THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF HIGH COMMAND
By Captain Harris Laning, U. S. Navy
During recent years military and naval officers the world over have been devoting more and more of their attention to the principles governing the exercise of command, and many are the books and papers that have been published on the subject. While not a few of the writings are invaluable to those who exercise command, nevertheless practically all of them treat the subject from a theoretical rather than from a practical point of view. However essential theory may be to the development of any art or science, it is not always necessary that he who practices the art be an expert in the theories upon which it is based, nor does it follow that one who is a good theorist' will for that reason be good in practice. Hence many of the writings on command are not of great help to the practical man in doing the actual work, for having filled his mind with theories, and probably sound theories, he is often at a loss as to how to apply them to his everyday work. It is the belief of the author of this paper that the "practice" of command, like the "practice" of navigation, engineering, or any other activity, can be so described that one can perform it with fair success even though not a great expert in the theory of it, and it is the intent of this paper to outline what appears to be a practical method for insuring successful high command in naval forces.
So far as the naval service is concerned command is of two distinct types. One type, which we may call low command, is more generally concerned with controlling men as individuals and in leading them while carrying out the wishes of a superior; the other, which we may call high command, concerns itself with controlling the unified efforts of groups of men through directing the commanders of the groups. Between the two types there is a great, though not always recognized difference. In the former the commander is always a follower who merely carries out the ideas of another, while in the latter the commander is always a leader who creates the ideas as well as directs the carrying out of them. It does not follow that a man who is excellent for low command will by virtue of that fact excel in high command, for it is one thing to lead on a way devised and directed by some one else and quite another to devise, direct, and lead the way for all others.
In the Navy the line of demarcation between high command and low command usually lies somewhere above the grade of captain. Up to the time he leaves the captains' grade, an officer's work is generally confined to that of low command. Starting with the grade of ensign, each duty of low command naturally prepares one for the next higher duty in that command, and an officer profiting by experience can pass along the line through the grade of captain without finding it absolutely necessary to give much study and thought to the principles of low command. As a subordinate he has no great difficulty in carrying out the duties assigned him, probably having an excellent division, department, or ship. He may or may not have analyzed the principles of low command and applied them to his work, though if he has he is undoubtedly a more efficient officer. Up to the time he leaves the grade of captain, and possibly for some time after, the average intelligent, energetic and conscientious officer exercises command passing well, and it is frequently assumed that when he has done so he has thereby become fitted for the high command that comes with further promotion. Such assumption is utterly unsound and is dangerous in the extreme. While it is practically certain that an officer who fails in low command will hardly excel in high command, it does not follow that mere success in low command proves one's ability for high command. On the contrary there are many men who, under the leadership of efficient high command, can obtain excellent results while commanding a ship, a division of ships, or other subordinate unit, but who have not certain altogether different essentials required for high command. It is the purpose of this paper to discuss those essentials and to then point out how they may be developed and applied.
Before starting a discussion of the essentials, attributes, or principles peculiar to high command, it would be well if we could digress long enough to consider those of low command, for there can be no doubt that as far as they go the principles of low command apply also to high command. However, it is not the purpose of this paper to deal with such elementary principles. It is assumed that all officers are more or less well qualified for exercising low command and that all are continuously preparing for the higher task when it comes. Hence for the moment we are not so much concerned with what we have been or now are as we are concerned with what we must be and do if we are to succeed in high command. Most of us are approaching a point in command where we may cease to be the followers of leaders to become the leader of followers, which change is very great and which we must be ready for when it comes. What must one be, what must one do to succeed in this new form of command?
Before we can deduce an answer to our query it is necessary that we have a full understanding as to just what is meant by command. In the Century Dictionary, command, as held by persons, is defined as "the right to order, control, or dispose of and carries with it "the right to be obeyed or to compel obedience." This definition covers the meaning of the word as it is generally understood, but analyzing the definition we cannot but be impressed with the fact that although it states much as to the rights possessed by one who commands, it says nothing at all as to the responsibility and duties of a person when he possesses those rights. That command carries with it responsibility and duties as well as rights is evident, but just as they are omitted from the definition they are not always given the consideration they should receive even by those who reach positions of high command. Thoroughly informed of the rights that go with command, not all understand or appreciate what such rights impose, yet it is what they impose that is the very essence of success in high command.
