THE STRATEGY DEPARTMENT OF THE WAR COLLEGE
A Lecture for the Officers of the United States Atlantic Fleet
By Captain Reginald R. Belknap, U. S. N.
The Department of Strategy of the War College includes the subjects of international law, policy, strategy, and logistics, together with the concrete application of strategy in chart maneuvers.
International Law
With international law in its fundamentals all naval officers are familiar, through study at the Naval Academy and preparation for examination. The subject is one in which all officers should be well grounded, particularly those who may come to command. Others, too, should be well informed and all may be assured of finding their interest increase the more they become versed in it.
The navy's principal and normal field is international, the navy being a powerful agency in the diplomacy of peace as well as of war. The ordinary course of cruising brings officers into situations where they must decide whether to act or to refrain, and if to act, what to do, how far to go. The decision, to be correct and suitable, must be founded upon a good grasp of law and precedent as they apply to the immediate circumstances. With the knowledge and cultivated judgment derived from consistent preparation, an officer may meet such situations with confidence. One hears much and often how the cable and radio have lessened the responsibility and discretion of ministers and naval commanders abroad, but let us not be deceived by any such misleading idea. In the first place, international relations have become much more complex partly through these very means of rapid communication. But besides that, cable and radio messages do not always pass quickly. At headquarters at home they may cut only a small figure in the day's business there, and the instructions sent to you may be so general or so apparently in conflict with needs or facts as you see them as to tax all your powers to conform.
Four times in the Boxer troubles the American admiral had to act without guidance from the Government. Not long ago in the Caribbean, a gunboat commander had to take a decisive stand on a doubtful question on the spur of the moment. On the retirement of an American admiral some ten years ago, he was at the instance of the State Department especially commended for the sagacity and insight of his reports during a trying period in China. Instances could be multiplied, and no matter what may be the future development of quick communication, the man on the spot must always be a great factor. Merely to report a situation intelligently, he must be able to comprehend it himself; how much more is required when he is called upon to act. And when he goes into a conference, if he is to play a worthy part there, he must be well grounded, well prepared.
It is inspiring to know our traditions and a word as to the achievements of our forbears may not be out of place. The War College walls bear a placard containing the tribute of two eminent statesmen to the naval officer as a diplomatist. In 1898, in London, Lord Salisbury, the British prime minister and secretary for foreign affairs, said that the promise of Europe to the Cretan people that they should have autonomy under the suzerainty of the Sultan, a problem of great difficulty, owed its fulfillment to the admirals of the international fleet, by their development in a very remarkable degree of the powers of diplomacy and government. And during the winter of 1902-3, apropos of a revolutionary situation existing in the Caribbean, Mr. John Hay, secretary of state, remarked to President Roosevelt: "I always feel relieved when the naval officer arrives on the scene because he always keeps within the situation." Two years later, Mr. Hay said to Rear Admiral Chadwick, then president of the War College: "We have had a number of difficult international situations in the West Indies and Venezuela in the past two years and they have all been handled by naval officers very well. They have not made a single mistake."
There you have extreme instances of the various situations where a naval officer may have to act—from guarding a consulate during local disorder to joint operations in a complicated matter of far-reaching effect. And there is another high plane where likewise our officers have borne great responsibility with credit—in advising the State Department on neutrality matters during the late war, and in being delegates to the great international conferences in recent years at The Hague and in London. Such is our background, such is the record of accomplishment and trustworthiness which officers of the present day have to uphold and continue.
The War College course enlarges our earlier study of international law by a course of lectures and by study and discussion of special topics, all conducted by Professor George Grafton Wilson. For many years, also, the War College has issued to the service, annually, a publication of one or more topics of international law, valuable for information and reference and often of absorbing interest.
Policy
The study of international law shows at the outset that the international community of nations differs radically from the domestic community of individuals in that no superior authority exists to enforce the compliance of a nation. As the earliest activities of individuals grew and expanded, the need arose for some regulation of them, and so government was instituted, to the end that causes of conflict in the community might be avoided, individual rights as well as common rights protected, the general welfare promoted, and differences that were otherwise irreconcilable might be settled by judgment, with compulsory compliance. Among the individuals of a nation the power of government prevails over conflicting interests, but among the members of the world community, a superior power disposing of the means to compel a nation does not exist, so that any conflict of interests between nations must be settled by agreement or by preponderance of force. A nation's activities have in the end to conform only to natural law, and as this law is not codified nor always determinable, and as nations do not knowingly embark on a course leading to war unnecessarily, the Government has need to be well informed about other nations. All are in the field together, claiming equal right, with no restraint other than voluntary agreement by treaty, the moral influence of international law, and the limitations of their own powers.
