REVIEW OF BOOKS
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, by James Bryce. (The Macmillan Company, New York. $2.50) A Review by Rear Admiral Caspar F. Goodrich, U.S.N.
This is the swan song of one of the greatest authorities on the subject defined in the title of a rarely fascinating and interesting book. Not only did Lord Bryce know his topic from the dawn of history to the present day, but he could talk of it gracefully and engagingly as well. These pages are the reproduction in print of lectures delivered during the summer of 1921, at the annual conference on international affairs held at Williamstown, Mass.; for force and attractiveness they lack nothing but the voice and charm of the speaker, now gone from us forever.
Lord Bryce asked why it is that jealousy, suspicion, envy and hatred persist in the intercourse between states, even between those recently drawn together by a great and common danger; and what can be done to make war less frequent and peace more prolonged. As ought have been expected from the author of the Holy Roman Empire, he seeks in history the reasons for the discord which but too generally prevails, and for suggestions of methods through which this discord may be replaced by mutual understanding and co-operation.
In his first lecture, Bryce goes back to the earliest times when every man was independent of all others, living by the spoils of the chase, taking from his neighbor what he liked, if he could, and defending his own against aggressors. This delightfully simple condition of life was known to the ancient philosophers as the "State of Nature." As men found it expedient to form associations of their kin for purposes of offense and defense, there came into being clans, tribes, and nations, each marked by the sacrifice of individual freedom of action in return for protection by the community as a whole. At every step, however, the clans, the tribes or the nations are seen to be in the "State of Nature" to each other and this is true today. "Although in civilized countries every individual is now under law and not in a State of Nature towards his fellow men, every political community, whatever its form, be it republican or monarchical, is in a State of Nature towards every other community."
There is no extraneous power which can dictate to a nation the course it should pursue under certain circumstances, still less enforce a keeping of the peace. Even so mild a philosopher as the author has tacitly but not explicitly to recognize the fundamental fact that the judgments of courts, civil and criminal, find acceptance, not because of an enlightened public opinion, but because back of them are arrayed the local police, the state militia, and finally the full armed strength of the entire land. In effect, justice is based on force and not, as the Stoics would have it, upon man's having attained his true nature with his passions subdued by reason, as in the mythical Golden Age, so often lauded by the dreamer or the revolutionist, and never actually achieved. Facing this grim truth, that every political community stands in a State of Nature toward all others, there must either be erected some authority above them all or there must be an improvement, not so much in human nature itself, as in a change of peoples' attitude toward foreign relations, through making them realize that they will gain more by co-operation than by conflict.
The author's study of the causes of the Great War describes the nervous tension under which all the European chancelleries labored, due to the fateful seizure of Alsace and Lorraine in 1871, to the constant growth of armaments, and to the anxieties the latter aroused on each side of the frontiers of adjoining states; but it seems to lay insufficient stress on the openly avowed purpose of Germany to establish world dominion.
With the treaties negotiated at Paris, he is thoroughly dissatisfied, as well he might be, since they have created new states without any sound basis in race for the determination of their boundaries. The particulars in which these treaties err are worthy of deep consideration, fraught as they are with terrible possibilities. He says, "Why the Turkish Government, which had in 1915 massacred a million of its Christian subjects, women as well as men, under circumstances of brutality and cruelty unsurpassed in the history of even the blood-stained East…should have been treated by the Allies with such extraordinary lenity and should now have fresh indulgences offered to it by the proposed modifications in the Treaty of Sevres—these are mysteries, the explanation whereof is probably known to some of you as it is to me. But the secret is one which…is too sacred for me to mention." This quotation will give an idea of Bryce's general attitude towards the bungling work done in Paris in 1919. He sounds a note of warning that a better peace must be secured "by removing the dangers and injustices which bode future wars." "Legally," he says, "there is peace; but temperamentally there is war." Still, it must be said that some of the causes of earlier wars have disappeared since Hapsburgs, Hohenzollerns, and other dynasties have ceased to control foreign relations, and nations no longer foster enmity along religious lines, although among Asiatics this sentiment has not lost all its potency for evil as recent events demonstrate. The discussion in his chapter on the Causes Making for War or Peace deserves careful reading, however lacking it may be in encouragement for the future.
Naturally, Bryce cherished the hope that a healthy public opinion might, through straight-forward diplomacy, give to International Law the power which is denied it by the absence of force, and he sought ways and means to bring about this much to be desired result. This hope, it may be recalled is, or was, shared by our own Mr. Root. Its validity is unchallenged insofar as peoples are concerned whose speech and traditions are identical, but, with those of different tongues and different modes of thought, this validity remains a thing to be hoped for rather than expected.
The lecture on the Morality of States is most illuminating if somewhat depressing. One might almost say that a state has no morals at all. At least history proves that selfish interest has led to most abominable assaults on the coveted territory of neighbors. The story of Naboth's vineyard is reproduced on tribal or national lines throughout the ages, our own not excepted. Bryce attributes this lack of morality to the absence of that responsibility between states which exists among individuals who live under the reign of law. "Few men avow, and of course nearly all moralists condemn, the doctrine that the end justifies the means. But it is widely followed in public life, and oddly enough, those who think themselves idealists, the men who live and fight for the thing, whatever it may be, that they put above everything else, and call a Sacred Cause, frequently apply this insidious doctrine." For this reason, Bryce deprecates the entrance into diplomatic discussions of the whole body corporate. What it desires must, of course, guide*.its representatives, but the negotiations are better left to the latter, who act in its name and then present the results to it for ratification or rejection.
The author believed in conferences. In this respect he resembles the late Marquis of Salisbury who is said to have remarked, "There's no question which cannot be settled by four men sitting around a table." Putting aside the erecting of an international police force as a practical impossibility, there is indeed no other way open to the bringing about of a better understanding between sovereign powers. The road bristles with difficulties as the conduct of Germany amply demonstrated at the Hague. Still, patience and renewed efforts may be counted upon to effect substantial progress. The creation of a Court of Arbitration was followed by results of encouraging promise, while what was done by the recent Washington Conference bodes well, however short it fell of the desired maximum.