It is not difficult to order, control, and dispose of when one has the power to compel obedience, but to do those things in the way to get the best results is an altogether different matter. That they must be done in the one best way in military or naval forces is evident, for unless they are, not only will the forces themselves pay the price but also the whole state to which they belong will pay it. From this it must be apparent that that which actually constitutes command, viz., "rights," is possibly the least important part of it while that to which no reference is made in the definition, i.e., the responsibility and duties of command, is the very thing on which all success in command rests.
It is much to be regretted that the definition quoted above is so generally accepted, both in the service and out of it, as the full meaning of the word command. The idea that a Naval Academy education, a commission, and an officer's uniform, if coupled with a long life in the service in positions of low command, are all that is required for high command is not entirely confined to civilians. All too many naval officers have that idea and seem to think that those things are practically sufficient in themselves to make a man function perfectly in the art of high command. As a matter of fact those things are the most primary and minor elements of high command. Having them, the officer is merely at the starting point. Whether or not he functions properly thereafter depends upon himself.
It has been said that truly great commanders, like Napoleon and Nelson, are born, not made, and there can be no doubt that some men have a natural bent for high command that others have not. However even the greatest in high command, born to it though they may have been, reached their pinnacle only because of their preparation for their tasks. And the same processes must be gone through with by every successful commander. Not one has or will become great through mere intuition and environment, and hence no matter on whom the mantle of high command may fall, it remains for him to fit himself for the work. Were it possible to make the mantle fall only on those who have the natural bent for it, filling positions of high command would be much simplified, for such men would instinctively prepare themselves. As yet, however, we have no means of ascertaining which officers have that bent, hence all who approach the zone of high command must prepare themselves for it even though not foreordained to succeed in it. Each one must so educate himself that he will know what to do and how to do it, and then, having that knowledge, must develop the qualities both in himself and his command, that will enable him to make his forces do the things he wants done, in the way he has decided to do them.
From the above it would appear that there are three fundamentals for success in high command:—First, knowledge of exactly what is to be accomplished; Second, ability to lay out the certain way to accomplish it with the forces at one's disposal; and Third, skill in directing and leading the forces commanded so they will do the thing to be accomplished in the way decided on to do it. If he who holds a position of high command develops these three fundamentals, knowledge, planning, execution, his success is certain. Therefore let us see what he must do to develop them.
Up to the time he starts preparing himself for high command, an officer is not compelled to familiarize himself with anything but the immediate tool with which he works, such as the gun, the turret, the engine, the shop, the plant, the ship, or, at most, a small group of ships working as a unit. He comes to know rather definitely, or at least should know if the work of his higher commander has been thorough, just what each tool he has been associated with must accomplish in any situation. Also he has been indoctrinated in the way the tools should be utilized to accomplish it. His work has therefore been rather simple and his responsibility comparatively small. But on taking up the work of high command all this changes. He no longer thinks in small units or operates one or more small units, but must operate many units of many kinds, in a wide range of activities, and solely to attain the end in view in a way determined by himself. While his knowledge of details and the previous training he has had are undoubtedly essential in the new position, by themselves they help him not at all in it. Unless he knows how to combine all the parts of his command into one great machine, and can make that machine do his bidding, he does not function as a high commander. True he may wear the uniform, occupy the position, and assert his "rights;" also he may put up the semblance of a machine; but when the test comes the machine will fail and in its failure bring disaster to itself and to the country that owns it.
Before one can develop a machine for making successful war he must know what such war is. Hence the first step toward high command is a study of war—what causes it, what will constitute a decision, and what principles of strategy and tactics should be followed to gain decisions. Such study of war can never end as long as an officer may be called on to exercise high command, for only by keeping up to date in all things pertaining to war can the officer hope to keep himself ready to wage it successfully. However, when he has progressed to a certain point in his study of the conduct of war, the officer must learn to apply the principles in planning and carrying out successful operations pertaining to war. This is the second step in preparation for high command and in this phase the officer must get actual practice through war games. By such practice he learns to correctly estimate situations and reach sound decisions as to the courses of action he should take to win out in any situation, and if such practice is continued he finally becomes expert in drawing up plans that will bring victory in war.
The two steps of preparation just now so briefly outlined can be partly made by taking the courses provided by the War College, but owing to the limitations of the correspondence course, and to the shortness of the regular course, neither step will be complete unless supplemented by constant work along similar lines. Both before and after the War College courses the officer must study and practice war operations, constantly endeavoring to broaden his knowledge and make himself more expert in the conduct of war. But no matter how far he continues such work it is after all only a preliminary to high command. However great one's knowledge of war may be or how remarkable his ability to plan successful operations, he cannot win unless he makes his machine carry out his plans. So we now come to the final and most important fundamental of command, execution, the practical and successful application of theoretical preparation.
