Destroyer Experiences During The Great War

A dreadful sound is in his ears: in prosperity the destroyer shall come upon him.—(Job, XV, 21)

I. THE FIRST SIX

Being a narrative of the experiences incidental to the crossing of the first United States destroyer division sent abroad for the purpose of operating against the German submarines in the Great War.

At Base 2

The United States Fleet under the command of Admiral Henry T. Mayo, had been assembled at Yorktown, Va., for several days, when, on the evening of April 6, 1917, this signal was flashed from the flagship Pennsylvania:

"Mobilize for war in accordance with department confidential mobilization plan of March 21."

We of the fleet had felt for some time that war was inevitable. When diplomatic relations were severed in February, the fleet was in West Indian waters, carrying on the usual winter maneuvers. The Commander-in-Chief immediately took all necessary precautions to guard against surprise attacks by submarines. Outposts, pickets, and patrols were established. The ships were darkened at night. During the passage to Hampton Roads the fleet proceeded cautiously by an unfrequented route. A screen of destroyers surrounded the big fighting ships. From Hampton Roads it moved up the Chesapeake to the mouth of the York River. Here Base 2 was established.

A boom was thrown across the river; outposts and pickets were posted; a destroyer patrol extending from Eastport to Key West was placed in operation. All these things were purely defensive measures.

There were no evidences of preparations for an offensive movement, and in fact, no such preparations had been made. It was a decidedly discouraging outlook, especially to us in the destroyers. From what little we had heard concerning anti-submarine operations, it was known that the destroyers were the best antidote for the poisoning. It therefore was disheartening to think we were destined for nothing more than to guard our battleships at home and to patrol our coast at a distance of three thousand miles from the scene of active operations. There is nothing more trying and more monotonous than looking for an enemy which is known not to be anywhere around.

My own ship, the Wadsworth, had been detailed to make the mail trips between Base 2 and Hampton Roads. This was much better under the circumstances than swinging at anchor as a picket or steaming wildly up and down the coast as a patrol. It was most interesting in that every morning we carried as passengers from Old Point Comfort, one or more officers, some of them old friends, who were on their way to the fleet. There were numerous discussions as to the future employment of the ships. When an opinion was expressed, which was usually the case, it was always to the effect that the fleet would continue as at present—that is, doing nothing in an offensive way…"It was evident that such help as the United States would give the Allies was to be moral and financial…We would send them munitions but we would not fight…Our fleet was to remain in home waters to guard itself against submarines which were three thousand miles away…Then if the Germans beat the Allies we would be ready to protect the United States…The attitude was a defensive one…It was strategy backwards in that it was division of effort instead of concentration…It was the kind of policy that had lost wars for other nations in the past…If adhered to it would lose us this war"…and so forth and so on.

On the morning of April 13, two of the passengers on the Wadsworth were Admiral Mayo and his Chief of Staff, Captain Orton P. Jackson. They were returning from Washington. It did not seem possible that Admiral Mayo was the conveyor of news which was of much moment to the personnel of the destroyer on which he was a passenger. Neither from him nor from Captain Jackson was there the slightest; intimation that something unexpected was about to take place.

It so happened that my family were in Norfolk, and, as the Wadsworth anchored at Hampton Roads every night, I frequently visited them. On the afternoon of the day when Admiral Mayo returned to Base 2, the Wadsworth as usual carried the fleet mail to Hampton Roads; and I, as usual, proceeded to Norfolk. So little of the war spirit had pervaded that place, and so little had we of the Navy felt its pressure, that my plans for the night contemplated attending one of those delightful dances known as the Norfolk German. When about to leave the house shortly after nine o'clock the telephone rang. The automobile was waiting outside. Someone else could answer the phone. We were just starting when the door opened and a voice called:

"Long distance from Old Point for Captain Taussig."

Returning to the house and taking up the receiver I found myself in communication with Lieutenant Falge, one of the officers of the Wadsworth. He was talking from the Chamberlin Hotel.

"Captain," he said, "I have news for you. The Jacob Jones has just arrived bringing orders for the Wadsworth to sail at daylight for New York, to fit out for distant service."

"Have a boat at the dock for me at eleven o'clock," was my reply.

Hanging up the receiver, I returned to the automobile. Instead of going to the ball, I was taken to the Old Point car. The war was a reality after all.

On reaching my ship at midnight and after reading the order, directions were given to be ready to get under way at 5:30 a.m. The order follows:

M-51-30

DESTROYER FORCE, ATLANTIC FLEET,
U.S.S. Seattle, Flagship,

13 April, 1917.
CONFIDENTIAL:
From: Commander, Destroyer Force.
To: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. Wadsworth.
SUBJECT: Movement orders.

1. • The Wadsworth is hereby relieved of her present duties in connection with mail. Proceed at daylight, April 14, 1917, to Navy Yard, New York. Dock and expedite all necessary preparations for special service.
   • The Porter, Davis, Conyngham, McDougal and Wainwright are expected to join you at Cape Henry and proceed on the same duty.
   • Further instructions will be forwarded later.