Wisely, it seems to me, Bryce rejects the proposition of a World Federation for the excellent reason that each member would have either an equal voice in the management or one based on population. In the latter case, the Western World would be swamped by China, or by a combination of states of which the citizens would be illiterate, or moved by the savage impulse of ignorance. Whether Bryce condemned the League of Nations, he does not state in positive terms but the inference is inescapable that it found no favor in his eyes, as one reads his analysis of a possible Combination of Powers. We must all agree with him, for such is our own attitude, as shown in countless instances, when he says, "Every civilized nation, since its fortunes are inextricably involved with the good or evil fortunes of every other, is bound for its own sake to an interest in the well-being of others and to help them, in whatever way it finds best, to avoid or recover from disasters. The greatest disaster is war, more terrible in its consequences than earthquakes in Sicily, or famines in China." It behooves us therefore to do all in our power to persuade other nations to seek a solution of their quarrels without resort to arms for the very good reason that, if they do not, upon us will fall a repetition of our present experience of having to help them escape from or to bear the burdens resulting from their unrestrained bellicose propensities.
There can be no doubt that a deeper sympathy with foreigners and a wider understanding of their problems, such as Bryce advocates, would go far to aid in the maintenance of peace, but we are quite within our rights when we condition our assistance upon the real, not the merely verbally expressed acceptance of the obligations on their part to cultivate the like charity. We hold the financial whip and we should not hesitate to crack it when we see a government spending its revenue on armies while its people starve. This reflection is mine, not Bryce's, I need hardly say. For all this brilliant ratiocination, I cannot conscientiously recommend a lack of military preparedness, which has, time and time again, cost us heavily in every way. We may counsel arbitration and practice it whenever we can, but until all nations accept it loyally, our advice is likely to have weight only if we have more than mere words to back it.
The book under review is as fascinating as a best seller. It brings before the eye a panorama of human life from the days of the cave man through those of Greece and Rome and the Middle Ages, down to the present. It revives our long forgotten school lessons and puts into history a vitality which as boys, and indeed as men, we never suspected. I urge my brother officers to read it, confident that when they do, they will thank me for having brought it to their notice.
NAVAL OPERATIONS, Vol. II. Text and Maps. By Sir Julian S. Corbett, Longmans, Green & Co. Price $7.50. 1921. A Review by Rear Admiral Albert Cleaves, U. S. Navy.
More than half of the second volume of the Naval Operations Series is devoted to the Dardanelles Operations, from the inception of that mad adventure in January, 1915, to the beginning of the campaign as it was carried on by the Army under Sir Ian Hamilton.
The period covered by this big book of nearly 500 pages is the half year following the Falkland Islands action. It includes principally the loss of the Formidable, the Yorkshire raid, the Dogger Bank battle, the progress of the U-boat campaign and the loss of the Lusitania. The volume ends with the resignation of Lord Fisher and Mr. Churchill, and the formation of the Coalition Cabinet. In the discussion of the British blockade and the German war zone, a fair statement of the American protest is presented. It will be recalled that there was much irritation in this country over British detention of certain American ships and American mail. These questions, the author states, "were settled out of court." This subject will be referred to later in this article.
The book is as interesting as a novel, which as some one has said is to compliment the novel. The author never indulges in superlatives, and rarely in adjectives, but at times his admiration of the British Navy and its splendid work leads him away from cold and formal narrative to something like enthusiasm. For instance in describing the loss of the Formidable, he says, "—of Captain Loxley nothing more was seen. Survivors saw him standing with his terrier on the bridge till the last, giving his orders as coolly as though the ship were going in harbor, cheering and steadying the men, praising the officers for every smart piece of work, and his reward was to see perfect discipline and alacrity maintained to the end." Again in telling of the night boat expedition which succeeded in destroying the E-15 which had grounded under one of the forts in the Dardanelles, he says, "—it was a gallant feat, finely executed and one which it is pleasant to know extorted high praise from the enemy," and quotes a German officer in Constantinople as saying when referring to it, "I take off my hat to the British Navy."
As the subjects treated in this volume have begotten libraries of discussion and recriminations, the author again reminds his readers that although the Admiralty has placed the official documents at his disposal he alone is responsible for the opinions expressed. He emphatically denies that anything in the nature of censorship has been exercised by the Admiralty.
After the destruction of Admiral Von Spee's squadron at the Falklands, a redistribution of the home fleets was effected, and the war entered a new phase. The Dresden had not been captured, the mystery of the Karlsruhe was not solved and two big armed merchant liners, the Prinz Eitel-Friedrich and the Krons Prins Wilhelm, were still at large on the high seas on the southern and western trade routes; therefore in the Western Atlantic there was no let-up in vigilance on the part of the British cruisers.
When the news of Sturdee's victory was received in London, it was natural to believe that the Germans would take advantage of the reduced force of the Grand Fleet to make a descent somewhere on the East Coast of England. It was Admiral Jellicoe's problem to estimate the situation, anticipate the raid and to decide upon the most probable point of attack. That the Germans were preparing to come out was known at the Admiralty.
It appears that the disposition of the forces was made by the Admiralty, although the rendezvous, "a matter of no less difficulty than importance," was left to the commander-in-chief.
On the part of the Germans, there can be no doubt that their intention was to give an exhibition of Teutonic frightfulness, and to strike such fear into the hearts of the enemy that recruiting would be paralyzed.
The High Seas Fleet had been held inside the Bight ever since the Heligoland action by personal orders of the Kaiser, and it was only on the initiative of Admiral Von Ingenohl that the three battle squadrons were sent out to support the raiding force, which was under the command of Admiral Von Hipper, and was composed of the four battle cruisers, the heavy cruiser Blucher, and the second Scouting Division of light cruisers and destroyers. The raiders sailed from Cuxhaven to the rendezvous December 15, in the afternoon, and after dark they proceeded on their mission, followed by the battle squadron.