Just as there are many officers who believe that command begins and practically ends with the "rights" of the commander, so there are others who think that it ends when one knows the principles of warfare, and is more or less expert in planning war operations. While the latter idea is possibly not so utterly wrong as the former it is still so far wrong that he who believes it is but little better fitted for high command than he who believes the former. Knowledge of war and ability to plan war operations will not by themselves gain decisions in war and this must never be forgotten. Sound plans based on even full knowledge of war bring favorable decisions only when they are properly executed. This being so it behooves us to go deeply into the matter of execution.
What must a high commander do to insure that the forces he commands will carry out his plans successfully? Operating on a sound plan, forces organized and indoctrinated for their task, well disciplined through proper training in team work, loyal and of high morale will always win the decision if it is humanly possible to do so in the existing situation. Therefore the answer to our question as to what the commander must do" to make his forces succeed seems to he in (1) Organization, (2) Indoctrination, (3) Discipline, (4) Training, (5) Team Work, (6) Morale, and (7) Loyalty. Let us discuss each of these until we clearly see not only its relation to the execution of plans but also how we may develop it in the forces we command.
Until he is actually given the position, the work an officer does in connection with high command is expended entirely on himself. But when he enters high command and starts to execute, the officer deals with others, many others, who know neither his ideas nor his methods, who are not organized or trained to meet the requirements of his plans, and who have little to bind them to him. Yet all of these he must take unto and make a part of himself and his machine. If he is to succeed he can no longer rest content with doing only what he is told to do or what routine requires him to do, but on the contrary must act, act vigorously, and along the right lines deduced by himself. Having no one above to drive him, he must initiate, push, and drive on his own volition until his machine is assembled and in every way ready to fight, for until it is assembled and ready the machine is useless for his purposes, and the high commander has failed in the duty his country implicitly trusts him to perform.
The first step in developing a war machine is to organize it properly to do the work it will be expected to do in war. Such organization is much less difficult to bring about than is generally supposed provided that efficiency for the task is made the criterion. Unfortunately, and all too often, those in high command sometimes let other things than fighting efficiency dictate the organization of their forces, and as a result they frequently wind up with commands that can do almost anything but the one thing they are wanted for, fighting. We have had this situation even in our own Navy and will continue to have it whenever organization is based on anything but the fighting factor. Therefore on coming to a position of high command, the first thing an officer has to do is to make estimates of the situation, ascertain who the probable enemy or enemies are, determine the fighting his command may be called on to do in case of war with them, and then decide on how he will carry on the fight and on his task organization to fight that way. This task organization for war, derived from those estimates, is the organization a commander should use for his forces, not just during war but during peace as well.
Let us show by instances the practical application of the above method, starting with the Chief of Naval Operations. Upon being made Chief of Naval Operations it becomes the duty of the officer so assigned to take what navy Congress has provided, the Department, the various shore activities, and the forces afloat, and organize them to win any war that is likely to occur. His process for doing this is the same as is gone through by any other commander though in his case he is required by law to draw up the war plans. When he has done that, it then becomes his duty to arrange the whole Navy, including the Department, into such task groups as are called for by the plans he adopts. It takes no law to enable him to do it; it takes merely a strong man who knows what he wants to do and has the force to do it. He may have to upset the Department considerably to do it, but even with laws creating Bureaus as they now are, a very workable organization can be effected. In the same way, by following only his war plan, he can see how to assign ships to fleets and naval districts, and having done that how to organize the shore activities to meet the demands of the fleets and districts. Since Congress has not yet provided all the Navy we will have in war, the organization gotten up by the Chief of Naval Operations to carry out his war plan will in many places be but a shell, and everywhere it will be much smaller in peace than it will in war. Nevertheless such an organization has but to be filled out or expanded to make it completely effective in war and this is as it should be. Shell-like though it be it is the only organization a ready-to-fight navy can possibly have.
Other officers coming into positions of high command, either in the fleets or in the Department, go through exactly the same process, though when the Chief of Naval Operations has perfected his organization it may be unnecessary for them to begin their estimate of the situation where he does. If the Chief of Operations has given them their force and mission their estimate begins with that. But it is carried on to the same end, be the task group commander the Commander-in-Chief of a fleet or a Chief of Bureau. Each decides how he will carry out his mission as set forth for him in the Chief of Naval Operations plan, and decides on the task organization his forces should have to do it. Then he puts his forces into that organization. And so it goes on down the chain of high command even into the realms of low command, until the navy as a whole and every part of it is organized to fight.