Strictly speaking, other nations are concerned only with our external affairs but in these days of wide and growing international communication and intermingling in matters of all kinds, it becomes more and more difficult to draw the line between what is external, what internal. The separate jurisdictions of national and of state laws in this country, for instance, have on more than one occasion brought matters which seemed to be exclusively domestic into considerable diplomatic prominence. The lynching of some Italians in New Orleans in 1888, and the more recent Japanese school question in California, are cases in point. So also with a new industry whose product is at first wholly absorbed by internal demand. When it expands and enters the export field, it comes into competition with other nations and affects their economics. Thus, as a nation's activities grow, other nations become more and more concerned in them, with the possibility of conflicting interests in the future.
Racial origin and temperament, geographical location and configuration, natural resources, and political and social organization are the most powerful factors in determining the course and destiny of a nation. These fundamentals are either unalterable or else so deep-rooted as to be susceptible of change only gradually. Their combined effect is so compelling that, while contrary action may retard or for a time divert a nation's natural development, irrepressible natural forces will in the end prevail. This is the meaning implied in the term "manifest destiny," examples of which are found in our own history. Thus, the manhood and enterprise of our settlers west of the Alleghenies made it impossible for the great outlet of that region, the Mississippi, to continue under alien control. Later, the powerful cohesive tendencies of common race, temperament, history, territory, and intersectional interests have, in spite of prolonged and bitter civil war and its aftermath, solidified our people as one nation. Likewise in Germany and in Italy, the many small states kept apart for years by artificial means finally overcame the separative obstacles and then these countries became solidified into the powerful nations of their destiny. Thus men, races, and nations are creatures of the forces of nature, which can be guided, governed, and developed, or for a time restrained, but essentially altered only slowly.
Policy, sound national policy, may be defined as a practical, wise course of action contributing to the nation's welfare, and it is evident that to shape a nation's foreign policy is not a matter of free choosing but rather the discernment of the natural causes which underlie the national interest in question. And in every case the policy framer must take into account the other nations that may be affected. The Government must consider whither a contemplated policy may lead, and as there is no superior control, the guiding, and if necessary restraining, function must be exercised by policy, which is a form of national self-control. And so, before settling on a policy the Government should examine into the probable causes of conflict with the interests of other nations, the importance of those interests to the foreign nations concerned, the probability of their opposition leading to a resort to arms, the interests of third parties that may be affected and their probable attitude, and, in the event of war, whether our means are sufficient to insure success, the cost of such a settlement, and the net result in gain or loss—not from the material standpoint but gain or loss to the nation in its world position.
Upon such an investigation, a Government could always proceed with confidence were it not that popular support is necessary. The problem is complicated by the fact that popular majorities consist largely of those who are not well enough informed to decide intelligently what the nation's policy should be. They expect the policy pursued to be appropriate and stoutly maintained even without the requisite force to rely upon, this difference between what should be and what is making the statesman's task more difficult, calling for knowledge and skill of the highest order.
To shape and pursue a successful policy is thus a higher art than mere governing, since it is the art of governing to advantage in competition with other nations. Education and training in administration might suffice for mere government, but the maintenance of sound policy requires a knowledge of the world, past and present, and such knowledge should include an intelligent grasp of the function of the military branch of the government. As Spenser Wilkinson says:
The policy of a nation must of course bear some relation to its strength, which depends upon its resources and the excellence of its administration, but the strength with which a foreign minister is more immediately concerned is that of the army and navy. (War and Policy, p. 8.)