Unopposed they passed through the twenty-mile gap in the mine fields which they had planted off the English coast and at 8:00 the next morning, having divided the force. Von Hipper began the bombardment simultaneously of Hartlepool and Scarborough, the Seydlits, Moltke and Blucher off Hartlepool and the Derfflinger, Von der Tann and Kolberg off Scarborough. The last named port was undefended, but Hartlepool had a battery of 6-inch guns and was also a flotilla station. The firing lasted about a half hour. Little military damage was done, but eighty-six people on shore were killed and over 400 wounded. Von Hipper then reunited his forces and started back home.
The rendezvous appointed by Admiral Jellicoe was twenty-five miles south east of the S.W. patch or horn of Dogger Bank and roughly halfway between Flamborough Head and Heligoland. The English destroyers made contact with the German destroyer screen about 5:00 a.m. but the presence of the English destroyers was known to Admiral Von Ingenohl an hour earlier. Obsessed with the fear of losses of his heavy ships by torpedo attacks, and burdened by his peremptory orders not to risk them except under favorable circumstances, and evidently forgetting that ships were made to take risks in battle, he deliberately abandoned the raiding forces which were well over on the English coast, and to use Sir Julian's words "fairly turned tail and made for home."
The day dawned clear, and began with a smooth sea. But a N.W. wind increasing to gale force soon sprang up, the visibility decreased, and the seas became short and steep, making it difficult for the destroyers. Although neither side knew it, at 6 A.M. G.M.T. the two main fleets were only about fifty miles apart, but they were destined not to meet that day.
While Admiral Warrender, who was the Senior Officer, and Admiral Beatty were trying to locate the enemy in the vicinity of Dogger Bank, the German squadrons had already reached the English coast. It was not until 9:30 that the English Admirals received a radio from the Admiralty that the raid had been accomplished; it was now their problem to intercept and destroy the raiders on their return to base.
Favored by the thick weather. Von Hipper made an easy run of it. First he steered a little north of east until after 12 noon, then he ran a few miles S.E., then turned to the N.N.E. for about twenty-five miles northward of Dogger Bank, and so back to the Bight. The official chart shows the English ships clustered around the Bank, and the unobstructed homeward track of the raiders well clear of them.
Sir Julian comments thus: "Two of the most efficient and powerful British Squadrons with an adequate force of scouting vessels knowing approximately what to expect and operating in an area strictly limited by the possibilities of the situation, had failed to bring to action an enemy who was operating in close conformity with our appreciation and with whose advanced screen contact had been established."
Admiral Beatty was ordered to discontinue the chase at 3:47. In this affair the submarines were stationed off Terschelling by order of the Admiralty, but took no part in the action except one torpedo fired from the E-11 which missed.
The Germans were bitterly disappointed. Von Tirpitz said that, "Ingenohl had the fate of Germany in the palm of his hand. I boil with inward emotion whenever I think of it." Von Scheer says, "It is extremely probable that by continuing in our original direction the two courses would have crossed within sight of each other during the morning." The author says, "In all the war there is no action which gives deeper cause for reflection on the conduct of operations at sea. On our own side the disappointment was profound." Bellairs, always a severe critic of the Grand Fleet, writes, "—does it never occur to the mechanical, (school) which wants war to be all certainties, that the sea belongs to the most skillful and artful wooer who adapts himself to her variable moods."
The battle of Dogger Bank on January 24, 1915, was a battle of battle cruisers and destroyers. The story as told by Sir Julian, which differs in some respects from some other writers as well as from the official report as given out by the Admiralty soon after the fight, must be accepted as authoritative.
The action was brought about by an early morning collision between the advance screen of Von Hipper standing to the N.W. and that of Admiral Beatty steaming S.E. Whether the German Admiral was bound out for a northern raid, or whether he was making a reconnaissance, or whether the German sortie was a diversion to facilitate an invasion (which some Dutch critics thought) is immaterial. The reappearance of the German ships in the North Sea was not unexpected and Jellicoe was looking for them. At the time Beatty sighted them, they had turned to the southward toward their base. Jellicoe with the battle squadron from Scapa was coming down from the North, and at 8 a. m. was 150 miles from the scene of action. There seemed to be a chance for a decisive engagement.
NOTE: H.C. O'Neill, A History of the War. London. T.C. and E.C. Tach. 1920.
Filson Young's brilliant account is that of an eye witness on board Admiral Beatty's Flagship the Lion. See "With the Battle Cruisers." Mr. Young's track charts differ from Sir Julian Corbett's. As a rule, however, track charts of ships during a battle are not to be taken too seriously.
The Lion, Flagship of Admiral Beatty, sighted gun flashes at 7:20 a.m. bearing S.S.E. The English ships were in column ahead, the Lion, Tiger, Princess Royal, New Zealand and Indomitable. At 7:50 Beatty made out the German battle cruisers on his port bow fourteen miles distant. He began working up speed to 28 knots, and steered a course parallel to the enemy, and clear of his wake in order to avoid mines. Just before 9 o'clock Beatty tried a ranging shot at 20,000 yards and shortly afterwards all the English vessels opened fire on the German stern-most ship, the Blucher. For the next two hours there raged a battle which will always hold a unique place in the history of sea warfare on account of a series of untoward occurrences by which a superior force not only failed to score a decisive victory, but enabled a crippled enemy to escape at the moment when his defeat seemed to be a question of only a few minutes. At 9:25 the great speed of the English had brought them close enough to engage opposite numbers. The Tiger did not understand the signal to do this and continued to fire on the German leader with the Lion. As the Princess Royal had shifted to the third German ship, the Moltke, the second German ship, the Derfflinger, was not under fire at all, and as the Germans adhered to their doctrine of concentration of fire on the van, the Lion was not only under her fierce and undisturbed fire but of that also of the Seydlitz, Moltke and the Blucher.