Even in a most highly developed navy an officer coming into a position of high command would be unlikely to find his command already organized as it must be if it is to carry on in his way, and so he must always reorganize it sufficiently to fit his way. It will not do for him to change his way or forsake it merely to meet some one's else organization, for the key of all organization lies in the task to be performed, and under no circumstance should the commander be forced to change his method of performing it. If properly prepared for high command, an officer can quickly organize or reorganize his forces to meet his plans for carrying out his mission by simply dividing them into the task groups he knows he will use in war. Having done that he has the best possible organization for his forces and the only one that will ever work or he will ever need.
The great obstacle to efficient organization in any Navy is the generally prevalent idea that there should be or can be a difference between its peace organization and its war organization. One might as well expect a team organized for baseball to win a football championship as to expect a Navy organized for peace conditions to win in war. If a team thinks and lives baseball it can't do much in football, and a Navy that thinks and lives for peace can never win wars. Yet to a certain extent that is the way in our Navy today, and any one who comes to a place of high command in it, if he hopes to succeed, must bend every energy toward remedying that defect at least in the part of it he comes
to command.
Just what causes a Navy or any part of it to continue in an organization based solely on types of ships and peace administration is hard to say, but it would appear to be because those in high command in such a Navy think in terms of peace rather than in terms of fighting. Possibly they know war and can plan war operations, but, if so, they fail in the final test of high command for they do not prepare their forces to execute. We who are now preparing for high command must not follow that example for even though those who set it may not pay a penalty it does not follow that we also will fail to pay it. Therefore let us resolve that when high command comes to us we will immediately organize our forces for the work they should be ready to perform. It may not be easy to do; it may possibly make peace administration more difficult; and it may even meet with the opposition of some who do not or will not think in fighting terms, yet for all that we must do it for otherwise some of us are doomed to defeat, and our country to disaster.
Having organized his forces for war, a high commander must next indoctrinate them with his ideas and plans for waging it, for no matter how perfectly organized forces may be they cannot function as a fighting team unless each part knows exactly what is expected of it. Without indoctrination a huge Navy even when properly organized, is very like an "All American" football team, in which each position is filled by naming an exceptionally strong and able player, but which has never been assembled as a team and taught a way to play together. If the eleven men named as the "All American" football team this year were suddenly brought together and started in a game of football against a reasonably strong team, no matter how excellent and how strong the individual players are it would still have but little chance of winning. It would be exactly the same way with a war team. Unless the parts filling the various positions on the war team know exactly what is expected of them in every situation, and know exactly how to do it, they cannot win. Teaching them what to do and how to do it is known as "indoctrination."
Were it possible to carry on war by means of fixed rules, the indoctrination of a Navy, a fleet, or a force, by its commander might not be absolutely necessary for with such rules one could turn to them and get an approximate idea of his part in any particular operation. However there are no such rules and, for naval forces, there never can be any. No two commanders will ever do exactly the same thing in any of the infinite variety of situations that arise in war and so whenever a high command is taken over by a new commander, even though the old commander has indoctrinated the command with his ways, it is still essential that the new commander at once start his indoctrination. And it is especially necessary that he do so in our Navy, for, possibly excepting the battleship force, no part of it is as yet fully organized for its war tasks or indoctrinated with anyone's ideas or plans for war. Not fully ready to wage war in accordance with anyone's ideas it is much less ready to wage it in accordance with the ideas of a new commander. Under any circumstance, but especially under circumstances such as still exist to a large extent in our Navy, a new commander must not delay his work of indoctrination. Like organization it is vital.
Indoctrinating the command is one of the longest and hardest parts of the work of a high commander, yet the indoctrination must be thorough. Just how to proceed with it is often confusing and it is to be regretted that many officers, even graduates of the War College, do not understand how it is to be attained. Some seem to think that indoctrination should come from or through the War College, but that can never be for the War College makes no pretence of laying down fixed rules for conducting war. Even after taking the course one officer will have one way of doing a thing and another an entirely different way, both ways being sound and in accordance with the best principles of warfare. The way to be followed by any command is, of course, the way of its commander, hence when indoctrination is attempted it must be done to accord with that commander's plans. If subordinates in the force have had the War College course the commander's work is much simplified, but whether they have had the course or not they must still be indoctrinated. How, then, may we go about doing it?
