Professional Notes

PROFESSIONAL NOTES

Prepared By Lieutenant Commander F.W. Rockwell, U.S. Navy and Lieutenant J.B. Heffernan, U.S. Navy

 

FRANCE

 

New Construction.—The French Naval General Staff has announced that construction has begun on the following vessels of the 1922 program:

FLOTILLA LEADERS: (2,400 tons) Jaguar at Lorient; Panthere at Lorient. LIGHT CRUISERS: (6,000 tons), Dttguay-Troitm at Brest; Primauguet at Brest; Lamotte-Piquet at Lorient.

 

Seaplanes on Hand September 30.—The Service Central de l'Aeronautique Maritime announces that the French Navy possessed the following planes on September 30, 1922:

AIRPLANES

HANRIOT 80 hp. Rhone (for school use) 30

HANRIOT 130 hp. Clerget, 12

BREGUET 300 hp. Renault, 12

NIEUPORT 180 hp. Rhone, 6

FARMAN bimotor 500 hp. (Salmson), 2

FARMAN bimotor 450 hp. (Lorraine), 2

Total 64

 

SEAPLANES

F. B. A. 130 hp. Clerget with hull (For school use), 25

HANRIOT 130 hp. Clerget with floats (For school use), 24

FARMAN C. L. 300 hp. Renault with hull, 100

FARMAN trimotor 1,000 hp. (Sunbeam or Lorraine), 2

LATHAM trimotor 950 hp. (Sunbeam), 6

LATHAM quadrimotor 1,000 hp. (Salmson), 2

Total 159

 

French Foreign Policy.—Probably no man in France was better equipped for discussing the foreign policy of France than was the late Senator Paul Deschanel. The following was prepared by Monsieur Deschanel for delivery in the Senate. He died before the date set for his speech and it is published now posthumously.

 

Gentlemen: I am asking certain information of the Government on our foreign policy.

 

First I would point out, in agreement with Messieurs Ribot, Doumergue, and Poincare, the disadvantages of diplomatic practices as carried on since 1919.

 

In all times past, under all regimes, absolute monarchy, committee of public welfare, directoire first empire, constitutional monarchy, we sent ambassadors accredited to foreign States and the ambassadors reported to the Minister of Foreign Affairs the results of conversations. The minister would then take up with the cabinet the matter to be examined. After deliberation in the cabinet the foreign minister would issue appropriate Instructions to his agents (ambassadors or ministers).

 

This method had the advantage of affording several lines of retreat, time for study of a question, time to prepare well considered replies, and finally to grant concessions only at the highest cost to an opponent.

 

While it did not exclude interviews between heads of Governments, yet such interviews were prepared in advance and not left to impromptu conversations.

 

On one occasion a chief of State, Napoleon III, thought to treat directly with foreign governments. More than once he negotiated without the knowledge of his foreign ministers, and even in opposition to them, and in 1870, in the absence of his Premier, Emile Chiver, he demanded of William I certain guaranties which resulted in the breaking out of war.

 

This method of handling international affairs was resumed again in 1919.

 

New Diplomatic Methods

 

Three men, who became prominent because of their great services in the War, the President of the United States, the British Premier, and the French Premier (I omit the Italian Premier only because he confined himself almost exclusively to questions regarding Fiume and the Adriatic); these three men excluded from their deliberations people who had fought and shed their blood with us, Belgium, Serbia, Rumania, Poland, and Tcheco-Clavicia, as if these noble peoples had the right of equality only in sacrifice; they called them "States with limited interests," as if the heroic Belgium Army that stopped the invader at Liege had defended a limited interest; and without control of any kind, without official and authentic proces-verbaux, without heeding the warnings and counsels of the chiefs who had won the victory, they took it upon themselves to dispose m regal fashion, of France, Europe, and the world.

 

Whatever judgment be passed on their work, I claim it to be in formal contradiction with the principles of the Republic, with the democracy, and with the parliamentary system, and I claim that if we do not do our utmost to preclude the return of that method of conducting our foreign relations we shall be remiss in our duty to future generations.

 

In the last discussion of the budget for the foreign office, Monsieur Briand showed little enthusiasm for these new methods of procedure, saying only that they resulted from the treaty of peace. They are not a consequence of that treaty but have followed it. It is but natural that those who have profited by these methods should cling to them; but I believe that, as regards France, every advantage is to be gained by returning as soon as possible to sure and normal diplomatic rules.

 

This is the advice also of certain English statesmen of long experience. On January 27, 1922, Lord Gray expressed himself as follows:

 

"Because I have criticized the supreme council I am said to advocate secret negotiations. * * * I have in no way spoken of secret methods. I have stood for the calmest methods, methods the most set. One may work in quiet without necessarily working in secret. * * * Do they think the new methods of the supreme council to be secret? And is it not time that there is more secrecy now in the present Government's method of carrying on foreign relations than formerly? * * * To-day we hear much of the supreme council, but there are no records kept of their doings. Under the old system there would be kept proces-verbaux of their conversations, and frequently these would be published by way of showing the course that had been followed. The new method followed to-day is to report the fact of a meeting between 'the French and British Premiers, but without giving any account of their conversation. In the procedure of the present Government there is on the one hand too much limelight, and on the other too much secrecy."

 

The treaties resulting from the new method, such as that of Versailles, and those following it, control now and will continue for long years to control our whole policy. We must then, in order to know where we stand and where we are headed, determine most precisely the consequences of that policy.

 

The Legend of Our Militarism

 

We are charged in Germany, and, most remarkably, in England and the United States, with ambitious aims, even imperialistic ambitions. Is there, I ask, a single Frenchman who would repeat the fault committed by Germany in 1871, that of introducing German representatives into French assemblies? No; but the leaders who won the war believed that certain measures of security were indispensable in the common interest of the Allies; and, over and above that, they agreed with the members of the committee charged with the negotiations with such men as Messieurs Charles Benoist, Aulard, Bourgeois, General Bourgeois, Cherquet, Derus, Gallois, Larisse, Pfister, Seignobos, and our leading geographer, Vidal de La Blanche. I am unable to name all of them. Certainly, these men were not imperialists anxious for conquests; they were students, republicans, professors, who knew geography and history. Moreover they were in agreement with the people in the Rhineland who had been subjected against their wills to Prussian domination and who, in a series of noisy demonstrations, claimed their autonomy under Germany.

 

What were the arguments of the English representatives that rejected the opinion of generals, of professors, of the Rhine people, and what arguments did the French plenipotentiary oppose? We do not know. What we do know is that on the seventh of last February (1922), at the opening of the British Parliament the Premier declared that he had to reserve the left bank of the Rhine against the operations of French annexationists.

 

This is the whole question of our relations with England, or rather with the cabinet now governing England.

 

Twenty years before the celebrated visit of Edward VII to the Paris Chambers of Commerce, I wrote that the entente between France and England was a fundamental necessity in European politics, that their long quarrel over colonies had become an anachronism since 1870. I have always felt that greatest admiration for Great Britain, for her literary and scientific genius, for her institutions, for her men in political life. And as for the statesmen who now directs her destinies, we cannot, without ingratitude, forget the great service he rendered the cause of right during the war. The unity of command, so long desired by our President and by our generals, was realized through his efforts, placing Foch in command of the whole western front.

 

There is one thing, however, which the English place above either the admiration or recognition they inspire, and that is the use of firm language such as they do not hesitate to use on every occasion.

 

No one is infallible, neither we nor they—none. But what enlightened Englishman, having in his mind any thought for the future, could pretend that when, in 1815, Lord Castlereagh put Prussia on the left bank of the Rhine, he had not laid seeds of serious complications for not only the peace of France, but for that of England as well? Only, Lord Castlereagh had a motive: Europe in turmoil for long years of Napoleon, British diplomacy sought to contain belligerent and conquering France by a warlike nation on her frontiers; thus does the abuse of power ever provoke similar reprisals.

 

And what enlightened Englishman, having in view not only the present but also the long perspective of history, would to-day uphold Gladstone for taking Lorraine from us in 1871, and placing Europe in a state of turmoil and uncertainty for well-nigh half a century?

 

But Gladstone had a reason—the secret negotiations between Napoleon III and Bismarck concerning Belgium and Luxembourg.

 

It is not we, however, who have menaced Belgium this last time, nor we who, after having deceived Belgium, covered her with blood and ruins.

 

If the English Government, which did not expect this aggression—I was convinced of this when visiting London in 1912—had spoken a little more quickly, William II would not have dared invade Flanders. And would not this word, spoken in time, have spared England and the world incalculable disasters?

 

And it is in the light of such facts that certain English people suspect us of unnamed ambitious designs, even of perfidy to them.

 

At Washington the British Admiralty presented the hypothesis that contemplated an attack of the English coast by our submarines. Some Americans and even some English were unable to suppress a smile at such a thought. But even if failing in our loyalty, would not our interests forbid our planning to separate ourselves from our neighbors? France and England need one another; they cannot do without one another. When our delegates in Washington finally grasped this point they were able to clarify the situation, but it is unhappy that they should not have had an earlier occasion for so doing. These prolonged silences made the American people doubt our intentions—this great people whom our fleet had aided so heartily to gain their independence.

 

France militaristic? Here are the figures:

 

Budget for 1922

?	Expenditures (in francs)
?	Military	Naval	Aeronautic	Total
English	5,365,895,600	4,288,908,000	957,372,000	10,612,175,600
French	3,700,345,454	843,618,295	254,652,440	4,807,616,189

 

England’s traditional policy has been to seek and maintain a balance among continental powers, to back the weak against the strong; the losers against the winners of a war. I have just shown that she has not always succeeded, and that, without so desiring she has more than once been responsible for menace and peril to the peace of the world.

 

However, she signed the treaty of Versailles. Should Germany violate the treaty it would be the greatest imprudence to deny the territorial guaranties provided in the treaty. For England, such a procedure would be quite a different menace than would be our submarines. In defending the common frontier, we are saving not alone our own country, but as well the liberty of the world.

 

If the two nations concluded an alliance, we hope it will provide against German aggression in Poland, for unless due precautions be taken as to this, the peace of Europe will be uncertain and precarious.

 

As to reparations, the supreme council, contrary to the treaty, has put itself in the place of the Reparations Commission in fixing the amount of the indemnity and the method of payments; whence the reduction of forty per cent in our credit, according to some, and fifty per cent according to others.

 

Eminent financiers, such as M. Ribot, Milles-Lacroix, and Cheron, speaking with full knowledge and authority have shown our economic situation in comparison with that of Germany, and what will be our situation if we do not require Germany to meet her signed obligations. Since the treaty did not specify either the amount or the methods of payments, the Germans are slow in finding the money for making payments, though they find it for their own profit and for the purchase of arms. But, with America demanding payments from us how can we satisfy them; if Germany does not first pay us? To take over control of Germany's finances is the only method of obtaining what is due us. Only when an inquiry has regulated this matter of reparations can the affairs of the world be set to rights.

 

Meanwhile the British Premier advances the proposition of a conference where French delegates are to sit as equals with men from Germany and with Soviets, but which the United States will not attend.

 

Be it said to his credit. Monsieur Poincare asks precise conditions and guaranties; the treaties and the League of Nations not to be attacked; reparations to be treated separately from economic reconstruction of Europe; and lastly, Russia not to be admitted to discuss the policies of foreign States and the payment of debts.

 

These are excellent principles; only we know that the Soviets, in order to attack industry and commerce, to get new material and to start the factories, are ready to sign anything put before them, even to give over their ports to international administration and police, saying to themselves that they can at any time take them back.

 

But while this might be to the interest of commerce, it does not hold so much of promise to holders of Russian securities. According to figures which are necessarily approximate, Russia's foreign debt is divided about as follows:

To France 25 billion

To England 19 billion

To Belgium 3 ½ billion

To Germany 3 ½ billion

To Switzerland, Holland, and Scandinavia 5 billion

To United States 2 billion

Total 58 billion

 

France has thus advanced twenty-five billion francs at par, on a foreign debt of fifty-eight billion, for the economic equipment and national defense of Russia, or about forty-three per cent of that debt. We must thus create an international organization for the control of Russia's commerce, in order to levy on her exports and imports the amounts due the holders of her securities, and in proportion to the holdings of her creditors. The question is if the Bolshevist Government will lend itself to such a proposition. There is no virtue in Lenin's confession of errors in his communistic efforts unless he were to accept this, and I doubt if he will.

 

Franco-American Relations.—The following is a translation of an article by Andre Tardieu, French deputy:

 

The reason why the United States, in financial and economic matters, is so distant from France is because we have done nothing to draw the United States near to us.

 

1. The return in the near future to Paris of M. Jean Parmentier, director of bonds, etc., in the bureau of the minister of finance, is not of much significance.

 

2. Mr. Parmentier went to Washington, not to treat with the subject of debts nor to discuss it. His mission simply consisted of presenting to the American Treasury an exact table giving the financial situation in France. This having been accomplished, the director will return to France and give an account of his mission. I cited the other day the opinion of Mr. Abbot, chief editor of the Christian Science Monitor, in his statement: "The politicians in the United States are fully aware that France cannot pay in gold, and if she pays in merchandise the American markets, already overstocked, will suffer greatly." They are aware of this fact, but no one dares to say so.

 

3. The great drawback in this whole affair is that there does not exist any solidarity of affairs between America and France, and consequently no one in New York or Chicago is interested in making any arrangements to facilitate payments.

 

4. I had hoped in 1918 to create this solidarity to endure for many years, but for reasons of internal politics I was unable to succeed.

 

5. It was in the middle of October, 1918, that victory was reasonably certain and the problem of reconstruction was already thought of. To me the financial aid of the United States was absolutely necessary to carry out any construction in a large scale. The American law authorized the Treasury Department to loan money to the Allied Governments only for the war and during the war. If then we had wished to have credits for construction, it was necessary to have another law passed.

 

6. To take the necessary steps to have this new law passed was what I was about to ask Mr. McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury. After negotiating with Mr. McAdoo for five days we arrived at an agreement, and he informed me that he would present the matter to Congress. I returned to France having obtained his promise in connection with this matter. Upon my return, the Communists' press attributed my voyage to the most extravagant motives.

 

7. The law as contemplated would have permitted us to dispose of several billions in credits. Of course it must be understood that under the same conditions that dollars were loaned for the war, that the dollars loaned for construction would have to be spent in the purchase of material in the United States or in the employment of American workmen. In any event we would have had the benefit of the powerful American industrial organization to help us rebuild our ruins and we would not have had to make any immediate payment.

 

8. When I returned to France, I immediately met with all sorts of resistance. I begged M. Loucheu and Clementel, minister of the reconstruction of the industries, to draw up a program—that is to say, a list of material to be purchased in the United States and the number of American workmen needed to complete the work. I was not able, notwithstanding my insistence, to receive any reply.

 

9. My two colleagues spoke of the necessity of assuring work to the French factories and by every means to avoid unemployment. From November, 1918, until May, 1919, this situation did not change. Several American and English industries came to Paris, due entirely to the proposed law which McAdoo had under consideration, with the view of aiding us to rebuild the devastated country, and naturally to make a certain profit on the deal. It resulted that during the month of May, the American Treasury, seeing that the demand for credits was no longer desired, did not present the proposed law for passage. The party of protective reconstruction triumphed. We missed the chance to have foreign capital become interested in the rebuilding of France. I believe that this was an error; as sufficient proof we have only to recall that M. Loucheur, the champion of protection in 1919 was in 1921 the negotiator of the accords with Wiesbaden, against which we have heard the objections of the French firms.

 

10. And above all, this helped to weaken the business ties between the United States and France. I say it without irony, but as the result of experience. If we desire to arrange sentiment we must also find a means of satisfying business interests. All of this time the American production would have been associated with our efforts and the American people would have many times brought pressure to bear with their Government in our favor.

 

11. Nothing is more useless than the regrets of what might have been. The above is simply to clarify the present difficulties. The greatest danger in the present financial situation is the strong partition which separates the French interests from the interests of the Anglo-Saxons.

