THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF RADIO COMMUNICATION IN MODERN NAVAL WARFARE
By Lieutenant Harry F. Breckel, U.S.N.R.F. 2
The successful carrying out of modern naval warfare is, in the main, entirely dependent upon the art of radio communication. A broad statement perhaps, but nevertheless, one that the writer feels is justified.
The many lessons handed down to us by careful study of the past wars, serve to emphasize the fact that the successful execution of any strategical plan involving a combatant force spread over a wide area, is dependent on the maintenance of reliable communication between the different units comprising the force. THEREFORE THE NECESSITY AND IMPORTANCE OF DEVELOPING AND MAINTAINING A LOYAL, EFFICIENT, RADIO COMMUNICATION SERVICE SHOULD NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED.
The successful functioning of a radio communication service is, of course, based on the efficiency and ability of the men at its head, but too much stress cannot be laid on the necessity for having loyal, competent, enlisted personnel conduct the operation of the various radio stations, both ship and shore.
There can be no doubt as to the superiority of American naval radio equipment over that employed by foreign navies and in this regard we need have no concern whatever. The fact that the United States (and particularly the American navy) is farther advanced in this art is largely due to the extensive research work carried out in this country, fostered, to a great extent, by the Navy Department. American inventive ability has also been exercised to the fullest extent by the insistent demand by the navy for radio apparatus of efficient design. The fact that the radio telephone is today a practical device, is largely due to experimental and research work either carried out, or fostered, by the Navy Department. As early as the year 191 5 the navy was conducting practical tests with radio telephone equipment, and the writer recalls clearly hearing the human voice transmitted via radio, between an American man o' war and a naval radio shore station, in that year.
There can be no doubt but what the individual responsibility borne by the naval radio operator is far greater than that shared by the enlisted personnel of other branches of the service, for much depends upon his efficient performance of the duties of his rating. Higher officials of the service, such as those in charge of the various bureaus, admirals of fleets or squadrons, commanding officers of the hundreds of vessels comprising the navy and many other officers in important positions, all are more or less dependent on the loyalty and ability of the naval radio operator to efficiently discharge his duties, for in these days of divided forces the successful working of the entire service depends upon perfect coordination between the units comprising it, which end can only be attained through the medium of a thoroughly efficient and reliable communication service.
Innumerable instances could be cited to show where, during the late war, dispatches of extreme if not vital importance, were entrusted to the enlisted radio operator and which, if they had failed to reach their destination, might have caused disaster or delay. The entire convoy system which proved so effective, the safety of the vessels at sea, the rescue of survivors of sunken vessels, the warning of vessels at sea to avoid certain areas, the general broadcasting of important information concerning mined areas, etc., the transmission of important dispatches between Washington and the military commanders in Europe, all depended on the efficient performance of the naval radio communication service, the successful operation of which hinged entirely on the loyalty and efficiency of the personnel actually carrying out the practical working details at the different stations, both ship and shore. These facts all serve to show that THE RELIABILITY AND EFFICIENCY OF A NAVAL RADIO COMMUNICATION SERVICE CAN BE NO GREATER THAN THAT OF THE INDIVIDUAL OPERATORS ACTUALLY CARRYING OUT TRANSMISSION AND RECEPTION, REGARDLESS OF HOW EFFICIENT THE VARIOUS OFFICERS COMPRISING ITS HEAD MAY BE. It can easily be seen that the necessity for having LOYAL and WELL-TRAINED personnel in this branch of the naval service is of paramount importance.
