dreadnaught battleships and nine battle cruisers, besides forty pre-Dreadnaughts and thirty-four armored cruisers. Completing or still on the stocks were ten battleships and one battle cruiser. This gave us an eventual strength of forty-two all-big-gun ships, plus seventy-four armored ships of the older type, an aggregate of no less than 116 ships. In the course of the war our Dreadnaught fleet was augmented by three battleships, which were being built to foreign order, and two battle cruisers, additions which exactly balanced war losses so far as number was concerned. Our Dreadnaught strength therefore remained practically constant, but among the older armored ships casualties were exceedingly heavy and these, of course, were not replaced. The Armistice found us with the following nine; pre-Dreadnaught battleships, thirty; armored cruisers, seventeen—not counting old ships of this type employed on subsidiary duty. Today, of these eighty-nine vessels, only twenty-two remain with the fleet, a fact that conveys very strikingly the ruthless weeding-out which has taken place in the interval. We have, in fact, scrapped the entire pre-Dreadnaught fleet of forty-seven ships and with them have gone nine Dreadnaughts and six battle cruisers. The smaller types of fighting craft have, of course, been swept away in far greater numbers. Light cruisers have gone by the score and destroyers by the hundred, while the submarine flotilla has shrunk from 130 boats to fifty-eight. Other Powers have also effected reductions in their naval establishments, but, having far less material to dispose of, their combined effort in this direction falls very far short of ours. The present composition of the world's navies is shown in great detail in the Admiralty Return which was published recently by order of Parliament. Under the Washington Agreement the battle fleets of the British Empire and the United States are to be of equal strength, and that of Japan is limited to ten ships. Pursuant to this arrangement, the United States is required to scrap fifteen all-big-gun ships, of which only two were completed, and approximately a dozen battleships of older type; Japan, on her part, being pledged to discard twelve ships in all, including four that were unfinished. As the other two signatories, France and Italy, possess no capital ships surplus to their respective tonnage ratios, neither Power is called upon to scrap any of its existing material.

 

Passing from heavy ships of war to those of lighter types, we find that the British Empire has four aircraft carriers complete and two being built, though it might be more correct to describe the Eagle as being reconstructed. The United States Navy has only one carrier at present, but two of its cancelled battle cruisers are being redesigned for that purpose. Japan, which has one ship built and two under construction, is also preparing to convert two unfinished battle cruisers into aircraft carriers. In spite of the withdrawal of so many ships, the British Empire is still able to marshal an imposing array of light cruisers, viz., fifty-one built and eight being built. From the number we have unfortunately to deduct the Raleigh, which appears to be a total loss. The United States is credited with nine light cruisers built—all of which are obsolete—and ten being constructed, while the corresponding totals for Japan are twelve and thirteen, her completed vessels, with but four exceptions, being of modern design and high speed. Moreover, since this return was compiled, a new Japanese program of construction has been announced, which includes eight light cruisers. When therefore the factors of age, tonnage and speed are taken into consideration, it appears that Japan will eventually have the most powerful light cruiser fleet in the world. Our present superiority in this respect is largely discounted by the fact that most of our ships were designed for work in the narrow seas, and if required to engage in ocean cruising would be handicapped by their limited dimensions and fuel capacity. Both in destroyers and submarines the United States Navy now occupies the leading position. Of the former, it has upwards of 300, while we cannot muster two-thirds of that total. In submarines, the disparity will be especially marked, when, in accordance with the Admiralty's plans, our establishment is reduced to fifty-eight boats at the end of the financial year, or sixty-four boats if those in Australian service are included. By that date the United States will have 141 submarines built and being built and Japan fifty-six, plus twenty-four new boats projected in the new shipbuilding scheme. The impression conveyed by a perusal of this official return is that the British Navy has indeed been "cut to the bone," and that but for the cordial relations now prevailing between Great Britain and the other principal maritime States our strength at sea would be grossly inadequate for the defense of the Empire. As it is, the One-Power Standard we are supposed to be maintaining applies only to capital ships and cruisers. In minor vessels, which nevertheless seem cast for a highly important role in future naval warfare, we are already outnumbered to an extent that in other circumstances would be disturbing.—The Engineer, 19 August, 1922.