The military branch must not be a thing detached, to be thought of only when war is imminent. The country's readiness to meet a forcible challenge of its foreign policy should always be kept in mind, and the statesman, as far as he can bring it about, should maintain the nation's military preparation in strength and character appropriate to the support of the nation's policy. The German army and the British navy are striking examples of this principle. What it is in the nation's interest that the nation's military power may have to contend for can be answered only by the statesman. He more than any other is concerned in there being military power ready and adequate for any probable needs, for this is provision against forcible interference with the nation's lawful rights, lawful by nature. What those rights are and where, by whom, and when they may be forcibly contested are questions for the statesman. If any probable development of the national activity is likely to encounter greater opposition of force than there is military power to overcome, the course of prudence is to divert those activities into other channels or, if that cannot be done, if the activities are essentially right and just for the nation and especially if they arise from strong natural impulse, then they should be restrained until the requisite military backing has been prepared.
The United States has from time to time held policies of direct effect on affairs of foreign nations. Our earlier shipping policy fostered the American merchant marine at considerable loss to foreign carriers. Our tariff policy has varied considerably, each change affecting foreign industries and commerce, sometimes to their advantage, sometimes to their loss, but always necessitating some readjustment. Others of our policies have long stood without material change, such as the Monroe Doctrine and Asiatic Exclusion. Of late years, the Open Door policy in the Far East has come to the front and as this bears not only on trade but also on the integrity of China, the matter has acquired broad proportions, requiring deep, far-seeing consideration.
Policy is studied in the War College by reading, lectures, and in writing of theses. Reading and consideration of policy continue throughout the course, being inseparable from the proper study of other subjects. The solution of problems brings out effects of various policies and reveals possibilities, desirabilities, or the actual existence of policy in the making, which throw additional light on our own interests and policies.
Strategy
How to determine the military power that may be necessary to uphold a given policy against challenge brings us into the field of strategy. Policy and strategy look to the same end, strategy answering the question how to do what policy requires in case of resort to arms. Policy aims to attain its object peacefully, if possible, but when that object is important enough to fight for, the means to attain it change from the milder form employed in peace to the stronger form of war. The object in view remains the same. Thus, war is the continuation of policy by the strongest means.
The Monroe Doctrine, for example, indicates the means to preserve from hindrance the development of the principles of living which brought about the predominance in America of the Anglo-Saxon race. The same result might have been achieved or at least aimed at by other means but the exclusion of foreign control is undoubtedly the surest course to maintain American ideas in the ascendant in this hemisphere. It guards against possible trouble growing by preventing any seed from being planted. This doctrine we have more than once upheld with more vigor than usual in diplomatic dealings. After the Civil War, France was given to understand that her forces and interference in Mexico must be withdrawn. In 1895, over the boundary dispute between Venezuela and Great Britain, this country declared an attitude of grave concern unless Great Britain should agree to arbitrate. In the Mexican case we were strong enough to compel the compliance of France, but in the latter case we were far from strong enough to coerce Great Britain by arms. It was probably estimated by both parties, however, that the friendship of the United States was of more value to Great Britain than any gain in Venezuela—and she acceded. Thus, in serving the national aim—to grow according to our own ideals, free from alien interference or menace—the Monroe Doctrine formulates a strategic decision expressive of national attitude and action. Hands off or we fight. So considered, the necessity becomes evident to study the strategy involved, the means to give effect to the Monroe Doctrine.
In studying any questions touching exterior interests, it is imperative to know the possibilities of conflict and opposition, the consequent demands and the resources to meet them. In cases where there may be more than one course of political action open, the strategy involved by each course under consideration should exert strong influence upon the final choice of policy. Where, on the other hand, the formulated policy is forced upon the government by deep-lying popular feeling, as in the case of Asiatic Exclusion, the strategy involved by that policy should receive the early and careful attention of the highest statesmen. Strategy is thus the "look" before the "leap" of policy, but where policy exudes in crude form from the popular will, strategy comes as an afterthought, with the extra risks, difficulties, and costs usually attendant on afterthoughts.
Strategy in its highest sphere determines where, to what extent, and for what specific purpose military force shall be employed or manifested in pursuance of the nation's policies. This lies in the province of the national headquarters—with the President and Cabinet. The weighing of the risks and costs of national action, contemplated or already undertaken, must be followed by decision and commensurate preparation, lest the result be all cost with failure. Here there must be mutual working of political and military considerations. Statesmen must take military considerations into full account in their deliberations on exterior affairs, and reciprocally, military authorities, in executing military operations and advising on large military questions, must comprehend the political significance of their undertakings. Nothing could be more misleading or more liable to miscarry a large operation than to advise or to act "from the purely naval point of view," as if it were or could be a thing apart. On this account, no directive body can wisely govern without military counsel of the highest order, and no military commander can succeed without understanding the end in view, political as well as military. Corbett states two vital principles in making war—one is the importance of admirals fully understanding the political significance of their orders and the other, the importance at headquarters of familiarity with the elementary principles of strategy.