It is to be noted that the English being to the leeward were getting the German destroyer smoke, and for a time Beatty lost sight of the enemy. Fearing a torpedo attack the English turned away two points at 9:40. A few minutes later the Lion began to be heavily hit, and about the same time the Blucher, which had severely suffered, dropped astern on fire, disabled but fighting gallantly until she sank at 12:13. At 10:54 submarines were reported on the starboard bow, and Beatty turned his ships eight points to port, away from the danger which was forward of his beam, and incidentally across the wake of the fleeing enemy, then at 11:2 back again to N.E. to avoid mines. At this time, however, the Lion was struck a blow that put her out of action, for her speed was knocked down to 15 knots and she was forced to drop out. Just before this happened Beatty, whose wireless was out of commission, and all but two of his signal halyards shot away, had hoisted the signal N. E. and then "Keep nearer the enemy," a signal Nelson made at Trafalgar. When the Lion left the formation, the command automatically devolved upon the second in command. Beatty had made N.E. but this was not hauled down when he made "Attack the enemy's rear." The flags were end on, and the "Keep closer to the enemy" signal was not made out, and Admiral Moore interpreted the signal to mean "Attack enemy's rear bearing N.E." and proceeded with all the ships to attack the helpless Blucher. Von Hipper continued his flight unpursued.
The failure to get the signals to keep closer to the enemy, and the misinterpretation of the signal which did get through, cost the English the battle. Sir Julian Corbett refrains from criticism; perhaps he realized the uselessness of indulging in that world-old game of what-might-have been. He likewise drops the mantle of charity over the German failure, and says only their attempt was "timorous." Lord Sidmouth remarks "the Germans lost a great opportunity." But so also did the English.
After the battle a controversy started over Admiral Beatty's despatch reporting the action, as given out by the Admiralty. The fact is only referred to here as a matter of history, although Corbett does not mention it.
According to Mr. Young, who was on board the Flagship and attached to Admiral Beatty's staff, the Admiral sent a brief telegram to the Admiralty, which as published stated that the presence of submarines necessitated the action being broken off. The actual sentence in the original despatch was, "in view of the unknown condition of the Lion, and the presence of enemy's submarines, Admiral Moore considered retirement desirable at noon, and gave orders accordingly." Referring to Admiral Beatty's detailed report in February, 1915, Mr. Young says, "After some time this was returned to him in proof by the Admiralty, seventeen out of the thirty paragraphs either altered or omitted altogether." In his book, the original despatch, and the despatch as made public, are printed. "In some vital matters, 'the reports' are essentially different."
The Dardanelles Campaign originated on January 2, 1915, in a request of the Grand Duke Nicholas to Lord Kitchener to relieve the growing pressure in the Caucasus by arranging for a diversion of the Turkish Army elsewhere. The next day Kitchener reported in the affirmative, and he suggested to Lord Fisher that the navy make a demonstration at the Dardanelles as there were no troops available.
A test bombardment had been made on the forts at the entrance of the Dardanelles in November, by a combined English and French Squadron, which served no purpose other than to give warning to the Turks what they might expect later, and consequently the defenses had been strengthened. The First Lord referred the question to Admiral Garden who had succeeded Admiral Milne in command of the naval forces in the Mediterranean, and he gave it as his opinion that the forts could not be "rushed'' by the navy, but "might be forced by extended operations," and he submitted plans.
On January 28, in spite of the opposition of Lord Fisher, the War Council decided upon a naval attack, although the grave risks of failure were freely recognized.
The attack was made by the combined forces of Admiral Garden and Admiral Guepratte. Sir Julian says, "At 9:51 on the morning of February 19, the first shot heralded the opening of the unparalleled operations which were destined to attain such vast proportions, to consume so much heroism and tragic effort, and end with such a glorious failure."
It is well to pause here to consider the old question of forts versus ships. It has been truly said that if history teaches anything, it is that it doesn't teach. In modern times, the fort has invariably had the ad vantage over the ship. At Alexandria for instance, although the fleet drove the Egyptians out of the fortifications, Stone Pasha told the writer of this review a few days after the bombardment, that he had inspected the forts within two days, and with the exception of guns disabled by direct hits, the batteries could easily have been made ready for action again in a day. This agrees with Lord Sidmouth's statement, "Trained gunners could easily have beaten off the fleet at Alexandria in spite of all the gross defects of the works attacked."
Anyone who has seen the effect of ship fire on the forts at Santiago and Port Arthur, and Tsingtau, will not wonder that Lord Fisher left the council room on January 28, and was only prevented from sending in his resignation by Lord Kitchener's , personal appeal for him to remain.
To return now to the narrative of the fleet attacks. The Cornwallis and Triumph opened the first action at a range of 7,700 yards, and in a few minutes the Suffren engaged the Kum Kale on the Asiatic side at anchor. The Flagship about noon tried two ranging shots at the Helles Fort at a distance of 15,000 to 16,000 yards. In the afternoon the bombardment continued but at shorter ranges, and all the ships were under way. At 5:20 the "General Recall" was made and the ships withdrew. The day closed with promise of success and the bombardment was to have been resumed the following day.
Unfortunately bad weather set in and continued for a week; during this interval the Turks repaired damages and Garden decided that troops were necessary; it was easier to request than to obtain. Kitchener could not understand why the navy couldn't do what he expected of it, but he did fully understand the consequences of failure to break through. It is worth mentioning here that during the interval of waiting and discussion the sea planes could not be used, "A misfortune that seriously affected the success of the work."
On February 25, the ships renewed the attack. Four ships underway worked in pairs and closed to 3,000 yards firing on Helles and Orkanie on either side of the entrance. Four ships at anchor engaged the forts between Helles and Orkanie. By 3:00 p.m. the shore batteries were silenced and then trawlers began sweeping, while the fleet returned to the anchorage.
At 8:00 the following morning, the attack was resumed and continued without opposition until 3:00 p.m. when fire was opened by concealed batteries which the sea planes had not found. At 4:00 the "General Recall" was hoisted and the ships withdrew. No attempt to land a force was made, but wrecking parties were sent ashore to blow up the guns in the deserted forts on both sides. This work, gallantly performed, brought the V.C. to Lieutenant Commander E.G. Robinson of the Triumph.
Operations were halted for two days by bad weather. It was now evident that a landing must be effected to clear the shores of the increasing batteries. It was also realized that if the attempt to force the passage was to be abandoned, now was the time when it could be done without too much loss of face, but just then seven battalions of sailors and marines sailed for Lemnos, and the navy continued to carry on until March 10. Long range firing was useless without accurate spotting and the air forces had not been as efficient in this work as was expected. It was obvious, therefore, that close action was necessary. Then the question was how to force the mine fields which were protected by mobile guns. After careful consideration of all the difficulties it was decided to force the Narrows.