/s/ Albert Gleaves

The Commanding Officers of the destroyers composing this detail were:

(60) Wadsworth…Commander Joseph K. Taussig.
(59) Conyngham…Commander Alfred W. Johnson.
(58) Porter…Lieutenant-Commander Ward K. Wortman.
(54) McDougal…Lieutenant-Commander Arthur P. Fairfield.
(65) Davis…Lieutenant-Commander Rufus F. Zogbaum.
(62) Wainwright…Lieutenant-Commander Fred H. Poteet.

We, of course, were looked upon with envy by all the other destroyer skippers. Each one of them was dreadfully disappointed at not being among the chosen few. This especially as there was a feeling that maybe these six would be the only ones lucky enough to get abroad. But particularly keen was the disappointment felt by Lieutenant-Commander Wygant and Lieutenant-Commander Bagley. These two destroyer Captains saw their ships, the Tucker and Jacob Jones, which belonged to the Eighth Division, displaced by the McDougal and Davis. It was purely an exigency of war, but it hurt.

The Change in Plans

It is necessary here to digress from the chronological order of happenings in order to relate how the decision was reached to send the destroyers overseas; and how the selection was made. None of the facts were known to me at the time.

From London, Rear Admiral Sims was making urgent appeals to send across immediately all the available destroyers and small craft. These appeals were not heeded. This was undoubtedly because the Navy Department had made no plans for employing our ships offensively, the attitude in Washington being an entirely defensive one.

On or about April 10, Rear Admiral Browning of the British Navy and Rear Admiral Grasset of the French Navy arrived at Hampton Roads on their respective flagships. Here they were met by our Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Benson, and Admiral Mayo. A conference was held in the Hotel Chamberlin. During the conference there was free and open discussion of the situation. No decisions were reached. The conference adjourned, proceeded to Washington, and on the following day, reconvened in the General Board Room at the Navy Department. Besides the four flag officers who had met the previous day at the Chamberlin, there were at this meeting: the Secretary of the Navy, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, several members of the General Board, Captain H.B. Wilson, U.S.N., Captain O.P. Jackson, U.S.N., and some members of the staffs of Rear Admiral Browning and Rear Admiral Grasset. The Secretary of the Navy presided. The discussions of the previous day were repeated. Both the British and French Admirals stated the Allies' needs and how in their opinion the United States could best help.

The question of the defense of our own battleships by an adequate number of destroyers seems to have been one of the chief issues. Finally Admiral Browning stated that while he recognized it was necessary that an adequate number of destroyers should be kept with the battleships, still he hoped that the United States would see its way clear at least to show its flag in the antisubmarine work off the Channel. He pointed out that even one destroyer there would have a great moral effect.

Secretary Daniels then turned to Admiral Mayo and said:

"Can we send them one destroyer, Admiral?"

To this the Admiral replied:

"We can send a division and should not send less than that."

The decision to send a division was immediately made.

It has been represented that the British Admiral asked for only one destroyer. This of course was not so. His final appeal for at least one in order to have the moral effect of our flag was made only after it became clear that the Navy Department's attitude was adverse to sending any of our vessels from the home coast.

A message was immediately sent to Rear Admiral Albert Cleaves, who was in command of the Destroyer Force, to select six destroyers for this duty. The selection was based entirely on the material readiness and steaming radius of the vessels. The Eighth Division was composed of the newest destroyers, with the exception of a few which had been lately commissioned. It was natural that this division would be in the best material condition. It would have been selected intact if it were not for the fact that the Tucker and Jacob Jones, through no fault of their personnel, did not have the steaming radius of the others. This reason, and no other, was why they were replaced by the McDougal and Davis.

That I should have been the commander of this division was purely accidental and circumstantial. Captain Hanrahan, who was my senior, commanded the Seventh Division. It so happened, luckily for me, that his ship, the Gushing, was undergoing extensive repairs at a Navy Yard. Otherwise, there is no doubt but that to him would have fallen the honor of commanding the first destroyers sent overseas.

Rear Admiral Cleaves recommended that the destroyers fuel and provision at Hampton Roads, and sail for the other side direct from there. This recommendation was approved by Admiral Mayo, but the Department directed that the vessels first proceed to their home yards.

Fitting Out

The decision to send the destroyers to the other side was made so unexpectedly and the movement started so promptly, it is possibly natural that there should have been considerable confusion connected therewith. This confusion was augmented by the attempts at secrecy which prevented the Department from taking the commander of the small force into its confidence. Consequently there was much working in the dark. At any rate, insofar as I, the commander of the little force, was concerned, the "fog of war" was thick. It was difficult to comprehend just what the Department's wishes and intentions were.

A brief review of our movements and the conditions met with will perhaps show what is meant:

(1) An order received at 9:00 p.m., April 13, directs six destroyers to proceed at daylight to New York to fit out for distant service. This, of course, implied haste.

(2) In accordance therewith the destroyers proceeded at 28 knots, arriving at the New York Navy Yard at 6:00 p.m., the same day (Saturday); The yard is closed for work until Monday morning. We find no one even casually interested in us. Apparently there is no haste after all.

(3) The following day (Sunday), the Commandant informs me he received word from Washington that the McDougal and Davis were due at New York. No mention of the others. However, arrangements are made to begin docking all ships the next morning, four destroyers to be placed in the large dock together.