Subordinates are said to be indoctrinated when they have become so imbued with their commander's ideas that, given a task by the commander, they will execute the task in practically the same way he would if performing it himself. Therefore the commander must cause his ideas to be absorbed by his subordinates until they actually think and act as he would or as he would want them to. Naturally this cannot come to pass if the commander stays away from his subordinates or keeps his ideas, plans, and methods to himself, so he does just the contrary. He constantly holds conferences with his officers regarding the operation and handling of the forces; he assumes war situations and explains how he wants the command to act in them; he assumes other situations, issues orders for the operations they demand, and causes the orders to be carried out by the subordinates in accordance with ideas he has enunciated to them; he trains his subordinates in order reading and order writing; he teaches them to estimate situations as they apply to their forces, to come to decisions as he would, and then to operate their forces in accordance with those decisions; he makes them realize that in their work all are striving to the same end, and he teaches them co-operation and co-ordination of effort. All these, and many other things, he must do, and he does them not with one officer at a time but with all the heads of the main subdivisions of his force gathered at conferences or games. Doing these things with those immediately under him, he requires them in turn to indoctrinate their subordinates, and so on down the line through the whole chain of command until the whole force works as a unit, united in thought, united in action.
As things are in modern navies, it often happens that neither the high commander nor his subordinates are familiar with all the uses or are well versed in the capabilities and limitations of the various forces and the new types with which they are working. Even in our own case it is often impossible for the "High Commander" to proceed rapidly with his work of indoctrination because neither he nor any one else knows exactly how to handle the new and not fully developed weapons. Even after all his preparation and training he must to a very large extent develop his plans and ideas after working with his forces to learn what they can do. Such procedure has been found necessary in our destroyer forces where the development of destroyer tactics and such indoctrination as is possible in a faulty "type organization" are going on hand in hand. However, in spite of the handicap, indoctrination is going on in those forces just as it should be in every force and in every part of the Navy. But it will never go on everywhere until each officer holding a position of high command rises to the occasion and carries out his duty rather than just rest content with exercising his "rights." Not the least important part of that duty is the indoctrination of his command.
The next step beyond indoctrination in preparing a command for its task is to make it "well disciplined." Let us get clearly in our minds what is meant by a well disciplined force. Specifically discipline is "training to act in accordance with rules," and forces are disciplined only when they have been so trained that they will always act in accordance with the wishes of their commander. In bringing forces to the state where they will always act in the way desired, the training sometimes becomes severe and corrective of faults by punishment, and, because of this, to many officers discipline has come to be so associated with chastisement and punishment that it is thought of only in connection with them. Officers having this idea seem to think that by chastising or punishing subordinates for anything and everything they thereby develop discipline in their command as well as a well disciplined force. That idea is not only entirely erroneous but possibly does more to reduce efficiency than any other one thing. Through forcing men not to do anything at all because they fear punishment if they do anything, it tends to defeat the very thing the high commander wants to accomplish. Discipline is never punishment. On the contrary it is a state or condition brought about not by punishment but by careful painstaking teaching and training on the part of the commander, by which a force becomes able to act in accordance with rules which are the commander's wishes as enunciated and taught by himself. While punishment for failure to so act is sometimes necessary it otherwise has nothing to do with disciplining forces. When constant punishment has to be resorted to it is prima facie evidence that the command has not been trained to act properly, and the fault lies not with the subordinates but with the commander himself. Not until the commander has taught and instructed his command in his ways, and has trained them to act in accordance with them, can he possibly have a well disciplined command.
A high commander must not try to hide his own neglect of duty by punishing his subordinates for not doing the things he has never told them he wants done. He may sometimes, and especially in peace time, evade paying the penalty for his shortcoming by using the power of his position to throw the blame on the helpless subordinate but he will never have a trained command. Punishment must be meted out when deserved but it should go to the one who deserves it, and unless he has truly trained his forces to his ways this will frequently be the high commander himself. As a matter of fact in a force trained to act in accordance with its commander's wishes, punishments are few because they are unnecessary. Training, not punishment, makes a disciplined force, and if the officer reaching high command will but bear this in mind and carry out what it implies he will have not only a force that will act in accordance with his wishes but one that will do so under any condition however impossible that condition may seem.
