DISCUSSION: Personnel
(See Whole No. 235, Page 1507)
Captain J.K. Taussig, U.S. Navy.—The reading of Lieutenant Henning's paper titled "Personnel," which was published in the September number of the Proceedings, has awakened in me some thoughts which have been slumbering for quite a while and which required a stimulant like this article to arouse. Personnel being a hobby of mine, due perhaps to the fact that the greater part of my shore duty has been intimately associated with its administration or training, it is perhaps natural that I should be conquered by an uncontrollable desire to discuss Mr. Henning's paper. At least this is my excuse for doing so.
Taking the sub-heads in the order in which they were treated we will first take up "Permanency of Personnel."
It is generally recognized throughout the service that permanency of personnel is a great asset for efficiency, and that due to this lack of permanency we never get beyond the elementary stages in training. In fact all ships are practically training ships, not for the higher and more intricate phases, but for the elementary work. Mr. Henning says the first step to remedy this is to: "Make the first enlistment six years." This undoubtedly would have a salutary effect on permanency. It is not the first step, but the second step. The first step necessary for permanency of personnel is adequacy of numbers. This, insofar as my personnel experience extends, has never been our fortunate position, excepting during the actuality of war, when, to a large extent the advantage in quantity was largely discounted by the disadvantage of quality. We have never had a proper balance between material and personnel, and the personnel has always been on the light side of the scales. Take for example our present situation where we are allowed 86,000 men. To run properly our navy on a peace time basis requires no less than 130,000 men. With such a shortage it is natural that two great defects are apparent in our personnel distribution. One is that many of our first line ships have no crews at all, and the second is that for those which have crews, there is no reserve for replacements. Now we would not think of not keeping a proper reserve of stores, supplies, fuel, and provisions with which to replenish our needs. But the idea of having a small reserve of men to take the place of those who are sent to hospitals, or of those who are discharged for various reasons, or desert, somehow or other seems preposterous! Our reasoning in general in regard to shortage of personnel both in individual ships and in the navy as a whole is not usually sound. Instead of ships in commission being short of their regular complements, they should have men in excess, especially in the Chief Petty Officer and Petty Officer ratings. It is these men who must be used as the nucleus for newly commissioned ships in case of war. We must realize that unless there is a decided improvement in our naval reserve affairs, that organization has practically become defunct. Its existence is on paper only.
As for the six-year enlistment term, there is no question but that this would be an excellent thing for the service in just as great proportion as the two-year enlistment was a terribly bad thing. Even with shortage in personnel, the six-year enlistment would add to permanency. But in going after the legislation necessary to obtain this lengthened enlistment period, we must not forget that congressional psychology is at present against it. In other words, instead of asking for legislation which calls for the first enlistment period hereafter to be six years, let us ask for legislation which permits the Secretary to make enlistments for six-years in addition to those terms that are now authorized. The chances are much better for getting the legislation in this form than in the other. It would then be in the province of the Department to authorize enlistments only for six years, and this would be done whenever the navy is recruited to its authorized strength, a condition which should be normal as soon as we once attain normalcy.
Lieutenant Henning's remarks about the continual transfer of officers and men from ship to ship, likening them to "birds of passage," are well made. There is altogether too much of this. But the remedy is not in the measures advocated by him. In fact so long as the four-year enlistment is in force and so long as we have inadequate numbers of men for the ships in service, the proposed remedies are impracticable. The first two of these measures are:
"(1) Allow no transfers to ships of the first line of men having less than three years to serve, and
"(2) Permit no transfers from ships of the first line until after three years service on that vessel except under exceptional circumstances which must be referred to the Department."
The present conditions as to number of men in proportion to material and as to length of enlistment period are not so very different from, what they were shortly prior to the war. At that time the Texas was to be commissioned. The Chief of Bureau of Navigation directed that no men should be placed on the Texas detail with less than two years to serve. This order could not be carried out. Owing to the large number of ships in commission in proportion to personnel there was no reserve available to fit out even a single ship with men having two years remaining on their enlistments. It could not be accomplished without taking a number of two-year men from ships already in commission, and it was manifest that if this were done there were no long time replacements for these men, and the instability of all these ships was increased thereby. So long as we live from hand to mouth in personnel, ships fully manned with long time crews are impracticable. The only remedies are the six-year enlistment and adequacy of numbers.