On March 17, Admiral De Robeck relieved Admiral Garden, who had been ordered home, and on the eighteenth the attack was made, but it was repulsed. Three battleships were sunk, and three more practically put out of commission. The forts were terribly hammered and the morale of the garrisons suffered equally but the ships had to retire.
Sir Ian Hamilton, who had been selected to command the Army Expeditionary Force, reached Tenedos on the evening of the seventeenth, the eve of the attack, at the same time as the last division of the French troops under General d'Armande. Both generals were in time to witness the naval fight at the Narrows.
Bad weather prevented the renewal of the attack on the nineteenth, and before the weather moderated the plans were all changed. Thenceforth the campaign was to be a combined army and navy operation, and a new phase of activities was begun.
Three weeks after the attack on the Narrows the army began landing on the beach north of Gabe Tepe—to be precise, it was 3:30 a.m. on April 25, that the picket boats with the cutters in tow cast off from the ships and steamed toward the land, and a half hour before dawn the boats with muffled oars hauled in their painters and rowed to the beach where they were greeted by rifle and machine-gun fire. Landings were made the same day at five other places, and in twenty-four hours over 33,000 men were put ashore. Lord Sidmouth says, "—it was a splendid feat of arms rendered possible only by devoted gallantry and the infinitely valuable covering fire of the ships." But it was only a footing. "The commanding ridge of Sari Bair was never occupied," and Achi Baba peak, 591 feet high, as important to the success of the landing as 203 metre hill at Port Arthur or the Henrich Berg at Tsingtau was to the Japanese, "was still two miles from our (British) front when the final withdrawal took place."
In the beginning of this article mention was made of the annoyance caused by the British detention of our mails. During the Civil War a similar controversy arose between the two countries when their status was reversed. England was the neutral and the United States the belligerent. The story is related by John Murray Forbes in his Letters and Recollections. Writing in the summer o£ 1863, from the Rhine, I think, having just left London where he was one of the many noncommissioned envoys employed in our propaganda in England, he says:
"Among my London acquaintances was Mr. Edward Ellis, a member of Parliament himself, and, I think, with one or two sons also in that body. He was a friend and adherent of Palmerston, and having a pecuniary interest in land on this side was supposed to be very well posted about American affairs. It was just at the time the controversy was going on about the letter bag of a steamer: it had been seized with the vessel carrying a cargo of munitions of war, nominally to Mexico, but undoubtedly intended for the Texan rebels. The bag must have contained proof of this, but, being under the seals of the British Post Office, was claimed by the British minister as sacred, and the dispute was going on as to what should be done with it: the condemnation of the vessel and cargo, amounting to a very large sum, depending a great deal upon the result.
"I was dining at Mr. Ellis' and while we were standing before the fire waiting for dinner to be announced, two or three of the younger members of Parliament came in and announced the 'good news' that the letter bag had been given up without being opened and removed the danger of a rupture in the friendly relations between the United States and Great Britain. This was all very polite, Mr. Adams being present and, as usual silent. I could not help, however, saying a word to this effect: 'I am very glad you like the news, but I hope you will remember one thing; that you are making a precedent which in the long future we intend to follow. You are now ready to introduce all possible privileges for neutrals in the carrying trade, but in the long run Great Britain is at war ten years while we are likely to be one; and whatever precedent you set now, we shall hold you to. '"
Sir Julian Corbett gives an interesting account of the unsuccessful search for the Dresden in the forbidding waterways of Terra del Fuego and Patagonia, and her final destruction at Juan Fernandez. When Von Spee made his sauve qui pent signal at the Falklands on December 8, to his light cruisers, she succeeded in escaping to Punta Arenas where she arrived on the eleventh. For three months she eluded the British squadron, although at times they were close on her heels. The Bristol and Glasgow reached Sandy Point the day after she sailed, and they hurried out to the westward hoping to run her down. The Inflexible swept outside the Horn and cruised up the coast as far as 43° S. when she was recalled. Admiral Stoddard in the Carnarvon took the east coast of Patagonia and the Cornwall did Staten Islands, and the Horn itself. It was trying navigation in those bleak solitudes where the long ocean swells break tremendously on the outlying rocks, and where there are so many breakers, the sea in one place is called the Milky Way. Although it was the summer season, the weather was cold, thick and misty, while the rain and sleet and snow swept violently down from the innumerable glaciers which descended to the coast line.
While the dauntless Englishmen were exploring the inlets and bays of a coast, "one sight of which," writes Darwin, "is enough to make a landsman dream for a week about shipwrecks, peril and death, the Dresden was lying quietly in the little cove charted as Hewett's Bay at the southern end of Barbara Channel where she anchored December 14. The English ships came close at times, but did not discover her. A week later the Carnarvon anchored at the north entrance of the channel and the Dresden shifted to an even more secluded anchorage on the southern shore of Santa Inez Island, where she remained undisturbed until February 15. Again, later in the month, the Admiral was within fifty miles of the chase and his tireless ships were sweeping the waterways from Beagle Channel as far north as Last Hope Inlet, where the Bristol damaged her rudder on an uncharted shoal.
The British Consul at Punta Arenas had good reason to believe that the German Consul was sending supplies to the Dresden in two tenders, and he was fairly certain of her anchorage. But neither the Admiralty nor the Admiral was convinced, and his information was discredited.
On February 13, the Dresden, overhauled and repaired as well as possible, ran out into the open sea, and cruised 300 miles off Coronel, where she coaled from colliers at prearranged rendezvous and sank a British ship. On the eighth of March she was at last sighted by the Kent who gave chase, but lost her at nightfall. On the ninth the Dresden reached Juan de Fernandez, and five days later she was found by the Glasgow and Kent and was destroyed at her anchorage.
The disregard of Chili's neutrality by both belligerents is a feature of the Dresden case: the English by searching with hostile intent the inland territorial waters of Chili, and finally attacking an enemy in a Chilian harbor; the Germans by violating the twenty-four hour limit for refreshment, and using Chilian anchorages as a base. England's prompt and courteous reply to Chili's protest, and immediate offer of compensation for all damages, soothed Chili's wounded feelings. Germany, however, paid no attention to the protest for at least six months.
