(See Page 1885, Whole-: No. 226)
Captain E. P. Jessop, U. S. Navy.—The comment offered by Captain Snow (CC.) in the February number of the Proceedings seems to the writer to be based on a very cursory reading of the original paper on the above subject, or else the writer’s methods of expressing his thoughts are confusing. Whichever reason is true, it would seem to be necessary to attempt to clarify some points at issue since it is believed that the subject is very vital to naval efficiency and should have a complete airing.
In the first place, I would ask the discussionist to reread the article with the following points in mind:
That the writer believes, and bases his article on his belief, that no specialist can be as efficient in his specialty without practical experience in the operation of the product of his specialty as he will if he has that experience.
That the corps system, both in construction, and engineering in the Navy, acts to prevent that experience being gained by the members of the “officers for shore duty only” class.
That it is perfectly feasible for that class to get the proper proportion of practical experience without in any way reducing their ability in design and construction, but on the contrary greatly enhancing it.
That the members of the Construction Corps and of the "engineers for shore duty only” class, arc losing incentives and perquisites by not being available for command and the former are losing something in promotion which must always make for a soreness in their souls for which there is only one remedy and that is putting them all in the regular line and making them as much a part of the operative as of the industrial Navy.
That the ability of the personnel of both the Construction Corps and the incipient Engineers Corps is unquestioned, but that the limitations imposed upon them by the corps system, and particularly in the training of the younger generation under that system, narrow their viewpoint and limit their usefulness to the Navy unnecessarily, and most seriously.
That it is not economical for the Navy to spend large sums of money educating specialists and then to curtail their usefulness to the service as the corps system docs.
That the amalgamation of the engineers, while effected primarily to put a stop to friction between corps on hoard ship, resulted in great improvement in engineering in every way, and it was not until 1916 when the "engineers for shore duty only" law was foisted on the service with its gradual removal to the beach of the older officers who had trained themselves in engineering and liked it, that engineering in the Navy began to run down again.
That the corps system both in the Army and in the Navy has been an obstructive element always, and for our purposes as far as construction and engineering arc concerned it is particularly deleterious because of the intimate relation of personnel and material in a ship if she is to he an efficient unit of the fleet.
In other words, the writer thinks that Mr. Squeers was right when he said, “W-i-n-win-d-e-r-der, go wash it,” as it takes such intimate connection with a window to find out if the putty is standing up to its work, if the sash fits in its grooves and if the other adjuncts for the operation of the window arc right.
The discussionist docs put his finger on a weak point in the original article when he points out that no chief of Bureau of Ordnance has served in that capacity for twelve years. The writer had in mind the chief of Ordnance of the Army, and temporarily confused the two, hut the essence of the statements made in that connection are true and arc known to all who were intimately associated with ordnance at sea immediately after the Spanish War.
His discussion of the relation between length and stream lines seems a hit beside the point.
The idea expressed by the writer was that continuous practical demonstration at sea of the difficulties of making the hulls as designed do what they were designed to do should have acted on any Navy constructor present to cause him to be more interested in cures for the condition than he could have been without such practical demonstration.
In practice, it was almost impossible to drive those ships at their designed speeds for any extended interval due to the fact that to do so called for the maximum overload which could be placed on the machinery, and if 1 hey could not he driven at such speeds for extended intervals, then they were not the effective units of the fleet that they were designed to he, and, therefore, the design was wrong. If, as intimated by the discussionist, the design was made on the economical speed factor, letting the battle speed lake care of itself, then we simply have another argument for amalgamation.
I believe it lo he quite clear to the Navy in general what battleships were of had design for getting battle speeds with a practical horse-power, hut for the information of the writer of the discussion I will state that no ship prior to the first dreadnaught showed proper results in this regard.
This subject cannot he quitted without inviting attention to the fact that the model tank experiments are practical, not theoretical, experiments and they are also operative experiments, and by the statement of the discussionist I take it they have been successful in pointing the way to improvement in the lines of ships, and it docs not therefore seem improbable that the writer’s idea that further practical experience with the operation of ships would enable the constructors to clear away other weaknesses of our ships if the constructors were given the opportunity for such experience.
The statement that “American destroyers, some years ago, were making their speeds with about two-thirds the power of contemporary British destroyers of equivalent size and speed,” seems lo he true of our later type of boats, while not so true of the classes of ten and twelve years ago, hut even the horse-powers of the late boats which were, evidently, used by the discussionist are the designed horse-powers and it would be very interesting to know the actual performance data on these vessels.
By far the most .serious misapprehension which the discussionist labors under is shown when he states apropos of the extra horse-power needed to drive British destroyers:
"This, however, does not show that the British constructors were in error in adopting what the author would, undoubtedly, call inefficient stream lines. At that time the British engineers were developing a horse-power on much less weight than we were. Getting their horse-power so cheaply, as regards weight, it was justifiable to adopt decidedly shorter boats, with the attendant advantages, and to accept for top speed the high resistance necessarily incident to reduced length.”
The value of a destroyer in war time rests so much on her fuel consumption, a great part of which must he expended at high speeds, that it is past all comprehension how any sane individual could seriously make the statement quoted above.
One-third less horse-power means one-third less fuel burned and one- third more radius of action with equal hunkers, and yet according to our critic, “this does not show that the British constructors were in error in adopting the shorter boat.” The above hut demonstrates the false viewpoint of a practical problem incident to separation from practice caused by the corps system.
One almost wonders if the discussionist ever saw one of our earlier battleships underway at sea when one reads his statement. "The mere fact that at maximum speed and over a range of only a knot or so, a battleship makes a strong bow wave does not necessarily justify the conclusion that the specialist did not know what he was doing and would have prepared a different design if lie had had a three-years’ cruise on another ship.”
The "strong bow wave” extended over many more knots than indicated above.
The writer can assure the discussionist that the material from which he wrote the original article is authentic and is well known to the greater part of the Naval service, and specific incidents are not used simply because it was the desire of the writer to omit personalities entirely and to deal with systems and results.
The present condition in engineering while greatly superior to that' existing at the close of the Spanish War is believed by the writer to be below what it would have been if it were not for the evils of the “engineers for shore duty only” law, and it was to attempt to correct while there is yet time, a serious lowering of our engineering standards, that the article in question was written.
To conclude, attention is invited to the discussionist’s statement that: "Amalgamation of the Construction Corps with the Line will violate a fundamental principle of organization as it means the complete coalescence of two corps whose lines of training, thought and life-work are radically different, although they strive toward a common end—the defense of the nation.”
Methinks the violation of the fundamental of organization consists in permitting two corps, having such a vital effect on the efficiency of a unit of the fleet to be so radically differently trained, as to cause them to have a widely different viewpoint and thought, and it was to correct what the writer considered a violation of fundamentals that amalgamation was proposed.
As for criticism; those at sea will always criticise those on shore and to make this criticism effective it is necessary that both sides know the other fellows’ work and viewpoint.