REVIEW OF BOOKS
NAVAL OPERATIONS, VOL. I (TEXT) TO THE BATTLE OF THE FALKLANDS, DECEMBER 1914. By Sir Julian S. Corbett. (Longsman & Co. Price $6.50.)
A Review by Rear Admiral Albert Gleaves, U. S. Navy.
The Official History of Naval Operations is to be completed in several volumes, probably five or six. The series will be an invaluable contribution to the literature of the World War.
As an accurate and concise writer of British naval history, Sir Julian Corbett is well equipped for this task, and his selection by the Admiralty to write the official history is peculiarly appropriate. The initial volume justifies the choice. Although the Admiralty accepts no responsibility for the opinions of the author, the archives have been placed at his disposal, and the history will therefore bear the stamp of authenticity.
The Introduction is an epitome of the book, and the ensuing chapters amplify the operations on the Belgian coast, the offensive against the German overseas possessions, development of submarine warfare, the exploits of the commerce destroyers, the convoy of troops during the imperial concentration, and what is aptly called the "deployment" of the fleet over the world.
The description of the naval fights and skirmishes is stripped of dry technicalities and will interest the lay reader as well as the "professional, and yet nothing essential is omitted, from the outpost affair of the Amphion and Konigin Luise in which both vessels were sunk (August 5-6) to the decisive battle of the Falklands (December 8) "which completed the winning of the outer sea."
The physical labor of compiling the material for the history must have been enormous, but the author is clearly what Matthew Arnold used to call architectonic. His logical arrangement of the great train of events which were crowded into those five months with bewildering complexity proves him to be a master-builder in his craft. Moreover he is just and temperate in his analysis, although many of the events he records spelled disaster or disappointment to British arms at sea.
It will not be a matter of surprise to be told that when war came the navy was ready—"the Home Fleets were even in a state of readiness beyond what the War Book provided." Undoubtedly Sir Julian Corbett refers only to the readiness of the individual ships and the organization and discipline of the fleet; otherwise the statement is at variance with the testimony of other competent writers. Mr. Filson Young, who served on Admiral Beatty's staff, and who is the author of the brilliant book "With Beatty in the North Sea" says "The Navy was ill-equipped for the task it had to perform; its equipment had to be learned and improvised under the immediate peril of war, etc., etc." Lord Haldane in a speech in the House of Lords, May 4, 1921, said, "We do not seem to have thought out the proportion in which destroyers were required to battleships and battle cruisers, nor were we adequately provided with submarines. Our mines were too few, but were relatively speaking, defective."
The Admiralty War Book or War Plans begun at the instigation of Mr. Asquith in June, 1911, was practically completed at the eleventh hour in June, 1914. It was worked out in great detail. Telegrams by the thousands arranged in order of priority, and letters and instructions in addressed envelopes were prepared for issue. When the time came it required only the pressure of a button to put the war machinery in motion. In spite of all this, however, and that the war plans were made by representatives from the Admiralty, War Office, Home Office, etc., there was according to Lord Esher a "want of co-operation between the navy and the War Office during the first five months."
When war was declared it was a surprise to many that the Grand Fleet and the High Seas Fleet did not make contact at once and fight it out, but notwithstanding the German longing for "the day," the numerical superiority of the British Fleet more than offset the material superiority of the Germans, and both sides realized that there was too much at stake to chance or risk a decisive action in the beginning. It will always be a matter of conjecture, though, why the Germans did not make a determined submarine attack on the inadequately screened fleet at Scapa in the early days. A success at that time would have had great moral effect.
But there was much work for the fleet beside fighting a fleet action. German commerce destroyers were out on the trade routes, and the trade routes were the arteries of the British Empire. Von Spec's squadron somewhere in the Pacific had to be reckoned with and disposed of before attention could be concentrated on the High Seas Fleet; there were insistent demands for coast protection, especially after the East Coast raids; and protection also had to be given to the troop convoys.