 

12. I will be greatly mistaken if M. Parmentier, upon his return from the United States, does not confirm this sentiment.

 

France-British Co-operation.—The question of eventual naval cooperation has been examined in the most friendly spirit by Admirals Beatty and Grasset, and, should circumstances require it, events would show that the squabbles of politicians have not weakened the hearty sentiment of comradeship which fifty months of close fraternity of arms in the face of a common danger have so firmly established between Jack and Alathurin. In the course of their exchange of views the two Allied Admiralties promptly recognized that future co-operation has been rendered easy by what the two navies have achieved together. They could anew become parts of the same supreme naval force. It is no longer a secret that, although President Poincare unreservedly worked in favor of conciliation in the Turkish question, he has ordered at the same time effective preparations with a view to standing by England should the latter be threatened in her vital interests.—Navy and Military Record, 4 October, 1922.

 

Delay in Ratification.—Paris, October 11.—Although a certain parliamentary group in France today is urging ratification of the Washington naval reduction, it is declared that even in case ratification was decided upon it would not come in time to be of help to the Republican party in the November elections.

 

The Naval accord, which is still going the rounds of various naval commissions, is scheduled for a vote in the sessions of the Chamber which commences Thursday, but uncertain events in the Near East, the spector of Russia and the loss of the battleship France are causing doubtful predictions as to early ratification. Furthermore, the fact that other European signatory Powers have not ratified the pact does not hasten action by France.

 

The official view of France is that she must ratify the accord, especially in view of her recent protestations before the League of Nations on the subject of disarmament, and because France wants something tangible to support Premier Poincare's "peace policy" in the Near East imbroglio. Many difficulties still stand in the way, principally an extra heavy program for the coming sessions.—Boston Evening Transcript, 11 October, 1922.

 

Efficiency of Submarine Force.—Although not more than 2,400 seamen are affected to the underwater branch, the French submarine force has given lately unmistakable proofs of efficiency. Either singly or by pairs our submersibles undergo, as a matter of routine, endurance tests of long duration that are directly and indirectly benefiting personnel and materiel, and it is la mode nouvelle for specialists of the constructional branch to take a part in those prolonged trials of new or modified craft, whereas before the war submarine commanders were officially deprived of initiative, and jealously kept in the shadow of the flagship with a view to playing a role in fleet action, they are now trained to act independently and to seize opportunities for bold enterprise. The pre-war French submarine force proved something of a disappointment, but past mistakes have been corrected, and a new spirit animates the flotillas, in which cheerful confidence prevails.—J.R. Galtreau, Naval and Military Record, 27 September, 1922.

 

Commercial Advertisement by Navy.—An experiment is being made in France in the way of utilizing the navy for commercial propaganda work: The two battleship cruisers Jules-Michelet and Victor-Hugo will start shortly on a nine months' cruise to Madagascar, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, China and India, and will carry catalogues, prospectuses, documents and literature of all kinds, provided by traders and manufacturers for distribution to those whom they may interest in the ports visited. There will be persons in attendance to give information upon the goods that France is able to export. The cinematograph will be employed to show the manufacturing and industrial resources of the country.—The Engineer. 29 September, 1922.

 

France and Naval Disarmament.—Admiral Favereau, the distinguished French officer who during the war held an important North Sea command, has been expressing himself rather frankly on the subject of naval disarmament. In common with many of his countrymen, he believes France will best serve her interests by refusing to ratify the naval treaties negotiated at Washington. He considers them to have been drawn up chiefly with an eye to the interests of Britain. America, and Japan, and thinks that the only fair method of naval limitation is to make relative strength as it existed in 1914, the basis of future tonnage ratios. If that were done, France would have a much larger allotment of capital ship tonnage than has been conceded to her. Not only would she take precedence over Japan, but instead of being placed on a level with Italy she would be twice as strong as that Power.

 

The admiral is also very severe on the submarine agreement, which he regards as contradictory, seeing that the first paragraph is virtually stultified by later ones. "It would appear," he says, "that the Washington Conference behind its seeming humanity marked a triumph of selfish interests. The French nation has therefore decided not to ratify those interests." It is hardly necessary to remind Admiral Favereau and others who think as he does that such action by France would bring about a serious situation, which might render the entire work of the Washington Conference null and void. Repudiation of the submarine agreement alone might not be such a grave step, except from the moral point of view, since that instrument might in any case break down under the stress of war; but failure to ratify the naval limitation compact would reopen the whole question of future relative strength, which, it was hoped, had been settled for at least a decade.—Naval and Military Record. 4 October. 1922

 

GREAT BRITAIN

 

Naval Competition Reviving.—Realizing the grave position in which the American Navy would be placed if a sudden emergency found it without a single high-speed cruising ship, the General Board is anxious to push forward the completion of the ten Omahas with all possible haste. As regards the new vessels whose construction is to be recommended, they will almost certainly be designed as a match for the 10,000-ton cruisers which Japan is about to lay down. This being the limit of displacement which the Naval Agreement permits, it will be interesting to observe how Americans and Japanese constructors tackle the problem of incorporating the best fighting qualities in a vessel of that size—always assuming that Congress can be prevailed upon to vote the money for new cruisers.

 

Idealists in America have unfortunately spread the delusion that naval rivalry was completely stopped by the Washington Conference, when, as a matter of fact, it was simply diverted into another channel. The process of disillusionment is likely to be painful, and may lead to much acrimonious comment at the expense of Japan. As it is, the threatened revival of shipbuilding competition in the lighter types of warships is the logical sequel to the refusal of the Conference to accept Great Britain's proposal for abolishing the submarine, a refusal to which the United States was unquestionably a party. Had the submarine been vetoed there would have been no difficulty in applying the tonnage ratio to all types of fighting craft, instead of to capital ships only, in which case the world would not now be on the verge of a new phase of naval competition.

 

The Submarine Fleets.—The American Navy's demand for additional submarines is rather surprising, in view of its generous supply of these craft. In October of last year it had 148 boats. Since that date twenty-two old boats have been placed on the disposal list, so that the total establishment is reduced to 126. This figure, however, still compares very favorably with the British total, which in the course of the present financial year is to be brought down to fifty-eight, as announced by the First Lord in his statement on the current Navy Estimates. Adding six boats now in Australian service and two in Canada—though the latter will probably be scrapped—the submarine establishment of the British Empire comprises only sixty-six boats all told, or little more than half the American total. The precise strength of Japan in these craft is uncertain, but she is known to have in hand a large program which, when completed, will place her second only to the United States in point of numbers.

 

The real strength of the Japanese submarine position is believed to lie in the large proportion of boats which are endowed with an extensive radius of action. On the other hand, most of the American submarines are short-range boats which could not be, used for independent trans-Pacific operations. Probably, however, the published figures of submarine endurance are no more to be relied on as a true index of radius than were the fuel endurance figures of surface ships in the coal-burning era. In those days it was customary to deduct from forty to fifty per cent from the nominal maximum, owing to the heavy consumption of fuel for driving auxiliary machinery. The result was that cruisers with a paper range of 10,000 miles were unable in practice to steam more than half that distance without bunkering. Another factor that enters into the question of submarine range is the capacity of personnel to endure the strain of prolonged service in these boats, which are not distinguished for habitability. For the largest German submarine built during the war, a radius of 20,000 miles was claimed but it is very doubtful whether the crew could have remained fit and efficient after half that distance had been covered without putting into harbor.—Naval and Military Record, 20 September, 1922.

 

Prohibition on the High Seas.—It is perhaps as well that events of more immediate gravity in the Near East should have diverted attention in this country from the singular incidents which have been taking place across the Atlantic in connection with the suppression of "rum running." Up to the present more than a score of British vessels have been seized by ships of the U.S. "Prohibition Navy," most of them admittedly far beyond the three-mile limit to which American jurisdiction is legally restricted. In one or two cases this high-handed procedure has been resisted, the latest instance being that of the British yacht Onward, whose skipper refused to let the American revenue officer come on board and forcibly removed his hands from the rail. It is admitted at Washington that there is no statute in the international code which justifies this high-handed procedure on the part of the American revenue officials, and only its prompt discontinuance can absolve our Government from the unpleasant duty of making strong representations to Washington.

 

That the advocates of prohibition should feel annoyed at the spectacle of foreign ships bringing cargoes of forbidden liquor to the vicinity of their coast is easily understandable, but that is no reason why they should set at naught one of the cardinal rules of international law and molest British ships which, technically at least, are passing on their lawful occasions well outside American territorial waters. There seems not a shadow of doubt that the Prohibition patrols have been guilty of arbitrary and grossly illegal acts, incidentally violating the very principle which their own country fought to defend in 1812. Fortunately, there are signs that the Washington authorities intend to curb this intemperate zeal on the part of their subordinates. They have, in fact, forbidden the seizure of foreign ships outside the three-mile limit, and everyone will hope that this order will put an end to a course of conduct which, if persisted in, might react unfavorably on our excellent relations with the United States. A touch of irony is given to the situation by the remark of a New York paper that for every gallon of liquor seized in foreign ships a thousand gallons are illicitly manufactured in the State of New York alone.—Naval and Military Record, 4 October, 1922.

 

English Orders Placed With Krupp.—The Matin, Paris, reports from London that the Krupp factory at Essen has just received a large order from a firm in Glasgow for material to be used in ship construction. It is stated that the prices of the German firm were very much lower than those of Engli.sh firms.

 

Status of British Aircraft Carrier.—On August 9, 1922, the Marquess of Graham published a letter in the Morning Post in regard to battleships and aircraft. The substance of this letter was that the British Navy's great need at present was for airplane carriers, and he suggested that the Admiralty should build at once at least three large aircraft carriers, of lower freeboard than the Argus and with greater speed and other improvements, with at least thirty airplanes' attached to each carrier, and with the whole complement in personnel—whether for air or sea service—belonging to the navy proper. After the airplane carriers to the above extent had been provided for, he said that post bellum battleships should then be built to suit the purse.

 

In reply to this letter, the naval correspondent of the Morning Post of August 11, 1922, published the following statement:

 

In view of the letter from the Marquess of Graham, published in these columns on Wednesday, it seems desirable to set forward the position in which the Royal Navy stands to-day in regard to aircraft carriers built and building.

 

Aircraft carriers are the only type of vessels, besides capital ships, the total tonnage of which is limited by the Washington Naval Treaty; it being laid down that the total tonnage for aircraft carriers of each of the contracting powers shall not exceed: United States and British Empire, 135,000 tons each; Japan, 81,000 tons; France and Italy, 60,000 tons each. Replacement of existing tonnage is also provided for, but with the special proviso that all aircraft carrier tonnage in existence or building on November 12, 1921, shall be considered experimental, and may be replaced, within the total tonnage limit prescribed, without regard to its age.

 

A further clause fixes the maximum displacement of any one aircraft carrier at 27,000 tons ; but the contracting powers are permitted to convert ships which otherwise would be scrapped under the provisions of the treaty with aircraft carriers up to a tonnage of 33,000 tons for each ship so converted, without increase of total tonnage allowed. The United States is converting two of the six battle cruisers which are now building under this arrangement, the remaining four being scrapped.

 

All the aircraft carriers belonging to the Royal Navy, built and building, fall under the experimental category. There are completed and now m service the Argus, Pegasus, and Ark Royal; of which the first alone can be regarded as in any sense constituting an ocean-going aircraft carrier, the other two being makeshifts. Two carriers, Eagle and Hermes, are on the point of completion, and should be passed into service during the current financial year. The former is a convert battleship, the Almirante Cochrane, taken over by the Admiralty when in course of construction for the Chilean Government by Armstrong's. She is of 22,790 tons displacement, and has a speed of 24 knots. Hermes is a smaller type of vessel, specially designed by Sir E. Tennyson d'Eyncourt, and has a displacement of 11,000 tons, with a speed of 25 knots. Finally there is the Furious, originally a 31-knot cruiser of 19,000 tons, converted into an aircraft carrier during the war, in which role she did good service with the Grand Fleet in 1917-18. This vessel is now undergoing reconstruction at Devonport, a sum of £300,000 having been voted for that purpose in the navy estimates, 1922-23. She will not, however, be completed until 1923-24.

 

Aircraft carriers for service with the fleet are yet in their infancy. Much experiment and experience under all conditions to be met with at sea is necessary before the ideal carrier can be designed; although at present the British Navy is far in advance of any other navy in this respect. It would seem, therefore, that the Admiralty policy of experimenting mainly with converted vessels is the correct and most economical course to follow, having regard to the lead possessed in this type of vessel and the "experimental clause" of the naval treaty referred to above. To sink several millions prematurely in building new vessels which, when completed, would very probably not embody the features which progressive experiments would demonstrate were necessary, would handicap the Royal Navy during the whole period that the naval treaty remains in operation.

 

Royal Navy Postgraduate Course For Officers.—At the present time the following courses are being conducted with the number of student officers noted:

 

I. Specialist Courses. These are for officers specializing in particular duties, viz.; Gunnery, Signals and Wireless Telegraphy, Navigation, and Engineering. The number of officers attending these courses is governed by the requirements each year. The length of the courses and the number for the present year are as follows:

 

Course	Number	Remarks
Gunnery	10	9 months preliminary course at R.N. College Greenwich followed by 9 months in Gunnery or Torpedo School.
Torpedo	8
Signals and W/T	6	9 months course at Signal School, Portsmouth
Navigation	10	7 weeks course at the Navigation School, Portsmouth
Engineering	32	Two terms (about 6 months) at R.N. College, Greenwich followed by a course of about 18 months at R.N. Engineering College at Keyham.

 

II. Courses for Junior Executive of Lieutenant.

 

Educational course at R.N. College, Greenwich, 6 months

 

Gunnery course at Gunnery School, Portsmouth, 12 weeks

 

Torpedo course at Torpedo School, Portsmouth, 6 weeks

 

Navigation course at Navigation School, Portsmouth, 6 weeks

 

All Executive Officers are required to take these courses soon after

promotion to the rank of Acting Sub-Lieutenant.

 

Loss of British War Vessels.—The destroyer Speedy, 1,087 tons, built

by Thornycrofts and commissioned August, 1918, was lost in the Sea of

Marmora on September 24, after a collision.

 

The British Admiralty has decided not to attempt to salvage H. M. S.

Raleigh except for equipment readily removable.

 

British Fleet in Near East.—Practically the entire Mediterranean

Fleet has been concentrated in the area: Dardanelles, Sea of Marmora

and Bosporus.

 

The following Naval units have been detached from the British Atlantic

Fleet and ordered as reinforcements to the British Mediterranean Fleet:

 

First Battle Squadron

 

First Division

Barham (Flag of V. A. C.)

Madaya

Valiant

Warspite

 

Second Division

Revenge (Flag of R.A.)

Ramillies

Resolution

Royal Oak

 

Second Light Cruiser Squadron

Curacoa (flag)

Caledos

Carysfort

Castor

Cordelia

Cambrian has been ordered to join this squadron

 

Curacoa, Carysfort and Cordelia of this squadron are known to be in Turkish waters. The exact whereabouts of the Caledoti and Castor are not known at the present time.

 

Second Destroyer Flotilla

Spencer (Flotilla leader)

Vanquisher

Vectis

Venetia

Viceroy

Violent

Viscount

Winchelsea

Wolfhound

 

Third Destroyer Flotilla

Campbell (Flotilla Leader)

Verity

Veteran

Wanderer

Wild Swan

Wishart

Witherington

Wyvern

Wolverine

Aircraft Carrier Ark Royal

Aircraft Carrier Argus

 

Second Submarine Flotilla

Lucia (Depot ship)

Adamant

L.18

L.21

L.22

L.25

L.52

L.56

L.71

 

First Destroyer Flotilla

Wallace (Flotilla Leader)

Vancouver

Velox

Versatile

Vortigern

Walker

Warwick

Watchman

Whirlwind

 

The destroyers Rigorous and Romola, which were in reserve at Gibraltar, have received full complements and have proceeded to Turkish waters.