The Army and Navy Departments of the government take the decisions of higher strategy as military policies to be carried out. Higher strategy may decide that to uphold the Monroe Doctrine we must be supreme in the Caribbean. And to control the Panama Canal we must be supreme in the Caribbean. And to be prepared against resistance to Asiatic Exclusion we must hold Hawaii, to do which (until Pacific Coast bases are adequate) means holding the Canal, and hence supremacy in the Caribbean. Thus, holding the Caribbean, the Canal, and Hawaii, are determined as cardinal military policies, and the requisite means for their achievement are worked out in the sphere of military strategy, by the War and Navy Departments.
Military strategy must take account of all elements affecting the international difficulties that may possibly develop. Not only our own policies but also those of other nations point where to look for possible trouble. The effect of these policies on the international situation as a whole is the true criterion by which to measure the military effort necessary to prepare. Mere numerical superiority in the theater of operations against an enemy is an insecure standard unless complications or pressure in other quarters are adequately provided for. Bismarck was careful to insure the neutrality of other nations before the wars of Prussia against Denmark, Austria, and France. When the Monroe Doctrine was promulgated, this country was in no condition to maintain it if challenged, but the international situation sustained it. Again, when the French violated that doctrine by going into Mexico, we were too occupied to resist with force until the Civil War was over.
A firm grasp of the true nature of the national purpose is necessary to determine where and how military effort will be effective. The basic principle of successful strategy is concentration of all effort, high and low, on the end in view. Concentration demands the right kind of effort—whether a strong and vigorous offensive, to strike hard and quick before the enemy is in full strength, to deny him time and opportunity to concentrate and complete his preparation and defense; or a defensive course, to gain time ourselves, to wear the enemy down or to put upon him greater effort or the mixed form of offensive-defensive, to hold what we have, harass the enemy, break up his combinations, and so wear away his power to continue.
An offensive course, for instance, may fail where a defensive attitude would have easily succeeded. Corbett derives a principle from Admiral Byng's unfortunate experience. "Better than taking the offensive yourself is to force the offensive upon an enemy who is too weak for it," These two principles marked the general course of the British grand fleet in the late war. The German fleet could do no great harm while confined to its own coast. For the British fleet to have gone in after them would have been very costly and probably disastrous. By not doing so but instead maintaining a position in readiness to rout the Germans, the offensive was forced upon the weaker German fleet, should it attempt more than guard its own coast. Mahan writes: "In war the defensive exists mainly that the offensive may act more freely." Trained judgment will perceive the course which tends most for concentration of effort towards the main purpose.
The degree of force and the kind and theater of its operations having been determined, in pursuance of the national policies, the next step in strategy is to prepare the force and the supports for its employment. These preparations include plans, personnel, training, material, bases, and supplies. In our War College studies, problems in strategy are based on an assumed general situation which is known to both sides and a special situation for each side known only to that side. These problems are made as realistic and as true to possibilities as permitted by the data at hand derived from experience. The qualities of existing types of vessels and weapons and the strength and composition of existing fleets are used. In this way the problems serve to develop, along with understanding the principles of the art of war, facility in applying them to the forces of the present day. These studies sometimes bring out the desirability of new or modified types or greater numbers of existing types, or other apparent improvements, and the problems afford a ready means of testing such proposals before laying out money on actual experiment in service.
Plans for operations lead directly to the consideration of building programs and repair and docking facilities, to the supply and training of personnel, the maintenance and training and mobilization of reserves, to the establishment, security and stocking of bases, and to the acquirement and transport of supplies. This leads us into the sphere of logistics.
Logistics
By the term logistics is meant the moving, supplying, and refitting of the fleet in the best order and security. The two prime requisites of military force are power and mobility. Power does not vary, assuming proper upkeep, but the means for mobility consume away. The mobility of a naval force is perfect for a time, but that is limited by the fuel radius. A force is productive in a military sense only while it is employed actively against the enemy, and the larger the proportion of the whole force that is actively employed at one time, compared to the time spent and the strength kept idle while refitting, the greater is the efficiency of the logistics. To save a day in the turn-around of a supply ship may seem a small matter, but multiply that by the whole number of supply ships employed and we save one or two whole convoys, thereby reducing the amount of escort duty to be done and correspondingly increasing the force available at the front. Hence, any increase in skill and pains applied to logistics is felt directly at the front, through enabling more force to press actively on the enemy.