Sir Julian Corbett's defense of the Admiralty against criticisms, and his story of how all the complex situations were handled—not without mistakes, of course—by the people in the dim, gloomy corridors at Whitehall, throws much light on the tremendous problems which had to be solved during the autumn of 1914.
Germany's naval problems were simpler but no less difficult. In her isolated position from the sea, she had no access to blue water except by routes barred by British ships. Her colonies were inadequately defended, and she had no advanced bases in the Mediterranean or the Indian Ocean. Her great asset was the Kiel Canal which gave her command of the Baltic, isolated Russia, and secured her communications with Sweden. It also gave her another entrance to the North Sea.
Before the World War the German Navy had no traditions. Their only sea fight had been the minor engagement between the Meteor and Bouvet in the war of 1870 off the coast of Cuba. They were gunboats which met by accident in the Bahama Channel; after a few shots both craft broke down and a passing kind-hearted neutral towed them into Havana. The Germans made the most of it, and the affair was commemorated in a large oil painting which was placed in a flamboyant frame and hung in the offices of the Minister of Marine in Berlin. In the period covered by the first volume of the Official History the German Navy created traditions, by the exploits of the Emden, Konigsberg, and Karlsruhe, and the two great fights of Von Spee. To its courage and efficiency Sir Julian gives generous testimony.
The Emden ran her brilliant and meteoric course in four months. Five days after her loss, we how know that the Karlsruhe was blown up off Barbadoes, November 5, but her mysterious end was kept secret and long after she ceased to exist she continued to occupy British cruisers. In the three months of her career she had taken or sunk sixteen British vessels, and one Dutch on British charter, a total of 76,000 tons.
The Konigsberg was a menace to trade and troop convoys, and served to divert British cruisers and annoy the Admiralty, but actually did little harm, and was finally blockaded the last of October.
In the North Sea there was much activity from the beginning, and the British suffered several disasters. The loss of the three Cressys, which occurred within the hour early on September 22, is regarded by the author as "another tragedy added to the useless sacrifices which never cease to darken naval memory," but the splendid conduct of the senior officer present more than half redeems his errors of judgment and disregard of orders.
The end of the year marks the end of Volume I with the defeat of Cradock, and Sturdee's victory. It will not detract from the interest of the book to turn briefly to these two events. Off Coronel the British lost a squadron but gained a tradition. Within a year and a half of the battle, Mr. Balfour in the eulogy he pronounced at Admiral Cradock's memorial said: "What, then, was his design in attacking a force obviously greatly superior to his own; a force which, except by some extraordinary accident, some stroke of unexpected fortune, he could not expect to successfully cope with? Was it that he refused to count the risks? Such deeds of uncalculating daring make our blood tingle within us. Yet there is, after all, a higher wisdom, a higher courage than such daring, and that higher courage I believe Admiral Cradock to have possessed."
At quarter past six in the evening of October 12, four days after it was sent, the Admiralty received a cable from Admiral Cradock to the effect that indications showed the possibility of the three light cruisers of Von Spec's squadron joining up with the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, and that he had ordered the Canopus to Falkland Islands, and that he intended to concentrate there.
The First Lord replied at once: "In these circumstances it would be best for the British ships to keep within supporting distance of one another," and also: "They [the German ships] and not the trade are our quarry for the moment. Above all we must not miss them."
The Admiralty in a cable (October 28) countermanded Cradock's orders for the Defense on the east coast to join him, and informed him "there is no ship available for the Cape Horn vicinity." It is doubtful if Cradock received this, and at any rate it could not have affected his dispositions.
The Admiralty considered that if Von Spee went north he would meet a superior force of British and Japanese ships, and if he went south he would meet Cradock's concentrated force with the Canopus.
The battle of Coronel was an accident. The Germans running south thought they had only the Glasgow ahead of them, and Cradock steaming to the northward expected to meet only the detached cruiser Leipzig. But at 4:30 p.m., November 1, 1914, the Glasgow located the German squadron coming down the coast, and at 6 o'clock the squadrons were in sight of one another, the Germans inshore, and the British silhouetted against the evening sky.