 

The complements of the battleships Centurion and Ajax have been raised to full complements, and these vessels have proceeded to Turkish waters.

 

The light-cruiser Ceres, of the Mediterranean Fleet, has been recommissioned and has proceeded to Turkish waters.

 

The light-cruiser Vindictive has just arrived at Malta upon her third trooping trip. This vessel also carries certain aircraft.

 

The flagship of the British Atlantic Fleet, the Queen Elizabeth, is in the Firth of Forth.

 

The First Light Cruiser Squadron and the Fourth Destroyer Flotilla are just completing a special cruise in the Baltic and, as these are the only other light forces with full complements available, it is probable that they will be dispatched to the Near East should the situation there become more serious. The cruise of these forces is in the nature of a diplomatic cruise, and it was therefore desirable to complete it if possible.

 

In accordance with the procedure in emergencies, the Admiralty has suspended publication of the movements of British vessels of war in the Mediterranean.

 

JAPAN

 

Japan’s Naval Construction Program.—Since we last wrote on the subject of Japanese naval policy there have been important developments which merit some further comment. In an article published on May 26, we renewed the principal modifications in the shipbuilding program brought about by the Washington Treaty, and showed that economic necessity was compelling Japan to proceed with the construction of a fairly large number of so-called "auxiliary combatant craft," the aggregate tonnage of which is not restricted by the Treaty. The Imperial Navy Department in Tokyo has now issued a statement explanatory of its shipbuilding plans for the near future. According to this document, there is no truth in the reports circulated abroad, principally in the United States, that a large increase in the number of auxiliary vessels which had been authorized previous to the Conference is meditated. On the contrary, it is stated, the total is actually to be reduced by one cruiser, thirteen destroyers and twenty-four submarines, as compared with the original program of ships to be completed by the year 1927. At the same time, however, the designs of all remaining vessels have been re-drafted on the basis of greater dimensions and power, so that the deletion of the thirty-eight units enumerated signifies a reduction of only 13,935 tons in the total displacement of the pre-Conference program. It is clear from this that very large additions have been made to the displacement of the surviving vessels, which comprise the following: Four cruisers of 10,000 tons each; four cruisers of 7,000 tons each; twenty-four destroyers of the first class, with an aggregate of 33,000 tons; and twenty-four submarines, with a collective displacement of 28,166 tons. It is not stated which of these vessels, if any, have already been laid down, but in any case they are likely to be put in hand as soon as circumstances permit, since they are intended to provide the leading shipyards with employment in place of that which was lost through the cancelling of the capital ships. The four largest cruisers, it is surmised, will be distributed among the leading State and privately owned yards—Kure and Yokosuka in the former category and Kawasaki and Mitsubishi in the latter. One of the 7,000-ton ships may be built at Sasebo Arsenal and the other three by contract.

 

Four of the new cruisers, it will be observed, are to be of the maximum displacement which the Washington Treaty specifies for ships of this type. They will therefore be the largest modern cruising ships to be found in any navy up to the present, surpassing our Raleigh class by 250 tons, and showing an excess of no less than 4,400 tons over the largest hitherto built in Japan. As they are expected to embody very high speed, a large fuel capacity, special features of protection, and a main armament of the heaviest caliber permitted by the Treaty, viz., 8-in. guns, particulars of their design will be awaited with more than ordinary interest. As regards the 7,000-ton cruisers, at least one vessel of this displacement is known to have been laid down recently, and it is probable, though not certain, that this ship is included in the quartet embraced by the modified program. As will appear later, Japanese constructors have been singularly successful with their recent light cruiser designs, which compare very favorably with the best cruising ships now under foreign flags. A total of 33,000 tons for the twenty-four new destroyers gives an average of approximately 1,375 tons per boat, as compared with the 1,345 tons of the latest first-class Japanese destroyers to be completed. The lower figure corresponds more or less to the displacement of our Admiralty V. class, which have machinery of 27,000 shaft horsepower for a speed of 34 knots. The Japanese 1,345-ton boats, however, are credited with 38,500 shaft horsepower, or only 1,500 units less than our Admiralty type flotilla leaders, which displace 1,800 tons. Evidently, therefore, the new Japanese destroyers are capable of developing very high speeds. The first-class boats are now armed with four 4.7-in. guns, two anti-aircraft machine-guns, and six torpedo tubes, but in the latest design a fifth 4.7-in. gun is said to be provided for.

 

Turning to the submarines of the amended program, the average displacement of the twenty-four new boats works out at 1,173 tons, but it is not expected that the entire group will be of uniform design. As far back as 1920, Japanese plans were got out for several types of large cruising submersibles, ranging in surface displacement from 1,500 to 2,500 tons, with a maximum speed of 18 knots, and in the course of last year the first 1,500-ton boats were laid down. Their displacement is almost double that of the earlier boats, which are 740 tons in surface trim and 1,100 submerged. Problems of submarine design receive the most careful attention in Japan, where a continuous effort is made to assimilate the best features of foreign, including German, construction into the basic design which has been evolved to meet special Japanese requirements. So far as can be ascertained, the manufacture of large-powered Diesel engines for submarine propulsion is still imposing a severe strain on the national industry, and it has been found necessary to enlist the aid of both British and continental firms to meet the demand for such machinery. Details of these orders are not yet available, but it is understood that the first boats of the new 1,500-ton type will be equipped with Diesel engines of European manufacture. In all other respects, however, the modern Japanese submarine is of purely national conception. It differs from the prevailing foreign types by reason of its large reserve of buoyancy, which is nearly fifty per cent. This is in accordance with German practice, while contemporary boats of British, American, and French designs have a much smaller reserve of buoyancy. The inner hull of the Japanese boat is small, but it is enclosed in a very large outer hull, with the result that the interskin spaces are exceptionally large. By this system the water ballast tanks and the oil storage spaces are considerably enlarged, the margin of safety is increased and the cruising endurance prolonged. In the opinion of Japanese naval officers, their submarines, though perhaps rather less speedy than foreign boats of similar tonnage, are better adapted to general war service, especially in the waters of the Pacific Ocean.

 

The exact number of submarines completed, built and projected for the Japanese Navy cannot be stated with certainty, information on this point being vague and contradictory. Taking sixty as the number of the last boat authorized before the modified program was adopted, and adding the twenty-four new boats specified in that measure, we obtain a gross total of eighty-four submarines. This, however, includes thirteen early boats which are too small to be effective outside coastal waters, and should therefore be omitted from any estimate of strength in ocean-going craft. The total is thus reduced to seventy-one boats, as compared with the fifty-eight boats of which the British submarine flotilla will consist when the deletions ordered by the Admiralty during the current financial year have been made. The American total is very much larger, but will be found on analysis to include a great number of boats of small tonnage and restricted endurance. Of large ocean-going submarines, comparable with those now built or being built for Japan, the United States has only fifty-six completed or building. It will thus be seen that Japan is in a far stronger and better position with regard to submarine strength than a cursory glance at the comparative tables would suggest.

 

Special interest attaches to the battleship Mutsu, which formed the subject of so much discussion at the Washington Conference. It will be recalled that under the original American scheme of limitation, this vessel was to be scrapped, a proposal to which the Japanese delegates took strong exception, mainly on the ground that she was practically completed before the Conference met. After weeks of debate, it was finally agreed that the Mutsu should be retained, corresponding (adjustments being made in the ratios of capital ship tonnage allotted to Japan, the United States and the British Empire respectively. As a result of this compromise, Great Britain was empowered to lay down two new 35,000-ton battleships. It will therefore be seen that Japan's successful claim to keep the Mutsu had far-reaching effects. Until our new vessels are afloat, this ship and her sister, the Nagato, will continue to represent the heaviest type of battleship in the world, though their individual displacement is 7,400 tons less than that of the British battle cruiser Hood. Laid down at Yokosuka Dockyard on June 1, 1918, the Mutsu was launched on May 31, 1920, and went into commission during December, 1921. Her leading characteristics are: Length between perpendiculars, 66oft. 7in.; length over all, 698ft. 6in.; breadth, 95ft.; mean draught of water, 30ft.; displacement, 33,800 tons. The lines of the hull, moulded with an eye to speed, are somewhat finer than those of the latest foreign battleships. There is no external bulge, but an elaborate system of subdivision in association with armored bulkheads placed well back from the outer plating is believed by her designers to make the ship reasonably invulnerable to under-water attack. The motive power is supplied by geared turbines of 46,000 shaft horsepower. There is no definite information as to the number or type of the boilers. The speed of the Mutsu on the measured mile is returned as 23.4 knots, but the ship is said to have attained higher speeds than this in her full power endurance trials.

 

As it is not the custom of the Japanese authorities to disclose details of armor protection in their modern ships, the thickness of the Mutsu's side, deck and turret armor can only be surmised, but according to the percentage of other weights to total displacement, it would appear to be very massive. The main armament consists of eight 16-in. 45-caliber guns, mounted in four turrets on the center line of the ships. These weapons were constructed at the Muroran Ironworks, and the breech mechanism at Kure Arsenal. Each gun weighs 112 tons unmounted, and throws a projectile of about 2,200 lbs. The mountings permit an elevation up to twenty-five degrees or thirty degrees. Twenty 5.5-in. quick-firing guns are disposed in casemates, the position of the secondary armament being clearly visible in the illustration. There are besides four 12-pounder antiaircraft guns, four above-water torpedo tubes, and four submerged tubes. As in the Nagato, the foremast is a gigantic heptapod structure, supporting searchlight platforms, control tops, and director towers for the main and secondary armament. Great rigidity is claimed for this form of mast, as well as immunity from destruction by shell fire; but the weight involved must be serious, and the large area of target it offers is a further drawback. The opening visible at the stern of the ship leads out of the admiral's quarters, and presumably takes the place of the overhanging stern-walk fitted in some earlier ships, which was liable to be flooded in heavy weather or when the ship was steaming at full speed. With the commissioning of the Mutsu, Japanese capital ship construction is to be suspended for a term of ten years, conformably with the Limitation Treaty. The 40,100-ton battleships Kaga and Tosa launched last year are to be used as target ships and eventually broken up; while the battle cruisers Amagi and Akagi, still on the stocks, have been re-designed as aircraft carriers, each displacing 26,000 tons.

 

The light cruiser Oh-i is one of a very numerous class of ships which have proved an unqualified success. Her sister vessels are the Kuma, Tama, Kitakanii, Kiso, Nagara, and with slight modifications, the Natori, Isudzu. Yura, Kinu, Ayase, Otonase, Minase, Abukunta. The Oh-i herself was begun at the Kawasaki Yard, Kobe, in November, 1919, launched the following July, and completed last autumn. The first ships of the class were begun in 1918, and the last unit, Abukuma, is still on the stocks. The principal dimensisons of Oh-i are as follows: Length between perpendiculars, 500ft.; length over all, 535ft.; breadth, 46ft. gin.; mean draught of water, 15ft. gin.; normal displacement, 5,500 tons. She has geared turbines of Parsons type, taking steam from fourteen boilers, mainly oil-fired, and developing 90,000 shaft horsepower. We understand that the designed speed of 33 knots has been exceeded by every ship of this class which has hitherto made her trials, and that in at least one case the remarkable velocity of 34 knots was achieved. This is easily a world's record for light cruiser speed, and one that reflects the utmost credit on Japanese engineers and engineering. Our own light cruisers of the E class, of 7,600 tons, are expected to develop 80,000 shaft horsepower, equivalent to 33 knots when in light condition, and the American Omahas, of 7,500 tons, are designed for 90,000 shaft horsepower and 23-7 knots; but meanwhile the Japanese ships have actually exceeded both these velocities. The Oh-i and others of her type are protected by a partial belt of high-tensile steel, reinforced by an armo deck, 2 ½ in. thick at the extremities. They are armed with seven 5.5in. quick-firing guns, throwing an 82 lb. shell. Two of these pieces are placed tandem-wise on the forecastle, one is on each beam abreast the foremast, and the remaining three are on the center line in the after part of the ship. While this disposition limits the direct-ahead fire to three guns and the stern fire to one gun, on the other hand, it permits of a powerful concentration of fire on the bow or quarter, and the fact that it has been adhered to in so many ships is evidence of its tactical advantages. There are eight 21 in. deck torpedo tubes mounted in pairs, two on 2ach side at the break of the forecastle, and two in similar positions abaft the aftermost funnel. Two 12-pounder guns are carried for aircraft attack. As will be seen from the illustration, all the guns have an excellent command, thanks to the high freeboard of the ship and the mounting of the after weapons on the superstructure deck.

 

These light cruisers are reported to be splendid seaboats, and able to work their armament with effect in conditions of weather which would severely handicap low-lying craft, such as our C and D vessels. A squadron consisting of the Oh-i, Kiso, Kitakami, and Tama, escorted the Prince of Wales in H.M.S. Renown from Hong Kong to Yokohama, and their admirable behavior in the heavy weather which was encountered during the passage was observed with great interest from the British ship. According to the Admiralty Return, mentioned above, Japan now has twenty-five effective light cruisers built and building, all but four of which date from 1918. If, therefore, the eight ships of the post-Conference program are all additional to these, the establishment will eventually reach thirty-three ships or, deducting the four older vessels, twenty-nine light cruisers, the slowest of which has a trial speed of 33 knots. Unless present programs are considerably amplified, no other navy will be able to match this remarkable fleet of cruising ships.

 

Steady progress continues to be made in the development of the destroyer flotillas. At the beginning of the year the effective boats in service numbered fifty-nine, the majority of which are of post-war design; and twenty-eight were under construction. As a number of additional boats have been commenced during the year, the present position is approximately as follows: Built, sixty-five; being built, thirty. To these must be added the twenty-four destroyers to be laid down in accordance with the amended program, the completion of which will bring the establishment up to fifty-five first-class boats and fifty-six second-class, the former with displacements ranging from 1,085 to 1,400 tons, and the latter from 600 to 850 tons. As in all other types of warships recently designed in Japan, the new destroyers exhibit a high degree of tactical efficiency in proportion to their size. The latest design of which we have cognizance is that of the Shiokaze class, launched in 1920, and to which belongs the Hakaze. The chief dimensions of this class are: Length between perpendiculars, 320ft.; length over all, 336 ½ ft.; breadth, 29 ¼ ft.: mean draught of water, 9 ½ ft. Machinery: General turbines drawing steam from four oil-tired boilers, and developing 38,500 shaft horsepower for a speed of 34 knots. The armament comprises four 4.7-in. 45-pounder quick-firing guns, two anti-aircraft "pom-poms,'' and six 21-in. torpedo tubes mounted in pairs. In the later boats, it is anticipated, the extra displacement will be utilized to increase the fuel capacity, and the gun armament may be strengthened. The Ashi was launched in September, 1921. and commissioned about four months ago. She is 275i/4ft. long between perpendiculars, 26ft. broad and draws 8ft. of water at the normal displacement of 850 tons. Her machinery consists of turbines, apparently without gearing, and three oil-fired boilers. On trial, the Ashi developed considerably more than the 21,000 shaft horsepower stipulated in the contract, and bettered her designed speed of 31.5 knots by nearly 2 knots. She carries three 4.7-in. guns, two anti-aircraft machine guns, and four 21-in. torpedo tubes. It is evidently the intention to discontinue the building of second-class boats in future, as the whole of the destroyers to be laid down under the new program are of the first-class type.

 

Submarine No. 23 is a "medium ocean-going" boat, completed late in 1920. Her displacement m surface trim is 740 tons, increased to 1,100 tons when submerged. The Diesel engines for surface propulsion develop 2,600 brake horsepower, and the electric motors for submerged running work up to 1,200 horsepower. The highest surface speed is not over 16 knots. Sufficient oil is carried for a radius of 6,500 sea miles. Two torpedo tubes are fitted in the bows and two in the stern. A short 12-pounder anti-aircraft gun is mounted abaft the conning tower.—The Engineer, 6 October, 1922.