Above all, it should be realized that inefficiency or disloyalty in a naval radio communication service is a condition which should not be allowed to exist and which, if it did exist, would, under certain conditions, jeopardize an entire fleet. Therefore more than ordinary care should be exercised in selecting its personnel. It should be borne in mind that an inefficient or disloyal radio operator is in position to work untold harm, and in the case of the disloyal man it might be stated that there are ways in which he could accomplish his end and still avoid suspicion or detection. By way of example let us assume that a state of war exists. An admiral of a fleet has received a supposedly authentic report from some reliable source to the effect that an enemy force of a certain strength has proceeded to carry out an attack on a certain city on the coast. He has reached a decision that it will be necessary to intercept the enemy force and engage it with a view to destroying same and he, therefore, has dispatched a force of similar character but of superior strength to do so. His force has proceeded to carry out his orders and is now several hundred miles at sea. Suddenly he receives another report to the effect that the enemy force is far stronger than the first report stated. The situation is now such that it is too late to increase the strength of his force to match that of the enemy's and that in all probability his force would be annihilated if allowed to engage in battle. There is, however, still available time in which he can recall his force. What does he do? The only way that he can get word to his force in time is by means of the radio, therefore he issues orders to his communication officer to transmit a dispatch telling the commanding officer of the force in question to proceed to such and such a rendezvous where he will receive reinforcements, after which he can proceed to engage the enemy, if this proceeding be possible, with some degree of assurance that the operation will be successful. Now after coding the dispatch for transmission the communication officer turns same over to the radio operator for transmission. It is more than likely that the radio operator is aware that a certain force has been dispatched, for in the majority of cases he will have been notified to keep a sharp lookout for radio signals from it. Also it may be possible that the enemy force has been using his radio and perhaps, due to increasing signal strength, etc., the radio operator is sure that it is headed toward, or getting closer to, his station. Summing up the general situation he feels sure that an enemy force is moving to attack somewhere, but where of course he cannot say. With the aid of the radio compass, however, it is possible that he may have determined that the enemy was proceeding in a certain direction and that in all probability the force which left some hours previous was dispatched for the purpose of intercepting him. If this operator should happen to be disloyal and should garble the message in transmission by failing to properly space his code characters, or leave out say the first code group WHICH IN PRACTICALLY ALL CODES IS THE KEY TO THE CIPHER USED, or fail to use sufficient power to "raise" the operator on watch at the station being called or in some other way cause the dispatch to fail to reach its destination entirely, the force which it was intended to warn might unwittingly engage an enemy of far superior strength and go down in defeat. It might be argued that the force would have out a scouting line to further insure protection. Granted, but as a rule we are also dependent on the radio for the receipt of information from our scouting line and a similar condition of disloyalty or inefficiency might exist here also. It might also happen that an enemy submarine would be successful in disposing of the only scout in a position to sight the enemy, long before visible contact had been made and many other conditions could arise, whereby it would be impossible for the force to evade an engagement. Now let us assume that the operator transmitting was a loyal, efficient man and that the message was sent in proper form. It may be that the receiving operator is not loyal or is inefficient, in which case the same situation might arise. In my mind too much importance cannot be attached to having tried and true operators in the naval communication service, for much depends upon their reliable performance of duty. There can be no doubt but that the successful accomplishment of our ends during the late war was largely due to the use we made of the art of radio and a little foresight cannot fail to convey the fact that we will be even more dependent on radio in any future conflict. With the addition of air craft to our fleets for spotting, scouting, offensive or defensive work; with seagoing submarines attached to the fleet equipped so that radio communication with them is possible even though they are submerged; with possibilities of employing radio controlled torpedoes or battleships far from being a vague supposition; with practical navigation of aircraft and vessels by radio not far off, it cannot but be apparent that the art of radio is becoming more and more every day a vital factor in carrying out naval warfare.
In short, so much will be required of the naval communication service in any future war that a great deal of thought should be given toward the careful training of the communication officers and the enlisted operators in direct supervision of the operation details at the different stations. The officers at the head of the naval communication service will no doubt, as they are now, be officers of the line who have had broad experience in all matters naval and who will fully realize the importance to the service of an efficient communication system. Therefore the main problem resolves itself into one of having communication officers and enlisted personnel entirely capable of carrying out the details connected with the organization. During the period of time that the writer served with the Atlantic fleet as a radio operator it was customary to detail officers who had but recently graduated from the Academy, as communication officers on board the different vessels. In some cases these officers had a fair knowledge of matters radio but in the majority of cases they knew little or nothing about it for the reason that they did not study the art sufficiently to enable them to efficiently handle the practical operation of a station. In so far as the handling of the different codes and ciphers were concerned their efficiency was excellent, but when it came to the examination of personnel for advancement in rating, or the actual standing of a watch, or the manipulation of the instruments, or further, to the actual repairing of apparatus which was out of order, these were details which, due