The logistic requirements for war vary according to the location of the principal operations. The elements influencing such variations are:
- The distance of the theater of operations from the home coast;
- The possession of secure advanced bases;
- The availability of positions suitable for advanced bases;
- The direction and distance of sources of supply;
- The material resources of the belligerent's own country;
- The number and location of available lines of communication;
- The degree of preparation existing during peace.
The elements of the enemy's logistics also influence our own, because his facility or difficulty of operating calls for greater or less effort to overcome him, thus affecting our logistics indirectly but surely.
No proper grasp can be had of the large problems of strategy until one has examined into the logistics involved in one of them. Not alone fuel, water, food, and clothing, but also general stores, base equipment, repair ships, hospital ships, ammunition ships, tenders of various kinds, sweepers, surveying vessels, patrol vessels, and troop transports—all may have to he provided for, prepared, organized, grouped, assembled, routed, turned around, and got back home for another load. It is a vast undertaking to maintain a large force overseas—in one problem 30,000 tons of shipping required to arrive every day.
The study of problems in support of national policies brings out requirements and existing deficiencies. It shows the need of bases, the need to acquire them and make them secure during peace. From a salient base already in possession, the fleet may at once, by an active course, prevent or neutralize the gain which would otherwise accrue to the enemy through delay on our part, if we first had to obtain a base—with all the attendant hurried effort and loss of time in preparing an expedition, with possible neutrality complications and exposure to enemy attack while seizing the base.
A military force is supported by its communications, which Mahan calls "the living connection with the national power." When the arteries are sound, activity may be daring and of robust vigor, but when the life channel is precarious, activity is gripped by invalidism. For communications to be reliable, the bases must be secure, and unless their security is independent of the presence of the fleet, the fleet is half paralyzed. "A fleet charged with the care of its base is a fleet by so far weakened for effective action—weakened both strategically and tactically." Insecurity of the base is as fatal to vigor as a weakness of the heart. The fate of Port Arthur and of the Russian fleet based on it is a terrible example.
Our own fleet made a notable long distance cruise around the world in 1907-09, with resultant influence on the subsequent development of a train. Another cardinal practice of ours, self upkeep and self-repair of ships in the fleet, is of the greatest value. These are long steps towards good logistics in war, but the study of logistics shows that these are only the beginning, and that the problem which might confront us in war would demand the utmost of every officer in keeping his weapons bright. All will do this the more surely through some effort on their own part to understand its meaning to the nation.
Conclusion
From the foregoing outline it is seen how international law, policy, strategy, and logistics are woven together in one great study for the welfare of the nation. By reading history, biography, and books on the large problems and prominent topics of the world's life, one acquires the power to see events in their real significance and to form sound opinions of one's own. The college courses and other exercises conjointly with other officers, point the way and help to keep one on the right track yet not in a rut, but most of all must officers depend upon their own efforts, keeping in mind the purpose of all our training and effort—that the naval commander and the naval force, in every way and every situation, shall be equal to the task.
The great names of naval history were men of large general information and knowing insight in international affairs—St. Vincent, Rodney, Nelson, Farragut, to mention only a few. Nowhere does "knowledge is power" apply stronger than in the navy, and it is obvious that the power of the leader to act to best advantage is greatly enhanced by broad-minded, well-informed grasp of the situation by his subordinates.
Rear Admiral H. C. Taylor, an early president of the War College, an officer of wide reading and experience, recommended young officers to read Mahan again and again, adding, "put it under your pillow." In a recent number of the Naval Institute, our Vice Admiral Knapp urges officers to acquire the international outlook. Only reading and study will lead to that, with real intent to read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest—the reflective kind of reading, which stocks the mind with information and develops the ability to apply it. Officers who form this habit of serious reading find it refreshing as well as profitable. By means of it you will surely advance yourself towards real fitness for that occasion when the situation may suddenly tax your utmost abilities. Then, if prepared, you may demonstrate, with the world looking on, that indeed, knowledge is power.