We might to our advantage take a leaf from England's book on this subject. When our officers have violated neutrality they have usually been punished, as for instance in the Trent affair, the cutting out of the Florida, and the capture of the Blanche. There is nothing to show that Captain Luce of the Glasgozv was even reprimanded, he was probably, and properly so, promoted. At all events the friendly relations between England and Chili were not impaired, nor was Chili's sympathy with the Allies affected. Clearly international law is on the side of the biggest battleships.
The volume closes fitly with an appreciation of Lord Fisher. When he found himself thwarted and his advice and suggestions ignored he resigned his seat as First Sea Lord. Sir Julian says: "To the country at large he was the embodiment of the old fighting energy of the navy—the man to whom we owed the organization and the strategical disposition which rendered the German fleet impotent when the long expected struggle began, and the all embracing combination against Admiral Von Spee which had given us our only decisive success at sea." Lord Fisher's second term at the Admiralty was not long when measured by months, but it covered a momentous period in the history of the Empire, and was long enough to impress upon the people the soundness of his faith, "War is great conceptions, and quick decisions."
THE 20TH CENTURY GUIDE FOR DIESEL OPERATORS, By Rosbloom & Sawley. Western Technical Book Co. Price $15. A Review by William H. Pashley, Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy.
This is a disappointing book for many reasons, such as its confused arrangement, its extremely bad English, its numerous incorrect statements and the fact that it was carelessly proof read, if at all.
The authors state in the Foreword that "all data has been carefully selected to suit the person engaged in the profession or for use in the study of Internal Combustion Engineering," and that "The primary object of this valuable addition to technical publications on the subject of Internal Combustion Machinery and such information as this book contains, is to instruct those interested in the prime mover in practical form."' They further state in the preface that, "Neither time nor expense has been spared in an effort to make this work a success, and by success is meant; 'A world's Standard Book'." With the above objects in view it seems a pity that loose statements such as the following are found: "The mechanical efficiency is expressed as the ratio between the effective power of the engine as measured by a brake on the engine shaft"; "In most cases there are levers by which cams are operated"; "The methods of fuel injection is a subject which can be solved and ultimately will have to be considered"; "Arguments in favor of Solid Injection as opposed to Air Injection is merely a matter of opinion"; "All bodies are supposed to be composed of minute particles so small that they can scarcely be seen by a high powered microscope"; "While the trend appears Jo be toward the solid injection system, nevertheless, mechanical injection is prevalent." These and innumerable other statements of the same character are found throughout this book. It would certainly not be beneficial to a person's English education to be compelled to study this as a text book and it is certain that a technical man could not "wade through" it without mental nausea.
I will now take up each chapter briefly, and endeavor to show what is wrong with this proposed addition to technical literature.
Chapter I. is devoted to "Technical Terms," as applied to Diesel Machinery and in this chapter we find such paragraphs as these. "Ratio of Expansion:
The Thermal efficiency at its maximum is due to the increased temperature when the engine is at its highest production. The accomplished results in creating the full energy out of the working mediums, and the working substance."
"Laws of Thermodynamics: In the conversion of heat into mechanical energy, one unit of heat is lost for every 778 foot pounds of energy obtained; and conversely, in the production of heat by mechanical means, one unit of heat is obtained from 778 pounds of energy expended. It is also known that it is impossible for a self-acting engine to convey heat from one body to another at a higher temperature without the aid of external assistance."
The student or operator learning the definition for Thermal Efficiency or the Laws of Thermodynamics from this chapter would be grossly misinformed. There are a few other paragraphs explaining a few terms found in Physics and Thermodynamics together with a dissertation on "Values of Liquid Fuels, Coal Tar, Oil Tar, Composition of Water, Composition of Sea Water," and how the sediment from the latter would encrust the water jacketing of Diesel Engines. Aside from the character of the information furnished one can hardly consider "Values of Liquid Fuels," "Composition of Water," and "Composition of Sea Water" as technical terms.
Chapter II is devoted to "Theory." From the title of the book one might expect that one would here find the theory on which the Diesel Engine was conceived, but such is not the case as the Authors apparently aim at "Theory" in general with which they incorporate a method of getting data from an indicator card, the precautions to be taken in using the Thompson Indicator and how to calculate H.P. from an indicator card. This is followed by definitions and explanations of the Carnot and Otto cycles which are much involved and considerably in error as illustrated by the statement that "In theory, internal combustion engines work on either the Carnot or the Otto cycle." After this comes "Heat and Combustion," followed by "Some Facts on Combustible Substances," among which are found the definitions for velocity, specific gravity, BTU, specific heat, etc. This chapter is so hopelessly mixed up that it is hard to conceive of it getting into print.
Chapter III is entitled "Miscellaneous Formulas" and is well named being a mixture of geometrical, triginometrical and empirical formulae, some good and some bad, the indiscriminate use of which might lead the operator or student into serious difficulties.
Chapter IV, "Principles of Operation," starts with a discourse in very bad English on Standardization; and drifts into valve action, fuel injection, two-cycle, four-cycle and two-cycle double acting engines. Then the authors discourse on the cycle of operation of the Diesel Engine in which they incorporate many ideas not germane to the subject, drift into directions for starting an engine, precautions to take before starting, types of fuel valves, engine timing, and finish the chapter with some meager information on the strength of materials. The arrangement of this chapter is hopelessly bad. A better title for it would be ''Some Miscellaneous Facts on Diesel Engines."
Chapter V is entitled "Liquid Substances" and, strange to say, concerns liquids only, their characteristics, measurement, viscosity, etc. This is better written by far than any of the preceding chapters and contains numerous useful facts.