to lack of practical experience, they were unable, in most cases, to carry out and dependence had to be placed on the ability of the chief petty officers who, with their broad practical experience were able to do so. This system worked well even under this apparent handicap, and in many instances within a year's time communication officers who had taken charge of a station with no previous practical experience had become proficient operators and were able to take over the practical operation of the radio equipment. However, in many cases the officer would have many additional duties to perform in which he, due to natural inclination, would take greater interest, with a result that his proficiency as regards matters radio was not as great as it would have been if he had been enabled to follow them entirely. Further, it is believed that at the time not enough importance was attached to matters radio on board ship to provide an incentive for commissioned officers to promote their efficiency in this branch. In the main it might be stated that the subject of radio simply aroused curiosity rather than genuine serious interest as in the case of matters pertaining to ordnance or other subjects dear to the heart of all naval men. The time has arrived, however, when the question of "Radio Efficiency" should be studied with the same tense interest as the subject of "Battle Efficiency," for unquestionably the "Battle Efficiency" of a modern fleet is vitally dependent on the efficiency and reliability of its radio communication .service. Knowing this, we should act accordingly. We should have radio communication officers attached to the different units comprising the fleet and also in charge of the numerous important high-powered naval shore stations who are not only interested in the art of radio communication, but who have taken up the study of same and who are conversant with the theoretical principles pertaining to it. These officers should be given an incentive to remain in this branch of the service as long as possible and means for promotion should be provided which would permit of their advancement in rank on a basis equal to that of their classmates serving in the various branches of the line. They should also take up the study of the divers communication methods employed by ALL foreign navies and more especially those of potential enemies; they should be thoroughly conversant with the character of the codes used by the radio operators transmitting so that the radio personnel under them can be thoroughly instructed in the reception of same in order that all enemy communications, in the event of war, could be correctly intercepted for the information of the commanding officers, or for the Naval Intelligence Bureau. For example, during the early period of the late war a large number of our naval radio operators were not familiar with the so-called "prime" letters used so extensively by the operators comprising the personnel of the Allied and enemy radio forces and for the time being they were unable to intelligently copy all. Communications heard. Of course it did not take them long to master these new code characters but it would have been muck better if they had known them in advance. Further, the communication officer should be in a position to instruct his force intelligently as regards the different systems of communication employed by foreign navies and as far as possible we should have several communication officers who are not only familiar with the various codes employed by foreign operators, but who are also familiar with the various languages. The study of foreign languages by the radio personnel should also be encouraged. Especial attention should be given the various methods of communication used by any potential enemy, with a view to working out details in regard to either maintaining deliberate interference during battle and "jamming" his operators, or determining the best method for getting our communications through without serious interruption. By careful observation it can easily be determined just how many different wave lengths the enemy has available and steps can be taken to interfere on ALL of them with a view to preventing him from getting his communications through. Further, as a rule a flagship does the most transmitting and a careful, observing operator can soon determine simply by the amount of radio traffic transmitted that the particular station in question is an important one and that steps should be taken to pay particular attention to copying all communications transmitted by it, or, if deemed necessary, that means be taken to create interference with his transmissions if possible. An observing operator can also determine by the amount of radio activity going on in an enemy fleet that some unusual activity is taking place or pending. Further, he can easily identify certain vessels after having heard them transmitting radio signals a number of times, in certain cases. Sometimes a station will have a "spark" of a peculiar tone frequency, or there may be a certain operator attached to it who has a certain characteristic way of handling his traffic, and by remembering these details an efficient radio operator can readily identify this vessel in the future when it is heard transmitting, regardless of whether a call sign is used or not. Perhaps one of the most easily "identified" vessels attached to the American navy was the U.S.S. Birmingham, which vessel had a very peculiar sounding "spark" which differed greatly from that of the average vessel. During a war game in 1916 the Birmingham was readily "singled out" and identified in spite of the fact that bogus calls were used to prevent it. Also I might add that the writer, during the late war, copied signals from the Birmingham, which vessel at the time was serving in waters adjacent to the Mediterranean Sea, and was able to identify her instantly in spite of the fact that he did not previously know she was in European waters. This possibility of identifying vessels can easily be eliminated through the use of arc or tube transmitting systems which are far more efficient and have practically the same "tone frequency," thus making it practically impossible to identify vessels as mentioned above. Radio officers should be qualified to instruct their personnel in regard to the numerous conditions which might arise during the practical operation of a radio station on board ship during wartime. Another essential feature that he should pay particular attention to is the necessity for having competent operators attached to his force who are capable of copying code signals at high speed. It is often possible to prevent an enemy from copying your communications if high speed is employed by the operators in transmitting the code characters. For example, during the late War the enemy was noted for the operating efficiency of