(4) The Navy Department gets report of arrival of all destroyers at New York. Devil to pay. It was the intention that those whose yards were Boston should have gone to Boston. To Boston they must go, and for Boston we departed the following morning, April 15.

(5) On arrival at Boston we find the Commandant and his assistant ready to help in every way possible. But we are still in the dark as to how long the Department intends it should take to get us ready. There certainly were reasons for sending us to the Navy Yards; otherwise we could have been well on our way across. A conference of commanding officers is held in which it is decided to ask for every thing we might possibly need. The list of repairs and alterations is submitted to the navy yard authorities, and an estimate of ten days given by them to complete the work. This was on Tuesday, April 16.

(6) A telephone message from the Office of the Chief of Operations informs me that the destroyers must be fitted out for any and every service; they must have everything done that they require. But they must he ready to sail at any time immediately on the receipt of orders. I felt exactly like the little girl who had permission to go swimming and was told by her mother to, "Hang your clothes on a hickory limb, but don't go near the water."

It seemed to me at the time, and I still feel, that a more reasonable way for the Department to have handled this situation would have been to order the division commander to Washington and to privately explain matters to him. Instead, however, in the endeavor to maintain secrecy, extreme methods were employed, which failed in results. In fact the only way that real secrecy could have been maintained would have been for the destroyers to have quietly sailed from Hampton Roads. By first going to other ports all the personnel connected with the ships knew that something unusual was at hand, that the only thing it could be was that we were going abroad. Undoubtedly everybody at the New York and Boston navy yards knew it or guessed it, as did most of the officers' and men's families. There was considerable telephone communication between Washington and New York and Boston, with stenographers listening-in. Secrecy under these conditions was impossible. The public at large may not have known what was going on, but the secret agents, from whom it was important to keep the knowledge, undoubtedly found out a great deal.

This week at Boston was by far the hardest, most uncomfortable, and most difficult week that fell to my lot during the war. All, or most of which, would have been avoided had the Department taken me, the commander of the force, into its confidence.

Destroyers had never before been sent across the Atlantic except in company with larger ships. There was no doubt as to our ability to cross; but not knowing how our logistic requirements would be attended to, or whether we were going to England, France, the North Sea, or the Mediterranean, or even some place farther on, made it necessary to take on board all the provisions that could be carried, and as much as possible of the spare parts, fittings, and equipment that were usually carried by the destroyer tender.

One could not but marvel at the amount of stuff that was brought down to the dock to be taken on these destroyers. Yet it all disappeared down the various hatches or was stowed on deck. When we finally shoved off each destroyer was displacing approximately 1,400 tons instead of the normal 1,100 for which designed.

The Department had been informed that the Division would sail on April 25. It was the intention to put to sea on that day, orders or no orders as to destination. This was evidently what the Department expected as Lieutenant R.C. Grady, who reported for passage, informed me that he had been instructed by the Chief of Operations to tell me confidentially that the destroyers should sail when ready, and the destination would be sent by radio. On April 22, the Commandant of the Navy Yard received this message headed, "Strictly Secret and Confidential":

Direct Officer No. 324 (J.K. Taussig) special service division of destroyers be ready sail immediately urgent. Report as soon as ready. Destination English Channel.

This narrowed the probable destination to a decided, limited area. Considering the matter since, it has come to me that perhaps the Department did not want the destroyers to sail until the exact destination was specified by Admiral Sims; but if, by the date set by me for departure, no word as to the base had been received, the destroyers should sail anyway.

On April 23, the Department was informed that the division would sail the next day instead of the twenty-fifth as previously reported. It seems that it was also on the twenty-third that the Department received from Admiral Sims a cablegram designating the base to which we were to go. In order that the written orders could reach me, quick action was necessary. On the morning of April 24, two officers appeared at the Boston navy yard. They suddenly had been dispatched from Washington by Federal Express. These officers, Lieutenant-Commander W.W. Galbraith and Lieutenant M.L. Hersey, brought the secret sailing orders, and one copy of a British code book. The envelope containing the sailing orders was marked "confidential." On opening it I found a second envelope marked "secret and confidential," containing an order which read as follows:

Op-10.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Office of Naval Operations
Washington
(no date).

To: Commander, Eighth Division, Destroyer Force,
Atlantic Fleet, U.S.S. Wadsworth, Flagship.
SUBJECT: Orders.

1. Upon the receipt of the envelope containing sealed orders forwarded herewith, and when your force is in all respects ready for sea, proceed to a position fifty (50) miles east (true) from Cape Cod, Mass., break the seal and carry out the orders enclosed therein.

/s/ V. O. Chase, Acting.

That same morning the Davis and McDougal arrived from New York, thus completing the division. At noon a pay officer arrived for duty as the division supply officer. He did not have time to accomplish much in the way of getting his outfit.

We filled to capacity with fuel oil up to the last minute, and. beginning at 4:30 p.m., April 24, the destroyers one at a time cast off and stood down the harbor. Our departure was as unostentatious as if we were going out for drill. There were only a few people on the docks, among them some of our women folks who bravely stood by to the last minute. It was not until weeks later that the press announced American destroyers were operating against the German submarines in the War Zone. This gave the people of the country their first real thrill, and the satisfying feeling that, after all, the United States was doing something besides talk.