 

Japan Begins Cut in Yard Force.—Washington, October 11.—Discharge of 6,000 Japanese navy yard workers, as beginning of the naval reduction program agreed upon at the Washington Arms Conference, was announced today in official advices to the Japanese Embassy. The step, taken in advance of an exchange of ratifications of the naval limitation treaty, was regarded here as reflecting the confidence of Japanese statesmen in the eventual acceptance of the pact by all the signatories.—Baltimore Sun, 12 October, 1922.

 

UNITED STATES

 

Our Naval Situation.—Our naval situation may be discussed at length or in brief under the following four general heads:

 

I. Accomplishments of the Conference on Limitation of Armaments

 

The United States made by far the greatest sacrifice in order to establish the principle of Limitation of Armaments by International Agreements. The United States scrapped battleships on which it had already spent one-third of a billion dollars and which, when completed, would have given us undisputed naval supremacy. We recommended limitation in all classes of fighting craft, but agreement could only be reached on capital ships and air-plane carriers.

 

We agreed not to establish naval bases in the Western Pacific, thereby reducing our potential power in that locality to a negligible amount.

 

Competition has not ceased in the increase of materiel, its design or in the sufficiency of efficiency of personnel. Whether or not it will be possible to extend the principle of Limitation of Armaments by International Agreement to include all fighting craft, the future alone can tell. Probably the best article on the accomplishments of the Conference is embodied in the address of Rear Admiral H.S. Knapp, delivered on April 27, 1922, before the American Society of International Law and published in their proceedings for that year.

 

The Navy Department approves in full of any reasonable plan to limit armaments by international agreement, as relative strength within limits is a vital factor. It should not be overlooked, however, that seapower is measured by three factors: (1) Navy or combat strength, (2) Naval and Commercial Bases, and (3) Merchant Marine; and to these might well be added Radio and Cable Communications.

 

In connection with this subject: the recent book written by Captain Knox might be read for more complete information. This book is entitled The Eclipse of American Sea Power, and is published by the Army and Navy Journal.

 

II. The Need of the Navy

 

An adequate navy is necessary in order that we may exert our influence effectively for the general good; secure and maintain our national policies; protect our own interests; insure our future prosperity and maintain our security as a nation. Our foreign policy is as strong as our navy and no stronger. A nation with little physical power has small weight in the council of nations and is given little consideration, even in regard to her own rights, and can certainly exert no influence for the rights of others.

 

Under this general head might be included the value of our navy in its aid to industry and commerce. At the present time a pamphlet is being prepared in the Navy Department with data obtained from all Bureaus regarding this subject.

 

The part the navy has played in all great wars has largely been overlooked. It can be given as an almost invariable rule that ultimate success in war lies with the power that controls the sea, having the resources of the world at its disposal and strangling its opponents by blockades.

 

Captain Overstreet has an excellent article in The Outlook of October 12, 1922, "Will Total Disarmament Prevent War?" In this connection it may be pointed out that if navies are reduced in size, the Merchant Marine is of increasing value for war purposes. With no regular fighting craft, the navies of the world would be their Merchant Marine.

 

This subject can be expanded indefinitely through a study of Mahan, Upton's Military Policy of the United States, and other books on similar lines. Upton's Military Policy of the United States does not deal very much with the navy, but does deal with questions of preparedness and "the cost of unpreparedness."

 

III. The Cost of the Navy

 

About eight per cent of the Federal revenue is spent on the navy. The Federal revenue is about one-third of the total taxes. Therefore about two and one-half per cent of the average total per capita taxes goes to the navy. The Federal taxes are not as evenly distributed as local taxes. Those who pay little or no income taxes are taxed little or nothing for the Federal Government, and consequently for the navy. The average per capita tax for the navy is three dollars. In the agricultural districts, where the navy is most opposed, the average per capita is about twenty-five cents.

 

The cost of the navy should not be confounded with the cost of past wars, which cost is in great part due to unpreparedness. Even leaving aside the risks we have run in the past and the unnecessary loss of life, from a financial standpoint only, the cost of unpreparedness has been far greater than the actual cost of wars, with adequate preparedness and with adequate preparedness, some of these wars could have been avoided and the others very much shortened.

 

The cost of the navy during peace is in great part repaid by its aid to industry and commerce.

 

The cost of the navy may be put on an insurance basis. Our exports are about six billion dollars a year, half of this being agricultural products. About two and one-quarter billion dollars a year are expended on private insurance policies. One-sixth of this amount if for National Insurance only would not be excessive.

 

There are those who maintain that the expenditures of the navy should be to a great extent given to schools; that the Federal Government spends very little on schools. In this connection it should be pointed out that education is not a function of the Federal Government, but is a function of local government; and that over one billion dollars in taxes are now spent by the people on schools. Whether or not this amount should be increased is subject to local decision. In the preamble of the Constitution are the words, "Provide for the common defense." This is a Federal function and its most important function.

 

IV. What Our Naval Policy Should Be

 

The discussion of this subject was in order before we ratified the Naval Treaty. It is hardly in order now even to discuss the subject. Our policy under the Treaty can be nothing other than to maintain a navy on a parity with Great Britain and five-thirds that of Japan in Regular personnel, Naval Reserves and fighting craft of every kind.

 

To maintain this policy we must maintain in full commission all battleships retained under the Treaty; we must build airplane carriers up to the Treaty limit; we must build cruisers to maintain our five in the 5-5-3 ratio, which means at the present time we should immediately have under construction twenty-two 10,000-ton cruisers; we must maintain our submarine strength, especially in fleet submarines of long radius. In this special type of submarines we are behind our ratio.

 

In destroyers we are ahead of our ratio, but have lost this advantage by having about two-thirds of them out of commission. It is an advantage to be ahead in any type, but destroyers cannot replace cruisers. We have no destroyer leaders.

 

To maintain this policy in personnel we require personnel equal to Great Britain and five-thirds times the number maintained in Japan.

 

It is difficult to make a direct comparison of personnel with Great Britain, for in their estimates they appropriate under fifteen different "votes." In "votes" one, appropriation is made for 88,805 men for the fleet; this does not include a large number of Reserves used constantly on fleet auxiliaries; the navy's quota of the Air Service; men on shore; men on service under Dominion and foreign governments; men in the Colonial Navy. We do not man our navy in part with reserves; we include our Air Force, recruits in training on shore, men at trade schools, recruiting stations, radio and compass stations, and other necessary military activities. On a conservative basis, to place our naval personnel on a substantial parity with that of the British Navy, we should appropriate for about 120,000 men.

 

Japan has a total enlisted personnel of 73,000 men. If we maintain our 5-3 ratio, we require five-thirds times 73,000, or about 122,000 men. We have a total of 86,000 men.

 

In time of war all navies are greatly expanded. We must make it an important part of our policy to organize and maintain a sufficient and efficient Naval Reserve.—Department News Bulletin.

 

Naval Mission to Brazil.—The U.S. Naval Mission to Brazil under Admiral Vogelgesang, is attracting international attention.

 

A correspondent of the London Times views the affair with alarm and declares that "it foreshadows the eclipse of the ancient British prestige and influence in the Brazilian navy." He goes on to say, "As the result of British pre-occupation during and since the war, the Americans have been left practically a free field in Brazilian naval affairs, of which they have not been slow to take advantage. The infiltration of American ideas among the younger Brazilian naval officers has been steady and progressive, and has been aided by the American aviation and staff instructors contracted during the latter part of the war, as well as by proper naval representation attached to the American Embassy. In contrast to this, British official interests have been confided to a naval attaché of junior rank, whose duties were not confined to Brazil, but extended to the Argentine and Uruguay, with headquarters in Buenos Aires, and whose visits to Rio de Janeiro have been infrequent and hasty."—Our Navy, 7 October, 1922.

 

CHILE

 

The Chilean Navy.—By decree of August 3, 1922, the following ships have been placed in ordinary: O'Higgins, Captain Prat, Esmeralda, Blanco Encalada.

 

This leaves in active commission, forming the active Fleet:

Dreadnaught: Latorre

Cruiser: Chacahuco

Destroyers: Lynch

Condell

Uribe

Williams

Riveras

 

The only other ships in commission are the:

Submersible: H-1

Cruiser Ministro —On Hydrographic work in Straits of Magellan

Zenteno

Transports Baquedano —On a practice cruise off the Chilean Coast

Angamos

 

MERCHANT MARINE

 

Use of Oil Fuel Growing Rapidly.—The fitting of an increasing proportion of the world's tonnage to use oil continues unabated. The percentage- of the total tonnage thus equipped has risen from 3.09 per cent in 1914, to 24.69 per cent at the present time. This change has been occasioned by two conditions.

 

These are the conversion of coal-burning vessels to an oil-burning basis and the construction of motor or Diesel driven vessels. The adoption of the internal combustion or Diesel type of propulsive equipment is just beginning to assume important proportions in the United States; but in Great Britain and the continent of Europe this phase of the development has been and is making rapid strides.

 

The motor-equipped ship has unquestionably a strong advantage in economy over oil-fired steam-equipped vessels; but it is anticipated that the change from coal to oil, as applying on the world's shipping, will be greater through the intermediate stage of oil-fired steam vessels. These should create a requirement of at least 10,000,000 barrels of fuel oil for each million tons of shipping, using oil as fuel. Practically all of the vessels in operation by the United States Shipping Board and under private American ownership are substantially on an oil-burning basis, there being 49.4 per cent of these ships exclusively oil burners, 23.3 per cent coal burners, and 27.3 per cent convertible to burn either coal or oil.

 

In the use of fuel oil on board vessels, there are many economical features involved which would make the continuance of the use of oil as a fuel for maritime purposes of the greatest importance and which can be briefly summarized as follows:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. • More economical operation and reduced crews.
   • Greater cargo capacity of the vessel on account of its ability to carry oil in compartments not otherwise available for cargo, such as double bottoms, peak tanks, etc.
   • Ability of vessel's propulsive equipment to render more continuous service, steady steaming and uniform speed, thereby tending to more efficient operation.
   • Lessened wear and tear on vessel's equipment, machinery, boilers and reduced cost of upkeep.
   • Less frequent painting.
   • Preserving effect of oil on vessel's bottom, it being rarely necessary to undertake the most expensive item of renewing tank tops in oil-burning vessels.

 

Were the 55,000,000 tons of world's powered ocean shipping to be converted to an oil-burning basis, it would consume annually over 500,000,000 barrels of oil, which represents nearly the total quantity of petroleum produced in the world today. While this consumption could, of course, be somewhat reduced by a more universal adoption of Diesel engines, it would, nevertheless, be of huge proportions.—Nautical Gazette, 7 October, 1922.

 

Motor Ships Supplanting Steamships.—In spite of the severe shipping depression, motor-ship tonnage (full-powered ships 2,000 gross tons or over) increased thirty-seven per cent in the year ended June 30, 1922, as against a gain of only four per cent for steam tonnage exclusive of motor ships, according to an analysis of shipping by the transportation division of the Department of Commerce.

 

On June 30, 1921, there were 145 motor ships of 2,000 gross tons or over, aggregating 692,000 gross tons ; on the same date this year there were 186, totaling 946,000.

 

The United Kingdom continues to lead with 36,000 tons, an increase of twenty-four per cent. Sweden registered a large percentage gain, but continues in third place. Norway has displaced the United States as fourth on the list. Germany which did not have enough motor-ship tonnage to appear separately in the list last year, has seven vessels aggregating 32,083 tons this year. Danzig has two ships of 12,078 tons; one of these is the Zoppot of 9,932 tons, one of the largest tankers in the world.

 

The above totals are for what may be termed seagoing ships. In addition to these are 605 vessels under 2,000 tons each, aggregating 234,325 tons, equipped with Diesel engines. Last year on the same date there were 553 vessels of this kind, totaling 216,110 tons.

 

The chief engineer of one of the largest British shipyards stated two years ago that he saw a promising future for sailing ships with auxiliary Diesel engine power. This kind of tonnage has increased from forty-five ships, totaling 13,000 tons on June 30, 1915, to 777 of 342,530 tons in 1921, and to 870 of 353,181 tons in 1922. The United States holds the lead in this kind of tonnage, with fifty-four ships aggregating 50,957 tons.

 

Conversion of Government Cargo Carriers Into Diesel Engined Ships.—As announced in our issue of last week, the Shipping Board has not received a single application thus far for an advance from its Construction Loan Fund, which at the present time amounts to $25,000,000 and can be availed of by reputable American shipping concerns desirous of constructing vessels of the best and most efficient type. In view of the low ocean freights now prevailing and the depressed state of the shipping industry, this outcome is not to be wondered at. When so shrewd a vessel owner as Sir William Raeburn concedes that high-class British tramp vessels can only be operated at a loss at this juncture, it is not at all surprising that American ship-owners, whose operating costs are certainly on a parity with if not higher than those prevailing on British flagships, should be disinclined to invest money in new tonnage for which no employment could be found.

 

While the American merchant marine has certain operating handicaps to contend with, it possesses a far larger proportion of oil-burning and recently constructed vessels than any of its principal maritime competitors. With four-fifths of our shipping adapted to the burning of oil fuel and five-eighths less than five years of age, we can rightfully boast of having the youngest and most modern merchant fleet. But although we now lead in these two particulars, we shall lose this advantage in time if we rest content with our past achievements in the ship-building line. In the opinion of the best shipping experts, modern and up-to-date cargo steamers such as we possess are bound to be superseded before a great number of years by Diesel engined freighters whose operating costs are so much lower than those of similar steam-propelled craft. Astonishing as the statement may appear, not a single motorship has been laid up for lack of profitable employment during the past eighteen months, whereas hundreds of the best type of cargo carriers have had to be tied up for this reason. In the light of this experience it is clear that the nation which has the largest percentage of internal combustion ships is going to outdistance all others as a carrier of ocean cargoes. Instead of holding our own in this respect, however, we are trailing behind the United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden and Norway in the amount of ocean-going motorship tonnage owned, while of the 103 motorships of 251,328 gross tons building in the world's shipyards at the end of June, only three of 9,298 tons were completing in United States yards.

 

Unless this country keeps abreast of the times by embarking on the construction of motorships on a considerable scale it will assuredly drop behind in the race for maritime supremacy.—Nautical Gazette, 7 October, 1922.

 

Effect of Prohibition Ruling.—Attorney General Daugherty's ruling is bound to prove very detrimental to our merchant marine, which has already so many obstacles to contend with. It will prevent the chartering of American passenger carriers for round-the-world or other pleasure cruises and deflect traffic from them by causing European bound voyagers from South America or the Far East to proceed to their destination direct instead of traveling via one of our ports. The manning of our coal burning ships will be made difficult as Spaniards and other aliens, who form a large proportion of the stokers employed on American flag vessels, will certainly prefer employment on foreign steamers where they will not have to forego their daily wine ration. Our freighters will be forced out of the West Indian trade, where rum forms a portion of every mixed cargo and American tramp steamers debarred from transporting liquors will be less eligible for general chartering purposes than alien vessels. In the absence of an international agreement prohibiting the transportation of alcoholic beverages on all merchantmen, our shipping will be at a serious disadvantage in competing for the world's carrying, trade if the present regulations remain unmodified. Congress should recognize this fact and promptly pass remedial legislation if it desires our flag to hold its place on the sea.—Nautical Gazette, 14 October, 1922.

 

The Hamburg-American Line.—German shipping journals report that the present fleet of the Hamburg-American Line consists of forty-three steamers of a total tonnage of 165,707. 198,692 R. T. are under construction.

 

On September 4 the Hamburg-American Line re-opened its regular monthly service between Plymouth—Cuba—Mexico.

 

The Cape Norte, the new 13,502 T. steamship recently built by the Vulkan Werft in Hamburg, for the Hamburg-Sud-Amerikanische-Dampfschififahrtsgesellschaft,

makes its maiden voyage on September 14. The other two steamships of this company, the Cap Polonio and the Antonio Delfino are also in the South American service and form the quickest connection between Germany and Brazil, Uruguay, Argentine and Chili.