Chapter VI, "Questions and Answers on Diesel Engine Operation," starts out with thirty questions on Diesel Engines few of which can be answered from what has been given in the preceding chapters and few of which concern Engine Operation, for example: Q.1. "Give a brief definition of a Diesel Engine"; Q.2. "How is the Diesel Engine classified in regard to construction?"; Q.19. "Why is the Diesel Engine classified as a constant pressure engine?," etc. Many of the questions are so poorly worded that one has to read the answer before one can understand the question, for example, Q.29. "Explain the construction of Valve Attachment." Most of the information in the answers is fairly correct though there are such errors as this: Q.15. "How is a compressor constructed?" Ans. "In two or three stages between each of which the air is cooled by passing through a reservoir of water." Although the authors undoubtedly meant air coolers a student would probably visualize humidifiers between stages. The next set of questions in this chapter come under the heading "Causes and Effects in the Principle of Operation of Diesel Engines and Remedies," and the first two questions are, "What is the maximum Piston Travel per minute and R.P.M.?" and, "How should valves be set on Diesel Engines?" Here again most of the information furnished is fairly correct but in some cases not sufficient to properly answer the question, while in others the answer does not have anything to do with the question. Q.30. "If repeated breakage of crankshaft should occur how would you account for it?" Ans. "Repeated breakage of crank shaft of Diesel engine is likely due to unequal working in cylinders, causing shocks and undue impacts. A crank shaft usually breaks after the material has become crystallized, and when a break has occurred it may be taken for granted that more or less crystallization has taken place throughout the whole crank shaft material. The original can be nearly recovered by heat treatment, and the whole crankshaft should be so treated occasionally, at least whenever part is repaired by welding." This answer is an exceedingly poor one as more Diesel Shafts break due to synchronous torsional vibration than to any other cause. Also the advice to heat treat an entire shaft after welding a part of it is unique as the shaft, particularly a long one, would be so warped as to be unusable in the engine it was removed from. This chapter is brought to a close with some information on "Machinery Material" which is of questionable use and partially wrong. It would probably give the student some erroneous ideas, for example: Q.8. "What material is used for the manufacture of shafting?" Ans. "Cold rolled steel is very widely used on account of the ease and cheapness with which it can be rolled true to shape and size." While this is true, would not the student be led to believe that crank shafts, connecting rods, wrist pins and the like were made of this class of material as no mention is made of them elsewhere? Q.18. "What effect will carbon have on steel?" Ans. "Carbon up to 1.25 per cent, increase's the strength of iron and the increase is proportional to the carbon content." In this case the story is only half told. Why not tell what else the addition of carbon does to steel (not iron), and not leave one to imagine that all one has to do to get strength is to add carbon, which is decidedly wrong.
Chapter VII on "Fuel Feed and Ignition," sticks to the subject but does not cover it fully, as there are numerous fuel injection valves on the market which deserve attention in any work on Diesels, I mean such valves as are found on the M.A.N. 3,000 H.P. type, four-cycle engines, and others of up to date design.
Chapter VIII, "Principles of Construction," starts with a long argument on two-cycle versus four-cycle engines as advanced by various manufacturers, with no attempt by the authors to settle the question or venture any enlightening opinion. This is followed by a fair description of a double acting engine. Next follows a few paragraphs on "Effects of Internal and External Stresses" which is not very illuminating. On page 153 is shown a "typical piston." This really is a two-stage air compressor piston. This is followed by a good article on scavenging two-cycle engines, then a discussion of the "Methods Employed in Reserving Marine Diesel Engines," but only the sliding cam shaft type of reversal is considered. Next comes Aspinall's governor which is all right as far as it goes but there are other governors a student might meet in practice and the principles governing which he should know.
Chapter IX, "Auxiliary Machinery and Accessories," is not quite so bad as some of the other chapters as it gives some very good cuts of oil coolers, filters, etc. In this chapter, however, is a description of the Sperry Magnetic Clutch which starts out with the statement: "The Sperry type of Magnetic Coupling or Clutch has been used successfully on submersible craft for a number of years. It may well be considered a clutch arrangement of exceptional reliability," etc. The government tests of the Sperry Clutch were made under my supervision and it never was installed in a submersible. It certainly can not be considered as reliable. It is at the present time in the experimental stage as regards clutching arrangements for Diesel Engines, though it is quite successful for clutching two motors, or a turbine to a motor. Tests showed that the Sperry Clutch will not hold reliably through a critical speed such as experienced in the operating range of most Diesel Engines. Again in this chapter we find "reserve gears for marine engines" described as though ships were backed by reverse gears. No mention is made of the size of engines for which these gears are suitable and one would be led to believe that a three or four thousand H.P. marine plant used a reverse gear to reverse the direction of the propeller.
Chapter X, "Description of Diesel Engines" commences with a good description and good cuts of the Busch Sulzer Engines such as found in the pamphlets of that company. This is followed by general description of various engines and rather a flattering description of the Nelseco line of engines which sounds like "selling talk." Experience with the construction and operation of these engines would lead to anything hut flattering comment.
Further along in this chapter, referring to the "Description of the Sperry Compound Engine," we find the following statement: "It is very ingenious in design and experiences with the first engines in coastwise service has demonstrated its suitability and economy equal to the best Diesels of same horsepower capacity." The authors apparently believe the Sperry Compound is "in coastwise service" and has "demonstrated its suitability and economy." Whereas the truth is that the Sperry Engine is still in the experimental stage and is not operating in any coastwise service. It is, to be sure, an engine of remarkable promise provided certain engineering problems are solved, but, so far, it is not a commercial engine. The description of the development of the Diesel Engine for U.S. Submarines is very poorly done and considerably in error.
The remaining chapters of the book can be briefly summarized as follows: Chapter XI, "Diesel Electric Propulsion," starts with an article by W. E. Thau of the Westinghouse Company, which is thoroughly good. In fact this article is one of the few good ones in this book : Chapter XII contains much good material and good illustrations but it is poorly put together like the chapter on "Description of Diesel Engines"; Chapter XIII on "Air Compressors" contains far too little information on this most important auxiliary for either operator or student; Chapter XIV does not give much useful information on pumps nor does it describe the various successful types of pumps in service; Chapter XV, "Batteries" has no place in a Diesel textbook. Batteries and other electrical apparatus should, in my opinion, be taken up in a book devoted to electricity and electrical apparatus.