The main action was fought on parallel courses, magnetic south, in a heavy sea and a moderate southwest gale with the light and visibility entirely in favor of the Germans. It lasted only an hour, and night fell on the most decisive defeat ever suffered by the British at sea.
The two squadrons were practically the same tonnage, but the British ships were heavily outgunned by the two heavy German cruisers which carried sixteen 8.2 in all, but only twelve could be used on broadside; opposed to these the British had only two 9.2 guns. Of lighter guns the British had thirty-two 6-inch against the Germans' twelve 5.9.
Unfortunately the British six-inch guns were placed so low down (in the County Class) that they could not be fought in a seaway, a defect which certain American officers discussed with officers of the Lancaster and Monmouth at Gibraltar when the ships were first commissioned in 1903. In speed the Germans had some advantage, but their great superiority lay in their smartness, and their splendid gunnery which was largely due to their director-system of firing. Besides the Scharnhorst had won the gold medal for shooting.
Fire was opened by the Germans at 12,000 range, which had closed to 4,500 when the Monmouth was put out of action.
The only possible hope Cradock had for winning the fight unsupported by the Canopus, lay in some hidden chance that "as by a stroke of the enchanter's wand," to quote Lord Balfour, he might inflict greater damage to the enemy than he himself received. That is all that can be said. He had the happy fate of not living to explain.
Admiral Cradock told an American officer at Vera Cruz just before war was declared that if he ever went into action, he intended to follow the ancient custom of his forebears and fight in his cocked hat and epaulets. One wonders if he did. But his tragic end did not call for this dramatic touch. Sir Julian says; "It is not without emotion that one contemplates the feeling of so fine an officer when suddenly he found himself face to face with the hopeless situation into which against all his protests and against his better judgment, he clearly believed himself to have been forced. A cloud that can never be lifted has fallen on one of the most tragic moments in our naval history. All we can ever know is the silver lining. For whatever he thought and felt, Admiral Cradock did not flinch."
His ship went down in the angry sea as the moon rose above the rugged Chilean coast. Tennyson's lines quoted by Lord Escher in his account of Kitcheners death are equally applicable to the passing of this sea Knight:
"And even then he turned; and more and more
The moony vapors rolling around the King,
Who seemed the phantom giant in it,
Enwound him fold by fold, and made him gray
And grayer, till himself became a mist,
…moving ghost-like to his doom."
Disasters had come fast to the British Admiralty which was now "stung into an activity which for reach and completeness had never been equaled in our annals" (p. 369).
Lord Fisher took the helm at the Admiralty, and at once the force of his impetuous character was made manifest. On November 11, Admiral Sturdee flying his flag in the Invincible put to sea with the Inflexible, his objective being Von Spec's squadron wherever it might be found. After joining up with Admiral Stoddart in the South Atlantic Ocean, he proceeded with the combined forces to the Falkland Islands and arrived at Port Stanley December 7. At once he began coaling, and at the same time allowed the Bristol and Cornwall to open up their engines.
The Canopus had returned to Port Stanley, and had converted herself into an immobile harbor defense by mooring in the mud, her heavy guns commanding the mouth of the harbor.
At 7:50 the next morning the enemy was sighted approaching. The stranger was the Gneisenau which Von Spee had sent on ahead to examine the harbor, expecting to find only the Canopus. At the startling sight of the tripod masts in the harbor, the Gneisenau turned at full speed to report to the admiral what awaited him.
Von Spee might have partially redeemed this mistake of approaching the harbor at the beginning of the day, instead of at the end—the same mistake made by Captain Muller at Cocos Island—by making "a dash for the entrance and forcing a decisive action when the British were the least prepared. But he preferred a stand-up fight in the open sea.
At ten o'clock the British squadron, except the Bristol, weighed and stood out. At this time the Scharnhorst was thirteen and a half miles to southward steering northward, but changed to nearly due east; at about 10:30 Gneisenau rejoined, and both ships continued to parallel the British squadron until 11:22 when they turned to the southeast. Sturdee, "having made up his mind not to press the action," gave the ships' companies time to wash up and "to take the next meal." The weather is variable, treacherous and changes without notice in those latitudes, but God was good to the British admiral. The sea continued calm, the sky blue, and the wind light.