Under the heading "Training Station Experience," Mr. Henning writes: "The training station period for every man should be six months, including a three months training ship cruise." This would be an ideal theoretical condition. But is it good under the present practical conditions? For example, is it desirable to place in commission a number of training ships when there are a lot of real fighting ships without crews? To place training ships in service means a further depletion of the fighting ships. It means more training for the recruits but less for the rest of the navy. There should be a proper balance somewhere, but it would seem that so long as we are below our needs in total enlisted personnel we can not afford to sacrifice the fleet training for purely recruit training. Under present conditions as to numbers and length of enlistment period, I believe it better for the navy as a whole to send the recruits direct to the regular fighting ships after a three or four months period at the training stations.
Many of the things Lieutenant Henning says about "Military Standard" are, unfortunately, true. However, he paints the picture a little worse than it has been my experience to see. We should have the same military standard on all ships throughout the service. This is far from so. On the inspection reports of a ship, the flag officer is required to answer the question: "Is she entitled to be called a 'smart ship'?" The answer to this question has, in my experience, usually been decided more or less on the military standard than on the naval standard. There is a difference in the life of a soldier and a sailor. The environment is different, and certainly the work is different, although the ultimate aim of both is fighting efficiency. When it comes to rigidity of action and manner as exemplified by the military standard, I do not believe that life on board ship is conducive to it in the same degree as on shore. While at quarters and at drill, these military standards should be adhered to, but at other times there are certain naval standards which permit of a let down in rigidity and which I believe broaden the man.
Perhaps one of the causes in our failure to maintain a proper military standard, is the sailors' uniform. There is nothing military about it, and if there is any truth in the adage that, "clothes make the man," I do not see how we can expect to keep up a high 'military standard so long as we stick to our present antiquated and unmilitary uniform. It is recognized that a uniform is necessary for the attainment of military standards, so if we are slack in these attainments let's make a change and put our men in sensible clothes, and give them a proper cap to wear instead of the ridiculous white hat which shrinks until it just sits on the crown of the head, and the big brimmed flat hat which the least puff of wind blows off. Some years ago we changed the Chief Petty Officers' uniform from the old-time sailor style to the present neat affair. Let us give the sailormen something similar and we will find it much easier to maintain military standard.
In Lieutenant Henning's discussions on "Physical Training," and "Morale," he brings out many pertinent points that are worthy of consideration and putting into practice. It will be noted that the time element enters into nearly all of these, and while an hour here and an hour there seem in themselves small, when we take into consideration the very many things that must be done on a man-of-war, they all total up to goodly proportions. We will have more time to spend on physical training, exercises, and instructive lectures, etc., if we succeed in getting beyond that perpetual elementary training state, which can only be accomplished when we get adequacy in numbers together with the six-year enlistment period.
His suggestions about employing the moving pictures for instructing the men in naval history is an excellent one. There is no question but that the periodic replacement of some very poor films now shown, by some that instruct concerning the past history of the navy would have a salutary effect on morale, in that it would tend to improve the esprit de corps. It is to be noted that the Bureau of Navigation recently sent to all ships a series of copies of paintings depicting notable scenes during the late war. This is somewhat in line with Mr. Henning's suggestions.
The effect on military standard and morale as exemplified by the manner in which Chief Petty Officers and other Petty Officers perform their military duties is worthy of consideration. Especially is this so where it concerns discipline. Our difficulties along these lines vary according to different ships. It has only been in recent years that we have abolished the rating of master-at-arms. As long as there had been a navy we had had a separate police force for maintaining discipline. Neither the army or marines had such a force. All non-commissioned officers were trained to understand that they were a link in the maintenance of law and order. But in the navy it came to be looked on as a function of "jimmy legs" only. As a result our petty officers became such for professional duties only—they were neither trained nor qualified for military duties.
Even now many of our Petty Officers are appointed entirely on their professional qualifications. We have many petty officer ratings where the incumbent has practically no military duty to perform. They do not control or command other men. In other words, they are officers in name only. The navy regulations provide for their assisting in the maintaining of discipline, but there are no men under their authority. Having this large number of so-called Petty Officers who have no command duties naturally detracts from the value of the others in their military capacities. The remedy would be to have a re-classification in which men who have professional qualifications deserving high rates of pay, but who have no military command, be known as rated men, rather than Petty Officers, and have some distinctive mark other than the Petty Officer rating badge. Then the real Petty Officers could much more easily be made to appreciate the significance of their titles. We can not expect the real Petty Officers to have an appreciation of their military duties so long as we take men into the service from civil life, and make them Petty Officers before they even know what it means to obey orders themselves.