 

Italian Building Policy: Naval Incidents in China: Norwegian Submarines: Russia's Baltic Fleet.—It was reported in these columns some weeks ago that the Italian Government would probably decide to drop the two new cruisers for which appropriations were asked in last year's Estimates and build instead a number of smaller craft. This has now been confirmed. The Minister of Marine has laid before Parliament a project to apply the money voted for the cruisers to the construction of four destroyers and six submarines, besides seventy aeroplanes for the naval service, and this course seems likely to be taken. The cruisers thus abandoned were to have been vessels of 8,000 tons, with a speed of 34 knots and a main armament of 7.5-in. or 8-in. guns. However as the funds available for the navy were strictly limited, the authorities concluded that actual defense requirements would be met more suitably by strengthening the destroyer, submarine, and aerial arms, especially as the cession of ex-enemy warships had brought the light cruiser squadron up to eight modern units. A good deal of money has been spent on reconditioning the prizes, several of which are still in dockyard hands. It is stated that the two best ships are the Ancona (ex.-Graudens and Bari (ex-Pillau). The ex-Austrian vessels Brindisi and Venezia (formerly Helgoland class) are built too lightly and have too small a fuel capacity for long-distance cruising. Italian naval experts say that German construction was very sound and practical, but that the Austrians tried to get too much on a given displacement, and only succeeded in turning out fair-weather ships. This seems to have been equally true of the Austrian battleships, judging by the ease with which the Szent Istvan and Viribus Unitis succumbed to underwater attack.

 

The Japanese battleship Suwo (ex-Russian Pobieda), which was being dismantled at Kure Dockyard, tried to forestall the operation on July 13 by capsizing alongside the wharf. It appears that workmen had incautiously removed a section of plating that continued below the waterline, and when the rivets were knocked out the water rushed in so quickly that the ship soon lay over on her beam ends and foundered. Her four 10-in. guns had already been removed, but the rest of the armament was still in place. Fortunately, the ship took sufficiently long in heeling over to allow all on board to save themselves. It is supposed that the removal of all the coal, stores, and armor-plate had made the vessel top-heavy, so that it required the entrance of very little water to cause her to capsize. The class to which the Suwo belonged were notoriously unstable. A sister ship, the Osliabia, was sunk in the battle of Tsushima. As leading ship of the port column she was brought under the concentrated fire of Admiral Togo's fleet and reduced to a blazing wreck thirty minutes after the action began. The Pobieda was salved after the Russians had scuttled her at Port Arthur. Most of her original guns were retained, but the Japanese found it expedient to improve the stability by loading her with 800 tons of ballast. As reconstructed the ship displaced 13,500 tons, her speed being reduced from 18 knots to 16. In 1902 she represented the Russian Navy at the Coronation Review held at Spithead. The third vessel of this type, Pereviet, also sunk at Port Arthur, was salved and commissioned under the Japanese flag as the Sagami. She was afterwards retroceded to Russia, but was destined never to return to the Baltic, a U-boat torpedo or mine putting an end to her career in January, 1917, while she was serving in the Eastern Mediterranean.

 

Messages from the Far East dealing with the recent civil strife in China give some details of the naval events which occurred in connection with the flight of Sun Yat-sen, the former President of the Cantonese Government. Sun took refuge on board a gunboat of the Canton flotilla, which remained loyal to him, and with four other vessels steamed up the river, finally anchoring in front of the Shameen, where his enemies could not bombard him without jeopardizing the foreign settlements. The opposing faction under General Chen Chung-ming had previously seized the Whampoa forts, and prepared to give Sun's ships a warm reception if they ventured up the river. It was necessary to do this, however, as a battery of 4-in. guns had been mounted lower down the river, and the flotilla was therefore exposed to a cross-fire. Finding their position untenable, all five ships weighed and proceeded up-stream at their best speed. A fierce fire was opened on them from fort and battery, but, thanks to poor visibility and wild shooting, they got through with only slight damage, the only serious hit taking effect on a destroyer, which had ten casualties. As soon as the flotilla came to anchor off the Shameen Bund, near the foreign gunboats, the Chinese commander was informed that strong action would be taken If he fired a single shot from his ships. Meanwhile H.M. gunboats Moth and Tarantula and an American destroyer cleared for action. Sun Yat-sen was requested to take his flotilla elsewhere, but this he refused to do, and eventually it was decided that he should remain there on undertaking not to open fire unless attacked by Chen Chung-ming.