Since training and not punishment makes a well disciplined force, how may a commander go about such training? We have seen the steps he takes to organize and indoctrinate his force but training goes far beyond that. True, during their indoctrination the higher officers get something akin to training but it is at best only on the game board and is theoretical rather than practical. What the commander now wants is to put theory into practice in exactly the way it will be done in actual war. Obviously to do that is impossible and the nearest approach to it lies in operations that are largely sham. But in sham operations it is not possible to cover every detail of actual war in one grand maneuver, hence it is necessary to take up the various phases part by part and carry out each in a way as nearly like actual war as possible. Movements, either strategical or tactical, can be practiced in "fleet maneuvers"; hitting with guns, torpedoes, bombs, etc., can be practiced through actually firing them at targets under conditions similar to those of battle; and other phases can be practiced each in its own way. And so after he has indoctrinated his force a commander must lay out a schedule of practical exercises, by which each and every part of his force gets actual practice at sea in everything it has to do in carrying out the plans for fighting as deduced by the commander. While we can never at one time hope to practice a force as a whole in all the details of its war operations, we can, by careful planning and taking the phases part by part, give the entire force and every part of it a tremendous amount of practice at sea, and sufficiently like war, to fulfill our requirements. Hence as soon as the commander has given his force sufficient indoctrination to make it know what he wants to do and his general plan for doing it, he must plan and carry out a system of actual practice that leaves no portion of his force untrained or overlooked. Fleet maneuvers covering each phase of the plan, target practice in every form of firing the force will be called on to use in battle, speed trials, economy in steaming, self-upkeep, communication, and every other detail can be practiced, and must be practiced over and over, carefully, systematically, and thoroughly until the force not only knows exactly what the commander wants done but can do it with precision, certainty, efficiency, and each part in co-ordination with all the rest. For this actual training the high commander alone is responsible, and until he has carried it through his command will never be disciplined or become a fighting team.
In the treatment of our subject up to this point little has been said of the teamwork required in a great fighting force, although in a way teamwork must be considered in every step the high commander takes. His plans for fighting must be based on it, his organization laid out to enable him to put it into effect, his indoctrination such as to make the theory of it known to his forces, and his training work practice his forces in it. In all that an efficient high commander does, teamwork exercises a dominating influence, and yet strange to say the principle of teamwork seems to have been lost sight of in recent years by many high naval commanders.
It is possible that the failure of the British fleet to win an immediately decisive victory at Jutland was due to its poor teamwork; in our own Navy if the various elements of the fleet have fully developed teamwork either in themselves or between each other it is not in evidence. Neither in battle, nor in the phases of a campaign that precede it, can any naval force hope to gain success unless its parts are ready and trained to make a tremendous and coordinated effort, and hence an officer coming to a position of high command, and especially to such a position in our Navy, must devote great attention to teamwork. It is not sufficient to merely base plans in it, to organize forces for it and indoctrinate them in it. Having done all those things and having practiced each part of his force in its own particular task, the high commander must then train the parts as a whole in simulated war maneuvers. When he has done that, but not before, his command will be a fighting team and naturally no commander worthy of the name can ever rest content until his is a fighting team in fact as well as in theory.
A force organized to carry out its commander's plan, indoctrinated as to the plan and the way of executing it, and trained until it can actually carry the plan through in a perfectly executed coordinated effort has gone far in its way to being ready for its great task. Even then, however, it is not sufficiently ready and should a commander stop his work at that point his force will be far from being all it can and should be. Organization, indoctrination, and training, essential though they are, will not by themselves make a force always victorious. Back of those things there must be a greater quality, a will to win, and that quality must be so developed that the force will refuse to accept anything but victory. The quality in a force that gives it such a will to win that nothing less than victory will be accepted is known as morale, and it is so vital that unless a command has it to a superlative degree it not only may be defeated but probably will he.
Napoleon said "In war the moral is to the physical as three to one," and it is probable that if he erred at all he placed the moral factor too low. Certain it is that material things such as numbers, equipment, and perfection of operation can never bring victory to a force, unless that force is dominated by a will to win that victory. In spite of this self evident truth the training of forces is frequently focused on giving them the ability to fight while the will to fight, which is the far more important element, has been left to look out for itself, and this in face of experience, which shows that even with less actual effort the moral factor can be developed just as surely and just as highly as can the physical. Since the physical factor, no matter how highly developed, is practically useless for war purposes unless glorified by the moral factor, it follows that a commander must develop that moral factor to the utmost. The question for us then is how he may do so.
When a commander attempts to develop the quality known as morale he is confronted with something very different from the other phases of his task. Whereas organization, indoctrination, training, and teamwork are definite things that require definite action to bring about, morale, the will to win—is a mental attitude, a particular mental attitude, that is so indefinite as to be almost intangible. What goes to make up the particular mental attitude that will not accept defeat under any circumstances, that no matter what the suffering or loss may be still drives on to victory? What may a commander do to develop it?