At 12:51 when the range was 16,000 yards the Inflexible opened fire. Thereafter the main action continued at varying ranges and such changing of speed and course that the gunnery of the battle cruisers was much impaired. The smoke, too, was very bad.
Von Spee directed his three light cruisers to save themselves and to make for the South American coast, while he and the Gneisenau fought it out to the end. Great superiority of speed and gun-power could have decided the action in a few minutes, but the British admiral preferred to maneuver in order to save his ships. He took a chance on the weather, and won. The Scharnhorst sank at 4:17 and the Gneisenau at 6:02. The Dresden escaped, but the Nurnberg and Leipzig were destroyed by the British light cruisers.
Dauntless courage was displayed by the Germans in this battle, and when their ships went down the English did all that was possible for a brave enemy in rescuing the few survivors of the battle and the icy waters.
Sir Julian shows fine restraint in his comments on the conduct of the "series of chases and actions known as the Battle of the Falklands." He says: "It was in fact as the Germans admitted a fine strategical victory. Tactically it has less claim to distinction owing to the marked superiority of the British squadron, but Admiral Sturdee could claim that by this method of conducting the action he had destroyed a powerful enemy squadron without material injury to two capital ships which it was essential to return to the Grand Fleet with their fighting power intact. The risk of detaching them had been considerable, but the Admiralty by sure judgment accepted it and so had succeeded in bringing to bear at the right time and place an overwhelming superiority of force. It may be said that the fortunate meeting at the Falklands was mainly a point of luck, but it was luck fairly won on Nelson's golden rule of never losing a wind, and in any case those who designed the operation fully deserved all the credit due to plans which obtained so large a measure of success without any diminution of naval strength. What the action meant to the course of the war was that in little more than four months the command of the outer seas had been won; and we were free to throw practically the whole weight of the navy into the main theater."
Admiral Von Spec has won a place in history with the great sea fighters of all time. He was an accomplished sea officer, skilled to a degree in his profession; he was also a brave and honorable gentleman, who has left behind him a glowing example of devotion to duty and to country for the youth of all nations. An admirable admiral!
"OLD-TIME SHIPS OF SALEM," published in 1922 (second edition) by the Essex Institute, Salem, Mass.
"SALEM VESSELS AND THEIR VOYAGES," a History of the Pepper Trade with the Island of Sumatra, by George Granville Putnam, published in 1922 by the Essex Institute, Salem, Mass.
A Review by Captain Thomas G. Frothingham, U. S. R.
Old Essex County, in Massachusetts, has been notable for its breed of sturdy mariners, who have done so much for the up-building of our nation. All history has shown that those who follow the sea develop qualities and characteristics which stimulate the enterprise of their communities. The men of Essex County were no exception to this rule and in our first struggle for liberty gave proof of its truth, on land as well as on sea. We must never forget that it was Glover's Regiment from Essex County which saved Washington's Army in 1775, when it was apparently hopelessly trapped on Long Island. These seafaring men rose to the emergency and ferried the outnumbered Americans away in the night—to the amazement of the British, who thought that Washington's Army would be their sure prey the next morning. This same amphibious regiment made Washington's surprising campaign in New Jersey possible, by skillfully carrying the American Army across the Delaware through the floating ice.
Salem, in Essex County, held a leading position among American seaports for two hundred years of its history, when the whole life of the town was devoted to commerce over the distant seas. "The enterprise and self-reliance of the merchants and shipmasters of this town eventually opened commercial relations with new and distant peoples living upon the shores of all parts of the known world. It has been said with truth that Salem ships traded 'with more different peoples in Asia, Africa, South America, and the islands of the sea than the ships of all other American ports put together.'"