The Crossing

On clearing Boston harbor the division formed in column, standard speed 15 knots. This would take us to the designated point fifty miles east of Cape Cod shortly after midnight. That seemed a long time to have to wait before we could ascertain our destination. My patience gave out at midnight, the secret envelope was opened, and this is what I read:

Op-10.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of Naval Operations
Washington
(no date).

Secret and Confidential:
To: Commander, Eighth Division, Destroyer Force,
Atlantic Fleet, U.S.S. Wadsworth, Flagship.
SUBJECT: Protection of commerce near the coasts of Great Britain and France.

1. • The British Admiralty have requested the co-operation of a division of American destroyers in the protection of commerce near the coasts of Great Britain and France.
   • Your mission is to assist naval operations of Entente Powers in every way possible.
   • Proceed to Queenstown, Ireland. Report to Senior British Naval Officer present and thereafter co-operate fully with the British Navy. Should it be decided that your force act in co-operation with French Naval forces, your mission and method of co-operation under French Admiralty authority remain unchanged.

Route to Queenstown—

Boston to Latitude 50 N-Long. 20 W, to arrive at daybreak,
thence to Latitude 50 N-Long. 12 W,
thence to Queenstown.

When within radio communication of the British Naval Forces off Ireland, call "G C K" and inform the Vice Admiral at Queenstown by British General Code of your position, course and speed. You will be met outside of Queenstown.

1. • Base facilities will be furnished by the British Admiralty.
   • Communicate your orders and operations to Rear Admiral Sims at London and be guided by such instructions as he may give you. Make no reports of arrival to Navy Department direct.

/s/ Josephus Daniels.

Copy to: C-in-C, Atlantic Fleet.
Comdr. Destr. Force.
CO. each vessel of division.

That was all. No letter of instructions and no information concerning submarines or how they were operating. We were certainly on our own resources. But I felt pride in the fact that although the Department did not take me into its confidence, it did have enough confidence to leave all details concerning what was to follow to my own initiative.

Prior to sailing, the following order was issued to the division. It was based on such limited knowledge of submarine warfare as had come to my attention:

5-11

SPECIAL SERVICE DIVISION, DESTROYER FORCE,
U.S.S. Wadsworth, Flagship

April 24, 1917.
From: Commander Special Service Division.
To: Special Service Division.
SUBJECT: Procedure in case of sighting enemy submarines and in case of damage to vessel of this force by mine or destroyer.

If submarine is sighted the vessel sighting it will make six toots on the whistle (in groups of two), open fire and head for the submarine. The next destroyer astern will head in the direction of the submarine on parallel course to the other and assist in the attack. Other vessels will continue on course keeping a lookout for other submarines. Use radio as per C-in-C printed instructions.

1. • In case a destroyer of this force is torpedoed or strikes a mine, other vessels will not stop, but will continue on course and make circle of wide radius around damaged vessel until other procedure becomes desirable. Vessels passing close to a disabled vessel will throw life preservers if it appears desirable.

/s/ J. K. Taussig.

This order would have been in different form had I been a War College graduate; and some of the instructions would have been different had I written them a month later. But it gave a basis for mutual protection, and it fulfilled the requirements of the then immediate mission which was not to hunt submarines, but to get across in a condition that permitted of immediate operations.

It was found that while the McDougal's cruising engines could maintain 15 knots as a maximum, it was forcing her too much at the excessive draft, and it would have been too uneconomical for her to make the long passage using the main turbines. Consequently, the speed was reduced to 14 knots.

On the afternoon of April 25, the Conyngham developed a knock in one of her circulating pumps. It was decided to stop and have it remedied, which was done in two or three hours.

On April 26, the wind started rising from ESE. It increased to half a gale in force and continued so for six days, the storm evidently moving eastward at the same rate as the speed of the ships. Fortunately, the sea was on our beam. If it had been farther ahead we would have had to slow down very materially. As it was, the speed was reduced to 12 knots. This speed was maintained for six days, and very uncomfortable days they were. All the destroyers rolled excessively in the beam sea. The mess tables could not be spread, and during this period all hands ate off their laps, that is those who ate at all did.

My chief concern was the condensers. It was certain that if we were spared such troubles the passage would be easily accomplished. But if any one of the destroyers developed sufficient leak to spoil her fresh water supply, it would mean considerable delay and the possible necessity of transferring water from one ship to another. The Wainwright, during the past winter, had trouble with the condensers, and it was with particular concern that I watched this vessel. On April 30, my fears were realized. A signal from the Wainwright announced "condenser leaking badly." This necessitated her stopping in order to locate and remedy the leak.

I could picture the feelings on the Wainwright, a feeling of remorse at being the cause of a delay to the division; and at the same time I could picture the men at work down in the hot engine room taking off the condenser heads, working feverishly and rapidly but skillfully and efficiently. There never were more efficient crews than those which sailed in this little flotilla. The personnel, though lacking in quantity, made up in quality. For the past year these destroyers had been hard at work; maneuvers day and night, target practice, and steaming trials. They had all been in competition with one another, and at the time of departure had reached the peak of personnel efficiency. However, it could not be expected that the material condition of the vessels was at the best. This was because we had just completed an unusually strenuous winter, under way continually, with very little time for overhaul. Our departure for overseas was at a time when we should have gone to the Navy Yard for the semi-annual overhaul.

