DISCUSSION
An Administrative Flagship
(See Page 1299, Whole No. 234)
Lieutenant Commander Frank Luckel, U.S. Navy.—Captain Taussig's well presented paper contains many good arguments in favor of the administrative flagship. Apparently by the term "administrative flagship" is meant a non-fighting flagship. This matter appears to be a recurrence of the old question of battleships versus special vessels such as battle cruisers, submarines, aircraft, destroyers, cruisers and other special types. A well balanced fleet comprises battleships, special types and noncombatants. The Commander-in-Chief is concerned with every type of vessel in his fleet. Judged solely from this viewpoint, it appears sound to station the Admiral on a fast independent vessel.
However, while the Commander-in-Chief is no doubt concerned with every subdivision of his fleet, there is a considerable school that would regard his paramount duty to be with the battleships. Submarines, aircraft, scouts and destroyers are considered to be mere adjuncts to the battleship fleet. Each type has its role which is played with reference to the battle fleet. Their station both before and during the battle is determined with reference to the battleships. The officer in immediate command of submarines, aircraft and destroyers should have a technical knowledge of his particular type. He would operate during battle in accordance with doctrine subject to such orders as he may receive from the Commander-in-Chief.
If the fact be accepted that scouts, battle cruisers, destroyers, aircraft and possibly submarines take their battle stations with reference to the battle fleet, then the officer in control of the battleships controls the fleet. The question now arises as to whether the Commander-in-Chief can control the battleships to better advantage from an administrative flagship located outside of gunfire range than he can from the leading battleship. If he be on board the administrative flagship he must rely entirely upon signals of some form. He also must rely very greatly upon the intelligence and loyalty of the officer in Immediate command of the battleships. His perspective of the battle should be better in so far as concerns the fleet as a whole. He would, however, not be so well informed with regard to the main action between the battleships. It is a question whether this is desirable.
If the Commander-in-Chief be on board the leading battleship he is in immediate control of the battle fleet. He can keep in constant touch with the progress of the action and take advantage of all favorable opportunities. His control of the battleships does not depend entirely on signals since the column is flexible and the course can be changed without signal. Forces composed of special types would operate according to doctrine and with reference to the battle fleet.
An ideal fleet flagship would be a very heavily armored battleship having somewhat higher speed than the other battleships. Ample quarters should be provided for the Admiral and his staff. Facilities for chart and game board maneuvers should be provided. The arrangement of masts and antennae should permit of long range radio communication. The cruising radius should be sufficient to permit of the strategical administration of the fleet as a whole. The above features can only be obtained by a sacrifice of the offensive power. It is in consequence proposed to reduce the number of turrets in so far as necessary. This reduction will reduce the number of turret officers and hence fewer staterooms will be required for the ship's officers. It will also permit a better arrangement of the masts in order to facilitate communication by signals or radio. This flagship would be able to take its place at the head of the battle fleet. The unusually heavy armor would insure a long life. "Fighting ships are not built that way" but why not begin doing so at the next opportunity.
In the administration of the fleet and the conducting of a strategical campaign the Commander-in-Chief would be "always tied down to a slow moving battleship." However, this battleship would be the fleet flagship and could take the Admiral wherever his presence is required. The "battleships should train and operate together." However, the absence of the fleet flagship would give the second in command an opportunity to gain experience in handling the battleships. This training would prove very valuable in case the fleet flagship should be sunk and the command pass to the second in command. The flagship's "separation from the other battleships weakens the fleet as a whole." The converse of this is that upon its rejoining the other battleships the fleet would be strengthened. "The general headquarters must be entirely independent of the subdivisions that compose the fleet as a whole." The fleet flagship is sufficiently independent of the battleship squadrons under the present organization. The fleet flagship cannot go to a distant port "without interfering with the training of any unit of the fleet." However, if all opportunities for training are taken advantage of, the flagship's fighting efficiency should not be seriously reduced.
"The commander of an army now takes a position from which he can best handle the situation, and this position is not in the front line." The Admiral of the fleet should undoubtedly be permitted to take the most advantageous position. Such a position is believed to be at the head of the battleships. However, he would not be restricted to this position and could go wherever most needed. If the Admiral were placed on board an administrative flagship his freedom of movement would be seriously restricted since he "may be anywhere not too near the fighting front." This inability to enter the battle is believed to be a serious handicap. "Because an administrative flagship is not a fighting unit" is held to be a fatal defect. "It has been customary to have a peace organization and a war organization. This, of course is fundamentally wrong." How the addition of an administrative flagship to the fleet would create a war organization is not apparent.