Most fortunately the records and relics of Salem’s maritime history have been preserved in the Essex Institute and Peabody Museum. These valuable collections, from which these two publications of the Essex Institute were compiled, exemplify an American inheritance from the high seas which is still vital in our nation—as was proved in the emergency of the World War, when the United States Navy again found that Americans still retained their ability to take to the sea.
Salem's early connection with the United States Navy was typical of the spirit of this American seaport. Salem men had done their generous share of the fighting in the American Revolution, and, after independence was won, the town of Salem made an extraordinary contribution to the Navy of our new nation. In Old-Time Ships of Salem the Salem Gazette, of July 17, 1798, is quoted as follows:
"Patriotic Subscription"
"Last evening a subscription was begun in this town for raising money for the use of the Government, to be applied to the building of vessels, or such other purposes as Government may choose…Neither ability nor patriotism is wanting." On July 24, the Gazette adds, "It is expected that the subscription in this town will be applied to the building of a stout frigate." This fund was used to build U.S.S. Essex, thirty-two guns, destined to be one of the famous frigates of the United States Navy, in the War of 1812, and the naval cradle of Farragut, whom Porter took with him as a midshipman on the daring cruise of the Essex in the Pacific. Lieutenant John Cowell, who had become Porter's ranking lieutenant in the last desperate fight of the Essex against the Phoebe and Cherub, was an Essex County man, and showed the tenacity of the breed by sticking to his duty after his leg had been shot off, dying from loss of blood.
For Salem, no one can dispute the claim that the Essex was "a noble effort on the part of a town of ninety-three hundred people." The following extract' from an advertisement in the Gazette showed the zest of the undertaking: "Let every man in possession of a White Oak Tree feel ambitious to be foremost in hurrying down the timber to Salem, to fill the complement wanting to maintain your rights upon the Seas, and make the name of America respected among the Nations of the World."
The fine picture of the Essex in Old-Time Ships of Salem is a reproduction of the water color in the Peabody Museum. There are twenty of these beautiful prints in color in this publication of the Essex Institute, and it has been possible to gather them for publication because one of the old Salem banks made it a custom to reproduce one of the historic ship pictures of Salem each year. The result is a most impressive and interesting memorial of the sailing ship era of our maritime history.
These Salem ship pictures are of great value because, first of all, they are faithful portraits. Each was a tribute of the captain to his own pride in his ship, and the result was that a sailorman stood over each artist, and insisted on fidelity to type and rigging. So generous was the purse of the visiting captain that there were skilled artists at many seaports ready for those commissions, of whom the most celebrated were the Roux family of Marseilles. These artists developed an almost uncanny skill in portraying each rope and block—and yet most of these paintings achieved the presentation of an ensemble that is not merely a diagram of a hull and rigging. Many are attractive pictures in themselves. The Anton Roux water color of the Salem privateer Grand Turk, "saluting Marseilles, 1815," is actually a bold and striking composition.
The Grand Turk was one of the daring Letter of Marque privately armed ships, which formed another link between Salem shipping and the United States Navy. In both the American Revolution and the War of 1812, the regularly commissioned ships in the United States Navy were of such small force that, outside of service in our Navy, American private enterprise fitted out ships which became efficient auxiliaries of the United States Navy. For the first time privateering was conducted in a way that made it a determining factor in naval warfare, and in both wars the resultant unexpected destruction of British commerce did much to win advantageous peace.
Salem's share in the exploits of the American privateers was what might have been expected of men who had learned to fight upon the seas to protect their commerce. Among the pictures in this book is a very fine one of the Salem private-armed ship America, "the largest, the fastest, the most fortunate and the most famous of all the privateers which at any time sailed out of Salem harbor." It is an illustration of the conditions in the commerce of the times, which gave our American seamen their resourcefulness in naval warfare, to read that this Salem ship was launched in 1804 "with port-holes in her sides, and never put to sea without a heavy armament."