 

German Merchant Marine Personnel.—German shipping journals report that in the German Merchant Marine on ships of over 100 R.T. there are 2,367 captains and other officers; 1,087 engineers and machinists and 12,348 men. It is claimed that these figures represent about one fifth of the pre-war personnel.

 

French Steamship Lines.—The Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 330,180 tons and seventy-nine steamers.

 

The Messageries Maritimes. sixty-four ships and a total of 303,700 tons.

 

The Chargeurs Reimis, with twenty-six ships and a total of 132,860 tons.

 

The Transports Maritimes, with twenty-five ships and a total of 91,900 tons.

 

The Compagnie de Navigation Sud-Atlantique, with ten ships, two of which are from 12,000 to 15,000 tons, the total amounting to 85,500 tons.

 

The Compagnie Havraise Peninsnlaire.

 

The Compagnie Francaise de Navigation (Fabre), etc.

 

Aside from these, there existed, before the war, a commercial fleet composed of 642 steamers of at least 100 tons (total 947,205 tons), and 1,115 sailing vessels of at least fifty tons (total 460,253 tons).

 

ENGINEERING

 

Corrosion.—In view of the enormous importance of corrosion from every practical point of view, it is a matter for congratulation that after years of neglect considerable attention is at length being given to it by researchers, and fortunately they receive the necessary support, partly from such bodies as the Institution of Civil Engineers and the Institute of Metals, and partly from the Government Department of Scientific and Industrial Research. As a result, important advances in our knowledge of the nature and mechanism of corrosion have been made, notably by Dr. Newton Friend and Dr. G. Bengough. The latest report published by the latter—the sixth report to the Corrosion Research Committee of the Institute of Metals, presented at the recent Swansea meeting, and dealt with in our issue of September 22—is of special interest. When it is realized, as indicated above, that for most metals the occurrence of oxidation is a normal and almost necessary process, it is the study of inhibiting causes that becomes of primary interest. Such causes have been sought in two directions. For a very long time, the so-called "electrolytic" theory of corrosion was widely accepted, and differences of electric potential, either internal and local or external and general, were looked for to account for all cases of rapid corrosion. No doubt in many cases such forces are at work, and the efforts made to eliminate them have proved successful to a limited extent. Thus the effort to reduce internal sources of electrolytic action by the use of metals of very great purity have met with only slight success; on the other hand, the application of external electric currents having a protective action has, in some cases, proved extremely effective. The actual application of such currents, however, is a difficult matter, and some of the most difficult cases of corrosion have not yielded to this type of treatment. More recently, the view that protection is to be sought by a study of the products of corrosion with a view to rendering them protective, in the same way as the oxide skin tends to protect aluminum, shows promise of greater fruitfulness. Although not, perhaps, evolved from any such considerations by its discoverers, it is held by some that the formation of a kind of protective coating or "passive" skin is the real secret of the non-corrodibility of the "stainless" or non-rusting steels containing chromium. In the great majority of cases, on the other hand, it is coming to be understood, thanks to the work of Bengough, that intense local corrosion may result from the accumulation of corrosion products which are not only non-protective, but actually accelerate corrosion. To find the explanation of many of these actions, appeal is now being made to the very modern science of the chemistry of colloids. To most of us, colloidal chemistry is suggestive of organic materials like glue and gelatine, but in recent years a colloidal chemistry of metals has also been developed. It is quite probable that the enthusiastic workers in that field may endeavor to carry their applications of this branch of chemistry too far; but Dr. Bengough—following, we believe, the lead of Dr. Newton Friend—has clearly shown that colloidal solutions—"gels" and "sols"—play an important part in many of the phenomena of corrosion. Nor is this surprising, when we realize that many of the products of corrosion, such as the metallic hydroxides which result from the oxidation of metals in the presence of water, are often met with in a highly gelatinous form. On corroded parts a "slimy mess" is at least as often to be found as a hard crystalline deposit, and it is—roughly speaking—with the understanding of these "slimy messes" that colloidal chemistry has to deal. Whether or not, therefore, the colloidal theory of corrosion affords the full and final explanation of the phenomena, there can be no doubt that the metallurgist, and indirectly the engineer, will be forced to take greater cognizance than hitherto of the chemistry of colloids.

 

Men of the older school, particularly when faced with such an array of highly specialized jargon as that adopted by colloid chemists, may be pardoned if they face the new viewpoint with some hesitation. The electro-chemical theory of corrosion was so easily understandable that if we must abandon it we shall do so with regret. Yet the history of scientific progress in connection with our knowledge of metals themselves must warn us not to "shy" unduly at a new array of scientific nomenclature. Not thirty years ago the infant science of metallography was widely ridiculed because of the list of "-ites"—"ferrite," "pearlite," etc.—with which its literature was adorned. To-day the scoffer is silent, and these terms are familiar to all metallurgists and even to some engineers. We must therefore face the intrusion of colloidal chemistry into metallurgy and engineering with an open mind, ready to learn and appreciate what it can teach us. These technical words employed by the chemist are, after all, merely convenient abbreviations or symbols; when the concepts behind them are understood, the terminology becomes not only a minor matter, but an easy one.—The Engineer, 6 October, 1922.

 

The Largest Motor Liner.—The 600 foot, 18-knot motor passenger liner which the Fairfield Company is to build for the New Zealand-Vancouver service of the Union Steamship Company represents a distinct step forward in the development of the motor ship, for she is to be equipped with engines developing 12,000 brake horsepower, or about twice as much as those in any motor vessel so far built. The machinery, we are in a position to state, will comprise four six-cylinder two-stroke cycle Fairfield-Sulzer engines, each set developing 3,000 brake horsepower and running at 135 revolutions per minute. The cylinders will have a diameter of 27 inches and a piston stroke of 39 inches. The scavenging air will be supplied by three electrically driven turbo-blowers of such size that two will supply all the air required by the four main engines. The auxiliary machinery will include four two-stroke cycle Sulzer engines developing 400 brake horsepower each, at 200 revolutions, and will be direct coupled to dynamos. The main engines will be built in Glasgow by the Fairfield Company under license from Sulzer Brothers, who will supply the drawings and certain parts. The auxiliary engines will be constructed at Winterthur.—The Engineer, 6 October, 1922.

 

Institute of Marine Engineers.—The changes that have taken place during the period of my service may properly be described as wonderful. Those changes have appeared in every direction, and most of them, it is pleasing to say, have been highly beneficial and useful.

 

The principal changes that have taken place in naval machinery in the period I have referred to are:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. • The general change from horizontal to vertical engines, the latter being of short stroke in order to keep the machinery under protection.
   • The increase in boiler pressure and the change from compound engines to the triple-expansion type.
   • The application of forced draught, in the first place to tank boilers.
   • The use of locomotive boilers for a comparatively short period.
   • The introduction of water-tube boilers and the evolution of the most suitable types.
   • The use of higher speeds of revolution of reciprocating engines, together with many other devices for reducing weight.
   • The more recent general introduction of steam turbines and of mechanical reduction gearing.

 

It will be interesting briefly to consider the nature of some of the problems that will have to be faced in the near future by the marine engineer, and the qualities required of him in dealing with them.

 

(1) The reciprocating steam engine has reached such a stage of perfection that no radical improvement in its performance is expected, and those to whom it is an acceptable type will take it in its present satisfactory form with the greatest confidence.

 

(2) In order to combine a high turbine efficiency with a high propeller efficiency reduction gearing has recently been introduced. In this country the gearing has almost entirely been of the mechanical type, and in several cases it has brought with it its own troubles, troubles involving problems of a highly interesting character. They take the form of breaking and occasional wearing of the teeth. Experiences have varied. In the navy mechanical gearing has behaved satisfactorily.

 

Other methods of effecting the reduction between the high-speed turbine and the slow-running propeller are also being used, chiefly abroad. In America, and to a small extent in this country, electrical gearing has been favored. It has some advantages over mechanical gearing, but it has also some disadvantages, especially at what may be termed the design stages. As far as I have been associated with such proposals they appear to be expensive in first cost and to require greater weight and space than in some cases can be allowed. Considerable economy in fuel has been claimed for this form of transmission, especially at low speed, and although there is no reason to doubt the accuracy of figures that have been published, care should be taken in making a comparison to ensure that the conditions and attendant circumstances are similar.

 

In Germany hydraulic gearing has been applied to some ships. One of them has been recently added to the Canadian Pacific Company's service on the Pacific side. Her performance will be of considerable interest, especially in the matter of fuel consumption, as the efficiency of hydraulic transmission is understood to be somewhat low, notwithstanding the heat saving devices that can be utilized therewith.

 

(3) Steam boilers, both of the tank type and the water-tube type, have been highly developed in this country, and the efforts which have been made to obtain the benefit of superheated steam in marine installations, especially in the merchant service, have been most creditable alike to the designers and to the engineers in charge. The problem is affected in the navy by the fact that although a large measure of benefit can be obtained at full power, it has been difficult to realize any material advantage when the boilers are being worked easily at low power. It is hoped that recent successful experimental work can be applied in this direction with better prospects.

 

(4) In America very high boiler efficiencies have been claimed, under certain conditions and with special fittings, which, if maintained on service afloat, will put our engineers on their mettle, and in order to ensure that we shall maintain pride of place it will be necessary for the marine engineer, to whom this problem principally belongs, to have a very wide knowledge, not only of the methods of efficiently burning oil fuels, but of the nature of the fuels themselves, and of the conditions affecting their efficient and economical combustion.

 

(5) Oil engines for propelling and auxiliary purposes will compel profound consideration for many a long day, and in the near future discussions may take in large part a different form.

 

(6) The light oil engine has been fitted for propelling purposes in a large number of small craft, and although this application is not largely connected with sea going engineering, it is interesting to observe that the Royal Lifeboat Institution has decided, as far as financial considerations will allow, to proceed with a scheme for establishing motor lifeboats round our coasts, an action which is significant of the reliability that can now be placed on machinery of this type, and one which cannot fail to be of interest to all sea-faring people and which is deserving of their support.

 

(7) The methods of lubrication of rubbing surfaces have received considerable attention during the last few years, and the correct principles of lubrication are now better understood than they formerly were.—The Engineer, 6 October, 1922.

 

World's Largest Motor Ships Building in Hamburg.—A famous German yard has just received an interesting order which means that this company is building the largest motor ships in the world. Furthermore, the yard holds the record for the amount of motor ship tonnage built during the year. The German firm received from a Swedish shipping company an order for motor ships aggregating a tonnage of 54,000. They will be fitted with Diesel motors of the system Burmeister and Wain. The Deutsche Werft possesses the license for these motors in Germany. Amongst others, this order includes two large ore cargo steamers each of 21,000 tons, having a length of 550 ft. and a width of 70 ft., which are the largest cargo steamers so far built in Europe, and which, incidentally, on completion, will be the largest motor ships in existence. These steamers will be fitted with twin screws, and will have a speed of 11 knots. The ships will be equipped with the latest appliances for the transport of ore, and are intended for traveling between Sparrow Point, U.S.A., and Chile. The owners of the ships will be a Swedish company, Messrs. Brostrom and Son, Gothenburg, which requires the ships for the execution of a contract they have closed with the Bethlehem Steel Corporation.

 

The Company has also, during the last few days, received from another Scandinavian shipping company an order for two motor ships each 6,000 tons. The entire motor ship tonnage which will be launched this year, and which is still in construction is thirteen boats, having a deadweight of not less than 118.000 tons, which beats the record of any other shipping wharf in the world.

 

The Flettner Rudder.—In the description of the new Flettner type of rudder which recently appeared in these columns reference was made to its installation in an 8,000-ton motor ship building by the Deutsche Werft at Hamburg.

 

The ship will be named the Odenwald and is for the Hamburg-Amerika Linie. The main rudder is of the balanced type and has an area of 154 sq. ft. The auxiliary blade is actuated through vertical and horizontal rods, the former passing up through the center of the main rudder stock. The vertical rod is actuated through a system of gear wheels and levers by wire-rope control from the navigating bridge, or alternatively from an after steering station, as shown. With the auxiliary blade in operation it is claimed that the power required for steering is less than five per cent of that for an ordinary-type rudder. Steering can be readily effected by hand, and the considerable cost of the usual power steering gear, including its upkeep and operation, is saved.

 

Under normal working conditions there is no twisting moment on the main rudder stock of the Flettner rudder, but provision has to be made for emergency steering should the auxiliary blade or its gear be disabled. To meet such an emergency the diameter of the main rudder stock must conform with the usual requirements of the Registration Societies and there must be emergency steering arrangements.—The Shipbuilder, October, 1922.

 

Electric Drive in the Dutch Navy.—Before a meeting of the Electro Technic Society of the Royal Institute of Engineers in Holland, Mr. W.F. Pott, Engineer-in-Chief of the Dutch Navy, read a paper giving a full description of the machinery of the submarine depot ship Pelikaan, just completed for service in the Dutch East Indies.

 

She is a vessel of 2,400 tons displacement, fitted with twin screws and driven by electric motors, the electric current being supplied by two dynamos coupled direct to Diesel oil engines. The switching arrangement enables running at reduced speed with only one oil engine running.

 

All auxiliaries are driven by electric motors, of which sixty-five have been installed throughout the ship.

 

The oil engines and practically all parts of the electric equipment have been made in Holland. The results of exhaustive trials were very satisfactory.

 

AERONAUTICS

 

Seaplane for Submarines.—Among the inventions tested recently by the Department of the Navy and found to be satisfactory is a hydroplane so built that it can be stored in an undersea boat, or operated from the deck when the submarine is on the surface.

 

The plane has a wing spread of twenty-one feet. It can be "knocked down" and stored in a four-foot hold within five minutes. Within the same time it can be assembled and launched from the deck. It is a biplane, with the cantilever construction. There are no struts between the wings. The entire surface of the machine, wings and body, is covered with wood veneer. Both wings lift completely off. A quarter turn of a knob removes the propeller. The elevators fold alongside the tail. Four hooks remove the two pontoons. The gas tank is an entirely new departure. It is enclosed under the top wing. The plane is equipped with a five cylinder Sennes Halske radial motor. It is air-cooled and develops fifty horsepower.—Boston Evening Transcript, 6 October, 1922.

 

The New Barling Bomber.—There is about to be delivered by the contractor to the army air service at its engineering division at McCook Field, Ohio, the largest airplane ever constructed in this country. It is known as the Barling bomber, and it is driven by six 400-horsepower Liberty engines. It is a triplane, 120-foot spread, height of twenty-eight feet, and over-all length of sixty-five feet, and at least four men will be required to operate all equipment under service conditions. It is capable of carrying 10,800 pounds of bombs, in addition to gasoline, supplies, two pilots, and two passengers. With 2,000 gallons of gasoline, 5,000 pounds in bombs can be carried for twelve hours, or with reduction in gasoline and thus cruising radius 10,000 pounds of bombs can be carried for seven hours. The machine will be equipped with instruments to show the pilot how the engines are functioning, with a telephone to afford communication between the tail and nose and with radio for communication with the ground. One purpose of producing this machine is to obtain information as to design and estimating performance of such types.—Army and Navy Register, 30 September, 1922.

 

A Crude Oil Aero-Engine.—It is trustworthily reported that William Beardmore and Co., Limited, acting in conjunction with the Air Ministry, have after lengthy experiments and trials produced a promising type of crude oil aero-engine. The engine has not yet been officially tested, and so far details of its design are withheld. It is understood, however, to he a six-cylinder engine of 750 or 1,000 horsepower. It is known that the Air Ministry has for a long time been devoting close attention to the design and construction of engines using fuel other than petrol and similar low flash-point substances. At the Royal Aircraft Establishment experiments have been in progress for a considerable period on the use of shale oil in an engine operating on the Diesel principle. In addition, the Establishment has been conducting experiments on the solid injection of a fuel containing ninety-five per cent of alcohol. In other directions, too, a similar object is being sought, as, for instance, in the case of Dr. Ferranti's experiments on direct injection in a two-stroke cycle engine. The advantage to be gained by discarding petrol as an aero-engine fuel would consist not only of a diminution of the risk of fire as a result of an accident or of the penetration of the tank by a bullet, but also of an economy in running costs.—The Engineer, 22 September, 1922.