 

Schiffbau reports the launch at Horten naval arsenal, on August 1, of the first submarine ever built in Norway. The earlier boats A1 (ex-Koben) to A4 were built at the Germania Yard, Kiel, and have a surface displacement of 225 to 250 tons. The two new submarines, B1 and B2, are considerably larger than those constructed in Germany, their length over all being 167.3 ft., the greatest breadth 17.4 ft., and the displacement 420 tons. On the surface they will be propelled at a speed of 14 ½ knots by Diesel engines supplied by Sulzer Brothers of WInterthur, while the electro-motors, which are entirely of Norwelgian manufacture, will give a submerged speed of 8 ½ knots. Immediately after the launch of Bi she was subjected to pressure and watertight trials, which In the absence of a pressure dock were carried out by lowering the boat to a depth of 164 ft. by means of a large floating crane. Work was begun on this vessel as long ago as 1915, but the abnormal conditions prevailing In the war and post-war period greatly retarded her construction. It is hoped to have Bi ready for her sea trials early next year. The second boat, B2, Is still on the stocks, and is not expected to take the water for another twelvemonth.

 

The following notes on the Russian Baltic Fleet come from a correspondent who is usually well-informed, but they are given here with all reserve: "The fleet at Kronstadt is much weaker than the Admiralty Return would lead one to believe. Of the battleships only the Schastopol (now Marat) Is really efficient; not one of the others could get to sea unless they had months of hard work put Into them by skilled artificers. The number of efficient destroyers is very hard to estimate with accuracy, but I put it at twelve, with probably the same number of submarines. From the larger vessels quite a number of guns, from 4-7-in. downward, have been commandeered by the army and mounted on field carriages, and many searchlights have been removed for the same purpose. The dockyard at Kronstadt is practically deserted, and it is long since any serious work was done there. The German Mission which was reported to be on its way to reorganize the yard had not arrived by the middle of July. Finnish shipping men scoff at the idea of the Red Fleet as a serious proposition, and declare that they would tackle it single-handed if they could only get a few discarded warships from one of the Powers. On the other hand, there are reports that the fleet is being thoroughly overhauled and refitted, also that Trotsky is doing his best to induce former officers of the Imperial Navy to rejoin the service by promising them a free hand as regards discipline. The one fact which seems beyond dispute is that the Baltic Fleet is at present a negligible quantity, whatever it may be a year or two hence."—Hector C. Bywater in the Naval and Military Record, 13 September, 1922.

 

The Material of Navies.—With the relative strength of the principal Sea Powers in capital ships fixed for the next ten years by the Washington Conference, the tables of battleships and battle cruisers contained in the recent official Return of Fleets, issued at the request of Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Alan Burgoyne, lose a good deal of their interest. Much the same is true of the section showing cruisers, for these vessels belong to quite an obsolete class, and, except for the British Courageous and Glorious, completed in 191 7, are all ships completed well before the outbreak of the war. The monitor table might also be passed over but for the interesting group of Italian vessels of the Monte Cengio type. Completed in 1918-19, these ships, which were not listed in the Return last year, are of 575 tons, and carry one 15-in. gun and a machine gun apiece. They are propelled by internal combustion motors of 700-horsepower. Two smaller craft of 360 tons, the Cucco and Vodice, each carry a 12-in. gun. Doubtless the Italians evolved these designs out of the needs revealed in the war, when British monitors lent to them were able to bombard the Austrian positions and communications on the Lower Isonzo and other places. But it will be interesting to see whether the craft are retained in the postwar Italian Navy.

 

Coming to the light cruisers, a type of increasing importance in future fleets, an examination of the Return will show how unreliable mere numbers are as a guide to comparative strength. The British Navy is credited with fifty-one such vessels (including five for the Dominions); America with nine; Japan, twelve; France, five; Italy, ten; Russia, one; and Germany, three. But these vessels range in displacement from the 3,218 tons of the Italian Quarto to the 9,750 tons of the British Hawkins; and while all but two of the British vessels are under ten years of age, all the American ships are fourteen years of age or over, and one, the Cleveland, was launched as far back as 1901. It can safely be deduced from the Return, however, that Britain has now the strongest light cruiser fleet of any Power, but large numbers of her war-built ships will become obsolete before very long, and when that happens the building program of America and Japan will make them serious rivals to us in this respect, even if they do not surpass us. America has in hand the ten 7,500-ton vessels of the Omaha type, each mounting twelve 6-in. guns; and Japan thirteen vessels of the Kuma and Kinu types, each armed with seven 5.5-in. guns. It is rather surprising that no light cruisers are in hand for Italy.