Consequently, it was not surprising that it was second nature for the America to become a successful privateer. Her "best speed was thirteen knots. She often maintained this rate for hours, and she often averaged more than ten knots for twelve consecutive hours. She was frequently pursued by Spanish and by British cruisers, and she left them with ease." This extraordinary ship was only 108 feet in length, 11.15 feet in draft, and of 331 tons. Yet her total of prizes sent into port, out of forty-seven taken, was "twenty-seven in all of a value of $1,100,000"—a wonderful record, when the scale of values at the time is considered.
Salem Vessels and Their Voyages is a detailed history of the adventurous voyages of Salem ships engaged in the pepper trade, with Sumatra. This book is also illustrated with many ship pictures from Salem collections, and there are also many reproductions of portraits of old-time merchants and masters. It is a remarkable gathering of fine types of Americans, and a study of their faces gives the reasons for their successes. And the records of their voyages are proofs that real men were needed to carry on this trade with the Malays.
Constant vigilance was necessary to keep their ships from capture, as the Malays preferred piracy to trade. There were many attacks, and several ships were overpowered and taken. Of these the Putnam was abandoned to the Malays only after a hard fight, in which the ship's carpenter did great execution with "a stout stick three feet long, on the end of which the cook had fastened a coffee mill." Probably this was a unique weapon for a sea-fight, but its construction certainly has merit.
In 1831 the Salem ship Friendship was rushed by the Malays, who were allowed to come on board in too great numbers by the first officer in the absence of the captain. Although she was recaptured by the help of other ships, this successful attack, and the large amount of plunder, had such an effect upon the natives in arousing their cupidity that it was necessary to chastise them. Commodore John Downes in U.S.S. Potomac did this so thoroughly that Captain Endicott of the Friendship afterwards stated, "When I visited the coast again, some five months after this event, I found the deportment of the natives materially changed. There was no longer exhibited arrogance or proud defiance."
The following should also be quoted: "There is preserved in the fireproof addition of the Essex Institute, among its other valuable collections, a broadside which is of interest in connection with the punishment of the Malays by Commodore Downes, as it relates the incidents of that battle. At the top is a picture of a ship under topsails, and beneath is printed the following: 'Battle of Qualah Battoo.' It will be remembered that the ship Friendship of Salem, while at Qualah Battoo on the island of Sumatra in the Indian Ocean, was taken by the natives and all hands (five) murdered. When the intelligence was received by the American Government, the U.S. frigate Potomac, Captain John Downes, was immediately ordered to that place to chastise them, which was successfully accomplished on the night of the seventh of February, 1832, convincing them that the Stars and Stripes of Uncle Sam are not to be trampled upon, nor the lives of American tars sacrificed with impunity."
A HALF CENTURY OF NAVAL SERVICE, by Rear Admiral Seaton Schroeder, U.S.N. (Retired). D. Appleton and Company, New York.
A Review by Rear Admiral Philip Andrews, U.S. Navy.
Admiral Schroeder's reminiscences are bright and interesting and are a record of naval and scientific services of exceptional variety. There are many incidents of historical interest and value. If more officers of similar length of service could be persuaded to write their experiences, the value of the navy's disinterested service to the nation would be better understood by the people. The book is simply written with a quaint style which is very pleasing; and altogether is full of interest in its record of the development and trial of new ships and new weapons during the development of the new navy. A striking feature of the book is its kindliness in its reference to individuals and to policies, good and bad, during this development.
The accounts of the Korean expedition; the Virginius affair; the shipping of the Egyptian obelisk from Alexandria, Egypt, to New York; and the cruise of the sixteen battleships around the world, are all of great interest and historical value.
The final reflections on service matters are fair and present views well worth consideration and discussion. The opinions on the present method of selection of officers for higher rank are reasonable and offer a possible modification for the future.
Altogether the book presents a record of unselfish service and accomplishment, in which all naval officers may take a just pride; and from which the public may learn how much of himself a naval officer gives to the nation, in valuable service in scientific and diplomatic, as well as in the naval field.
Admiral Schroeder commends to all officers the motto which he has tried to follow: "Whatever you do, do with all your might"—truly good advice.