On occasions it has appeared in print, and I have frequently heard it expressed, that the crews of the destroyers were composed of picked officers and men. If this were so, the picking had been done long before we entered the war. The truth of the matter is that the vessels sailed with their regular personnel. As for my own ship, the Wadsworth, we had on board the usual peace time complement of five line officers (including the Captain), and ninety-six enlisted men, five of whom were fresh from the training station. It was not until we had been operating in the war zone for some time that the complements were increased to eight officers and 115 men.

But to return to the Wainwright. Knowing how eagerly and rapidly they were working it seemed possible they might not take as much time as desirable to complete the job satisfactorily. So to show that I was not impatient (although I was), a signal was sent to Captain Poteet to "take your time and make a good job of it." In an incredibly short period they had removed the condenser heads, located and repaired the leaks, replaced the heads, and signaled their readiness to proceed.

There were but few incidents that were not usual in such a passage. Of course all the destroyers were darkened at night, a procedure which was routine until after the signing of the Armistice.

One day we suddenly sighted the big White Star Liner Adriatic. The visibility was poor and we had undoubtedly seen her before she saw us, as a few minutes later she turned tail and started to run, which she continued to do until our colors were hoisted. At first it seemed rather strange for her to be doubtful as to our identity even if she had no knowledge of American destroyers being in the vicinity. But after a little experience in the War Zone I realized how it was that the destroyers were taken for submarines when first sighted. When visibility was not good, destroyers and other small craft were frequently taken for submarines, even by those who had considerable experience.

On May 2, the wind and sea having gone down, we proceeded with more comfort. As the secret orders directed that we cross the twentieth Meridian at 3:00 a.m., it now became necessary to slow down to even less than 12 knots in order not to arrive there before this time.

I supposed the definite time for crossing this meridian was given so as to assist an escort vessel in making a rendezvous. Sure enough, during the forenoon our radio picked up the first faint calls from H.M.S. Parthian, which, we learned later, was a destroyer. She was new, and, therefore, not on our list of vessels.

The Parthian requested our position, course, and speed. This was given, and he was informed that we had slowed down in order to cross the designated meridian at 3:00 a.m. in accordance with orders from Washington. On suggestion from him we increased speed to 15 knots. The visibility was poor and the Parthian failed to make contact. He radioed that he would steam to the eastward at our speed and on a parallel course so as to join us after daylight in the morning. However, the visibility was again poor and the Parthian was not sighted, nor was she seen until after our arrival at Queenstown.

This was the morning of May 3. The sea was now smooth and we were proceeding comfortably when the Wainwright again signaled her condenser was leaking badly. It was necessary to stop. During the wait the Wadsworth stood by the Wainwright while the other four destroyers stood out for five miles on radial lines in the hope of sighting the Parthian. But nothing was seen so we continued on our way as soon as the Wainwright reported ready.

At about one o'clock the shout of "Sail ho!" was heard. There from out of the haze, standing towards us with a bone in her teeth was a British destroyer. She came along at high speed flying the international signal, "Welcome to the American Colors," to which the Wadsworth replied, "Thank you, we are glad of your company," which very inadequately expressed how really glad we were. This destroyer was the Mary Rose.

This little episode has been the subject of a picture by a British artist. He calls it "The Meeting of the Fleets." In truth it had a significance in that it was really the first meeting in war between the outposts of the British and American Navies with the intention of friendly co-operation, instead of hostile action.

The little Mary Rose wheeled around and took station on the bow of our formation. The Captain signaled that he would remain with us until arrival at Queenstown. Having heard that vessels in the neighborhood of submarine should zigzag, but having no definite instructions in regard to it, a signal was sent to the Mary Rose asking if it was desirable for the destroyers to zigzag. The signaled reply was: "It is safer to zigzag but it is a terrible nuisance." I concluded that any submarine that sighted seven destroyers proceeding together at fairly high speed would keep clear. So we did not zigzag.

Shortly after the day of our arrival at Queenstown the Mary Rose was transferred to a North Sea station. A few months later we received the sad news of the loss of the Mary Rose, the gallant little ship going down in battle and taking all hands with her. While escorting a Norwegian convoy, two German raiders made an attack. The Mary Rose went for the enemy cruisers in an attempt to protect the convoy. The odds were too many against her and she went down fighting to the last.

There now being no doubt as to all destroyers having sufficient fuel, the speed was increased to 20 knots and we continued thus throughout the night and until the next morning. Then the Mary Rose signaled that a message received from the British Vice Admiral at Queenstown directed the destroyers to arrive off Daunt Lightship not prior to 1:30 p.m. in order that arrangements made for taking moving pictures could be carried out. This necessitated slowing down a little.

At the appointed time we were off Daunt Rock light vessel which from a position five miles off shore marks the approach to Queenstown harbor. Here we formed column and with the Mary Rose showing the way, steamed past the tug having the moving picture operators on board, past the lightship, and through the swept channel which had just been cleared by the mine sweepers. As we arrived, the ever busy sweepers were still picking up mines which had been laid by a German submarine the night before. Mines had not been laid off Queenstown for several months previously, and it was the first time that they had ever been laid within six feet of the surface. All of which was good evidence that the Germans knew about the sailing of the destroyers, and, if they did not know the destination, they were very good guessers.