 

Loss of the "C-2."—Washington, October 17.—The dirigible C-2, which was destroyed by fire at San Antonio, Texas, was the Army's best and largest "blimp." It was completed shortly after the army's big Italian-built airship, the Roma, was destroyed, with a loss of thirty-four lives, at Norfolk early this year. The C-2 had a gas capacity of 172,000 cubic feet and was capable of making a speed of sixty miles an hour.

 

The dirigible was on its return trip from a trans-continental flight, having made the trip from coast to coast in sixty-two hours flying time. Last July the ship made a non-stop night flight from Washington to New York and return, and in the fog narrowly escaped striking a smokestack and some of the New York City skyscrapers.

 

The length of the C-2 was 192 feet and its diameter was fifty-four feet. It was equipped with two 150-horsepower Hispano Suiza engines, and was built for the Army Air Service by the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, at Akron, Ohio.—Baltimore Evening Sun, 17 October, 1922.

 

Helium.—From 8,000,000 to 10,000,000 cubic feet of non-explosive helium gas will be available within a year for the inflation of army dirigibles, Major-General Patrick, chief of the Army Air Service, reported today to Secretary Weeks.

 

The Secretary of War conferred with General Patrick in his effort to ascertain just what steps had been taken or would be necessary to avert through the use of helium instead of hydrogen such accidents as the destruction by fire of the dirigibles Roma and the C-2.

 

General Patrick explained that the envelopes of the dirigibles now in service permitted helium gas to escape. It was said the army has only 1,000.000 cubic feet of helium on hand.

 

The four new army dirigibles in the process of construction, it was explained, would be equipped with envelopes of a texture which would conserve the gas.

 

General Patrick also informed the Secretary that the Fort Worth (Texas) helium plant had recently resumed operations.—The Baltimore Sun, 19 October, 1922.

 

Cheaper Helium Method.—A simpler and cheaper method of recovering pure helium from natural gas in only one liquefying operation has been perfected by the U.S. Bureau of Mines here, Dr. H. Foster Bain, director, has announced in a statement to the American Chemical Society that is interested in the use of nonflammable helium instead of hydrogen in our airships.

 

Whereas the helium plants erected during the war, and the Government Fort Worth plant now in operation, put the helium through two processes to make it of sufficient purity for balloon use, trial runs made within the last month in the Bureau of Mines , cryogenic laboratory using perfected apparatus promise the easier, more direct method.—Boston Evening Transcript, 23 October, 1922.

 

New Speed Records.—The breaking of every existing record of speed, from one to 150 miles, adds just two more records to the bag of the United States Army Air Service. It now holds the altitude record, the endurance record, the speed record over a closed course for every distance up to 150 miles, and has exceeded, over a closed course of fifty kilometers, the world's straightaway record over a one-kilometer straightaway course.

 

Lieutenant Maughan's phenomenal race, averaging 206 miles an hour, breaks by over twenty-six miles an hour the previous record, held by an Englishman, J.H. James, flying a Gloucestershire Mars I. Lieutenant Maitland made one lap, his first last Saturday, at the rate of 216.1 miles an hour, beating Sadi LeCointe on the much-advertised Nieuport Sesquiplan, which made 214 over a straight course of one kilometer.—Baltimore Evening Sun, 17 October, 1922.

 

Brigadier General William Mitchell, assistant chief of the United States Army Air Service, set a new official world's speed record when he flew over a one-kilometer course at Selfridge Field, Mich., at an average speed of 224.05 miles an hour in four heats. The test was timed by representatives of the Federation Aeronautique Internationale, thus making the record official.

 

General Mitchell drove the Army Curtis plane which last week won the Pulitzer speed trophy and in which Lieutenant R. J. Maughan later drove unofficially at a speed of 248.5 miles an hour.—Boston Evening Transcript, 19 October, 1922.

 

New Glider Record.—Ilford, Eng., October 23.—The honors in the English gliding competition Saturday, fell to France and Holland through last minute efforts of their entries in which two new world's records were established. M. Maneyrolle, of France, smashed all existing records, including those of the Germans, by remaining in the air for three hours and twenty-two minutes in a Peyret monoplane. G.P. Olley, flying one of the Fokker biplanes, stayed up for forty-nine minutes with a passenger. —Boston Evening Transcript, 23 October, 1922.

 

ORDNANCE

 

Rifle Bore Corrosion Test.—The bureau of mines of the Interior Department has completed an extensive and important investigation as to the nature, causes, and means of prevention of the destructive corrosion frequently suffered by the bore surfaces of rifles through which modern, high-powered charges of smokeless powder have been fired. This investigation is the first systematic attempt that has been made to substitute scientifically demonstrated facts for the various unproved theories and some dogmatic assertions by more or less self-constituted authorities that have been prevalent ever since bore corrosion in high-powered rifles became a subject of very great importance.

 

The report contains a wealth of information, which has been embodied in a pamphlet (Technical Paper No. 188) issued by the bureau of mines. Following is the summary of the experts:

 

A review of the scientific, patent, and trade literature and the compilation of the experiences of many practical riflemen has shown much confusion in the theories involved in the after-corrosion of firearms and much divergence in the practices recommended for prevention. Generally this corrosion has been attributed to acid products on the bore, although other explanations, including the action of chlorides, has been advanced. A critical laboratory study, comprising the exposure of fired rifles and fouled barrel sections to known humidities, the chemical examination of the corrosive residue, the use of special ammunition, and the analysis and testing of many "nitrosolvents" and other compositions recommended as preventives showed:

 

The present high-pressure smokeless cartridge leaves no nitrocellulose residue and no corrosive acid residue. After-corrosion following the use of such cartridges is caused by (1) the explosive deposition of a water-soluble salt or salts in whose aqueous solution the steel corrodes, together with subsequent exposure to (2) a high humidity and (3) the presence of oxygen. In the present service ammunition this salt is potassium chloride from the decomposition of the chlorate in the primer.

 

Such water-soluble salt or salts are retained in tool wounds and pits on the bore surfaces, in which they cannot be seen and from which they cannot be removed mechanically. They are easily dissolved by water or suitable aqueous solutions.

 

After-corrosion may also be prevented by keeping both ends of the bore tightly corked.

 

The present service ammunition can be rendered noncorrosive by eliminating the chlorate of the primer. It may be possible to develop a noncorrosive primer that will not affect the present ballistic properties of the cartridge. This point is under investigation.

 

A number of non-aqueous compositions recommended for cleaning firearms possess little or no value. Their supposed virtue seems to rest 'on tests conducted at humidities so low that no corrosion could occur.

 

After-corrosion proceeds below the dew point.

 

A simple test for differentiating between worthless and valuable cleaning compounds is described.

 

Corrosion from nitrocellulose powder occurs only when the confining pressure is extremely low, as in blank cartridges.

 

The study has shown that after-corrosion is closely allied to a number of other problems of corrosion beneath oil films and has indicated a simple method for eliminating the attending menace to many important iron and steel products other than firearms.—Army and Navy Register, 30 September, 1922.

 

New 14-Inch Railway Mount.—In the new 14-inch railway mount, model of 1920, which was exhibited a week ago during the meeting of the Army Ordnance Association at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md., and which soon will be put through a program of tests at that place, the army is in possession of a coast-defense weapon that is more universal in type than any that have gone before and of longer range than any carried on such a mount. The gun has a range of a little over twenty-six miles.

 

For several decades heavy long-range guns for coast defense have been mounted on carriages of one of two general types, namely, the earlier barbette or pivot mount, which appeared in different forms to suit various requirements, and later the disappearing carriage, which saw its highest development shortly before the World War. With the increasing ranges resulting from advances in ballistics, as well as with development of aircraft, came recognition of the serious inherent defects of the existing seacoast carriages. Foremost among these defects are their vulnerability to attack from above and their uselessness for action at points other than where they were mounted.

 

In the new carriage an effort has been made to overcome these defects. A mount has been developed that is mobile to a high degree over the railways and through the tunnels of the country but that sacrifices none of the essentials of a modern coast-defense weapon. Among these essentials are that the mount affords an absolutely level platform that permits traversing without changes of elevation, a means of traversing at constant speed as slowly or as rapidly as desired by power, and loading and ammunition-serving facilities that insure rapidity of fire. In addition, it has features that do not appear in existing types. The concrete emplacement is of very simple form and requires no pit, thus avoiding the difficulties that arise from locations near sea level. Ammunition supply may be from fixed magazines in the vicinity of the emplacement as heretofore, or the mount may he served rapidly and continuously from ammunition cars, thus simplifying construction work and fortifications. Moreover, the new carriage may be used on a temporary field emplacement, thus supplying the need for a mobile weapon of extreme range and heavy caliber adapted for land operations.

 

The carriage itself provides for extreme elevations up to the maximum range of the gun, and traverse is provided through 360 degrees. All maneuvering may be accomplished by hand or by power supplied from a generating plant traveling with the carriage.—Army and Navy Register, 14 October, 1922.

 

NAVIGATION AND RADIO

 

Short-Wave Radio Transmission.—Excellent radio transmission has been obtained by using waves of 15 m. generated by thermionic valves giving a power of 200 watts and an aerial current of 1 amp. After a successful attempt over land, a test was recently made from Carnarvon, Wales, to a receiving apparatus on a boat running to Kingstown, Ireland, and speech was received in that harbor, seventy nautical miles from Carnarvon. It had previously been found that the diminution in strength of the received energy was greater at low levels than at high, and it was expected that greater distances than seventy miles could be covered under suitable conditions on land. The result of a test between Hendon and Birmingham, England, was very satisfactory, and it was proved that the effect of the use of a reflector at each end was to increase the received energy 200 times.

 

The work with experimental stations is to be continued, and the results have so far been such as to make it clear that this new method of direction finding will certainly be developed further. The use of small wave lengths precludes the likelihood of interference from disturbance, but it introduces some difficulties in tuning of the receiving circuit.—Electrical World, 7 October, 1922.

 

Eliminating Static.—By the use of a so-called "resonance-wave coil"—essentially a complete and compact wireless antenna—the Signal Corps of the United States Army claims to have developed a method whereby "static" or atmospheric disturbances as an accompaniment of orderly radio communications may be eliminated. It is merely repeating a statement of universal acceptance to say that static electricity or atmospheric disturbances is the big retarding factor in the development of radiotelephony. This discordant element in the reception of wireless signals is operative from June to October—about five of the twelve months in the year.

 

The device of the Signal Corps for instituting proceedings effecting the divorce of orderly wireless signals and the crackling, meaningless noises, takes the form of a drain coil of wire. The incoming signals, for instance, from broadcasting stations, traverse the so-termed "resonance wave coil" and then proceed to the conventional radio-telephone receiving outfit, irrespective of the design—vacuum tube or crystal set. The noteworthy thing, however, is that this coil of wire or compact antenna is of a discriminating caliber and only wireless signals are admitted passage into the radio-telephone receiver. The atmospheric disturbance or static electricity, discordant note that it is, is sidetracked and conveyed to the ground. Such are the claims made for this new form of "static eliminator." —Scientific American, November, 1922.

 

MISCELLANEOUS

 

The World's Navies.—Statistical comparisons of naval strength are in less demand nowadays than they were before the war. There is a widely-held though not entirely accurate impression that competition has ceased and the world's leading navies have become stereotyped as to dimensions for at least ten years ahead, so that the 5-5-3 formula is a rough but reliable guide to the relative strength of the three principal fleets during that period. It is felt, moreover, that the old method of computing the power of a navy simply by totaling up the vessels of each type is no longer practicable, having regard to the great differences which now exist between individual units of any given type. To take a specific instance, we find that the designation "battleship," always a very elastic one, has to-day become all but meaningless unless it is carefully qualified. A sharp differentiation became necessary with the introduction of the all-big-gun type, and so we began to use the terms "Dreadnaught" and "Pre-Dreadnaught," to which was soon added the unofficial but useful tag of "Super-Dreadnaught," signifying a vessel armed with guns above 12 inches caliber. Now, thanks to the war and the technical progress to which it gave rise, we have had to invent other labels to distinguish battleships one from the other, and "Pre-Dreadnaught" and "Post-Dreadnaught" have each come to possess a very definite meaning. To a smaller degree the process of subdividing each category applies to every other type of fighting craft, the result being that the mere enumeration of its various ships conveys no trustworthy idea of the actual power of any combatant fleet.

 

These remarks are suggested by the recent publication of an Admiralty Return, giving particulars of the navies controlled by the chief States of the world. The complete document is informative, but the published summaries are apt to be misleading. Under the heading of battleships, for example, there are lumped together indiscriminately pre-Dreadnaughts of venerable age and post-Jutland ships of the very latest type. Italy is credited with twelve "battleships" and Japan with no more than eleven, in spite of which the Japanese group is at least twice as powerful as the Italian. Another anomaly is the inclusion among Japanese "battle cruisers" of three old 14,000-ton ships which have no real pretension to that imposing title except that they are officially listed as such in Japan. "Cruiser" is another term which covers an extraordinarily wide range of vessels, varying in this case from the Courageous, of 18,600 tons, to the U.S.S. Charleston, of only 9,700 tons. The task of classifying monitors appears to have caused the Admiralty compilers some difficulty, for under this heading are listed five Japanese vessels which bear no resemblance to our monitors, and are really old armor-clads disrated to coast defense status, a fact made clear in the return itself. But a certain confusion is inevitable when, as in this return, the British system of nomenclature is applied in some cases and foreign systems in others. It is only fair to say, however, that strict adherence to national designation in every case would probably have resulted in making confusion worse confounded so far as the lay public is concerned. Where the tables are both interesting and valuable is in relation to their expose of comparative strength in the types which are not affected by the Limitation Agreement—that is, light cruisers, torpedo craft, and submarines, and a study of the figures here shown gives food for thought.

 

Our preponderance in light cruisers is considerable, possessing, as we do, fifty-one built and eight building, though many of the former are marked down for the scrap heap. Of ships built the United States has nine to Japan's twelve, but, while all the American vessels are obsolete the majority of those owned by Japan are of up-to-date construction, and as the light cruisers building for the two Powers number ten and thirteen respectively, the Japanese lead in this type is very pronounced. In destroyers the position is as follows: Great Britain—Built, 200; building, eight. United States—Built 315; building, three. Japan—Built, fifty-eight; building, twenty-eight. With regard to these figures it may be noted that a certain proportion of our 200 boats are probably ineffective through enforced neglect, and would need extensive repairs to make them fit for active service; that the Japanese total is apparently understated, and that ninety per cent of the American destroyers having been post-war built, are probably in the best of condition. The submarine totals are even more significant. We have ninety-three boats built and eight building, the United States has 102 and thirty-eight, and Japan twenty- four and thirty-one. Here again there are discrepancies between the Admiralty Return and other sources, which credit Japan with many more than twenty-four completed boats. As it has been decided to scrap twenty-seven of our submarines this financial year, we shall then be left with but fifty-eight, only one of which is of post-war design. On the other hand, Japan will have at least forty boats and the United States about fifty boats, all designed since the war. If therefore, the submarine is destined to play in future naval warfare that important role which its champions forecast for it, our establishment cannot be considered excessive, and is in any case far below the ratio we claim in capital ships. This Admiralty Return serves, indeed, as a timely reminder that our margin of naval power has become exceedingly narrow and will not bear further trimming unless we are prepared to accept a position of definite inferiority in future.—Naval and Military Record, 20 September, 1922.