The collection of the material for writing this book must have involved an enormous amount of work, and it is most disappointing to find such laboriously collected material mixed up with statements not supported by fact, and then put up in book form, and offered to a public eager to obtain the best information possible concerning this latest type of machine for the generation of power. This book as it stands fails utterly to accomplish the purpose of the authors as given in the Foreword and Preface as it is neither "a valuable addition to technical publications" nor is it "A World's Standard Book."
ELECTRIC ARC WELDING, by E. Wanamaker and H.R. Pennington. 247 pages, 167 figures. Simmons Boardman Publishing Co. Price $4.00. A Review by D.J. McAdams, Metallurgist, Naval Engineering Experiment Station.
There has been need for several years of a book on welding written by a technical man for technical men, with careful selection and logical arrangement of material. The recent book by Wanamaker and Pennington does not appear to supply this need. This book contains a wealth of unselected information assembled without much regard for the principles of composition and rhetoric. The chapters (designated sections) are not arranged in logical order and the material is not properly distributed among these chapters.
The chapter on "Electric Arc Welding Principles" should have been placed before the two chapters on "Equipment," and "Installation." Obviously the advantages and disadvantages of the various types of equipment cannot be appreciated before knowledge of electric arc welding principles has been obtained. The chapter on "Training Operators" should have been placed after the chapters on "Electrode Materials," "Preparation of Work," etc. Microstructure, instead of being discussed in a final chapter containing a number of subjects that had apparently been overlooked and omitted from their proper location, should have been discussed in a separate chapter immediately following the chapter on "Electrode Material."
Following a chapter on principles of metallic and carbon arc welding, and the two chapters on equipment and accessories, a logical sequence would be chapters on electrode materials, macro- and micro-structure of welds, shaping and other preparation of metal parts to be welded, internal stresses and means of minimizing them, training of operators, welding of cast iron and non-ferrous metals, examples of practical application of arc welding, and a final chapter giving data on cost, speed, strength of welds, etc.
The illogical sequence of chapters in this book would not be so serious a defect if the material were properly distributed among the chapters. A redistribution of material would greatly improve this book. For example, the chapter on "Electric Arc Welding Principles" might well have been made broad enough to include carbon arc as well as metallic arc welding principles, thus including much of the material from the chapter on "Carbon Arc Welding." The chapter on "Training Operators" contains discussions of electrode materials, thermal disturbance, internal stresses, inspection of welds, etc., which belong in other chapters. On the other hand, this chapter should contain some specific directions that are given instead in the chapter on "Carbon Arc Welding." Most of the material in the last chapter on "Miscellaneous Notes and Data" should have been discussed in the chapter on "Electrode Materials" and in a chapter on Micro- and Macro-Structure of Welds.
The criticism given above deals entirely with composition. The proper selection of material for a book, however, is even more important than its arrangement. Selection of material for presentation depends on selection of the readers for whom the book is to be written.
After careful reading of this book, the writer is unable to visualize the readers for whom the book was written. As stated above there has been great need for a book on welding written for technical men. This book, however, does not seem to have been written for technical men, otherwise one would not find such statements as "oxygen is a colorless, tasteless gas. It is the most abundant and most widely distributed of all the elements, constituting by weight more than one-fifth of the air and eight-ninths of the water." On the other hand, the book does not seem to have been written for non-technical men since it assumes that the reader has knowledge of the principles of electrical engineering. It is assumed, for example, that the reader understands the meaning of such terms as "inductance," "reactance," "power factor," etc. Evidently the authors, as a result of failure to select their readers, failed to make careful selection of the material for their book.
Books on electric welding should be written for metallurgists as well as for electrical engineers. In fact such books should be written from the metallurgical point of view, since electric welding is essentially a metallurgical problem. For this reason books on welding should be written either by metallurgists, with enough electrical engineering knowledge to understand the principles of the electric arc and the various types of welding apparatus, or by electrical engineers with thorough understanding of the principles of metallurgy. Joint authorship by an electrical engineer and a metallurgist would favor the production of an excellent book on welding. The book under consideration is handicapped by the fact that both the authors are electrical engineers. Not realizing the handicap under which they were working, they have devoted much space to discussion of metallurgical questions and have even included descriptions of the manufacture of iron and steel. Descriptions of manufacturing processes, even if well written and free from error, are of doubtful value in a book of this kind. Brief descriptions of the properties of iron and steel are of course desirable. Unfortunately, however, the descriptions and discussions of metallurgical processes and of the properties of iron and steel contain the defects and errors that might have been expected, such defects as would undoubtedly be found if a metallurgist were to write a book on electrical engineering. As illustrations of these defects and errors, one need only quote the following statements: "Cast iron has no elasticity," "Manganese helps to remove phosphorus and sulphur; it slags these two elements out of the metal." "Nickel increases the tensile strength of steel without impairing its elasticity." "The metal in the converter contains ferrite." "The elasticity of the metal in the weld will always be less than the elasticity of the metal in the original plate." The authors' repeated use of the word "elasticity" in this book is especially puzzling. Since cast iron has an elastic limit of about 6,000 lb. per square inch and a modulus of elasticity of about 13,000,000 lb. per square inch, it is hard to understand the statement that it has "no elasticity." One might think that ductility instead of "elasticity" is meant, except for the fact that in referring to cast iron the authors use the expressions "brittleness" and "lack of elasticity" in the same sentence. For example: "Its (cast iron's) brittleness, lack of elasticity and weakness also complicate matters."
In spite of the above discussed defects in selection of material, composition, and metallurgical description and explanation, the book contains much valuable information on the subject of welding. The chapter on "Preparing Work for Electric Arc Welding" gives many illustrations of the different types of joints and designs and kinds of welds. This chapter is of great practical value. The same comment may be made concerning the chapters on "Application of Arc Welding to Railroads and Structural Engineering," "Equipment for Arc Welding," and "Installation of Arc Welding Equipments—Welding Accessories." The remaining chapters contain many good paragraphs scattered throughout material that is either misplaced or that should have been omitted. It is to be hoped that the authors in a later edition will improve the book by rearranging and condensing the material and eliminating the metallurgical errors.