At Queenstown

Just before passing between the headlands at the harbor entrance the division was stopped, and a British Naval Officer boarded each vessel to pilot us to our berths. On the Wadsworth came Lieutenant Commander Robinson, R.N., and with him were Commander E.R.G.R. Evans, C.B., R.N., Lieutenant Commander (SC) E.C. Tobey and Lieutenant Commander J.V. Babcock of our Navy, and Mr. Sherman, the American Vice Consul. Captain Evans had been detailed as liaison officer on request of Admiral Sims; Lieutenant Commander Tobey was attached to our embassy at London; Lieutenant Commander Babcock belonged to Admiral Sims' staff; and Mr. Sherman came as the representative of the American Consul to welcome us to Queenstown.

We were soon under way again and with the Mary Rose still leading stood up the beautiful harbor. This fascinating place later became very familiar to us, as it did also to the thousands of American officers and men who followed and who so frequently sailed in and stood out from that time until after the Armistice. But today was a special occasion. The shore and hills in places were crowded with people gathered to welcome us. There evidently was no secrecy as to our coming in so far as the inhabitants of Queenstown and Cork were concerned. And they made very much more over our arrival than we had thought of.

We passed close to the lighthouse on Roche Point, and on up the harbor between Dogsnose and Ram Point. Then a turn to the right and through the gate in the submarine net, past Spike Island and through the shipping in the outer anchorage. A sharp turn to the left around Bar Rock buoy found us standing close along the Queenstown shore, so close it seemed as if one could almost touch the houses. There was the handsome cathedral of Saint Clomans; and high on the hill overlooking the entire harbor stood Admiralty House with the British Vice Admiral's flag whipping in the breeze. At this time we did not even know the name of the British Vice Admiral; but I know now, without having been told, that Vice Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly was on the roof of Admiralty House, binoculars in hand, watching with critical eye every move of those six little destroyers as they steamed up the harbor. Then there came the long double line of mooring buoys, at one of which was the Light Cruiser Adventure, while some of the others were occupied by the patrol vessels, sweepers, destroyers, sloops, trawlers, M.P. boats, etc., which were in port for a short respite from their arduous duties. Between the buoys and the Royal Cork Yacht Club, we passed on up to the Haulbowline dockyard where the Wadsworth moored to the oil jetty; her stem almost touching the stern of the little old Colleen, the station ship. The Conyngham tied up alongside the Wadsworth, while the other four destroyers moored to buoys. The ten day trip was over; fuel oil was already pouring into the tanks of the Wadsworth and Conyngham.

Had the exigencies demanded, all destroyers could have gone to sea that evening, as soon as fueling was completed. The date was May 4, 1917.

Captain Evans and Lieutenant Commander Babcock upon stepping on board, had each handed me two envelopes. These contained a note from Vice Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, Commander-in-Chief at Queenstown; a letter from Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, the First Sea Lord of the British Admiralty; an operating order from Rear Admiral Sims who was in London; and a long personal letter from Admiral Sims. In view of the historical interest of these letters they will be reproduced here in full; all excepting the personal letter from Admiral Sims from which only extracts will be given. Admiral Bayly's letter follows:

Admiralty House,
Queenstown,
3- 4- 17

Dear Commander Taussig:

I hope that you and the other five officers in command of the U.S. Destroyers in your flotilla will come and dine here tonight, Friday, at 7:45, and that you and three others will remain to sleep here so as to get a good rest after your long journey. Allow me to welcome you and to thank you for coming.

Yours sincerely,
Lewis Bayly.

Dine in undress: no speeches.

This note with its kindly invitation, which of course was accepted, was the forerunner of many other invitations from Admiralty House which came throughout the stay of the Americans at Queenstown. However, I knew of no others that were written. Thereafter all invitations from Admiralty House came by word of mouth or by signal.

I was particularly proud to receive Admiral Jellicoe's letter. I knew him personally, having had the pleasure and pain (both of us were wounded) of serving with him in China in 1900. I could appreciate that now, as First Sea Lord, he was an extremely busy man to take time for writing to me. The letter is in his own handwriting:

Admiralty, Whitehall
1. 5. 17

My dear Taussig:

I still retain very pleasant and vivid recollections of our association in China, and I am indeed delighted that you should have been selected for the command of the first force which is coming to help us to fight for freedom, humanity, and civilization : we shall all have our work cut out to subdue piracy. My experience in China makes me feel perfectly convinced that the two nations will work in the closest co-operation and I won't flatter you by saying too much about the value of your help. I must say this however. There is no navy in the world that can possibly give us more valuable assistance, and there is no personnel in any navy that will fight better than yours. My China experience tells me this.

If only my dear friend McCalla could have seen this day how glad I should have been.

I must offer you, and all your officers and men, the warmest welcome possible in the name of the British Nation, and the British Admiralty, and add to it every possible good wish personally for yourself.

May every good fortune attend you and speedy victory be with us.

Yours very sincerely,
J. N. Jellicoe.