 

Naval Disarmament.—Have we all been premature in assuming that the Washington Treaty had finally put an end to all rivalry at sea between the navies of the different nations, each of which was to be "rationed" according to the scale laid down by the Conference? America and Great Britain have accepted the ratio allotted to them, and Great Britain at any rate has set a splendid and public-spirited example in reducing her naval strength to limits which may prove to be even smaller than those the Washington Treaty assigned to her. But Brazil, which was one of the lesser naval Powers, the fixing of whose quota was left to the League of Nations, has formally notified the Disarmament Commission that she is unable to participate any further in any of the League's schemes or any international Conference for naval disarmament based on the Washington Treaty or the principles contained therein. The chief ground of her objection, as stated by Senhor Oliviera, her representative at the League Assembly at Geneva, are two in number, the first having reference to the limit on naval construction, the other to the prohibition of the construction of a new navy yard. The latter in particular is insisted on, because at present Brazil has no Government Dockyard, and the acceptance of the Treaty would prevent her from ever establishing one, and leave her permanently at the mercy of foreign nations for the supplies of naval ships. Hitherto, though her navy is not inconsiderable, Brazil has looked chiefly to British shipbuilders to construct her ships for her, and in the interest of our own shipbuilders we shall not be sorry if she continues, to do so. But the ground of her objection is quite comprehensible, and it touches a point which the Washington Conference, carried away as it was by the enthusiasm aroused by the speeches of Mr. Hughes and Mr. Balfour, seems to have regarded as of secondary importance. Argentina has already withdrawn altogether from the League, and with Brazil in the same position as regards disarmament more than half of South America will remain unbound by its stipulations. Moreover, Chili and Uraguay have a plan to organize a Pan-American League of Nations in March, and if this scheme goes through, with the United States already outside the original League, the latter will have its operations confined, except as regards British territory on the American continent, to the eastern hemisphere, and as the American peoples both North and South, are rapidly growing in numbers, wealth, and power, they may very easily in time overtop the European nations altogether.

 

Moreover, there appears to be some doubt as to whether the naval agreements of the Washington Conference will be ratified by France. Ac cording to the French Admiral Favereau, who commanded a squadron in the North Sea during the war, public feeling in France is strongly opposed to ratification, for several reasons, of which perhaps the most prominent is that the datum taken as determining the relative strengths of the different navies in the future was that of the close of the war, not that of before the war, and was consequently highly unfair to France, which was then the fourth largest navy, coming next after America, before Japan and far before Italy, both of which added largely to their navies during the war. If the anticipation that France will reject the naval disarmament proposals should prove well founded, what becomes of the proportions so carefully drawn up to regulate the relative strength of the navies? Unless there is a common agreement for limitation it is difficult to see how the nations are to avoid the bad old system of naval rivalry, which put them all to the enormous cost of building against each other, without ever reaching finality or being substantially benefited in return for their outlay. Limitation of land forces has apparently been relegated to the Greek Kalends, nor, till Germany begins to carry out the Treaty of Versailles in good faith and the wars and rumors of wars in the Near East come to an end, is it possible to look forward to any immediate reduction in land armaments. But it had been thought that on sea at any rate there was a prospect of harmonious agreement to disarm. If this is not the case the hopes of a permanent peace will become weaker than ever, and the nations, in sheer fear of being caught napping, will begin once more the "mad race of armaments." If the League of Nations is to be really anything more than a glorified debating society it should take this question in hand at once and leave no stone unturned to secure general agreement upon a matter of such vast national and international importance.—Naval and Military Record, 20 September, 1922.

 

The Cruising Endurance of Submarines.—Among the popular misconceptions with regard to naval material that prevailed before the war, none was more deeply rooted than the notion that a submarine boat could remain at sea only for a few days at a time, and therefore could not be employed in any operation which involved a prolonged absence from its base. This was one of the principal arguments with which Sir Percy Scott's critics sought to refute the sweeping claims he had made on behalf of the submarine only a few weeks before the outbreak of the Great War. It was put forward, not merely by civilian writers, but by several naval officers of high rank, and in view of this authoritative opinion it is not surprising that the general public came to regard the submarine as being useful only for coastal operations. Events soon showed, however, that the sea-going range of these vessels had been grossly underestimated. In the first month of the war German U boats were met with several hundred miles from their nearest base; early in 1915 they were encountered off the coast of Ireland, and by the spring of that year one boat had arrived at Constantinople after a voyage of 3,450 nautical miles from Wilhelmshaven. Meanwhile small British submarines built in Canada had crossed the Atlantic under their own power, and the E-11, of 675 tons, had made a trip in the Sea of Marmora—that is, in enemy waters—lasting thirty-one days. Then, a year later, came the cruise of the German U-53 to the United States coast and back, a voyage of at least 7,000 miles, which was accomplished without replenishing the supply of fuel. It may be said, therefore, that the cruising endurance of submarines proved to be about ten times greater than pre-war forecasts had indicated. There is still some uncertainty as to the maximum period of time which a submarine spent continuously at sea during the war. The British boats on the Atlantic patrol frequently made voyages of well over one month's duration, while according to German accounts the first Untersee-Kreuzer, the U-139, made one cruise lasting six weeks.

 

Interest in this question of submarine endurance has now been revived by the remarkable performance of a French boat, the Victor Reveille, which was recently ordered to carry out a test for determining how long she could remain at sea. Leaving Cherbourg at the beginning of July, she arrived at Toulon on August 31, after an uninterrupted voyage of sixty days. This, so tar as is known, constitutes the longest voyage which has been made by a submarine up to the present date, though it need hardly be said that peace conditions are far more favorable; for such a test than those which obtain in war. The Victor Reveille was formerly the U-79, and is one of the many ex-German submarines now under the French flag. Completed at Hamburg in 1916, she belonged to a group of ten boats which were especially designed for mine-laying, and one of which sowed the mines that sank H.M.S. Hampshire, with Lord Kitchener on board. The performance of the Victor Reveille is the more noteworthy in view of her modest dimensions. On the surface she displaces only 755 tons, increased to 833 tons when submerged. Her length overall is 186ft. 4in., the breadth 19ft. 10in., and the draught 15ft. 1 in. She is therefore less than two-thirds as long as a modern destroyer and some loft. narrower in beam. The propelling machinery consists of two sets of Diesel four-cycle six-cylinder engines, developing 900 brake horsepower, which gives the boat a surface speed of 10.6 knots. For submerged propulsion the electric motors develop 800 brake horsepower for 8 knots. In his paper on German submarines, Mr. A. W. Johns, R.C.N.C, said that the class to which this boat belongs differs from all the ordinary U boats in having internal main ballast tanks. They have a pressure hull of large diameter—16.4ft., as against 13.5ft. in U-161—and small external saddle tanks, which, instead of carrying water ballast, carry oil fuel. The two main ballast tanks are internal, the larger extending under the mine room and up the sides of the motor room, while the other is under the engine room and partly up the sides of that room. With a- full load of fuel, amounting to eighty-seven tons, the nominal range of the Victor Reveille at an economical speed of 7 knots is 7,800 miles. It is not yet known what distance she actually covered in the course of her sixty days' voyage, but it is evident that had a speed of 7 knots been maintained throughout, the total run would be 10,080 miles, or 2,280 more than she is supposed to be capable of making on one load of fuel. In point of fact, the radii of all the German boats with which our experts have had experience have proved to be substantially larger than the official German estimates, and there is more than a suspicion that their actual endurance was purposely minimized for obvious military reasons. That the submarine possesses a much wider radius of action than any surface warship of equivalent size is now well known, but it is doubtful whether the full extent of her advantage in this respect is commonly realized. She derives it mainly, of course, from her internal combustion engines, which at low power are very economical in fuel consumption, while the structural arrangement of the hull is well adapted to the carriage of a large supply of oil in proportion to the displacement. Official data published since the war show that great cruising endurance was aimed at in the design of all German submarine types. In the U-29, a typical U boat of 675 tons displacement, the endurance at an economical speed of 8 knots was 9,800 miles. In the U-43, of 725 tons, it increased to 11,250; in the Untersee-Kreuzer, Nos. 139 and 142 it was respectively 18,000 miles at 8 knots and 20,000 at 6 knots. Still more remarkable were the corresponding figures for the smaller types; the UB-18, of only 272 tons, was credited with an endurance of 7,000 miles at 5 knots; the UB-48, of 516 tons, with 9,000 miles at 6 knots; and the UC-16, of 410 tons, with 8,700 miles at 7 knots. These are boats whose limited dimensions would seem to put them in the category of coastal submarines, yet they were nevertheless capable of voyaging for many thousands of miles. The longest-range submarines built in Germany appear to have been the Deutschland and her six sister boats, originally designed as submersible cargo ships, but afterwards converted into fighting craft. Although of only 1,510 tons displacement, their fuel supply was sufficient for a continuous run of 25,000 miles, at a speed of 5 ½ knots. However, when estimating the sea endurance of small vessels, whether of the surface or submersible type, it is necessary to take other factors besides the mechanical into consideration.

 

That a boat such as the UB-18 could really make an uninterrupted voyage of 7,000 miles may well be doubted. Owing to the cramped accommodation below and above deck, the difficulty of ventilating the narrow interior spaces packed with machinery, the noise of the Diesel engines, and the violent motion of the boat in rough weather, the health of the crew would inevitably begin to suffer after a few weeks at sea. In other words, the human element would be liable to become exhausted long before the mechanical element had reached its limit. In time of war the conditions of service on board would, of course, be infinitely more trying; there would be a constant strain on the nerves of the men when they were at sea, especially in enemy waters, and therefore had to spend most of their time under hatches. The actual radius of any type of submarine in war time would therefore depend primarily on the mental and physical stamina of the complement, which implies that it cannot be fixed with any degree of precision. But as submarines increase in size, enabling better living quarters to be provided and setting free more space on deck for exercise and recreation, the conditions of service tend to become more tolerable, and there is consequently less likelihood of a breakdown occurring in the health or morale of the personnel. There is no visible reason why a very large ocean-going submarine should not be able to remain at sea as long as her, fuel holds out, without imposing any superhuman strain on the personnel. On the other hand, if dimensions are increased beyond a certain limit the submarine becomes difficult to maneuver below the surface and requires to be navigated with extreme care in all but the deepest waters. For this reason every navy will no doubt continue to build boats of moderate size—say, up to 1,000 tons—for general service, while at the same time developing the large submersible cruiser type for special overseas operations. This division of types seems, in fact, to have been adopted in the United States, France and Japan, following the example set by Germany during the war. Although the prospect of a long period of peace has naturally slowed down the development of the submarine boat, steady progress is still being maintained, and there are boats now under construction abroad which appear to be little if at all, inferior to the German submersible cruisers in respect of sea endurance. The advent of submarines capable of crossing and recrossing the Pacific Ocean with a margin of 10.000 miles to spare promises to introduce a new and complicating factor into naval strategy.—The Engineer. 15 September, 1922.

 

Italy's Interests in Near East.—Il Messaggero, a semi-official Roman daily, said in a recent issue: "Every country has its own particular program. Italy has a program to submit and defend which can be summed up: 'The reconstruction of Turkey.'" The article goes on to say that: "The British anti-Turk policy must give way to a policy of National justice in the common interest of Europe. This policy of justice will commence by the re-construction of Turkey, the re-in statement of the Sultan at Constantinople, and the return to Turkey of all Musulman regions in Europe and Asia."

 

With respect to Anatolia, Italy's interest will be served by seeing Greece ousted from Smyrna. Italy has lost that trade center since its occupation by the Greeks. Furthermore the presence of the latter there tends, in the opinion of Italians, to destroy the equilibrium in the Eastern Mediterranean which is an essential point in Italy's foreign policy. Italy feels that with the Greeks out of Smyrna there is a chance that she will be placed again in the position accorded to her by the treaty of St. Jean-de-Mauriene, or even if the Turk retains Smyrna that, by championing his cause, she—Italy—may be accorded special trade privileges there.

 

Il Mondo, a conservative, able paper, with Nitti tendencies said, recently, "As far as Constantinople is concerned, it is certainly impossible to conceive of a Turkish State with its historical capital either occupied by foreign troops or strangled to the extent (to quote here the elegant expression of M. Venezelos), 'of having barely sufficient air to breathe.'"

 

General Bencivenga, who has written extensively on international topics, has a leading article in Il Paese: "The freedom of the Dardanelles, evacuation of Thrace by the Greeks; re-establishment of normal relations between Christians and Musulman," sums up Italy's interests. He contends that the freedom of the Dardanelles is essential since the Black Sea is the natural area for Italian commercial expansion. For this reason Italy cannot consent either to allow the Turk to be master of both sides of the straits or to tolerate the permanent establishment there of any great power. With respect to Thrace: Italy, which is very sensible to Balkan disturbances, cannot consent to the state of unstable equilibrium that results from Greece's possession of Thrace, a territory, which because of its strategic position and Greece's military situation, she cannot hold. Furthermore, the writer says, it is in Italy's interest that Bulgaria has an outlet to the Aegean Sea.

 

"Don't Give Up the Ship." By Brigadier General George Richards, U.S.M.C.—This is the third time I have had the pleasure to appear before the officers undergoing instruction at this command. There were two subjects it was my endeavor to talk about before—one was "Initiative and Leadership"—the other was "Administration." As to the talk of to-day, it may have a subject, but I do not venture to give it a title. A year ago I tried to express here one dominant thought, one idea that seemed to me we might write down as a work-a-day principle to guide us in the solution of problems confronting us in the building up of a new Marine Corps, problems that to a large extent must be successfully solved solely by us. We were to take counsel with ourselves to meet these great questions. For, when people get together themselves and collect their individual forces together, the thing they aim at doing is usually the thing in the end that is accomplished. There was once a story told, one of Aesop's fables, I think, about the man with seven sons. You remember the boys—as they grew up or were growing up, they could never agree—always they were found bickering amongst themselves. You will recall the father's method of illustrating his point. How he brought seven sticks, each of which he separately broke with comparative ease. Then the old gentleman went further, taking seven more faggots, he bound them together. Not one of his seven sons had the strength to break the bundle! So it is for unity I stand here to-day!

 

The war brought home to many of us older officers lessons of great importance that recalled our earlier experiences. There were we who stayed at home to keep for you the home fires burning, so to speak. We who served here while we waited. And then there were you who so valiantly bore on the front line our Country's honor in France! How proud we were of your achievements! Now, let me tell you here of the finest thought that was brought back from France to me. It came from one of you who had helped so well to bear that burden Over There. This was his thought—"That Fourth Brigade, that apparent raw material we took to France. And it is true we trained it there for a year under our own eyes for the task for which we were sent. Then with the perfect or almost perfect instrument it was, we were thrown against the Germans. The reward for what was done there—the distinction and the glory that came out of it all was ours—all! But the credit, there's the rub—the credit I do not think we may rightfully claim. That belongs to many who never put their feet on the soil of France. The Fourth Brigade was the product of thirty or more years of constant and united endeavor of all of the Marine Corps, all working together in one earnest effort." Now that seemed to me, a home-fire burner of some thirty years of activity as a most gracious complim.ent to all of us and a compliment very tactfully extended. I cannot ever forget it. I think, though, I should tell you my answer. "That organization, the Fourth Brigade," I said, "was not the fruit of thirty years of effort, not by any manner of means." It was the work of 146 years. Back I would go to the very beginnings. Back to those men whose names are now almost forgotten, men who for years have lain in their graves. They laid the foundations upon which our building began. What names for us to conjure with! Samuel Nicholas —William Burrows—Franklin Wharton—Archibald Henderson—Presley Neville O'Bannon! That last name—it brings to me an incident of recent years. You might yourself be put some day in a situation where you are about to be hurried or stampeded into doing something your judgment does not accept. There were people who wanted to change the uniforms and they were advocating a new sword, a more practical weapon. Their arguments were sound or seemed so. There was no answer. But someone was reading from the uniform regulations descriptive of our sword, our so-called obsolete weapon. A sword with mame-luke hilt curved blade and metal or nickeled scabbard—"Don't you think that sword had something to do with Presley O'Bannon? He who with his Marines made those Arabian mame-lukes into soldiers and with them stormed the Fortress at Derne 'On the Shores of Tripoli?' And hoisted for the first time the American Flag on a Fortress of the Old World?" That question was enough. It stopped the movement and, as we looked further into the matter and in detail, we found this to be true—that sword of ours of today is modeled from the very sword presented by the State of Virginia to Lieutenant O'Bannon of the Marine Corps in recognition of that daring exploit! We are not likely now ever to lose it. For the memory of Tripoli is something that we shall preserve in our history so long as there is an American Marine!