Lieutenant Henning's description of the chaotic situation which existed during mobilization at the beginning of the war, is in no wise exaggerated. In fact these conditions were in many respects even worse than he sets forth. All of which was due, of course, to our lack of preparedness.
We had a Naval Reserve law which had failed to accomplish its intended purpose, so that at the beginning of the war our reserves amounted to almost nothing. Then when war actually came, the reserve force grew with leaps and bounds until it contained over 300,000 men and women. The men who enrolled in the reserves did so simply because there was a limit by statute on the size of the regular navy, and no restriction on the number of reserves. These three hundred thousand so-called reserves were reserves in name only. In reality they were untrained regulars. To quote from "A Study of Our Navy Personnel Situation," published about a year ago in the Proceedings:
"In other words our present reserve force did not come into existence because of the possibility of war, but because of the actuality of war. As certain as this organization found its creation because of the war, just as certain will it find its death because the war is over. It cannot be saved unless the laws are changed, and unless we come to appreciate the fact that the only reserve that should be maintained in time of peace is one that is at all times qualified for sea service."
We have witnessed the passing of the reserve due to natural attrition, lack of funds, and the general defects in the original law. The laws are from time to time being changed; but under present conditions there is no chance of our having an effective reserve that would permit of an immediate mobilization of even one-half the ships we would wish to place in service. How best to organize such reserves as we have, and how best to provide for an efficient mobilization plan are of vital importance. Unless the reserves are well organized, and unless there is a good mobilization plan, it would be just as well not to spend any money whatever on the reserve force.
I can see no reason why both the organization and mobilization plan should not be effective and efficient under the direct control of our Naval District Commandants, provided sufficient funds are available. These Naval Districts have the machinery for making the plan effective and are now prepared for immediate expansion in case of war. This condition did not exist prior to the late war. I think Mr. Henning's proposal to make each ship accountable for its own reserve, entirely impracticable. The status and stations of our ships are changing too rapidly to make this plan feasible. The destroyer Dent may be "based at Philadelphia with reduced complement"' today, but tomorrow the Dent may be en route to Asiatic waters, or she may be in full commission or out of commission. Each change of status would require a shift of the reserve personnel and a distribution of them perhaps to several ships. In this kind of a plan there would be no organization for caring for the greater part of the reserves which must be in readiness for placing on board the fighting ships which are out of commission. It seems to me that our "complex organization heretofore attempted, the Naval District idea," is simplicity itself in comparison with Mr. Henning's suggestion. There are many complexities in Mr. Henning's plan which would not be apparent to one who has not had experience in the actual administration of large bodies of men. Decentralization of authority may be good to a certain extent, but to carry it out to the limit contemplated, could not result in anything but chaos. The idea of each ship having its own reserve force, controlled by itself, cannot be a success for many reasons. But the chief of the reasons are that the status of ships changes too rapidly, and the men for each unit would be too widely scattered. In addition it has been found to be very bad practice to have any man in the naval service consider that he is enlisted or enrolled for a special detail only. All men in the navy, whether regulars or reserves, must be available for duty on any ship and any station the Department sees fit to send them.
Mr. Henning, in his discussion of where the reserve is to be used, says: "It can not be too strongly urged against filling up the complements of the battleships of the first line with reservists." Why only battleships? Why not all the ships of the first line? With what are we going to fill up the complements of the battleships if we don't fill them with reservists? There is no reserve of regulars. The only other way the battleships could be filled by regulars (and they would all require filling), would be to take the men from the cruisers, destroyers, and auxiliaries, thereby further depleting their already depleted complements. But would we do this in case of war? Manifestly not, and for very good reasons. The cruisers, destroyers, and auxiliaries will be the ships whose services will be first required in operations against the enemy. Both the cruisers and destroyers are very much more likely to see active fighting than are the battleships. The cruisers and destroyers will undoubtedly see some such service, but the battleships may never have an engagement. We could not afford, at the beginning of a war, to deplete these cruisers and destroyers of their regulars, and send them to the battleships. No, it looks now that in case of war again we would go through the same process as the last time; that is, deplete our battleships of trained men in order that certain other ships may immediately operate. The battleships can probably better take weeks or months to absorb the new material than could the cruisers and destroyers. This of course is not as it should be; but I do not see how under the present conditions, where we have neither an adequate regular personnel or reserve force, it could be helped. We will simply be facing the facts as they exist, and have to take our medicine no matter how