Morale, for all purposes of war, is a state of faith; it is belief in an ability to see anything through to a successful conclusion; it is a measure of men's confidence in their cause, in their leaders, and in themselves. If this be true, we begin to have something definite to work on, for to develop morale it is only necessary to develop that confidence until it is absolute. And a system for that development can be devised by any able commander provided he himself has the measure of confidence he desires to inspire in his subordinates. Much of the work he can do himself and some of it no one can do for him, but a great deal of it can be done by a special organization put in the force for that particular purpose, provided the commander makes himself the soul of that organization.
It is impossible to lay out briefly the special organization necessary to develop morale in a force or to explain in a few words how such an organization goes about its task. However, it is unnecessary to do so for in certain books, like Colonel Munson's The Management of Men, both an organization and a system for the development of morale are so well explained that any high commander can perfect his own from them. Naturally the high commander should not delay starting the work along that line, but when he has done so he must remember that he still has other things to do to develop morale, and that these other things are things no one can do for him. Always his own example must show his confidence; always he must energize the system with the fire of his own faith; and always he must lead. While through his own efforts and those of his morale organization his forces may develop great confidence in their cause and in themselves, he must never forget that these are but two legs of the tripod that makes morale. The third leg of the tripod is the troops' confidence in their leader, and the structure will fall just as surely from the failure of this leg as from the failure of any other. Hence unless a commander can inspire confidence in himself as a leader he will never have a successful fighting force.
The confidence of a force in its leader is based primarily on the strong personality of the leader himself, and this personality includes ability, devotion, and justice. A truly great leader has little difficulty impressing his ability and devotion on his subordinates. During the organization, indoctrination, and training of the force they have ample opportunity to weigh both, and they will weigh them for exactly what each is worth. Any failure of a high commander to carry out his duty along some such lines as have been discussed in this paper cannot but be known to his force, and though by other ways he may keep their love, their honor, and even their respect, during peace time, when put to the crucial test in war, they are bound to question both his ability and his devotion. When subordinates do that, the will to win in the sense meant in this paper cannot exist. However, even though by his work he clearly impresses both his ability and devotion on his subordinates, a commander who is lacking in justice to them can hardly hope to exact their loyal support when facing trying conditions. Only justice begets loyalty and unless held by the extreme of loyalty men cannot and will not make the supreme effort or the supreme sacrifice called for in war.
Though loyalty is really only one of the many elements that taken together bring high morale, it has such far-reaching effect on morale that it deserves some attention, and especially so since all too often those holding positions of high command do not always understand its principles or apply them to themselves. While in the sense ordinarily used loyalty is devotion to a superior and therefore works upward from the bottom, in the military sense it works both ways and to have its maximum effect there must be loyalty down as well as up. This fact is often overlooked, and we not infrequently see a commander exacting all from those under him and giving them little or nothing in return. In fighting forces one-sided loyalty spells failure, for certainly no commander can expect from his subordinates anything more than he himself gives to them. The commander who fails to support his subordinates when they are faithfully trying to carry out his wishes cannot long count on their maximum support. The commander who in order to avoid punishment for his sins of omission or commission, throws blame on subordinates, has no right to expect, much less demand, devotion to himself. Yet time on time we see these obvious truths violated and find men who should be leading their subordinates to higher standards actually taking a low standard of action in their dealings with subordinates. How different it is for the commander who bias the moral courage to stand by and with his subordinates in their hour of need! When his own hour comes they will stand by him to a man and no effort or sacrifice will be too great for them to make when he asks it. Therefore in our preparation for high command and when we come to high command let us not forget that the loyalty of our subordinates to us and all we do will be measured in kind and amount by our own loyalty to them.
There is no better way for a, commander to show his loyalty to his subordinates than by having faith in them to carry out any task he assigns. It is to warrant such faith that commanders go to such great lengths to indoctrinate and train their commands, yet it often happens that even after they have done so they nullify their work either by taking charge of a subordinate's task or by including in orders detailed instructions for carrying it out. Showing, as it does, a lack of faith, such action is fatal to results and if persisted in not only reacts in the subordinate's loyalty to his commander, but also tends to destroy his initiative, the very thing on which a commander must rely when not in personal contact with the subordinate. When a subordinate knows his commander depends on him to carry through successfully his part in the general plan, in the way that seems best to him as the man on the spot, he will spare neither energy nor resources in doing so as long as there is life in him. This is exactly the spirit and will to win that the commander wants and must cultivate; but it never comes to a force whose commander tries to do anyone's work but his own. For this reason, if for no other, high commanders must leave all details of execution to their subordinates. Nevertheless there is another and quite as important reason for doing so.