 

But I was speaking about France. This is what I would say. The friendships formed on those front lines are as bonds of steel welded by fire to keep you who served there together always. Your deeds in France must be told and re-told to one another and you must gather and re-gather that their memory be preserved. As the whole Marine Corps preserves in that sword the symbol of our common heritage from O'Bannon so would the whole Marine Corps help you to preserve through the memories you recount of France an inspiration for the Marine who is to come after us. There are no two schools of thought in this—no two schools such as I mentioned when I was last here at Quantico. The Marine Corps in its approach to line and staff questions—that was what I was then talking about—the Marine Corps in its approach to all questions upon which we might be led to divide puts forward but one thought, no other thought than this, "we are all for one and we are one for all." I am going to try to put myself back to my own days of twenty odd years ago, just for a moment. Just after my Philippine days and more particularly the times of the Boxer War—for my closest friends in the Marine Corps to-day are those that I served with in China in those stirring days of the summer of 1900. The Ninth Infantry, for instance, that fought alongside the Fourth Brigade of Marines in France was with us then. So was the Royal Welsh Fusileers that furnished the Guard of Honor when General Pershing first landed on British soil in 1917. Those Welshmen I liked because they had been Marines in the War of the Revolution. I am not going to tell you their story here; I am' going, though, to speak of an incident after those China days were over. I was on the old White Star liner, the Gaelic, returning home. It was full of missionaries—men and women thrown out of the interior of China by that great upheaval. Amongst them was an old Methodist parson, who had served fifty years there—he had rarely in this time seen or spoken with one of his own race. He was a man, active, zealous and earnest. He was one who believed in his work, a man of broad mind not influenced by prejudice. He told me a story I want to leave with you to-day. He was to build a little mission. He wanted bricks. Finally, he came in contact with a Chinaman, a brick maker, who sold bricks. The missionary was disturbed over the quality of the goods he was to buy. Finally, he said to this Chinaman—"Are you sure you can make me good bricks?" I can picture that brick maker in his reply. Drawing himself up to full height, with great dignity, with pride in his eye, and in his speech, he said: "L have made bricks for eight hundred years." And my missionary friend added to me—"So he had, he and his father and all his forefathers before him, they had made bricks, and all that the family had developed for thirty generations in the making of bricks that skill was the proud possession of this Chinaman." Of course, such a man could make good bricks!

 

We all here will remember Mr. Gilbert Wilson who taught the Marines of Quantico to sing. Let me tell you what he once told me. He said that the first words of that song; I never, never heard the song without a thrill comes over me—its first words—

"From the Halls of Montezuma,

To the shores of Tripoli;"

there are just ten of them. Wilson said to me, "There is your morale, there is your esprit, all in those ten words, history, tradition, everything." I read of the wounded from Belleau Woods being carried into the hospitals in Paris singing the Marine's battle hymn. In reading I knew, I understood, though I did not see! "History, tradition, everything." No, we "stay at homes" did not see. But how proud we were and what an honest pride we have now. How we pictured you, how we tried to follow you. We heard you had been broken up and made the military police. That we did not like—we had known of its evils for us in our efforts to assimilate in the Navy the soldier with the sailor. Finally we heard that you had had to send your General, the Marine General, the late General Doyen, home broken in health and that an Army General was to command you. That depressed us, but as it was not a new experience in our life to be commanded by an officer from another service we were, though depressed, not impatient. We felt better, though when we heard the compliment paid you in that General Pershing's Chief of Staff, General Harbord, was your commander. I'll not follow you further in detail—only this would I say, the Army more than doubled that compliment after you had done so well in June of 1918, for then they gave to the Marine Corps, to General Lejeune, the command of an Army Division, two-thirds of its officers and men being of the United States Army—there was a distinction never before conferred upon the Marine Corps, never before had a mixed force—such a mixed force as we were accustomed to in our life or experience in the Naval service—ever been commanded by an officer of the Marine Corps ! And even if your identity as a Marine was then lost in that great organization and we could not follow you further, we never ceased then or now to take pride in the achievements of the Second Division. Your worth as a Soldier was not to be questioned by anyone! Of that we were sure and we were secure! It seems now as I hesitate—that I have not come down here to talk to you—I am here just to tell stories. I said you saw a lot that I did not see nor could I visualize—I mean in France. There was something we heard about that was there. It was a very necessary article, it seems. Not exactly an incinerator, or even a pot boiler. It was a machine to steam the soldiers' clothing, all of them, when opportunity availed and it had an ugly name. Well, before I get ahead of my story—there was a marine sergeant or a doughboy, it may have been, who was strong on history. He knew all the historic utterances of heroes of almost forgotten wars. He could say most of them, and it seems they ail came from the Navy; he must have been a Marine! "Damn the torpedoes." "You may fire when ready." "There is glory enough for all"—these he could readily repeat. Well, his company had come back from the front line trenches. The men were all disrobed for their bath. Their clothing was being gathered up when this machine hove in sight. They cast the machine loose and started the fire to make it function. The men were all very much interested. They had gathered about in their birthday raiment, I suppose you who were there know exactly how they felt. As their clothing was being dumped into the machine they began to cheer! It was the sergeant's opportunity; he mounted the machine and shouted: "Don't cheer, boys, the poor devils are dying."

 

I don't pretend to be very strong on historic sayings. There is one, however, I can never forget. It also came from the Navy. I was born in the State of Ohio, down on the Ohio River. I grew to fifteen years of 9,ge with a little knowledge of the Navy and none whatsoever of the Marine. That seems strange to me now, for I well remember the story in McGuffey's Fourth Reader about the Mutiny in the Massachusetts State Prison in 1824 and of Wainwright. But I did not associate him then with the Marines. In those days in fact I never had seen salt water. But the county in which I was born and grew up was named Lawrence. My father, an old Welsh Quaker, was born in Chester County, Pennsylvania, but had settled in Ohio at the age of ten, with my grandfather—he told me for whom the county was named—it was for James Lawrence; Captain James Lawrence of the United States Navy. My father told me how James Lawrence had died on the quarterdeck of the ship Chesapeake, pierced by a musket ball in an engagement off Boston harbor with the British ship, The Shannon. And he spoke to me of Lawrence's heroic words, which have become immortal: "Don't give up the ship." In such circumstances I shall never forget them.

 

Do you know how or why the Marines were sent to France to serve with the Army there? Let me tell you the truth. It was not so much because the Army needed you there, for indeed they had asked for you. It was because the General Board of the Navy decided that the best training the Marines could have for their distinctive duties in connection with future operations of the Fleet was that to be afforded in actual warfare in France. You went there when the Army called for all trained troops available, but you went there for strictly naval purposes—let me repeat "Strictly Naval Purposes," that was why you went to France. Let me most forcibly impress this upon you!

 

Last November, for the first time in my knowledge, the Marine Corps celebrated its birthday. You remember the terms of a very inspiring Marine Corps Order issued on November 10, 1921? That was our one hundred forty-sixth birthday! What I would here draw your attention to concerns the circumstances under which we were instituted and the reason for which we were brought forth. The War of the Revolution was distinctively a conflict that ended in the favor of the side that mastered the sea. No one makes that clearer than Mahan. No one recognized it with greater force than George Washington himself, for to Admiral De Grasse, commanding the French Fleet at Yorktown, he unselfishly gave the credit for that victory—a credit history persists in granting to others.

 

But in 1775 the Corps of Marines sprang into existence. In the resolution that created the two battalions of those days, it was specified "that particular care be taken that no persons be appointed to offices, or enlisted into said battalions, but such as are good seamen, or so acquainted with maritime affairs as to be able to serve to advantage by sea when required; that they be distinguished by the names of the First and Second Battalions of American Marines."

 

Let me lay here a little stress on these words of our Fathers—"So acquainted with maritime affairs as to be able to serve to advantage by sea when required," for I am going to depart just a moment from my text and indulge myself in a bit of sentiment. While we are perpetuating in the organization of the Marine Corps the illustrious name of the Fourth Brigade, it might be wise for us now to recreate somewhere two units with the object to perpetuate those organizations of the Continental Congress: "The First Battalion of American Marines, and the Second Battalion of American Marines." Only once in the history of the Marine Corps did Congress create for it distinctively military units. I have just described the occasion. Let me pursue that sentimental thought a little further. Do you know that the First Flag of the Continental Navy came from the Marines? That is true, though there are people who would dispute it. Back in the days before the Revolution, at the time of our birth in 1775, before even the Declaration of Independence was written, before even the United States of America could be so called by name, we have the story. Benjamin Franklin wrote that he had observed on one of the drums belonging to the Marines whose recruiters were raising these two battalions, there was painted the rattlesnake with this motto under "Don't Tread on Me!" Franklin said, knowing it was the custom to have some device on the Arms of every Country that he supposed this design was intended for the "Arms of North America." That corps of drummers often marched the streets of Philadelphia in those days "drumming up recruits." When later, Congress created the Continental Navy, that device of the Marines became the design of the Flag that flew from the mastheads of our first ships of war.

 

So I think it safe to say it was for sea service the Marine Corps was created and that it has been sea service that has perpetuated him. And it is equally safe to venture that want of proper sea service or "acquaintance with maritime affairs so as to serve to advantage at sea if required" will be a means through which his existence as a Marine may terminate.

 

The fleet of to-day is not the fleet of a century ago. Naval science presents a variety of new conditions. No longer can the Fleet of the Line maintain itself in readiness for conflict for such extended periods of time or in so wide an area as did the fleets of Nelson and Collingwood. The modern fleet required different methods through which its area of sea control may be extended. A base of operations, a rendezvous for repairs, is still, as before, an essential. But something further is required. The modern fleet required different methods through which its area its power, its radius of control or action, through the establishment of advance bases, temporarily fortified, at a distance from the main base. Here lies the most important auxiliary service for the Marine Corps, a service you here at Quantico are trying to develop through intensive training of the commissioned and enlisted force of a unit you have established. The need to the Fleet of a mobile force, armed, equipped and trained for the purpose of seizing and defending the advanced base is now a prime necessity of all strategic or tactical plans. Such a force, not drawn from the personnel of the ships of the first line, but separately organized, transported and maintained as a distinctive tactical unit of the Fleet, known as the Advanced Base Unit, is a most important fleet auxiliary.

 

That the Marine Corps to-day is a mobile force, ready to move at the moment's notice, is due to its sea habit, its naval esprit, acquired by its officers and men in their varied service as part of the complements of seagoing vessels of the Navy. This has been developed in a distinctively naval atmosphere. This naval esprit has been diffused throughout the rest of our personnel. It is with great satisfaction to observe how well this process is progressing here at Quantico. The experience the Marine and the Marine officer gain at sea as an inherent part of the complement of seagoing vessels of the Navy is an asset to the whole Marine Corps and to the Navy. It is an asset that could not be exchanged for anything else except at the sacrifice of the efficiency of both the Navy and the Marine Corps—the entire Naval personnel. It is only through such a service that the true perspective is to be gained, that the naval purpose of the Marine is visualized. The educational opportunities of the life of the Marine Officer in the ward-room mess, to say nothing of the lasting contacts and friendships that are there formed for us, cannot in their worth to the Navy be overestimated. It is these conditions that have brought forth in the Marine of these times, officer and man, the qualities that go to make up a highly trained efficient force of naval infantry, or artillery instantly available for naval use. Such a force as we now have in the Marine Corps with its naval esprit, its familiarity with naval customs, the uniform, the precedents and traditions of the sea is a force that will be controlled in future naval operations by the one mind that directs the campaign, the Commander-in-Chief of the Active Fleet. Questions of divided authority, which the history of all nations show to have been involved in joint operations of distinctly land forces with sea forces, cannot arise. With the Marine Corps as it now is and as you here at Quantico are making it in the training of the advanced Base Force, the Navy cannot fail to have perfect co-operation. You are not being maintained here as a land force separate and distinct from the Navy. The whole plan you follow here in your training of that unit is one established in detail by the proper technical Bureau or Office of the Navy, located within the Navy Department. This plan is being worked out by the Marine officer in the closest of liaison with the Navy Department and more particularly the Fleet. I would that all the Naval service were conscious of what you are developing here under such favorable auspices, an instrument necessary for the Fleet. An instrument vital for success in whatever duty bur Country's welfare may lay upon the Fleet.

 

In getting together with the Navy in this admirable way you are carrying forward their great work here at Quantico, you are fulfilling my fondest aspirations—Don't give up the Ship.

 

The together idea, I told the last class here was the progressive idea. When interests are divided or forces are distributed, ruin is not far off. But as we naval officers (for Marine officers are Naval officers) draw all our forces together, the power of the whole naval organization is increased and we shall get there. And there was another thought I felt here on my last visit, and that was this—that there is plenty room in this great organization for all to live and work in happiness and in peace. There was a time as I was growing up in this Marine Corps that it did not seem so to me. I mean when we were trying in our poor way to do what is being done so admirably here to-day. When we were endeavoring to develop the Marine Corps for the Navy. When we were trying as best we could to save the Marine Corps for the Navy, with elimination absorption abolition stalking at our heels. There were those of the Navy who would not help us, for it seemed then it was the irrepressible conflict of the "sailor and the soldier" within the Navy. The details are too lengthy to repeat, they would serve no good purpose here. But I would have you know there was a final paper written that seemed then to end the conflict happily for all. That paper was completed on July 23, 1913, the anniversary of the birth of General Grant, a great soldier. Two days later, the General Board of the Navy in an admirable report put the entire question officially at rest. Something written in that paper, for it was printed—it was my own, I would now read to you. The words include one more historic saying by Grant (not the Navy this time). What was so written was for the same object as of my talk to-day; here are the words: "Twenty-eight years ago, on July 23, 1885, there died one of the most illustrious soldiers our country has produced. Our fleets received on North River, beneath the shadow of his tomb, the plaudits of the Nation for our victories as against the ships of Spain. He was a man of great deeds, but of few words. Having crushed at Appomattox the most formidable opposition to Federal authority, having vindicated by force of arms the policies of his Government, he united in common interest the discordant elements of his people and endeared himself to his fellow-countrymen for all time, saying: 'Let us Have Peace.'"

 

I say God-speed to you in the work you are here doing in peace for the Navy; in the building up on safe and sane foundations, under a doctrine expressive of plain common sense what is essential for the future of the Marine Corps. You are doing this in the exercise of moderation and self-restraint—you are suppressing prejudices, rejecting passion and emotion—even hair-trigger judgment in this real reconstruction of the Marine Corps for the purpose of the Navy. Now as a final word, only the other day I read, as New Year Resolutions for everybody, something I have brought with me for you. You are living up to all they express in your daily conduct in this work of reform. Here they are:

 

Resolved, that in the year 1922 I will think things out.

 

That I will be wise enough to withhold judgment until I have all of the facts and that I will be sure the facts are genuine.

 

That I will not permit my solid judgment to be swayed by my personal feeling and that I will spurn every effort of self-seekers to gain my favor by attempting to arouse my prejudices.

 

That I will do my own thinking and not permit myself to be stampeded into any opinion by anyone on any pretext whatsoever.

 

And so God giving me courage, I will be a solid American citizen, unafraid, going forward with faith, believing in my country and my fellowmen, doing unto others as I would have others do unto me.

 

I thank you one and all.