"Our Commanders-in-Chief have been so much more intimately connected with the battleships, it is natural that their efforts for efficiency have been devoted mostly to this class of vessel." This condition probably exists and it is believed that it is for the best. The battleships are the backbone of the fleet and their efficiency will probably have a predominating influence in case of battle. Furthermore, the Commander-in-Chief probably wisely entrusts the handling of the special wings to subordinates who have specialized in their particular types. "Being attached to one of the subdivisions of a fleet,—owing to the perversity of human nature, narrows his viewpoint." Since the Admiral must be attached to some vessel it would appear desirable to "narrow his viewpoint" in the direction of the main battle fleet rather than elsewhere. "The battleship is expensive to operate" whether or not the Commander-in-Chief is aboard. This argument can have little weight considering the cost of operating the navy as a whole. Is it "illogical to place the Commander-in-Chief on a vessel that is the most costly to move from place to place," if his presence there, will help to win the battle? "The conversion of one of the old armored cruisers" into an administrative flagship would, it is believed, produce a flagship having most of the disadvantages of the battleship flagship without its advantages.
"The tactical game board and the chart maneuver" are most important facilities for the training of all officers. Every battleship could and should be fitted to permit such training. The chart maneuver does not require any extensive facilities. Without doubt, considerable danger to the radio aerials and signal yards may be sustained by the battleship flagship in action. Also the position of the administrative flagship on the unengaged flank might facilitate signaling. The Commander-in-Chief would be in a safer position if located outside gunfire, range. These are advantages in favor of the administrative flagship which are conceded. There are no doubt many other advantages but we should consider the question thoroughly before stationing the Commander-in-Chief on a non-fighting vessel.
?
Promotion by Selection
(See Whole No. 235, Page 1487)
Rear Admiral Albert Cleaves, U.S. Navy.—Rarely has the Naval Institute published a more timely paper than the one under discussion. Those who will not agree with Mr. Barnes' conclusions, must at least acknowledge the excellent presentation of his arguments.
The service has been disturbed many years by the question of promotion by selection and when the present method was established by law, it was hoped that a satisfactory solution had been found. After six years, however, it is safe to say that at least a majority of the Navy believes that it has failed, and are now looking for something else. Better the old Plucking Board in spite of the final grievous mistakes which put it to death.
No one probably denies that there should be a method by which the worthy are rewarded and the unworthy cared for otherwise, and the old machinery was suitable for the purpose had it been properly used. There has always been selection for duty regardless of seniority, and this as Mr. Barnes remarks is the true selection "that carries with it no jealousy, injustice or hatred,"—or at least the minimum amount.
The present law is unfair in not requiring the board to inform an officer passed over the reason for this action. To try, and condemn a man in camera, is to violate every principle of justice, and disregards—if my history is correct—the fundamentals of the Magna Charta, the Bill of Rights, and the Habeas Corpus Act, for all of which much blood has been spilled. It is un-American. It certainly does not make for the best interests of the service.
If the present method—it is not a system—of promotion by selection has benefited the service in a few cases of accelerated promotion, the benefit has been offset by the consequent humiliation inflicted upon those meritorious officers who have been passed over in many cases by others not distinctly of superior ability, but who are denied the privilege of retirement.
It was frequently said in the clubs and elsewhere when the first Selection Board met in 1916, that its proceedings would establish a precedent for succeeding boards. They did not. The first board attempted to break away from seniority and select. After six years' trial, the net result of "selection," has been a topsy-turvy re-arrangement of the lists in the upper grades, by the subsequent promotion of nearly all the officers passed over, but with their precedence lowered. Nothing can be more subversive to discipline and efficiency than repeated shifting of rank and precedence. With such instability of seniority no one knows where he stands. Under such conditions military hierarchy vanishes.
A cruelty begotten by the Star Chamber method is the havoc that gossip often plays with an officer's reputation. The board of course assigns no reason for passing over any one, and preserves a dignified silence. Then those twin imposters, Rumor and Gossip, get to work. I recently listened to a detailed and vicious account of why a certain officer had been passed over, which I knew personally to contain only the merest thread of truth, and the alleged facts to be absolutely incorrect.
A serious indictment of the operation of our Selection Board is that it decreases initiative and encourages officers to play safe. Many fear to incur the disapprobation of their seniors, and what is even worse, the criticism of their juniors, lest their chance of promotion or preferment be imperiled. The result is sycophancy working downward as well as upward, which of course reflects on those so affected, senior as well as junior.
No one doubts the sincerity of the board which is sworn to perform its duty without prejudice and partiality, having in view the best interests of the service. I have served on three boards, and I have never seen men work more conscientiously, or strive more earnestly to do their duty, with an eye single to the good of the service. But I believe we failed in part, simply because we are human.
A well known Admiral, a member of the board, once remarked, "If we sat here and deliberated for six months we would even then adjourn feeling that we had done injustice to some one." Humanly speaking it cannot be otherwise.
I concur with Mr. Barnes that selection should be in the lower grades, up or out.
We cannot do better than to adopt the English system of promotion by seniority after reaching command rank.