Whenever a high commander usurps the province of a subordinate he does more than kill initiative and destroy morale, he puts himself in a position in which he cannot but neglect his own great task. From what has gone before it is evident that in attending to his own important duties a high commander has quite all the work any man can do and that if he undertakes the work of another he can do so only at the expense of the time he needs for his own. Furthermore, in doing it he sacrifices the whole force to a part, and even the part becomes worse off than it otherwise would be because it is trained solely to operate alone. We see an instance of this when a Commander-in-Chief takes personal charge of say his battleship force, and personally supervises all it does while giving little or no attention to the rest of the fleet. Because that task keeps him very busy he may feel he is doing all he can do and his full duty. On the contrary he is doing nothing that he should do and is actually neglecting his duty. No matter how perfect the co-ordination of battleships may become between themselves it will serve no purpose in war unless the battleships as a group co-ordinate with those of the other parts of the battle fleet. Even a perfectly trained battle fleet will be of little value in war if it cannot co-ordinate its efforts with those of the other forces that have to lead it to battle. This being true it becomes nothing short of fatal when a Commander-in-Chief concentrates his energies on only one part of his force, for he stands not only to get nothing from his fleet as a team, but also to get the absolute minimum from the part he concentrates on.
In the same way that a Commander-in-Chief often fails through usurping the work that belongs to subordinates so will any other high commander fail who does likewise. Yet over and over we find high commanders doing that very thing. They swamp themselves in details belonging to subordinates, and because they overwork themselves in doing so they imagine they are making progress even though they never give a thought to their own great task. Success in high command is never measured by the quantity of work done by the commander but only by the work he does on his own particular task, and high commanders should not delude themselves on that point. To do so is absolute proof of incompetency and unfitness for the task. If a high commander cannot from his mission deduce his own task he certainly is not fitted for command. Neither is he fitted for it unless he sticks to that task, and to no other. In these two statements we have the very foundations of all success in high command—knowing one's own business and attending to it. When the high commander does that he does all, but the trouble is that many high commanders do not do it. Those who aspire to such positions should avoid the pitfall, but if they do it will be by their own efforts for there is no one else to point them fair.
What one must be and what one must do to succeed in high command is now before us. Even from this brief discussion it must be evident that he on whom the mantle of high command may fall has a responsibility and a duty he cannot evade without willfully exposing himself, his command, and his country to disaster. While those in position of low command always have over them a higher commander who is competent to judge, and who does judge and pass on their work, the high commander has no such superior and if he so elects he can often leave undone those things he should do without himself paying any penalty for it. During war, should he then be in command, his country of course will judge him by the results he gets. But war may not come during his time in command, so even though the evil of his way lives after him he may not be held responsible for it. Ordinarily during times of peace the sole judge of a high commander's work is his own conscience, and if he chooses to salve that it is probable that no power superior to him will either question or doubt anything he does or does not do. During such times, though he has utterly failed to prepare his force for war, it is even possible a high commander may be considered a successful one for at that time, at least outside the Navy, no one knows or seems to care about the Navy's readiness to fight. But can we as naval officers neglect our duty simply because of that? Are any of us so deficient in moral obligation and sense of duty that we are willing to turn over to a successor a command which if war comes might bring odium on him and disaster to the country? Let us hope not, but at the same time let us not forget that our own Navy is not today either a fully organized or highly trained fighting team. Were the way to make it a fighting team obscure, were there any doubt as to exactly what course a high commander should take to make it one, there might be some excuse for our not making it ready and keeping it so. But with the way so clear there certainly cannot be. Knowing that way, an officer worthy of the uniform he wears and of the trust his country has placed in him cannot and will not spare either himself or his efforts in following it.
Truly the principles of high command are embodied in the trinity—self preparation, planning, and execution—each of which follows the other in turn and none of which is of value without the others. Of these the first two concern themselves only with the high commander, but the last concerns itself with the entire command and is the measure of all that command does. No matter how well the commander may prepare himself, no matter how expert he may become in planning, those things go for naught unless he organizes his command to carry out his plan, indoctrinates it with the plan and method of carrying it out, trains it so it will act in coordinated effort in accordance with the indoctrination, and finally develops in it the "fighting spirit" and the "will to win." These are the things the high commander can do and must do. And they are the things he will do if he too has the fighting spirit and the "will to win."