the radio personnel; invariably his communications went through at top speed and without waste of time and I recall several instances where our operators were unable to copy his messages because of their inability to copy at high speed. These operators were of course in most cases men who lacked experience, but nevertheless it will be seen that the ability of operators to copy any other operator regardless of his speed is essential, to say the least. Also it might not be unwise to change the dot and dash code characters used by the operators at times for this would be disconcerting to enemy operators trying to intercept our signals, to say the least, for in practically all cases he would be familiar with only the standard code characters generally used and would be utterly unprepared for any change with a result that our communications would get through without having been intercepted. There are many details such as these which could be studied and worked out by a communication officer fully interested in the work and proper instruction in regard to same be conveyed to the personnel under his command, with a resultant increase in the state of efficiency of the force. Further, a system of drills could be devised simulating actual battle conditions for the purpose of instructing the personnel as regards the effecting of quick emergency repairs, the clearing away of radio antennae which have been shot away and the rapid erecting of emergency auxiliary antennae to take their place. In short, there are so many details to be taken into consideration by a communication officer besides the maze of instructions relating to fleet traffic, the changing of codes and ciphers and other routine duties, that to give proper attention to same will, without doubt, occupy his entire time. Therefore it seems only proper that an officer having this duty should not be encumbered with additional duties. Of course it may be stated that radio gunners are available to take care of the majority of the mass of detail. Granted, but we should have competent commissioned officers in charge of the Radio Department who are also fully familiar with all its workings as in the case of other departments. With officers in charge of the practical operations as well as the various executive duties it is believed that a general increase in all-round efficiency will undoubtedly result. Due to his superior education various advantages and disadvantages can be more carefully weighed and proper steps taken and he will no doubt often take into careful consideration smaller details of importance which in many cases are overlooked by men charged only with the practical operation of a station. Also, officers who are familiar with the general principles of radio and who have observed the station's operation at first-hand, may be able to devise or invent valuable additions to its equipment, which may further improve its efficiency in battle.
Another angle of great importance which should receive careful attention, is the training of adequate reserve personnel, for in time of war a large number would be required for immediate service. The navy is fortunate in this respect in having available splendid material for this purpose. There are hundreds of thousands of amateur radio operators scattered throughout the nation who with a brief period of training would eventually develop into efficient operators. As a rule the average amateur is more or less familiar with the constructional details of practical radio equipment and the majority of them are proficient in handling the code in a more or less efficient manner, but all of them have a general foundation as regards matters radio which could readily be built up. To provide for the enrolling of the more efficient amateurs in the reserve force, it is believed that the appointment on the staff of the various state reserve force commanders, of radio communication officers to take care of the details of this work, is a desirable feature. In some cases former communication officers are actively engaged in radio research work, or the manufacture of radio equipment, or have taken up amateur radio as a hobby, in which case they are more or less in direct touch with the amateurs in their state and know who are the most desirable for naval purposes. Such officers who are still affiliated with the reserve force, would, no doubt, take up the work of training an adequate reserve radio personnel with a great deal of interest, if not absolute enthusiasm. Many interesting details, such as a chain of naval reserve force radio stations, operated by reserve personnel, for handling the communications of the reserve force commanders, code classes, theory classes, radio drills, etc., etc., could be worked out and put into practice and judging from the writer's personal experience in handling the problems relating to amateur radio during the past two years, it would become necessary to stop enrolling additional recruits, for the American radio amateur is unquestionably a most enthusiastic individual and one can "listen in" almost any hour of the day and night and hear any number of amateur stations "hamming." The average amateur will, with proper training, undoubtedly develop into an ideal naval radio operator, and steps should be taken to sift out the more desirable material for enrollment in the naval reserve force, after which proper intensive training could be provided so that in the event of a national emergency an efficient, reliable radio reserve could be called to the colors, who would be available for instant service.
The writer has read with a great deal of interest the timely article written by Lieutenant (jg) H.D. Kent, U.S. Navy, in the July, 1921, issue of the United States Naval Institute Proceedings and can but agree with him when he states the necessity for having a Communication College for the Training of Radio Communication Officers in the art of radio communications and radio strategy, for much will depend on our having an efficient, organized radio communication service in any future conflict, capable of "going the enemy one better."
In conclusion, might I even go so far as to state that under certain battle conditions, the fleet with the most highly developed communication service will in most cases obtain a decision over the one possessing an inferior radio service?
(Nothing in the article I have written should be construed to cast reflection in any manner whatsoever on the radio communication service, its personnel or the officers attached thereto, for this article was solely written with a view to setting forth the important part that radio will play in any future conflict between the United States navy and a foreign power, and also to set forth certain facts which the writer observed during his service as a radio communication officer during the period of his service with the regular navy.)