 

This certainly was a cordial greeting and one to be proud of as coming from the highest ranking British Officer.

It brought home to me then and there, that the coming of the American Destroyers meant more to the Allies than anybody in the United States could appreciate without having been on or near the scene of conflict.

The operation order issued by Admiral Sims as Commander of the United States Naval Forces was, as can be seen, brief and very general as to detail:

U. S. DESTROYER FORCE,
European Waters,
April 29, 1917.

Operation Order

No. 1.

Enemy submarines operating against Allied commerce in increasing numbers.

1. • This force co-operate with, and operate under, direct command Vice Admiral British Forces based on Queenstown.
   • Keep U. S. Destroyer Force Commander informed periodically of military service performed. Eliminate all official usual routine correspondence and reports which interfere in any way with efficient military service. Give particular heed to physical condition of personnel.
   • In absence of U.S. supply vessels obtain necessary supplies and repairs by direct request on British Headquarters, Queenstown, details and accounting to be arranged upon arrival of supply officer.
   • Forward official mail via British official routes. Use U.S. Service Radio Code for code messages to Force Commander.

Wm. S. Sims,
Rear Admiral, U. S. N.
Commanding U. S. Destroyer Force.
European Waters.

It is not at this time considered expedient to reproduce in full Admiral Sims' personal letter to me. It was one of advice, information, and instructions combined: just such a letter as one would expect Admiral Sims to write to one of his old flotilla captains. And it was one of great value to me as it contained the first authentic news as to existing conditions, with information as to what we were to expect, together with such good wholesome advice that for me cleared the hazy atmosphere as to the proper course of procedure. He wrote in part:

U. S. Embassy,
London, April 29, 1917.

Confidential:

My dear Taussig:

Needless to say your command will receive a most hearty welcome by this country both for sentimental and military reasons, for the submarines are becoming more and more successful with longer daylight and better weather, in spite of all the destroyers and patrol boats the British are able to send against them. In the week ending April 22, they destroyed 237,000 tons of shipping. Manifestly if this is not checked the Allies cannot win.

As soon as I was informed that the Division was coming over, I asked the Admiralty to detail an experienced destroyer commander to meet you at Queenstown and give you and your gang all the points, tricks and stunts, that the British have learned during nearly three years of actual warfare. You will be supplied with "depth charges" and other appliances now employed, and be informed as to the best known methods of using them. Also as to the various methods that have been tried and found less efficient.

The Officer selected is Commander Evans, who was second in command of the Scott Antarctic Expedition, and was in command of the Torpedo Leader Broke, at present repairing the damage she received in the recent (April 20) destroyer fight off Dover. This was a very brilliant night action of two torpedo leaders (1,800 tons) against six German destroyers. Evans' boat torpedoed one and rammed and passed clear over the stern of another. Get the gang all together and make him tell you all about it, for the account contains a great deal of practical information as to the best methods of handling guns and torpedoes, in case you encounter enemy destroyers—which, however, you are not likely to do in the immediate future. He can also give you some very useful points on keeping your men contented while doing work which is necessarily largely monotonous.

I will not attempt to give you the details as he can better do that, but I cannot too strongly impress upon you the essential basis of such night attacks, which is that barring the handling of his boat, the Captain can do little in diverting the details. It is bound to be an affair of minutes, or even seconds, that will depend for its success largely upon the completeness with which the plan is worked out and understood by the personnel. The boat that is organized on the principle that all details are to be directed by the Captain will not succeed. See that your Captains understand this important military requirement.

While the above applies more particularly to actions against enemy destroyers, it applies also to actions against submarines. Evans will explain the use of the "depth charges," the most effective weapon against the subs, and from his explanation and the nature and use of the weapon you will recognize the absolute necessity of practically instant action in carrying out a pre-arranged plan of attack.

I have just been placed in command of all U.S. destroyers operating on this side including twelve more destroyers with tenders and auxiliaries to be sent later, but as the active command will of course be exercised by the senior officer on the spot, under orders of the Vice Admiral of the Port, I want to warn you as to certain difficulties that may arise.

Require all officers not only to refrain from all criticism of British methods, manners, and customs, and ask them to refrain from mentioning them in their letters. Also give attention to bringing about friendly relations between our enlisted men and the British. This is very important.

Criticism can do no good; it may do much harm. Let us set a record among the Allies for co-operation- and show what can be done in a common cause.

I hope you will be able to shake your gang down and get on the job with as little delay as possible, and thereby make a good first impression, which counts for a good deal. To that extent, and perhaps more, you have the reputation of the service in your hands, as far as the British go. Whatever you accomplish is liable to have pretty wide circulation in their service. Paymaster Tobey, who is thoroughly in touch with his end of the game over here, is going over with Evans and will assist you in arranging for supplies, repairs, etc.

I am sure your people will be intensely interested in this work. Of course you and they will understand that it will be no picnic. It will not only be hard but may prove very monotonous. Its success will be largely in keeping the subs below the surface or chasing them away from a. certain area.

I may be able to assign you to more interesting work later, as a change if nothing else. In the meantime I am sure I need not warn you not to allow the monotony of the present duty to cause the least relaxation of extreme vigilance, upon which success in such work depends.