 

In the important matter of aircraft-carriers, the Return shows little change from last year. The British Navy has the same four vessels, the Furious, Argus, Pegasus and Ark Royal, with the Hermes and Eagle under construction. The United States, too, has the same ship, the Langley, but in her building list, in place of the 14,240-ton ship Wright, an ex-merchantman which was included last year but has now disappeared, there are the two ex-battle cruisers Lexington and Saratoga. A new aircraft-carrier in the Japanese Fleet is the Wakamiya, but she is a comparatively small vessel of 7,600 tons, and was originally a naval transport. There are four aircraft-carriers building for Japan, the Hosho and Shokaku, and the ex-battle cruisers Akagi and Aniagi. For France there is completing the ex-battleship Beam. This country, therefore, although it has fewer aircraft-carriers altogether than were used for the Grand Fleet alone during the war, is at present well ahead of the other Powers in this respect. But this class of vessel is still in the tentative stage, as was recognized at Washington when it was specifically laid down that "all aircraft-carrier tonnage in existence or building on November 12, 1921, shall be considered experimental, and may be replaced, within the total tonnage limits, without regard to its age."—Army, Navy, and Air Force Gazette, 26 August, 1922.

 

Sir Philip Watts' View.—In the course of a lengthy letter to The Times Sir Philip Watts made a notable contribution to what he himself terms "the great sea and air controversy." None can be better qualified than the famous ex-Director of Naval Construction to speak upon this subject: no opinion will command more respect than his amongst those who seek for such enlightenment as can be shed by the views of high authority upon the great problem. For it is to the genius of Sir Philip Watts that we owe the Dreadnaught. Others may have seen—undoubtedly did see—that the all-big-gun ship was indicated by the experience of Tsushima: Sir Philip Watts designed her. In the course of his letter he points out how, in the earlier classes of the Dreadnaught type, the chief difficulty with which his department had to cope was to devise protection against torpedo attack. For the submarine was the urgent menace in those days; not the aircraft. During the Great War the pre-Dreadnaught battleships which were torpedoed—as in the Dardanelles—came off very badly. On the other hand, the only three ships of the Dreadnaught era (Audacious, Marlborough, and Inflexible) which were seriously damaged by under-water attack withstood the onslaught, and but for a combination of bad weather and bad luck we now know that the first-named vessel would have been saved.

 

The point which Sir Philip Watts manifestly seeks to emphasize is that, just as the growth of the torpedo menace resulted in a satisfactory development of protective measures, so is the aerial threat likely to bring a corresponding antidote. Even if the aircraft had not entered into the category of hostile conditions against which the capital-ship designer has to provide, the great increase of range of naval artillery has produced a very similar form of problem. For a projectile discharged from a range of 20,000 yards has such a high trajectory that it spends what gunners term its remaining velocity in a nose dive. In fact, plunging fire is so much akin to aerial torpedo attack in its effect that even had the latter not come into existence the naval designer would have had to devise resistance against the former. "What we did not contemplate with the Dreadnaughts," writes Sir Philip Watts, "was that descending shell could penetrate our upper and main decks and fittings and travel considerable distances before exploding; it was anticipated that the shock would cause the fuse to act and the shell to burst before reaching the protective deck." In short, the delay action fuses which the Germans employed to such deadly advantage both in sea and land warfare had not then been contemplated.

 

It may well be that the new methods of attack will result in a revolutionary change in the whole system of armor protection. Since the capital ship is more likely to be menaced in future by attack from the air or from under the water than by direct broadside fire, her broadside belting may have to be distributed over her deck, and broadside protection effected by means of "blister" sides and honeycomb bulkheads. The naval architect cannot impose more than a certain limited ratio of weight upon total displacement, and this is bound to be reduced in proportion as it is placed higher in the hull. Probably the one salient point which the experiments with aircraft versus armored ships is intended to solve is the relative value of broadside and deck protection under present-day conditions.

 

It is gratifying to find that, in conclusion, Sir Philip Watts expresses himself as "strongly in favor" of the policy of the Admiralty in deciding to lay down two new battleships. He reminds us experience has shown that the serious possible hits, whether from the sea or from the air, will very seldom be made against a fleet maneuvering in battle. At Jutland the Marlborough was the only British ship struck by a torpedo, although large numbers of torpedoes were fired by the Germans. Indeed, Sir Philip Watts declares that if the later classes of Dreadnaughts were "suitably strengthened" they would give a good account of themselves in any war which might take place within the next fifteen or twenty years. It is our belief that the bulk of naval opinion holds the same view: a view which must necessarily be greatly strengthened by the exceptional qualifications of the authority who now confirms it.—Navy and Military Record, 23 August, 1922.