I am sending you an operation order specifying the manner in which the operations of your force are to be coordinated with those of the British.

I have no doubt that, no matter how arduous the duty may prove to be, you will not only remain cheerful, but will keep all hands the same.

Very sincerely yours,
Wm. S. Sims.

There was considerable more to-do made over our arrival than we had anticipated. It seems that the British placed a decided importance on our coming as an historical event worthy of record. It was for this reason that one of the War Office official photographers was sent from London to take moving pictures of our ships, their personnel, and their doings. And this photographer certainly was on the job. Every place we went that first day the moving picture machine was ahead of us.

The destroyers were all moored before three o'clock. Shortly afterwards the six captains, accompanied by Captain Evans and Lieutenant Commanders Tobey and Babcock were taken in Vice Admiral Bayly's barge to the landing at Queenstown. There we were met by the American Consul, Mr. Wesley Frost, Captain Carpendale, R.N., the flag captain, and several members of Admiral Bayly's staff—among them Commanders Roe and Churchill. I knew nothing of the program, but simply followed where led, rather surprised that so much fuss was being made over these six little destroyers, and always wondering what was coming next. There were automobiles at our disposal, and we invariably rode, even if for only a very short distance. Our first stopping place was the American Consulate, conveniently situated over a saloon near the landing. On mounting the stairs and entering the office I was somewhat appalled at the gathering awaiting to greet us. The assemblage consisted of the Lord Mayor of Cork, Mr. Butterfield, and about twenty of the leading officials and citizens of Cork and Queenstown. After a round of hand-shaking, champagne was brought in and Mr. Butterfield made a speech of welcome. This certainly was war with a vengeance. I had not contemplated speech making among the "any and every duty that might be required." But of course I had to say something, and am just as well satisfied that I do not now remember what it was.

From the Consulate we were driven up the hill to the entrance gate of Admiralty House. Here we disembarked and walked through the lovely garden to the door where Admiral Bayly awaited us. The Admiral was standing with his back to the moving picture camera which, as usual, was grinding away as we approached. I would have given a good deal to know just what the Admiral's thoughts were. I was presented by Captain Evans, and then immediately introduced the other five captains. In a letter written nearly two years later, in which he thanked me for my share in the presentation, by American naval officers who served with him, of a silver model of one of our destroyers, he wrote "…When you and I first met in May 1917, I think we both wondered how the show would work, but besides that there was such a determination on the part of you and those who came with, and those who followed you, that it should prove a success that there never really was any doubt or question in the matter…"

This official call was of short duration. There was still the call to be made on General St. John who commanded the military forces in the immediate vicinity of Queenstown. The General and his entourage were most cordial and it was regretted that we had to cut short our visit. But is was growing late and there was just sufficient time to return to our ships and get ready for dinner at Admiralty House.

During my stay at Queenstown I had the pleasure of dining at Admiralty House many times. However, all the dinners excepting this first one were informal and more or less en famille. The dinner this evening given in honor of the six American Destroyer captains was a formal affair, there being fourteen at table. The only woman present was the Admiral's charming niece, Miss Violet Voysey. Here we met all the higher ranking officers of Admiral Bayly's staff and the officers who were in command of the various departments operating at or from Queenstown as a base.

It felt very good, after being tossed about for ten days at sea, to turn in on the nice big bed in the Admiralty House. We of course received all the attentions for which English hospitality is noted, and the next morning greatly enjoyed the home-like breakfast with Sir Lewis and Miss Voysey. It was served in true English style, that is each one waiting on him or herself. We could not tarry long as there were duties to perform on board ship and there were still official calls which had to be made and returned. In the afternoon we went to Cork going by way of the picturesque River Lee in the Admiral's barge. Here we returned the Lord Mayor's visit and called on General Doran who commanded all the military forces in Southern Ireland. Needless to say we were graciously received at both places. That afternoon we had tea with the American Consul and Mrs. Frost.

It might seem from reading an account of these functions that all our time was taken up with calls and parties, and that the actuality of war was for the time forgotten. But this was not the case. We had plenty of reminders that the submarines were about and that the situation was serious. A converted yacht came in bringing survivors from a torpedoed vessel—an almost daily occurrence. While at dinner at Admiralty House we heard the explosion of one of the mines which the Germans had planted in the hope of bagging one of the destroyers. Before the party broke up, Captain Carpendale left to meet a patrol vessel which was bringing in the survivors of a British sloop, which had been torpedoed, with the loss of the Captain and about forty of the crew. We were told that the lost captain had been one of Admiral Bayly's favorites.

On board the six destroyers all hands were working like beavers preparing for the arduous duties which we knew were before us. The details of this preparation will be left for another chapter. Suffice it to say that we had been in the war zone but a very few hours before we realized the seriousness of the situation and could appreciate why the authorities were so glad to get re-enforcements even on so small a scale as that represented by the six American destroyers, which to them symbolized "The Return of the Mayflower."

The kindly spirit in which we were received and the cordial manner in which everybody extended greetings, made us feel at home immediately. This undoubtedly had much to do with the perfect co-operation between the British and American Naval forces which began on the day of the arrival of "The First Six," and lasted, with unblemished record, until the last of the American forces quitted Queenstown two years later.

(To be continued)